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Abstract 
This dissertation offers an assessment of Fair Trade’s transformative potential 
through an empirical examination of the case of Fair Trade wine produced in 
Argentina and consumed in the United Kingdom. Guided by a dialectical 
understanding of the research process, the analysis is done at various levels of 
generality, offering both case-specific and universal arguments about the Fair 
Trade system as a whole. Theoretically, the dissertation develops a regulationist 
framework based on a critical engagement with the French Regulation Approach 
and the Amsterdam Project in International Political Economy. The proposed 
analysis of Fair Trade as a ‘mode of regulation’ makes possible: (i) an 
examination of specific ways in which this initiative institutionalizes key 
socioeconomic relations, (ii) a comparison of Fair Trade with the ‘conventional’ 
economy and (iii) a discussion of its concrete effects. The further exploration of 
Fair Trade’s political and ideological dimensions sheds light on the reasons behind 
the system’s current limitations. The analysis shows that Fair Trade offers very 
limited improvements compared to the conventional economy. Additionally, for 
the Argentinean wine industry, Fair Trade further marginalizes the most 
vulnerable groups. These findings, it is argued, are a consequence of Fair Trade’s 
acritical acceptance of the main capitalist contradictions, which importantly limit 
the transformative aspirations of its supporters.   
Afhandlingen vurderer Fair Trades transformative potentiale gennem et empirisk 
casestudie af Fair Trade-vin produceret i Argentina og konsumeret i 
Storbritannien. Analysen bygger på en dialektisk forståelse af 
forskningsprocessen, hvorfor analyserne er gennemført på forskellige niveauer af 
generalisering, således at der udvikles både case-specifikke og universelle 
argumenter om Fair Trade-systemet som helhed. Teoretisk udvikles der i 
afhandlingen en regulationistisk begrebsramme på grundlag af et kritisk 
engagement med den franske reguleringsskole og ”The Amsterdam Project in 
International Political Economy”. Den foreslåede analyse af Fair Trade som en 
’mode of regulation’ – en særlig form for regulering – muliggør: (i) en 
undersøgelse af de specifikke måder, hvorpå dette initiativ institutionaliserer 
centrale socioøkonomiske relationer, (ii) en sammenligning med den 
"konventionelle" økonomi og (iii) en diskussion af dets konkrete virkninger. Den 
videre udforskning af Fair Trades politiske og ideologiske dimensioner kaster lys 
over årsagerne til systemets nuværende begrænsninger. Analysen viser, at Fair 
Trade tilbyder meget begrænsede forbedringer i forhold til den konventionelle 
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økonomi. I den argentinske vinindustris tilfælde viser det sig desuden, at Fair 
Trade yderligere marginaliserer de mest udsatte grupper. Der argumenteres for, at 
disse resultater er en konsekvens af Fair Trades ukritiske accept af kapitalismens 
grundlæggende modsætninger, som i centrale henseender begrænser 
reguleringsmetodens tilhængeres transformative aspirationer. 
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Introduction
Nicaragua, 1979: a revolutionary movement, the hard core of which was made up 
of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, ended the Somoza dynasty’s 
dictatorship that had persisted since 1936. The decade-long Sandinista government 
that followed, under the leadership of Daniel Ortega, represents one of the last 
landmarks in the history of socialist-inspired Latin American revolutionary 
movements. By the beginning of the 1980s, Nicaragua not only represented an 
opportunity to develop an alternative political and economic project; for many it 
served as a beacon of hope in a continent riddled with dictatorships. The United 
States actively opposed the Sandinista adventure from its inception, and provided 
support and funding to the so-called contras, the counter-revolutionary armed 
forces that opposed the government. The US-led international opposition, the 
violent means used by the contras – who combined guerrilla warfare with plainly 
terrorist actions – and the Sandinista counterhegemonic discourse attracted the 
sympathy of many progressive forces around the world, who saw the Sandinistas 
as an anti-imperialist force. 
The Sandinistas’ attempt to impose a mixed economy had its backbone in agrarian 
reform. Vast lands that belonged to the Somozas and other oligarchic families – 
25% of the country’s total (Bacon, 2010:54) – were expropriated and, together 
with other idle properties, either incorporated into major State Productive Units or 
redistributed among smallholders grouped into cooperatives. Within this 
revolutionized agricultural context, the production of coffee acquired great 
importance. Given the high prices that this commodity enjoyed during most of the 
1980s, coffee became responsible for more than one-third of the country’s total 
exports. Coffee exports thus became a key element of Nicaragua’s strategy to 
increase its stocks of foreign currency, which were particularly scarce given the 
context of international hostility. Yet the country constantly faced a labor shortage 
after the introduction of the agrarian reform, especially during the harvest season, 
as many smallholders preferred to work their own property to someone else’s 
plantation. Because this shortage of manpower constituted a threat to one of the 
country’s main economic sectors, finding solutions became paramount. 
Sympathizers of the Sandinistas in Europe and across the Americas saw a concrete 
opportunity to move from passive supporters to engaged actors and contribute to 
the development of alternative political and economic structures. Peru, Chile, 
Argentina, Colombia, Spain, France, Austria and Ireland, for example, were 
among the most popular countries of origin where activists organized and formed 
12

what came to be known as international coffee brigades. These groups of 
volunteers expressed their solidarity with the Sandinista project by travelling to an 
unknown place that was undergoing a civil war to join state-owned plantations or 
cooperatives and help in the production process. They perceived doing so as 
facilitating the struggle against imperialism by contributing to the solidification of 
the country’s main source of international revenue. Of course, the thousands of 
volunteers who joined the international brigades during the 1980s did not solve the 
labor shortage. However, their actions represented an important channeling of the 
desire for transformation and international solidarity. 
Nicaragua, 2015: the tumultuous decade of Sandinista adventure came to an end 
in 1990 when Ortega failed to be reelected. Since then, Nicaragua has followed the 
same neoliberal path that most Latin American countries did during the 1990s, 
characterized by the privatization of public property and assets, the contraction of 
the state and the reduction in the provision of social protection. As a consequence, 
the state-owned plantations, as well as several of the coffee cooperatives promoted 
by the Sandinistas, have disappeared. Nevertheless, more than 20 years later the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front returned to power when Ortega became 
president again in 2006. This time, however, he did not do so as the outcome of a 
revolutionary upsurge, but through elections. This time, however, his political 
program resembled much less Castro’s communism than Chavez’ 21st century 
socialism. Under a “program of reconciliation and national unification” – and 
accompanied by a former spokesman of the contras as vice president – Ortega’s 
new period as president relegated the revolutionary aims of his previous 
experience to the rhetorical level, replacing them with more modest re-
distributionist ambitions. 
Like the Sandinista metamorphosis, today’s Nicaragua is also a clear example of 
the transformation in the forms through which international solidarity and support 
are expressed. In Nicaragua’s coffee cooperatives, international brigades are gone; 
they have been replaced by Fair Trade officers and auditors. A report published in 
2014 by Fairtrade International shows that Nicaragua has become one of the Fair 
Trade movement’s leading players. It currently has the fifth-highest number of 
Fair Trade coffee producers and, when considering all types of products, it is 
ranked 10th in the number of certified producers and 9th in exports per value 
(Fairtrade International, 2014). This transition has involved replacing the role of 
the volunteer with that of the consumer. While in the 1980s activists travelled to 
Nicaragua in order to contribute to its anti-imperialist struggle by participating in 
the coffee harvest, in the 2010s socially concerned consumers support the 
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empowerment of small producers by purchasing Fairtrade-certified coffee without 
even having to leave their neighborhoods.  
The case of Nicaragua, while in many respects embedded in its own historical 
circumstances, illustrates a broader trend: contributing to social change through 
market relations. In this way, the mysticism built around the direct commitment 
that characterized the international brigades is replaced by a very different 
approach that invites consumers to – more easily – use their day-to-day purchases 
to contest unfair trade and productive relationships. While revolutionary aims and 
direct forms of engagement are less and less a part of today’s internationalist 
spirit, we witness the constant increase in popularity of this new, consumption-led 
and market-based, strategy. While Fair Trade is still undoubtedly minuscule as a 
proportion of total world trade, its steady growth is undeniable, especially among 
socially concerned citizens in the global North: while the estimated total retail 
sales of Fairtrade-certified products in 2004 were 0.83 billion euros, almost 10 
years later they grew more than six-fold, to 5.5 billion euros in 2013 (Fairtrade 
International, 2014). The fast pace at which Fair Trade has grown in the last 
decade is an important indicator of its growing popularity; each day, more people 
and organizations seem to accept and engage with its underlying logic of shopping
for a better world.
But what is Fair Trade about? Even if it would be impossible to reduce the Fair 
Trade movement to a single organization – in fact, it is characterized by multiple 
institutions and associations – in the search for a definition, we can rely on one 
provided by FINE, the most important network of Fair Trade organizations, which 
has described its goal and scope in the following terms: 
Fair trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that 
seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development 
by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalised 
producers and workers, especially in the South. Fair trade organisations are engaged 
actively in supporting producers, awareness raising and in campaigning for changes 
in the rules and practice of conventional international trade (www.ifat.org, accessed 
27 July 2010). 
Going a step forward, the Fairtrade Foundation has said that this regime “provides 
a genuine alternate, a means of ensuring that growers benefit as they should from 
their crops” (Fairtrade Foundation, in Whisler, 2009:2). The idea of alternative 
methods and the strong emphasis on producers’ rights are common themes 
throughout the movement. Fair Trade presents itself as an alternative approach to 
commerce, in which producers are expected to fulfill certain minimum production 
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conditions, and in exchange receive long-term agreements with buyers who are 
willing to pay a price high enough to cover the so called costs of sustainable 
production.
Fair Trade, though clearly an economic initiative, is also a geopolitical project that 
articulates its discourse using important normative elements. It begins by stating 
there are two poles in the world system: the south (poor and marginalized 
societies) and the north (rich societies benefiting from the exploitation of the 
former). The claimed aim of this emerging alternative approach is to achieve a 
new integration of both parts of the system through a new kind of globalization, 
which is not only economically driven, but also introduces moral and political 
concerns. The world becomes linked not only through exploitative economic 
rationality, but also by social responsibility and solidarity through the 
globalization of fairness. Consumers in the north, simply by buying a Fair Trade 
product in their own neighborhood, are contributing to the development and 
prosperity of producers in the south; this is what their globalization is about.  
Nevertheless, the novelty does not stop here. The idea of Fair Trade permeates the 
whole economic circuit and seeks to guarantee not only certain conditions of 
production and exchange, but also works as an interpellation to the consumer. 
Labeling products with the Fairtrade logo is much more than a way of informing; 
it is fundamental to promoting the ideology. Consumers are invited to go beyond 
mere economic agency when choosing their favorite product: introducing a moral 
element causes the consumption of goods to transcend economic rationality 
(Bryant and Goodman, 2004). For a growing number of people, this has even 
acquired a political dimension. Choosing Fair Trade products is a way of 
expressing their views about a fair society, and buying them involves taking part 
in an action that supports an alternative system: they are doing, not just thinking 
(Clarke et al., 2007). As a consequence, “political action and consumption become 
fully merged” (Žižek, 2009:430) 
This dissertation contributes to a broader inquiry of the options and possibilities 
for transformative praxis at the global level. It departs from the assumption that 
replacing international coffee brigades – or any other form of engaged political 
activism – for Fair Trade consumers has deep political consequences. The more 
general goal of this research, hence, is to explore and critically examine what these 
consequences are, at the levels of effectiveness (what changes are being 
delivered?) and tactics (how are these changes produced?) using the case of Fair 
Trade wine produced in Argentina and consumed in the United Kingdom.
15
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Working with a case, as will be explained in depth in the methodological chapter, 
offers the opportunity to simultaneously study elements that are unique to the case 
and more general ones. In this way, while the main focus of my investigation will 
be the empirical analysis of the chosen case, its examination will also be able to 
draw some more general conclusions about the Fair Trade system as a whole. 
Hence, the case of Argentinean Fair Trade wine is to be understood as an entry-
point to the wider phenomenon of Fair Trade.  
Wine, though still minor within the entire Fair Trade constellation of products, 
became standardized and certified in 2003, showing a strong tendency towards 
growth since then – 611,744 liters were sold in 2004, while in 2013 the total was 
almost 21 million liters (Fairtrade International, 2014). With the three main 
producer countries (Argentina, Chile and South Africa) being part of the globally 
recognized “new world wines” segment, it is expected that the volumes sold and 
the revenues produced will continue climbing in the years to come. Its relative 
newness and high pace of growth makes wine an interesting product to examine. 
Focusing this analysis on the Argentinean wine sector allows a comparison of the 
implementation of Fair Trade practices in small producer organizations and 
conventional firms within the same context – a topic that has been neglected by 
most of the literature, which has mostly been concerned with commodities 
produced in cooperatives. Furthermore, Argentina is the only relevant Fair Trade 
wine producer whose experience has not been systematically analyzed. In this 
way, it provides an opportunity to contribute to a more complete understanding of 
this field. Lastly, the United Kingdom has been chosen because it constitutes the 
biggest world market for Fairtrade-certified products more generally (its more than 
2 billion euros in retail sales in 2013 represented 37% of the world’s total) – and 
wine in particular – with its almost 11 million liters sold representing more than 
half of the world’s total (Mercer, 2014). 
My main research question has been framed within this empirical context: 
How successful is Fair Trade in providing alternatives to conventional 
economic relations in the case of wine produced in Argentina and consumed in the 
United Kingdom? 
In order to answer this main research question, a set of secondary research 
questions follows: 
 What are the main transformations that Fair Trade produces in conventional 
economic relationships? 
16
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 How does Fair Trade affect the socioeconomic position of marginalized 
producers and workers in the Argentinean wine sector? 
 How does Fair Trade attempt to gain legitimacy as an alternative system? 
 What type of politics are promoted by Fair Trade? 
To answer these questions, I have formulated one main and four secondary 
research objectives that need to be fulfilled: 
To assess the success of Fair Trade in providing alternatives to conventional 
economic relations in the case of wine produced in Argentina and consumed in the 
United Kingdom. 
 To elaborate a theoretical approach in order to conceptualize Fair Trade 
from a holistic perspective and grasp its multidimensional nature; 
 To develop a methodological strategy capable of discriminating between – 
and working at – the various levels of singularity and generality in which 
the case is embedded; 
 To understand Fair Trade’s particular articulation of production, circulation 
and consumption through the analysis of the case; and 
 To determine the socioeconomic effects and political implications of the 
Fair Trade system.  
1. Assessing Fair Trade: fragmentation, monism and utilitarianism 
Empirical research on Fair Trade has been advancing for more than a decade. 
Many studies have attempted, in various ways, to evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of this initiative. However, the conceptual and analytical framework 
put forward by this dissertation represents an original proposal for the assessment 
of Fair Trade that seeks to overcome the three main weaknesses evidenced in the 
current literature. Previous research has represented: (1) a fragmentary approach 
that privileges the analysis of one economic sphere at the expense of a holistic 
conceptualization of the Fair Trade system, (2) a narrow understanding of Fair 
Trade that fails to grasp its multidimensional nature and (3) a utilitarian 
perspective that is only concerned with measurable outcomes, which avoids 
critical scrutiny of the means by which they are achieved. In what follows, I 
describe these three trends and their main limitations. 
First, several studies on Fair Trade can be criticized for their tendency towards 
fragmentation, since most research has centered only on one particular moment of 
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the economic circuit: i.e., production (for example, Utting-Chamorro, 2005; 
Pirotte et al., 2006; Jaffee, 2007; Bacon, 2010; Vásquez-León, 2010; Hanson et 
al., 2012; Jari et al., 2013), circulation (for example, Moore et al., 2006; 
Macdonald, 2007; Doherty, 2008; Fridell et al., 2008; Kurjanska and Risse, 2008; 
Davies, 2009; Vakila et al., 2010; Le Velly, 2011) or consumption (for example, 
Bryant and Goodman, 2004; Clarke et al., 2007; Shah et al, 2007; Goodman, 
2010; Kim et al, 2010; Bray et al, 2011; Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011). Even if 
very interesting analyses have been conducted and innovative conclusions offered, 
the excessive emphasis that these fragmentary approaches place on isolated 
economic moments makes it difficult to acknowledge that Fair Trade works as a 
system, as a whole, and is much more than the sum of its different spheres. 
Limiting our research to a single part of the whole prevents us from understanding 
and assessing Fair Trade’s potential as an alternative economic system. If we 
continue ignoring the interactions among these levels and the analogies they share, 
it will be impossible to produce a clear and comprehensive overview of the 
regime. 
Second, it can be argued that in part of the current literature fragmentation takes a 
step forward. In this process of division and partition, it is not only the system as a 
whole that has been lost, but also one of its main characteristics: its 
multidimensional nature. Hence, part of the literature seems to be guided by a 
principle of monism, as it assumes that Fair Trade is only an economic, political, 
ethical or ideological phenomenon. While relevant attempts to overcome 
disciplinary divisions need to be highlighted (some of the best examples are: 
Goodman, 2004; Watson, 2006; Fridell, 2010; Goodman et al., 2014), it seems to 
be the case that a split between economic (for example, Hayes, 2006; Balineau and 
Dufeu, 2010; Johannessen and Wilhite, 2010; Annunziata et al., 2011; Bondy and 
Talwar, 2011; Doherty, 2011; Vagneron and Roquigny, 2011) and more culturally 
oriented (or extra-economic) perspectives (for example, Wempe, 2005; Béji-
Becheur et al., 2008; Zick Varel, 2008; Brown, 2011; Le Mare, 2012; Stenn, 2013) 
still characterizes a good part of the literature. The main problem with such an 
approach is that Fair Trade has defining elements that belong to these different 
realms simultaneously. Fair Trade seeks to articulate alternative economic 
relations that would differentiate it from “ordinary capitalism” due to the inclusion 
of some moral minimums. But in doing so, it immediately acquires a political 
dimension: a sense of opposition to the system underlies its genesis, and optimism 
about a new system feeds its institutionalization. For its supporters, entering this 
economic system means much more than entering the “old” market; it means 
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making a political choice. Very closely linked to this we find the ideological 
constructs that Fair Trade continuously elaborates and reinforces in order to justify 
its existence and growth, seeking to legitimize its position across society at large. 
A whole set of symbols, values and messages is interconnected in the creation of a 
vision of the world that seeks to increase the number of supporters and foster the 
reproduction and expansion of the system. As a consequence, we can only 
understand Fair Trade’s specificities from a multidimensional perspective that 
dynamically accounts for the various codeterminations among its economic, 
ethical, political and ideological elements.  
Third, I have brought together under the label of utilitarianism a broad variety of 
publications that constitutes what can be considered the dominant approach to the 
assessment of Fair Trade: impact studies (for example, Arnould et al., 2009; 
Bacon, 2005; Bacon et al., 2008; Barham et al, 2011; Becchetti and Costantino, 
2008; Becchetti et al., 2013 Costantino, 2013; Méndez et al., 2010; Ruben and 
Fort, 2012; Ruben et al., 2009). Most impact studies follow the same overall logic: 
they take for granted that – after a certain period of time – Fair Trade regulations 
have been implemented and are in place. Therefore, their main objective is to 
evaluate whether production and trade under Fair Trade norms have been 
successful in providing certain benefits. To do so, they identify a number of key 
indicators to account for those benefits (for example, changes in income, 
investment, consumption patterns, skills development, among many others) and 
seek to measure them. This is usually done in a comparative manner, either 
diachronically (comparing the situation of those indicators before and after Fair 
Trade’s implementation) or synchronically (contrasting the magnitude of the 
chosen indicators in producers that have adopted the Fair Trade standards with 
those from a comparable group of producers that does not participate in the Fair 
Trade system). The conclusions, then, are based on the measurements obtained: 
Fair Trade will be positively evaluated if producers have improved their 
conditions or enjoy a better situation than non-certified producers.  
At this point it may be clear why I describe these publications as utilitarian: their 
main focus is on outputs, on the quantifiable utility (however it is understood by 
each researcher) that Fair Trade beneficiaries obtain. There are two main reasons 
why I find these utilitarian approaches to Fair Trade’s assessment problematic. 
First, because they take for granted (and do not analyze) the actual implementation 
of Fair Trade – they are not concerned with whether the standards are being 
fulfilled or the differential relevance that certain aspects may acquire in the case 
under study. This can be easily seen in the usual “gap” that these studies evidence 
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in between a section in which they present Fair Trade’s main elements (as in the 
standards) and the results of their measurements. As a consequence, they cannot 
provide causal explanations for their findings (can higher levels of investment be 
explained by Fair Trade’s promotion of low-interest credit? Are producers actually 
making use of this possibility?). Second, and closely related to this, the typical 
utilitarian concern with outputs overshadows the importance of analyzing the 
mechanisms through which those results are obtained. In this way, impact analyses 
avoid discussing, for example, the particular ways in which the Fair Trade price 
formation is presented in the standards, how it actually takes place in practice, and 
the variable impacts it might have on different actors, products and geographical 
contexts.  
All in all, much of the current literature that has sought to assess the Fair Trade 
certification-based initiative has so far suffered from three main problems: a 
fragmentary perspective of analysis, a unidimensional understanding of Fair Trade 
and a utilitarian criterion of evaluation. The following subsection describes the 
way in which the assessment proposed in this dissertation attempts to overcome 
these weaknesses.  
2. A regulationist framework 
In order to provide an analytical strategy capable of overcoming the main 
weaknesses in the current literature, my perspective of analysis is informed by 
what I call a regulationist framework. Its name is a consequence of the centrality it 
gives to the main concepts and assumptions developed by the French Regulation 
Approach. However, the latter has been critically appropriated, as its original 
version suffers from some limitations in the appraisal of Fair Trade. Hence, my 
regulationist framework emerges from two critical operations. First, the adaptation 
of the Regulation Approach, a perspective of analysis typically applied at the 
macroeconomic level, to a sectorial scale. Second, complementing the Regulation 
Approach with the work of the Amsterdam Project in International Political 
Economy. This subsection briefly describes the main features that characterize this 
conceptual framework and explains how they contribute to overcoming the main 
weaknesses in the current literature.  
While the concept of Fordism is undoubtedly the most famous contribution put 
forward by the Regulation Approach, it would be misleading to describe this 
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perspective as a theory of Fordism. As Robert Boyer (1990a:xviii) has clarified, 
“the concept of Fordism is a product of the regulation approach (…) It is not the 
point of departure of the theory of regulation, much less the sum total of its 
results.” Fordism, therefore, is one particular historical finding, one result among 
others, which has been achieved through the use of the Regulation Approach, 
which is better understood as a method of analysis. It is important, hence, to 
distinguish what constitutes the core analytical and methodological elements of 
this perspective from the substantive historical forms that have been identified in 
different studies. 
The Regulation Approach understands social relations as essentially contradictory 
(Billaudot, 1996:32), which is why it emphasizes the fragility of social 
arrangements and the always-present possibility of conflicts and transformations. 
While social reality is characterized by change and underlying tensions, it is also 
true that certain periods of stability can be achieved, and this is what the 
Regulation Approach attempts to explain. Within the field of political economy, 
this concern can be summarized by the question: how is accumulation achieved in 
spite of the contradictory social relations that constitute it? According to the 
Regulation Approach, accumulation becomes possible only when the tension 
inherent in its contradictory social relations can be channeled in a way that makes 
them compatible with regular accumulation. It is the regulation of social relations 
that makes it possible to provisionally solve capitalist contradictions and, 
therefore, stabilize accumulation for a certain period of time (Lipietz, 1995:41). 
The Regulation Approach has developed its main concepts within this framework.  
Most of the literature on Fair Trade presents a major weakness: it focuses only on 
one part of the economic process (i.e., production, circulation or consumption), 
reifying a single sphere as an independent arena when it is actually only one part 
of an interconnected system. My main objective in this research will be to grasp 
Fair Trade as a whole, to understand how these different economic spaces are 
structured and work, how they relate to each other and, most importantly, how 
they are regulated in order to be compatible and assure stability. Thus I have 
chosen to conceptualize Fair Trade as a mode of regulation in order to (a) 
determine the degree of innovation it entails compared to the conventional mode 
of regulation currently in place in the Argentinean wine sector and (b) analyze its 
effects when coupled with its respective sectorial regime of accumulation. These 
two concepts are the theoretical core developed and commonly used by the 
Regulation Approach. A regime of accumulation is understood as a 
complementary pattern of production and consumption that is reproducible over a 
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long period; however, if it is to be successful, it requires a particular mode of 
regulation to realize and reproduce it over time. The latter is understood as a set of 
institutions, procedures, rules and habits that has the capacity to guide individual 
actions in a way that is compatible with accumulation. This concept goes beyond 
the material conditions and processes of production and refers to the social and 
political institutions and structural forms that seek to regulate conflicts and 
contradictions within the system.
Therefore, the main concepts developed by the French Regulation School provide 
the macro perspective necessary to examine Fair Trade from a holistic point of 
view. However, this approach still suffers from some problems, namely: it tends to 
economic determinism, its usual unit of analysis is the nation-state, and it 
underestimates the role of actors and their strategies. In order to overcome these 
limitations, my regulationist framework includes the main concepts and 
assumptions developed by the Amsterdam Project. The notion of comprehensive 
concepts of control – understood as a world view promoted by certain social 
groups, but with the potential to integrate other ones – allows us to complement 
the economic concerns of the Regulation Approach with important ideological, 
political and cultural elements that the French scholars tend to undervalue. 
Additionally, the Amsterdam perspective, unlike the structuralist tendencies of the 
Regulation Approach, proposes to understand politics as a dynamic process that is 
mobilized by class fractions, their main units of analysis when it comes to agency. 
Lastly, the regulationist fixation with the nation-state as the scale of analysis is left 
behind with the conceptualization and deployment of the transnational level of 
analysis. 
The analytical perspective proposed by this dissertation will attempt to overcome 
the main weaknesses highlighted in the literature. Unlike fragmentary approaches, 
the main concepts developed by the Regulation Approach offer a macro 
perspective that understands economic phenomena from a holistic point of view, 
making of the interrelationship of production, circulation and consumption one of 
its main features. In this way, conceptualizing Fair Trade as a “mode of 
regulation” (and not just a differential characteristic of production, circulation or 
consumption) makes it possible to assess this initiative and its logic from a 
systemic point of view. The further development of the Regulation Approach with 
the introduction of the Amsterdam Project makes it possible to grasp the 
multidimensional nature inherent in Fair Trade through the inclusion of 
ideological, cultural and political elements. Lastly, and in contrast to utilitarian 
approaches, a regulationist perspective privileges a more qualitative analysis of the 
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structural changes that Fair Trade has (not) produced. Since structural changes are 
understood here as transformations in the way in which socioeconomic relations 
are structured or institutionalized, the focus shifts from the specific outcomes of 
Fair Trade to the process through which these outcomes are obtained. A 
regulationist perspective, therefore, proposes to assess the ability of the Fair Trade 
system to transform the socioeconomic relations in which workers and producers 
engage – and not merely its capacity to provide results. 
3. Overview 
The dissertation will be structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 presents the conceptual framework that will guide my research process. 
It has two main parts. The first introduces the French Regulation Approach and 
explains its most important concepts. This presentation is followed by a discussion 
of how to adapt this macroeconomic perspective to the study of (agricultural) 
sectors and the implications of such a transition. The first part of Chapter 1 
concludes with a critical appraisal of the Regulation Approach, in which its main 
weaknesses are identified. The goal of the second part of this chapter is to 
introduce the Amsterdam Project in International Political Economy, a neo-
Gramscian perspective capable of overcoming the limitations of the Regulation 
Approach. After presenting its main concepts and explaining how they 
complement the original regulationist perspective, I propose some ways in which 
the Amsterdam Project should be developed in order to better account for the 
specificities of Fair Trade. 
Chapter 2 constitutes the roadmap of this dissertation: it describes and justifies the 
overall logic of inquiry followed by my research process. It begins with a 
discussion of different views on case study and, after showing their limitations, 
presents the dialectical approach that informs my understanding of case-based 
empirical research. The selection of my case is justified within that framework. 
The chapter continues with an explanation of the way in which this dialectical 
approach has been applied to my process of research, distinguishing between its 
main moments and describing their presentation throughout the dissertation. 
Finally, this chapter finishes with a detailed explanation of the methods of data 
collection and analysis applied, and the different uses they were given at each 
point of the research process.  
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This dissertation has been organized in the form of a dialectical movement from 
the general to the particular in order to return to a general level and contrast it with 
the new knowledge produced. Within this schema, Chapter 3 offers the highest 
level of generality. It is divided into two main parts; the first offers an overall view 
of the main features of the Fair Trade system, and the second reviews the state of 
the art among those inquiries that have sought to assess Fair Trade’s 
transformative potential, in general, and in relation to the wine sector, in 
particular.
Chapter 4 analyzes the recent historical evolution of the regime of accumulation
in Argentina’s wine sector. Its main features and transformations are explained in 
relation to the changes experienced at the country’s macroeconomic level and the 
global tendencies in the wine world. This chapter concludes with a description of 
the sectorial regime of accumulation’s current structure and the relationships of 
domination that characterize it.  
Chapter 5 complements Chapter 4 by  examining the Argentinean wine sector’s 
mode of regulation. By considering specifically sectorial processes and global 
transformations, this chapter describes the six structural forms that characterize 
today’s sectorial mode of regulation and the ways in which they relate to its 
regime of accumulation. 
While Chapter 4 and 5 describe the conventional Argentinean wine sector, 
Chapter 6 offers a detailed description of the characteristics that the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation assumes in this context. The chapter, differentiating between 
the more general regulations included in the standards and the particular ways in 
which they are implemented in practice, looks at the most relevant features that 
each of the six structural forms display in the Fair Trade mode of regulation. The 
chapter concludes with an assessment of the Fair Trade system’s capacity to 
structure alternative socioeconomic relations by comparing the conventional and 
Fair Trade modes of regulation and analyzing the effects produced by the coupling 
of the latter with the sectorial regime of accumulation. 
Chapter 7 explores some of the processes that are responsible for the outcome 
described in Chapter 6. Here, I analyze the class fractions involved in the system 
and their power relations, the most relevant elements that compose Fair Trade’s 
ideology and the specificities of Fair Trade politics. Describing how the Fair Trade 
system is governed, its core principles, and internal contradictions and limitations 
helps explain the reasons behind the findings presented in Chapter 6. 
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Lastly, the Conclusion offers a final assessment of Fair Trade, distinguishing 
between the case-specific conclusions and those that apply to the whole Fair Trade 
universe. The arguments provided in this section are used to return to the question 
of contemporary options and possibilities for transformative praxis at the global 
level presented at the beginning of this introduction, and, consequently, a 
discussion of the political implications of a Fair Trade strategy for social change is 
offered. The conclusion finishes by reflecting on the theoretical and 
methodological dimensions of this work and presenting some possible paths of 
future inquiry.   
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Chapter 1: A Regulationist Conceptual Framework 
The goal of this chapter is to introduce the main theoretical insights that will guide 
my empirical analysis. As has been explained in the introduction, I am building a 
framework based mostly on the original ideas developed by the Regulation 
Approach. Though this label might give the idea of a unitary trend in political 
economy, regulationist perspectives cannot be said to compose a homogeneous 
body of literature. Different regulationist schools or groups can be identified that, 
even if sharing the same concern with the explanation of the exceptional moments 
of stable accumulation in capitalist economies, differ in many of their 
assumptions, use of concepts and analysis strategies. Heterogeneity goes one step 
further by taking into account the diverse positions that different researchers 
within the same school present and how regulationist perspectives have evolved in 
time. The consequence is the impossibility of postulating a single Regulation 
Approach or “the” true regulation theory. In this chapter, I offer a regulationist 
conceptual framework that builds on, and is inspired by, concepts, underlying 
assumptions and analytical strategies developed by different regulationist authors, 
some of whom would not even describe themselves as such. Far from trying to 
ascribe my position to a particular stream, I propose my own (re)construction of a 
regulationist perspective that draws on insights and concerns that can probably be 
shared by many different positions, but without necessarily identifying with any of 
them. This is done with two objectives: first, the theoretical concern of advancing 
and combining regulationist streams to develop a solid and comprehensive 
perspective of analysis within critical political economy; second, the analytical 
development and articulation of a set of concepts that will make my critical 
assessment of Fair Trade possible. 
In what follows, I present my own version of such a regulationist perspective. The 
main focus in the first part of this chapter is centered on the group of authors who 
are most commonly identified with this perspective. I begin by describing the 
context in which the French Regulation Approach emerged, the theoretical 
positions it contested at that time and how it evolved during its first years. I then 
offer an account of the assumptions that most regulationists share, and I use this as 
my point of departure. After presenting the main regulationist concepts I will work 
with, I discuss how I propose to apply them at the sectorial level. Lastly, I provide 
a critical assessment of the shortcomings and weaknesses of this theoretical 
perspective. The second part of this chapter looks at how the Amsterdam Project 
in International Political Economy complements the French Regulation Approach. 
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I explain the most central concepts – class fractions and class formation, 
comprehensive concepts of control and the transnational – in order to offer an 
alternative for overcoming the problems that the Regulation Approach suffers 
when accounting for agency, political and ideological elements, and a scale of 
analysis that transcend the nation state. Lastly, I propose some developments and 
modifications to the Amsterdam Project to grasp better the specificities presented 
by the case under examination. 
1. The emergence of the Regulation Approach 
The crisis of the 1970s put an end to the uninterrupted period of prosperity that the 
most developed capitalist economies had experienced after the Second World 
War. “Les trente glorieuses”, as it was baptized by Jean Fourastié (1979), was a 
period of approximately three decades during which the French economy (along 
other OECD countries) grew at unprecedented rates, obtaining not only high levels 
of production and profits, but also developing a strong system of social benefits 
and protection. The 1970s caused a shock, as they represented the first structural 
crisis after a long period that had faced only minor ones. Characterized by stagnant 
growth rates, rising unemployment and high inflation, the originality of the crisis 
rejected the Keynesian explanatory schemas developed after 1929 and demanded 
new analytical efforts. 
In the social sciences, the 1970s stressed the difficulties of the up-to-then 
dominant approaches in explaining change (Dosse, 1992:334). During a relatively 
stable and prolonged period of capital accumulation, the neoclassical concept of 
self-regulation and the Althusserian notion of reproduction faced only minor 
challenges in their attempt to describe how the capitalist economy worked and 
perpetuated itself. Nevertheless, the crisis showed how idealistic it was to rely on a 
law of general equilibrium and how problematic it could be to conceive of the 
conditions for reproduction as already-given systemic elements. The Regulation 
Approach originated in this period of crisis as an attempt to overcome the 
functionalist views that stressed the role of coherence and stability while 
overlooking the contradictory and changing nature of economy and society 
(Lipietz, 1988:16). 
Three decades of constant growth had given the illusion of an economic system 
that was able to generate unlimited prosperity, as if it were autonomous of external 
factors and just depended on its own imperatives. The crisis, however, made clear 
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that capital accumulation was far from being an automatic process and that, as 
regulationists would argue, it actually relied on the maintenance of the smooth 
functioning of a specific set of capitalist relations. The crisis triggered the question 
of why things no longer worked. However, to answer this, it was necessary first to 
reconsider how things had worked before (Ibid:14). It is within this context that 
the regulationist perspective begins its development with a threefold effort: 1) to 
show that capitalist reproduction is not an automatic process that runs by itself; 2) 
to understand how, nevertheless, it is pursued during specific periods of time; and 
3) to explain why these relatively stable periods of reproduction are ended by 
crises (Lipietz, 1993:131). From a regulationist point of view, stability in the 
accumulation of capital is not the result of a natural tendency to equilibrium or an 
automatic process of reproduction, but a rare moment within what is actually a 
contradictory and changing system. In their attempt to understand the crisis, they 
were not trying to explain it as an extraordinary moment that interrupted how the 
system normally operated. On the contrary, they perceived the long period of 
stability that preceded crises as exceptional: “Crises, understood as a process that 
brutally restores the contradictory unity of the various stages of the accumulation 
process, ought to be the rule, not the exception” (Boyer, 1990a:35). This dynamic 
and conflictive conception of social relations was foundational for their approach 
to their historical moment: “The main idea was not to pose the question ‘why 
crisis?’, as if stability was the rule, but ‘why not before?’” (Lipietz, 1995:40). It is 
in the attempt to conceptualize how capitalist relations are contingently 
normalized and reproduced in stabilized ways that the concept of “regulation of 
social relations” arises (Lipietz 1988:14). 
To understand fully the main body of regulationist literature, it is necessary to 
review the context in which it appeared. Before moving to the emergence of 
“regulation”, I explain how it was shaped by a critical relation to structural 
Marxism and a rejection of the main neoclassical postulates. 
1.1 Beyond reproduction and general equilibrium 
The Regulation Approach’s early filiation is illustrated well by the definition that 
Lipietz (1993:99) coined and popularized: “the rebel sons of Althusser”. Though 
initially inspired by his innovative approach to Marxism, they soon found that the 
only way to explain transformations and crises of social orders was by building 
critically on Althusser’s initial foundations. The events of May 1968 in France had 
proven to be a challenge for structuralism in general and for its most prominent 
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Marxist figure in particular: the enormous mobilizations – the biggest in post-war 
history – cast doubt on a line of thought that had fossilized structures in detriment 
of action and agency. Just a few years later, evidence of macroeconomic 
stagnation and the beginning of the end of the so-called golden age of capitalism 
would add to the criticism of a too static depiction of the world, where capitalist 
reproduction had been understood up to then as being quasi-automatic. Within this 
context, the critical appraisal of Althusser by the regulation scholars comes as no 
surprise. 
The Regulation Approach highlights Althusser’s rupture with an orthodox form of 
understanding Marx: the promise of a revolution being mechanically unleashed by 
the clash between the dominant relations of production and the development of 
productive forces (Ibid:106). The structuralist break provided new foundations for 
understanding and working with classical Marxian concepts such as modes of 
production and relations of production (Boyer, 1990a:vii). Althusser’s ontology 
was one of the main innovations that the approaches in terms of regulation1
adopted. By rejecting vulgarized conceptions of Marxism (in which economic 
relations determine the social and political spheres), a social formation is 
understood as a fabric of contradictory relations with a certain degree of autonomy 
from each other, but still connected by relations of overdetermination, not just a 
simple reflection or translation (cf. Althusser, 2005). From this point of view, the 
economic domain does not possess analytical preeminence; instead, certain 
political-ideological-economic configurations emerge, where a particular element 
might achieve dominance over the others. During the 1960s, structuralism became 
a way of revitalizing Marxism and criticizing the “poor version” (Lipietz, 
1994:72) that was defended by the French Communist Party (PCF, from its initials 
in French). Some of these Althusserian ideas became conditions of possibility for 
the Regulation Approach to develop. However, as Lipietz highlights, Althusser’s 
shift from understanding social relations as contradictory and unstable to their 
conceptualization as structures (Lipietz, 1993:100) – which can be clearly 
appreciated when comparing the compilation of his texts between 1960 and 1964 
in For Marx ([1965]2005) to the collective work written under his direction, 
Reading Capital (Althusser and Balibar, [1968]2009) – was at the base of a 
theoretical approach unprepared to deal with a conflicting and changing reality. 

1“Approachesintermsofregulation”(approchesentermesderégulation)istheexpressioncommonlyusedin
thefrancophoneliteraturetounderlinethepluralityanddiversityofstreamsthatconstitutetheRegulation
Approach.
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Having begun working under this paradigm, the regulation perspective could only 
continue by criticizing it: what began as filiation led to rebellion. 
Althusser’s structuralism had conceived social orders as ultimately coherent and 
stable entities. Though power relations and class exploitation were at the heart of 
structures, the capitalist formation had been successful in achieving domination 
and enjoyed a little-contested supremacy. What Lipietz (1995:42) describes as the 
conception of a structure “without inherent contradiction” leads to an immobile 
representation of society, where social relations lose their conflictive nature and 
class struggle seems to be indefinitely postponed. Althusser’s concerns with the 
conditions that make social reproduction possible are in line with that image: the 
capitalist system can endogenously reproduce itself through social structures and 
ideological apparatuses in quite an effective manner. Once the social relations 
have been structured in the right way, reproduction seems to happen 
automatically, making futile every attempt to revert the system. This vision not 
only reinforces the already mentioned tendency to overlook conflict, but also 
reifies the nature of reproduction. Basing their claims on long-term historical 
surveys, the Regulation Approach described how continued reproduction of an 
economic mode of development is rare or exceptional. As I will explain in further 
detail later, capitalism is characterized by conflict and change, with brief and 
occasional moments of stabilized reproduction and accumulation. Althusser, thus, 
denies the “conflictual, contradictory, improbable and risky character of the 
reproduction of practices” (Lipietz, 1988:17) and even more importantly, the 
historical changes and transformations that are necessary to secure a “surprising 
resistance to economic crises and conflicts” (Boyer, 2002b:21). 
As a logical consequence, Althusser’s structuralism leaves no place for agency. 
Individuals are considered to be mere bearers of structures and are denied any 
transformative power. They take part in history, but only following the script that 
is dictated by the position they occupy in the social totality. They express 
structures and nothing else. A structure without an inherent contradiction is a 
structure where class struggle does not take place; hence, there is no room for 
action and change driven by social groups. However, if social relations are to be 
understood as conflictive, if reproduction is claimed to be improbable and 
contradiction seems to lie at the heart of the system, a place for individual 
autonomy has to be found and the transformative potential properly 
conceptualized. 
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This rebellion against Althusser launched a transition “from reproduction to 
regulation”, as François Dosse (1992) stated in his History of Structuralism. To 
account for contradiction, conflict, transformation, crisis and agency, it became 
necessary to produce a double break with Althusser. As Lipietz (1995:42) 
explains: on the one hand, vertically, they would keep the idea of domination and 
exploitation already present in his work, but putting it back in movement, 
understanding regulation as a field of struggle. On the other hand, horizontally, the 
holistic approach had to be nuanced by reintroducing subjectivity, divergence of 
interests and the possibility of a plurality of strategies adopted by different actors. 
While the criticism of Althusser and structural Marxism acknowledges the initial 
strengths and a certain common ground, the opposition to neoclassical economic 
theories assumes a much more radical stand. Aglietta’s ([1976]2000) A Theory of 
Capitalist Regulation begins with a criticism of what he calls the dominant 
economic theory and states that his “theory of social regulation is a complete 
alternative to the theory of general equilibrium” (Ibid:13). Later regulation-
inspired work has kept this approach and made the mainstream economic literature 
its main rival. What Boyer has described as a “radical and severe critique to the 
neoclassical programme” (Boyer, 2002a:21), is presented in four main points in 
the remainder of this subsection. 
First, the approaches in terms of regulation reject the neoclassical indifference to 
history, a weakness that was also highlighted in the Marxist structuralist stream. 
The dominant economic theory has developed universal rules and explanation 
schemes that are applied to any case, irrespective of the space or time in which it 
is situated (Lipietz, 1988:21). Furthermore, this emphasis on atemporal axioms 
makes any attempt to introduce historical accounts of economic facts futile, 
resulting in an approach that is foreign to history (Aglietta, 2000:14). In 
opposition to this, the Regulation Approach seeks to develop a “local theory” 
(Boyer, 2002a:11), spatially and temporarily situated and conscious of the 
historicity of different modes of regulation and development. The regulationist 
heterodox contribution rejects the proposition of universal laws and develops 
instead an approach capable of discerning variations across time and space 
(Vercellone, 1994:12,13). In this respect, the influence of the Annales School is 
acknowledged as a guide to studying different stages of capitalism, their specific 
economic structures with their respective crises (Boyer 2002b:24) and the 
different historical forms that a social relation can take (Boyer, 1990a:vii). 
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Second, regulationists reject the neoclassical project of establishing a “pure 
economics”: a self-closed discipline kept at a distance from the other neighboring 
social sciences (Ibid:8,9). This epistemological position is derived directly from 
their ontology: the neoclassical perspective thinks of economic relations as unique, 
different and autonomous from other social relations, making their study the 
exclusive field of economics. Having “pure economics” as a point of departure 
leads to what Aglietta (2000:10) describes as the “totalitarian” aspect of the 
dominant theory, the practice of reducing and excluding any piece of empirical 
evidence that contradicts their assumptions as being mere “imperfections”. When 
extra-economic institutions are taken into account, they are described as 
perturbations and therefore causes of crises (Coriat, 1994:108,109,127). “Pure 
economics” is detached from social conditions and temporal restrictions: “the goal 
of theory is to express the essence of its object by stripping it of everything 
contingent; institutions, social interactions, conflicts, are so much dross to be 
purged to rediscover economic behaviour in its pure state” (Aglietta, 2000:14). 
The Regulation Approach energetically denounced this position and proposed a 
perspective in which the economy is inherently structured by social relations and 
therefore cannot be just explained through pure exchange relations in idealized 
markets. 
Third, the Regulation Approach questions the anthropological assumptions of 
neoclassical economics: that economic agents are those who put the economy to 
work. Essentially, they are rational individuals who pursue their own stable 
preferences with strategies that maximize benefits and minimize costs. This 
principle of universal rationality works as an a priori axiom. It is thus assumed as 
pre-given and as a permanent and unalterable aspect of human nature (Ibid:13). 
Coherently, the neoclassical perspective postulates an individualist methodology 
as the best way of studying economic processes, a perspective that after achieving 
a hegemonic position in economics began to expand to other social sciences.2
Regulationists reject the transhistorical economic rationality proposed by this 
paradigm and seek to re-frame it in particular spatial-temporal contexts, taking 
into account the social and political interests that transcend mere economic 
calculation. Even though they, as previously explained, had criticized 
structuralism for ignoring the role that social groups and agents play in their 
theory, regulationists also rejected methodological individualism for reducing 
structures to the contingent result of individual interactions: “It is not easy to 

2Foranalysesofhowtheneoclassicalmicrofoundationshavebeenatthebaseofeconomicimperialism,seeFine
(2000)andFine&Milonakis(2009).
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apprehend the dynamics of an economic system as a derivate of bilateral 
interactions between individuals deprived of any social and political substance” 
(Boyer, 2002a:8). 
Fourth, and at the heart of the regulationist assault, is the concept of general 
equilibrium. If rational, self-interested, individuals are the unit of analysis and the 
driving force of the economic system, the question that follows is: why does this 
anarchy not collapse? This question is answered through automatic regulation. 
According to the neoclassical explanation, individuals seeking their own interest 
are put in relation through a market that functions as a coordinating mechanism. It 
is through it that agents exchange values and information and are able to achieve a 
systemic equilibrium even without consciously trying to do so. The idea of general 
equilibrium, then, describes the viability of an economy that is entirely composed 
of units moved only by their own interests (Boyer, 2002a:9). Economic relations 
from this perspective are reduced to mere modes of coordination (Aglietta, 
2000:13) and are thus deprived of any conflictive or destabilizing attributes. The 
idea of self-regulation possesses here the same vices that the concept of 
reproduction had in the structuralist framework: an excessive emphasis on its 
functionalist dimension and a neglect of the system’s contradictory nature. The 
inherent tendency to equilibrium of the market, on the one hand, guarantees the 
compatibility of ex post rational calculations while, on the other hand, leaves 
historicity out of the scene, since an atemporal equilibrium allows agents to follow 
their maximizing strategies without needing to change them. The enormous 
importance and explanatory power of general equilibrium in the neoclassical 
framework leads Aglietta (Ibid:10) to characterize this theory as “totalizing”, 
because it is exclusively devoted to the elaboration of a single concept. 
The authors involved in the development of the Regulation Approach, as can be 
seen, produced a comprehensive criticism of the dominant economic theory. 
Having understood what was to be rejected, the next task was to decide how to 
follow. As Aglietta (Ibid:15) put it: “The way forward does not lie in an attempt to 
give a better reply to the theoretical questions raised by the orthodox theory, but 
rather in an ability to pose quite different theoretical questions.” 
1.2 A brief history 
The notion of regulation, as Boyer (1990a:15) acknowledged, was applied to 
political economy by Destanne de Bernis (1975), one of the first social scientists 
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to make use of it. In importing this concept originally developed in the natural 
sciences, he sought to update Marxist economic analysis by freeing it from 
determinist constraints, offering thus a solid alternative to neoclassical theories. 
With this goal in mind, he founded the Research Group on the Regulation of 
Capitalist Economy (GRREC, from its initials in French) – also known as the 
Grenoble Regulation School – which studied the different norms and 
arrangements in the regulation of capitalist relations. Inspired by systems theory, 
the main concept was initially defined as “the adjustment, in conformity with 
certain rules or norms, of several movements or acts, and their effects or products, 
which are initially distinct due to their diversity or succession” (Canguilhem, 
quoted in Boyer, 1990a:15,16).3
Though Destanne de Bernis and the Grenoble School can be identified at the 
origin of these developments, the so-called Parisian school – which would become 
dominant – followed its own path. Destanne de Bernis’ approach was considered 
to be too static, as his accumulation regime seemed to be unique and invariant, 
while the institutions supporting it were the only elements evidencing change 
(Ibid). Another important difference was the Parisians’ mistrust in the elaboration 
and application of “general laws of capitalism” (Lipietz, 1983:xv) – namely, the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the equalization of profit rates. The 
particular articulation of these at a given moment in history was understood by the 
Grenoblois as the main object of regulation (cf. Destanne de Bernis, 1983). These 
features, combined with a powerful state that is able to normalize capitalist 
accumulation through an alliance with monopolistic or oligopolistic businesses – 
in consonance with the theory of state monopolist capitalism defended by the PCF 
– placed Destanne de Bernis closer to an orthodox Marxist position than an 
innovative one (Coriat, 1994:115,116). These elements were at the base of what 
was perceived as the teleological character of Destanne de Bernis’ approach 
(Boyer, 1990a:15) and led to the objective of elaborating intermediate categories 
to make better use of the concept of regulation. Though criticized, Destanne de 
Bernis’ work was an initial step in conceptualizing a “mode of regulation”. 
Sharing Destanne de Bernis’ goal of proposing an alternative to the general 
equilibrium theory, Michel Aglietta devoted his doctoral thesis to long-term 
capitalist evolution in the United States and produced what is nowadays 
recognized as the first (Parisian) regulationist work. While the perspective adopted 

3ForadiscussionofCanguilhem’sconceptofregulation,itsreceptionbyDestannedeBernis,andlatercriticismby
regulationistauthors,seeTroisvalletsandDiRuzza,2008.
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in his dissertation was still closely linked to structural Marxism and could not be 
said to be properly regulationist (Jessop, 1990:171), he spent a year rewriting it4 to 
include elements related to the market’s contradictory dynamics and the 
circulation of commodities that Althusser had so rigidly discarded as a superficial 
phenomenon (cf. Althusser and Balibar, 2009; Lipietz, 1979:16,17). This led to 
the publication in 1976 of A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, which would become 
the initial landmark of what nowadays is known as regulation theory. 
At this point, Aglietta’s work had not achieved the conceptual complexity that 
currently characterizes the Regulation Approach. However, he defined the main 
features of a perspective that studies capitalism in engagement with the idea of 
regulation. He attempted to show how political economy had been too concerned 
with accumulation while neglecting the role that social regulation plays in making 
it possible and stabilizing it. Regulation is not a resource exogenous to the 
economic system, but a set of social arrangements that are strongly involved in 
shaping it. Therefore, his concept of “structural forms”, defined as “complex 
social relations, organized in institutions that are the historical products of the 
class struggle” (Aglietta, 2000:19), highlights the extra-economic dimensions of 
accumulation. These structural forms are those social relations that at a certain 
time in history become fundamental for codifying rules and institutionalizing 
practices and norms of behavior in society (Vercellone, 1994:14). The coherence 
among different structural forms makes possible the appearance of economic 
regularities that are at the base of relatively extended periods of economic growth 
and the reproduction of social relations (Coriat, 1994:117). The idea of structural 
forms was further refined and operationalized in relation to the concepts of 
“regime of accumulation” and “mode of regulation”, providing the most visible 
common background for the variety of “approaches in terms of regulation” that 
would later appear (Ibid:119). These intermediate categories – in between abstract 
invariant notions and empirical facts – were the regulationists’ alternative to the 
universal laws and the main tools used to analyze stability, crises and their 
specificities. 
Aglietta was soon joined by fellow “polytechnicians” at the Center for Economic 
Research and its Applications (CEPREMAP, from its initials in French), most 
notably Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz, but also Jean-Pascal Bénassy, Rosa María 
Gelpi, Jacques Mistral, Carlos Onamini and Juan Muñoz among others. This core 

4ThishappenedwithinthecontextofaseminarorganizedattheInstitutnationaldelastatistiqueetdesétudes
économiques,whereAgliettadiscussedhisworkwith,amongothers,AlainLipietzandRobertBoyer.
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group shaped the “standard” regulation perspective and was responsible for 
developing and popularizing the approach in France and abroad. This is why the 
so-called Parisian School is commonly assumed to be “the” Regulation Approach. 
That this theory was originally developed within the state apparatus, and not in a 
university, is not unimportant. The main goal of CEPREMAP was to make use of 
economic research in the planning activities of the state. In this sense, 
regulationists were technocrats working within the organs that had inherited the 
idea of a “concerted economy” to be secured by state policy (Vercellone, 
1994:8,9). At the same time, many recognized themselves as sixty-eighters, 
having been active during the May events and involved in Maoist, communist or 
other radical organizations. Being reformist technocrats, they were fully aware of 
the neoliberal outburst that the crisis had generated and saw this as a major threat 
to their country’s future developments. Thus, the Regulation Approach not only 
had theoretical concerns at its origin, but also political ones. Their goal was to 
provide a diagnosis of the failures that led to the 1970s crisis in order to propose 
an alternative leftist economic policy where planning would assume a leading role 
based on wide social agreement (Ibid:9–11). 
Being high-ranking civil servants in the influential planning apparatus of the 
developmental state, the regulationist interest in transcending economic theory and 
translating it into practice was fundamental. Their best opportunity to do so arose 
in 1981, when they were asked to act as advisors to the newly elected socialist 
government led by François Mitterrand. Invited to “criticize” and tell the 
government “what works and what doesn’t” (Lipietz, 1994:75), Aglietta, Boyer, 
Lipietz and Coriat accepted the challenge and took part in bi-weekly meetings at 
the Élysée Palace. Though initially optimistic about the possibility of structuring 
an updated mode of regulation to deal with a new reality, they soon became 
disappointed. They began by warning the government that the Keynesian policies 
that had been successful for more than two decades were at the roots of the crisis 
and that a simple replication of these policies would therefore not solve it. The 
government did not follow their advice and applied the well-known expansionist 
policies that seek to increase aggregate demand. After their failure, in 1983 
Mitterrand took an “austerity turn” and the socialist government began with 
neoliberal reforms. At this point, the regulationists chose to leave this association 
and there was a rupture within their school. 
The aftermath of this experience, as Lipietz has described, was a situation in 
which “each of us had to choose their own way” (Lipietz, 1995:43). The 
exhaustion of the radical reformist project had fueled the development of the 
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Regulation Approach. From this moment, there would be no more shared political 
ground for the group as a whole (Vercellone, 1994:6). During the 1980s, 
differences among the regulationists arose, not only politically but also 
theoretically (Coriat, 1994:132,133; Vercellone, 1994:24; Lipietz, 1994:76). 
Conflicting views of the Marxist foundations of the theory, discussions about the 
most relevant dimensions of analysis and disagreements around the need for a 
renewed micro-perspective were at the base of a fracture that would became 
increasingly evident with the years. In this respect, there are different ways of 
understanding these divisions. According to Boyer (1990a:26), it was impossible 
to deny the tensions within the Regulation Approach, but these seem to be due to 
the most abstract levels of economic theory. Regarding the more intermediate 
concepts that the regulationist researchers used in their empirical work, Boyer 
affirms that there is broad agreement. He argues that these contradictions do not 
threaten a unified Regulation Approach, since the shared intermediate categories 
are compatible with a set of different more abstract contexts. From a less 
optimistic point of view, Lipietz affirmed that there is not one regulation school 
but “a number of little streams which have either merged into larger currents or 
split up into even smaller trickles” (Lipietz, 1983:xv). More than ten years later, 
within the debate around the potentiality of working closer to Convention Theory, 
he had no doubts about being more radical about the lack of homogeneity: “It is 
not possible to speak anymore of different preferences sharing a same common 
theoretical base. It is the base itself that has been shattered” (Lipietz, 1995:44). 
As a consequence, there is no single unequivocal regulation theory, school or 
approach. In France alone, it is possible to identify three different groups: to the 
already mentioned Parisian and Grenoblois clusters, one can also add a group 
formed around the PCF, whose main figure was Paul Boccara. Bob Jessop, 
responsible for some of the most distinguished reviews of the Regulation 
Approach, has differentiated a total of seven regulation schools (Jessop, 1990, 
1997; Jessop and Sum, 2006). A plurality of schools and perspectives combined 
with the already heterogeneous itineraries followed by the different founding 
figures make it difficult to describe this theoretical position as unitary. In this 
dissertation, though I will begin by basing my theoretical framework on the work 
of the Parisian authors, I do not plan to work within a single trend. My objective is 
not to find the “real” or “original” stream; my goal, instead, is to build a 
regulationist perspective based on different contributions, concepts and 
developments by researchers working within a variety of traditions. The result 
should be a regulationist theoretical framework compatible with many of the 
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assumptions and main concepts of the already existing positions, but not 
necessarily being ascribed to any of them or reflecting a specific trend or author.
In this sense, I will follow Lipietz (1994:78), who not only questions the idea of a 
regulation “school” but also affirms that there has never been a unified regulation 
theory. With him, I rather propose considering the regulationist developments 
more as an approach or perspective, that is, a group of ontological assumptions, 
theoretical concepts and methodological premises that lead our understanding of 
what reality is and how to understand it better. 
2. On regulation 
To understand the questions that the approaches in terms of regulation raise, it is 
necessary to make clear the main assumptions they rest on. The regulationist 
perspective understands social reality as an ensemble of contradictory social 
relations and its main object of study is their institutionalization, crises and change 
(Billaudot, 1996:32). A contradictory social relation can only be understood as the 
coexistence of struggle and unity between the two elements that compose it. 
Bourgeoisie/proletariat and private/social are opposing elements that constitute 
capitalist relations; they are the poles in a contradiction put together through their 
unity and struggle. The two elements are connected because they need each other 
(for example, proletarians need to sell their labor to capitalists, while capitalists 
extract surplus value from this work), but this connection is intrinsically 
conflictive (for example, the distribution of value between labor and capital). It is 
this dual, contradictory relationship, nevertheless, that makes them what they are 
(Lipietz, 1979:27–9). In their conflictive relation, the two poles do not have 
symmetrical power, and that is why at certain moments one of them acquires 
dominance over the other, imposing unity in the struggle in their relationship. The 
institutionalization of a social relation assumes a particular form that stabilizes it 
transitorily but does not eliminate the contradiction(s) inherent in the social 
relation (Billaudot, 1996:32). When a social relation can be identified, it is 
because it has been reproduced during a certain period of time (Lipietz, 1988:18), 
meaning that a unity between the two aspects could be achieved. The attribution of 
a unitary character to a structure allows a contradiction to be established; thus, it 
can be studied better and it is in this sense indispensable. However, this has to be 
understood as a single moment in a dialectical process of apprehending reality, 
since struggle, the specifically contradictory element, is always there, threatening 
the structure from the inside (Lipietz, 1979:35). 
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To say that unity is always unity in struggle, to say that a social relation is always 
contradictory, is to highlight the fragility of arrangements, to depict the instability 
and always present possibility of change that constitutes social life. However, at 
the same time it is to say that unity, a certain social relation at a moment in 
history, was shaped by and is the result of struggle. It is the struggle derived from 
the contradictory relations that constitute it that makes capitalism unstable. The 
conflict is placed in the very heart of the mode of production, opposing the 
contradictory interests of bourgeois and proletarians (Boyer, 2004:22). This 
assumption leads Aglietta to affirm that class struggle “determines the actual 
movement of history” (Aglietta, 2000:66). Capitalist social relations are based on 
poles of opposition, which will never be conciliated. Though unity can be 
momentarily achieved and conflict postponed, the contradictory nature of the 
structure always keeps the possibility of unity succumbing to struggle latent. 
Hence, it becomes necessary to understand both poles of the process 
simultaneously: change and invariance (Boyer and Saillard, 2002:60). Reality is 
always changing and conflictive; however, some periods of stability can be 
achieved and this is what the Regulation Approach wants to explain. This is the 
radically different question they propose against those raised by neoclassical 
theories: how is accumulation possible in spite of the contradictory social relations 
that constitute it? It is here that the concept of regulation comes into play. 
In his foundational text, Aglietta explains: 
This movement [the movement of history] is all the more governed by the logic of 
accumulation, the more the class struggle occurs in modalities that are compatible 
with the extension of commodity exchange. The conditions for such a canalization 
of the class struggle involve the totality of social relations at any given time, and it 
is their study that forms the content of the theory of capitalist regulation. (Aglietta, 
2000:67) 
This is the assumption that underlines the work of the different regulationist 
perspectives. Accumulation becomes possible only when the struggle inherent in 
contradictory social relations can be channelized in a way that, though not 
eliminating it, makes it compatible with regular accumulation. A theory of 
capitalist regulation will therefore, study how, at a certain point in time, social 
relations are institutionalized in such a way that the risks that the class struggle 
may pose to accumulation become diminished and cannot critically affect it. The 
particular form that such institutionalizations might assume is, of course, the 
contingent result of struggle. It is through the opposition and conflict of social 
groups that social relations are transformed and regularized in specific ways, some 
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of which might make possible the process of reproduction (Ibid:29). Unlike a 
structuralist fashion, reproduction cannot thus be understood as an endogenous 
capacity of the economic system, but becomes actually a “social creation” 
(Ibid:19). Understood in this way, it is possible to conceive of it as a process that, 
on the one hand, involves both economic and extra-economic elements and, on the 
other hand, does not happen automatically, but is subject to crises and ruptures. 
Capitalism, consequently, cannot rely on a natural tendency to general equilibrium 
or a self-regulating capacity. On the contrary, it depends on the continuity of a 
struggle to maintain the specific capitalist social relations that make it possible. 
In another classical regulationist text, Lipietz (1979:36) proposes to use the 
concept of regulation as “the process in which unity imposes itself through the 
struggle of the elements”. The task of a regulationist perspective will then be to 
understand the different ways in which unity in struggle is achieved, but always 
taking into account that there is a dimension in the struggle that far from leading to 
reproduction, tends to undermine and threaten stability and the configuration of 
the very same social relations. The regulation of social relations makes it 
provisionally possible to solve capitalist contradictions and, therefore, stabilize 
accumulation for a certain period of time (Lipietz, 1995:41). In agreement with 
Aglietta, Lipietz highlights that “the possibility of economic regulation is therefore 
overdetermined by the possibility, and the fragility, of a social regulation” 
(Lipietz, 1979:56). What up to had then been understood as the reproduction of a 
pure economy, depends actually on the existence of a “consensus” (Ibid) or “great 
compromise” (Lipietz, 1987a:2) between the different social classes, which is built 
through the regulating agreements that institutionalize certain forms of social 
relations. 
Unlike what consensus and compromise would suggest, these arrangements are 
never the outcome of conscious negotiations and agreements but, as in Aglietta’s 
explanation, a place where hostile forces are encountered (Lipietz, 1995:41), the 
product of class struggle and, as such, the present expression of the balance of 
forces. This conflictive constitution of social relations rejects any functionalist 
reading of the way in which regulation is achieved. Regulatory forms were not 
created to solve contradictions, but could continue to exist because they 
contributed to their resolution (Lipietz, 1988:20,21). Such a perspective could be 
classified as “functionalism after the fact” (Lipietz, 1993:129) because it does not 
presuppose that history has as its goal the development of certain social relations, 
but sees consequences of certain institutional forms as the possible effects among 
a wider variety. Since regulatory forms emerge contingently, many times without 
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the intention of their “creators”, they do not have a priori reason to stabilize 
accumulation or work together (Boyer, 2002a:7). They could therefore be 
described as “chance discoveries” (Lipietz, 1988:21), structural forms that most of 
the time have been shaped with different expectations in mind but have over time 
proved efficient in reabsorbing conflicts. 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Regulation Approach found 
the most effective way of working with this idea of regulation in the development 
and application of intermediate concepts. In the next section, I will develop the 
most important of these and explain their interrelations. 
3. Regulation Approach: main concepts 
In this section, I present the main concepts of the French Regulation Approach. 
3.1 Regime of accumulation 
A regime of accumulation describes a long-term macroeconomic situation in 
which the allocation and distribution of social production have been stabilized so 
that the transformations in the conditions of production and the transformations in 
the conditions of consumption evolve in parallel, maintaining a complementary 
pattern (cf. Lipietz, 1983:xvi, 1986:15). When such a regime is settled, the 
distortions and disequilibria that are inherent in the process have been reabsorbed, 
allowing accumulation to occur in a relatively coherent fashion. Such a stability in 
capital accumulation depends on the alignments of a set of regularities that have to 
do with: a specific way of organizing production and the relation of wage earners 
to the means of production, a temporal horizon of capital valorization upon which 
managerial principles are organized, a distribution of value allowing the 
reproduction and development of different social classes or groups, a composition 
of social demand that validates the evolution of productive capacities, and an 
articulation with non-capitalist economic forms when they are of relevance 
(Boyer, 1990a:35, 2004:36). The particular configuration that these regularities 
might assume and the different ways in which they can combine is not predictable, 
since different regimes of accumulation can emerge in different places or times, 
showing the compatibility of capitalist relations with a variety of macroeconomic 
arrangements (Boyer and Saillard, 2002:61; Boyer 1990a:35). 
The Regulation Approach has empirically identified different regimes of 
accumulation out of which two appear as the most important. Historically 
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dominant by the end of the 19th century among the most advanced capitalist 
economies, an extensive regime of accumulation was characterized by the 
progressive imposition of capitalist methods and organization of production over 
alternative forms. Growth in capital stock was achieved by the expansion of 
capitalism into new areas of activity, while its techniques and organization of 
production remained unchanged. Thereby, it was the appropriation of absolute 
surplus value that generated accumulation. In such a regime, a developing 
industrial working class proved of importance in the formation of profit, but did 
not have enough weight to be decisive in the formation of demand. Given this 
situation, the extensive regime of accumulation was mainly based on the extended 
reproduction of the means of production, while the production of consumption 
goods remained secondary (cf. Boyer, 2004:54; Aglietta, 2000:71,72; Lipietz, 
1987b:33). An intensive regime of accumulation, which became dominant at the 
beginning of the 20th century, was based on productivity gains achieved through 
the permanent development of production techniques and the reorganization of the 
productive process. This regime of accumulation was shaped by constant scientific 
and technical innovation. This phenomenon was critical in the emergence of new 
products and the rationalization of the productive methods that were at the base of 
an unprecedented rise in productivity gains. Growth in capital stock was not 
related to capitalist expansion, but to the extraction of relative surplus value due to 
rises in the level of productivity and the intensification of efficiency in the use of 
resources. A massive and more developed working class became one of the critical 
factors in the formation of aggregate demand. In this regime of accumulation, 
consequently, a process of mass production was matched by one of mass 
consumption. This was possible because the working class had not only become 
majoritarian and acquired the power to shape the main trends in demand but also 
because in this regime of accumulation, wages and productivity gains increased in 
parallel, ensuring a constantly growing purchasing power (cf. Boyer, 2004:54; 
Aglietta, 2000:71,72; Lipietz, 1987b:33). 
3.2 Mode of regulation 
As I have described before, long-term capital accumulation is an unstable and 
highly improbable phenomenon, since the contradictory nature of the social 
relations that are at the heart of the capitalist mode of production frequently tends 
to disrupt its reproduction. A regime of accumulation can survive only because its 
schemas of reproduction are stable, which means that not all configurations are 
possible (Lipietz, 1987b:15). Stabilized regimes of accumulation do not create 
themselves, but are the result of “the specific coercive effects of institutional 
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forms which manage to create a coherence of strategies and expectations among 
agents living in a capitalist market economy” (Lipietz, 1988:32). It is this 
coherence – which can only be achieved as the result of social and political 
constructions – that ensures the stability and reproduction of a regime of 
accumulation. A smooth accumulation of capital is not achieved because of the 
spontaneous bilateral agreements made by agents in the market. On the contrary, 
the form that fundamental social relations assume at a certain time in history is the 
contingent result of the way in which class struggle has shaped them through 
institutions. 
The key for success seems to rely on finding a suitable mode of regulation, which 
can be understood as a relatively coherent combination of compatible institutional 
or structural forms that at a certain point in history becomes able to adjust, guide 
or coerce individual and social behavior in such a way that the regime of 
accumulation becomes stabilized (cf. Boyer and Saillard, 2002:64; Lipietz 
1983:xvi,xvii, 1987a:4). By ensuring over time the compatibility of multiple, 
decentralized and conflictive procedures and decisions, a mode of regulation is not 
only able to support and steer a regime of accumulation, but also enables the 
reproduction of the fundamental social relations (Boyer, 1990a:43). A successful 
mode of regulation is able to canalize the destabilizing effects that are the product 
of the contradictory constitution of its regime of accumulation, diminishing the 
threats that they might pose. Thus, an economic system can only be conceived of 
as socially constituted, since its conditions of possibility depend on an 
arrangement of institutions, networks, rules and norms that postpones its inherent 
tendencies to crisis and makes accumulation possible. Since the elements that 
compose a mode of regulation are social and political by nature, the illusions of a 
pure economy must be rejected. So too must the assumption of rational agency, 
since the idea of a mode of regulation implies that social elements are incorporated 
into individual behavior (Lipietz, 1987b:15). 
A mode of regulation is the contingent result of social conflicts and therefore 
depends not only on the regime of accumulation to which it is coupled, but also on 
the moment in history when it is developed, the society in which it develops and 
even sectorial differences. Therefore, there are no receipts or infallible modes of 
regulation, as they are the historical outcomes of (often unconscious) struggles, 
experiments and trial-and-error processes within specific social and political 
formations. The particular elements that compose them also vary, as does their 
hierarchy. A structural or institutional form may appear to be fundamental when 
working within a certain regime of accumulation, but as soon as the latter changes, 
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another one may take the leading role (Boyer, 2004:45). The universality of 
neoclassical models or structuralist conditions for reproduction appears as 
oversimplistic. Since different regimes of accumulation have specific schemas of 
reproduction, a variety of modes of regulation become possible. It is important to 
highlight, however, that modes of regulation not only change from society to 
society or within a society, but also in different historical periods (Lipietz, 
1983:xvii); it is also possible to find heterogeneous modes of regulation coexisting 
in the same social and political formation. In most cases, one of them dominates 
because it has achieved a hegemonic status, while the others subsist in specific 
sectors or markets (Lipietz, 1988:34). 
Empirically, the French Regulation Approach has mostly focused on 
characterizing two historical modes of regulation. The first, dominant in the most 
advanced capitalist societies from the second half of the 19th century until the 
Second World War, was the so-called competitive mode of regulation. Its main 
features are those that neoclassical approaches identify as typical of a market 
economy. However, it is important to highlight that the latter presents them as 
universal and atemporal while the regulationist perspective frames them in a 
specific period of time. In competitive regulation, nominal wages are based on 
fluctuations in industrial activity. This system of flexi-wage formation defined the 
individual nature of wage negotiations, linking their nominal values to the up and 
downs of industrial activities, the contingent relation between labor demand and 
supply, and the specific characteristics and circumstances of each sector. In a 
system where labor was sold at conditions that changed daily, with its price 
depending on market dynamics, the reproduction of workers became uncertain and 
an individual responsibility. State intervention and the role of monetary authorities 
were modest, and the collective organization of social forces was at this point 
quite limited. Competition between capitalists was driven by prices, which worked 
as the main adjustment variable. The primacy of metallic money over credit 
money and the co-variation of nominal wages, industrial prices and productive 
conjuncture, produced a very unstable system whose main variables were easily 
and drastically altered by the fluctuations in accumulation (cf. Bénassy et al, 1977; 
Lipietz, 1988:33; Boyer, 2004:46). The monopoly mode of regulation, articulated 
in the central capitalist economies by the beginning of the post-war era and 
effectively working until the crisis of the 1970s, emerged as the consequence of 
the development of new structural forms. At its heart, there was a new process of 
wage formation, where its actual price was determined by collective bargaining 
(which was largely extended and codified in parallel with the reinforcement of 
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workers’ collective organizations) and taking into consideration norms of 
consumption. Wages left behind their individual character and started to be 
defined in collective terms, providing more homogeneous intra- but also inter-
sectorial levels. The critical role of wages in securing reproduction was socially 
acknowledged and collective elements of wage earners’ lifestyles were included in 
their formation. The settlement of minimum wages and longer-term contracts in 
combination with the indexation of nominal wages to productivity gains left 
behind the extreme fluctuations that were characteristic of the competitive mode 
of regulation. A new relation between the state and economy was conceived where 
the former intervened to protect social interests from the potential harmful effects 
of the latter. The state’s role could be seen in different areas, for example, in the 
provision of social services and public goods or in the composition of indirect 
salaries. This last element was very relevant, as access to services such as 
education and health became widespread. Monopoly regulation was characterized 
by internal monetary expansion and the use of emission to cover deficits in the 
public finances. Credit and state money were the dominant money forms. 
Regulationist authors see a key feature of this mode of regulation in its relative 
autonomy from external constraints. Bretton Woods and a fixed system of 
currency exchanges provided a stable environment for international trade that 
nevertheless, even if permanently growing, was always secondary to the leading 
role that internal markets played in the determination of the overall economic 
activity (cf. Bénassy et al, 1977; Lipietz, 1988:33; Boyer, 2004:47–9). 
3.3 Institutional or structural forms 
A mode of regulation is the conjunction of a group of coherent institutional or 
structural forms. As explained above, the latter term was at the heart of Aglietta’s 
efforts to describe capitalist accumulation in the United States, while the concept 
of “institutional” forms was adopted by other regulationist authors. Nevertheless, 
they are synonymous in the research of most of these authors. What are then 
institutional or structural forms? Basically, they are the specific configuration or 
codification that fundamental social relations assume at a specific time in history 
and in particular geographical areas (cf. Boyer, 1990a:17, 37; Boyer and Saillard, 
2002:61). They are the transitory arrangements that help social relations to 
reproduce (Aglietta, 2000:29), and are therefore the main formations that the 
approaches in terms of regulation seek to analyze: “It is then necessary to show 
why and how the inherent contradictions of these relations give rise to a process of 
institutionalization, or, as we put it in this work, to the creation of structural 
forms” (Ibid:27). They adjust the heterogeneous decisions of economic agents, 
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originating in this way regularities in individual and collective action and, 
ultimately, in the accumulation of capital. Institutional forms, as regimes of 
accumulation and modes of regulation, are subject to change, since the invariant 
aspects of the fundamental relations they shape “can only be reproduced through 
continual alterations of their forms and precise articulation” (Boyer, 1990a:37). 
There are three main ways (Billaudot, 1996:22) in which structural forms 
homogenize actions and produce regularities. First, they may resort to coercion 
through the application of collectively adopted laws, rules and regulations. 
Second, conflicts and struggles between private actors may lead to negotiations, 
compromises and agreements. Third, shared systems of values, customs or 
representations of realities can be at the base of routines that replace individual 
impulses and initiatives. 
The fundamental social relations, and thereby the most relevant institutional or 
structural forms, are subject to change according to the particular mode of 
production and the specific characteristics that it might assume at a certain 
moment in time and a geographical space. The specificities of capitalist relations 
of exchange and production define a mode of production characterized by the 
primacy of exchange value over use value, the imperative of accumulation and 
three main inherent contradictions: between social and private, expressed through 
the commodity relation; between capitalists and wage earners, from the point of 
view of economic property; and as a result of the separation of producers from the 
means of production, from the point of view of possession (Lipietz, 1983:20,21; 
Boyer, 1990a:32,33). Most regulationist authors agree that the relations of 
exchange and production typical of the capitalist mode of production are mainly 
made viable and normalized by three structural or institutional forms: the wage 
relation, a monetary regime and a form of competition. These three forms express, 
respectively, the way in which surplus value is appropriated, how economic units 
are connected and the pattern in which centers of accumulation relate to each other 
(Boyer, 1990a:37). Two other structural or institutional forms have been identified 
– the state and the mode of insertion in the international context – completing 
what has come to be known as the five main institutional forms (Boyer, 2004; 
Boyer and Saillard, 2002; Billaudot, 1996). 
3.3.1 Wage relation 
Among these five structural forms, the wage relation is highlighted as the most 
fundamental by regulationists, since it is the social relation that best represents the 
essence and logic of the capitalist mode of production (Lipietz, 1988:26; Aglietta, 
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2000:380). Within capitalist societies, labor power appears to be a commodity 
because the wage relation has assumed the form of a commodity relation, though 
it is not truly one. In contrast, the wage relation does not involve the exchange of 
equivalents (Aglietta, 2000:31). In a capitalist economy, only a fraction of agents 
can take the initiative, while the vast majority of the population is relegated to a 
passive role. Because labor assumes the form of a commodity and is exchanged as 
such, it is subject to a process of social validation (Lipietz, 1988:27). If workers 
are to survive, they are compelled to sell their labor power to capitalists who, in 
contrast, are not compelled to buy it. The validation of labor power, and thus the 
social integration of the proletariat, is subject to the decisions that capitalist 
entrepreneurs will make in accordance with their own interests. This enormous 
asymmetry between the two poles in the productive process characterizes the basic 
ambiguity of the wage relation (De Vroey, 1984:46). 
The wage relation has its origin in the separation between producers and the 
means of production, which has two aspects. On the one hand, the social relation 
of dispossession shows that the separation of productive activities into a manual 
component and a conceptual component favors the appropriation of knowhow by 
capitalists, giving them control over the organization and intensity of work and 
rendering workers into submission (Lipietz, 1988:26; Boyer, 2004:21). On the 
other hand, considering the ownership of the means of production, capitalists have 
the power to assign economic units to the productive process and still retain the 
right to dispose of the result of their work. The connection between producers and 
the means of production is mediated by a wage contract between those selling 
their labor and the owner of the means of production (Lipietz, 1988:27). The wage 
contract implies a double exchange. First, proletarians sell their labor power to 
capitalists, obtaining a certain amount of money. This payment, however, is 
always less than the actual value produced by the worker; the difference between 
them is the surplus value kept by the capitalist, which makes accumulation 
possible. Second, capitalists pay a salary to workers independently of the success 
of their production in the market. This means that they assume the risks linked to 
validation in exchange for the proletarians’ surrender of surplus value and their 
submission to the rules of the workplace (Ibid). The contradictory nature of both 
the property and the dispossession aspects of the wage relation is the basis of the 
struggle between the two social classes. For the first aspect, there is confrontation 
over the division of surplus value (how much should go to wages and how much 
to profit), while for the second aspect, there is a struggle between the levels of 
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autonomy and submission that the workers are expected to experience (Lipietz, 
1988:28,29; Boyer, 2004:21,22). 
The inherently conflictive nature of the wage relation, however, faces a whole set 
of institutional, juridical and organizational arrangements that seek to overcome it 
and make accumulation possible: effort norms, control measures, incentivizing 
remunerations, collective negotiations, etc. (Boyer, 2004:22). The specific 
organization of the productive process, its duration, the level of wages, social 
benefits, the definition of rights and duties, and other similar conditions are not a 
free choice for each company, but the result of the capitalists’ maneuvers within 
settled norms, rules and dispositions. Therefore, the wage relation form can be 
understood as the configuration of the labor/capital relation, composed of types of 
work organization, the modalities of the worker’s reproduction and their lifestyles 
(Boyer, 2004:39; Boyer and Saillard, 2002:62). Boyer (1990a:38) has defined five 
components in the capital/labor nexus that are key in understanding the different 
historical specificities that the wage relation form has assumed: “the type of means 
of production; the social and technical division of labor; the ways in which 
workers are attracted and retained by the firm; the direct and indirect determinants 
of wage income; and lastly, the workers’ way of life, which is more or less closely 
linked to the acquisitions of commodities or the use of collective services outside 
the market”. The configuration of these elements changes with time and, at certain 
points in history, might prove effective in channeling the opposition between 
capital and labor in such a way that this conflict does not interfere with the process 
of accumulation. 
3.3.2 Money 
Money is the institution at the base of market economies (Boyer, 2004:14). It has a 
fundamental role in regulating commodity relations, since it is the means through 
which the relations between centers of accumulation, wage earners and other 
commodity subjects are established (Boyer, 1990a:37). That is the nature of 
money. It is not a commodity in itself, but a general equivalent used to ensure the 
equivalence of values in the exchange of commodities (Boyer and Saillard, 
2002:61; Lipietz, 1988:22). Economic subjects are constituted through money, 
since they cannot operate without it. Consequently, it can be said that money, 
within the economic realm, has the same function as language (Boyer, 2004:16). 
Commodities can be validated and exchanged for money and this is how social 
actors perceive that they have value. However, it is important to highlight that the 
intrinsic value of a commodity is given by the amount of socialized labor that was 
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necessary to produce it. This means that the “form” of the value expressed by 
money is determined through social relations at the level of exchange and does not 
necessary reflect the “matter” of value, which was created in the process of 
production (Lipietz, 1988).5
Having such a critical role in the functioning of a market economy, the nature of 
money is subject to regulations that have an impact on its dominant form and 
emission. A whole hierarchical system is organized by commercial banks, that 
lend credit to consumers and firms under the conditions imposed by a central bank 
that is in charge of the emission of legal money. This last entity plays the role of 
the “market secretary” (Boyer, 2004:14), regulating the availability of money 
according to the changing conditions of the economic system. We can thus say 
that the monetary regime is the set of rules that organize and structure the system 
of payments and credits (Ibid:15,16). 
3.3.3 Competition 
According to Boyer (Ibid:23), competition is the third institutional form that gives 
a distinctive character to market economies. Unlike the neoclassical positions, 
which affirm that market relations are driven by autonomous rational actors who 
take decisions based on their own interest, the regulation perspective affirms that 
there are certain patterns of relations among the different productive units. The 
competition form, consequently, seeks to answer the question about the way in 
which different centers of accumulation organize their relations (Boyer, 
1990a:39). While the universal models of the dominant economic theory affirm 
that the formation of prices is the coincidental result of a specific volume of offer 
and another of demand, the regulation perspective finds different ways in which 
competition can occur, giving birth to various processes of price formation 
according to the specific ways in which the relations among the participants of a 
particular market are configured. Therefore, the competition form shows “how are 
organized the relations among a set of fractioned centers of accumulation, whose 
decisions are a priori independent from each other” (Boyer and Saillard, 
2002:562). 

5LipietzhasstudiedtherelationbetweenwhathecallstheexotericandesotericlevelsinhisbookTheEnchanted
World(1983).
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3.3.4 State 
Most authors working within the Regulation Approach do not usually work with 
or have developed a theory concerning the fourth structural form, the state,6 but 
have rather characterized the various configurations that it can assume and the 
effects they have on economic dynamics (Boyer, 1990a:41). Understood as a field 
of class struggle, the more general role of the state is concerned with its 
regulation, as it is one of the main institutions that contribute to the protection of 
the hegemonic configuration of social relations, supporting the dominance of 
particular classes or groups of classes over others (Lipietz, 1988:18, 1987b:19). 
Periods of intense class struggle come to an end or are pacified through the 
institutionalization in the state form of compromises adopted by the contenders, 
thus avoiding endless confrontation (Ibid). Though conflicts do not disappear, they 
are conducted through intra-systemic channels, reducing the potential damage of 
their effects. This pacifying role of the state is understood as the contingent result 
of institutionalized compromises and it should therefore, not be confused with a 
functionalist understanding of this structural form. Far from being conceived as a 
monolithic entity, a state often acts in contradictory and inconsistent ways (Boyer, 
2004:29). This happens because in spite of its apparent unity – a single institution 
with a centralized direction – its actions are the result of social conflicts that 
underlie the social formation as a whole. 
The state form is defined as the often contradictory totality of a set of 
institutionalized compromises that, once settled, create semiautomatic rules and 
regularities in the expenditures, public revenues and the orientation of its 
regulations (cf. Boyer and Saillard, 2002:63; Boyer, 1990a:41). The state is 
strongly imbricated with the economic sphere, as is evidenced by its relation to the 
other three structural forms already discussed (Boyer, 2004:27–9). The creation of 
a central bank responds to the need to include an actor that is not driven by the 
logic of profit or private interests, but which safeguards the always unstable 
viability of a system of payments. The choice of monetary policies and exchange 
regimes are other ways in which the political sphere is linked to the monetary 
form. The competition form works as a mediation between the private and public 
spheres, with states seeking to enforce and apply rules and firms adapting their 
strategies of accumulation as a reaction. Most states intervene in the settlement of 
particular wage relations providing (directly or indirectly) social services, 
recognizing workers’ demands for social rights and sanctioning them, among other 

6WithBrunoThéretbeingoneofthefewexceptions.See,forexample,Théret,1995;2002.
50

ways. Overall, the strong interdependence between the state and the other 
institutional forms is nothing but clear evidence for the close relationship between 
politics and the economy.  
3.3.5 Form of insertion into the international regime 
The fifth main element of the mode of regulation is the form of insertion into the 
international regime. This includes the set of rules that organize the relations 
between the nation state and the rest of the world, encompassing commodity 
exchanges and the localization of production, direct investment, the financing of 
external flows and balances, and even migration policies (cf. Boyer, 2004:30; 
Boyer and Saillard, 2002:62). In this respect, the variables to be taken into 
consideration are many and relate, among others, with the establishment of 
financial, monetary or trading agreements and the adjustment of exchange rates, 
international commercial policies or conditions for international investment. Note, 
however, that this structural form should not be confused with the notion of an 
international order, which can be understood as “a particular configuration of trade 
and capital flows reflecting a hierarchy of competitiveness, and function according 
to certain implicit or explicit rules” (Glyn et al, 1990:61). The form of insertion 
into the international regime has to do with the position that a social and political 
formation occupies within this international context and how they relate. There are 
multiple possible combinations for this relation and it cannot be simply reduced to 
the exertion of national sovereign powers or the imposition of international forces; 
they are the result of the interplay between these two tendencies. Both spheres, 
however, should not be understood as dichotomous and mutually exclusive: 
regulation strategies adopted at the internal level cannot ignore the external 
context, while changes and disruption in the local domain will affect the 
international one. 
Overall, the French Regulation Approach has developed, and commonly works, 
with five structural forms: wage relation, money, competition, state and 
international insertion. However, given the sectorial dimension of my research, a 
sixth structural form will be introduced: the representation of the product. An in-
depth discussion of the use of the Regulation Approach for the study of sectors 
and the resulting need to include a sixth structural form will be provided in 
Section 4 of this chapter. 
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3.4 Mode of development 
As I have explained above, the mode of development is a set of structural or 
institutional forms that, when they are coherent and compatible, constitute a mode 
of regulation. However, for it to last and prove efficient, it needs to favor the 
specific configuration that social relations have assumed in a given society and 
time to produce and accumulate capital. When a regime of accumulation is 
successfully combined with a mode of regulation, there is a mode of development 
(Boyer and Saillard, 2002:64), and it is the analysis of its emergence, regularities 
and crises that constitutes the regulationists’ main object of study (Boyer, 
1990a:48). 
The Fordist mode of development is probably the empirical finding for which the 
Regulation Approach is best known. After the Second World War, an intensive 
regime of accumulation came to be coupled by a monopoly mode of regulation, 
leading to sustained production and distribution of value until the 1970s. This 
mode of development was the regulationists’ explanation for the exceptionally 
prolonged period of stability that is commonly known as the golden age of 
capitalism (Glyn et al, 1990). The generalization of mass production that boosted 
an intensive regime of accumulation generated unprecedented growth in labor 
productivity and capital accumulation. This increase in productivity had led to a 
massive growth of production some three decades before, but at that point, it could 
not be sustained because the level of consumption was not high enough. However, 
the monopoly mode of regulation ensured there was a parallel growth of real 
wages and productivity, allowing capitalists to maintain their profit rates but also 
increasing workers’ consumption capacity. Thus, a massive growth of production 
could be counterbalanced by an increase in consumption, stabilizing the regime of 
accumulation. Collective and centralized bargaining procedures were used in 
(re)negotiating wages, with increases based on the evolution of prices and 
productivity. Prices, wage formation, productivity gains and profits became 
interrelated and critical factors in the stabilization of the Fordist mode of 
development. The role of the state is among the most salient characteristics of 
Fordism, as it played a leading role in the formation of macro- and micro-policies. 
The state acted through collective agreements, minimum wage legislation, transfer 
payments, expansion of the public sector, provision of credit and fiscal policy. 
With these different elements, the state was key in guaranteeing the linkage 
between wages and productivity gains, which offered investors the potential for 
increases in consumption and diminished their perception of risks. Fordism is 
understood as a national mode of development. It took place in the leading 
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capitalist societies internationally, but the critical role that domestic markets 
played in the creation of growth placed international trade in a marginal position. 
The global order, organized under the United States’ hegemony, provided a 
coherent institutional framework for international trade, finance and payments. 
Though international trade grew continuously during this period, it could never 
offset the dominant position of internal markets over growth and demand, making 
the nation state the main scale where regulation operated (cf. Boyer, 2004:57–63; 
Glyn et al, 1990; Lipietz, 1987b:29–46). 
3.5 Crises 
However, following the basic regulationist assumptions, this stability has to be 
understood as always transitory and subject to different threats. Most authors 
working within the Regulation Approach thereby work with two different 
concepts of crisis.7 Cyclical or minor crises (Boyer and Saillard, 2002:65) are 
those that introduce temporary problems in the production and accumulation of 
surplus value but can be reabsorbed by the current mode of regulation. Since their 
resolution does not demand the transformation of the established set of structural 
forms, they can be classified as crises in regulation (Lipietz, 1987b:34). Structural 
or major crises (Boyer and Saillard, 2002:65; Lipietz, 1987b:34), on the other 
hand, appear when the mode of regulation and the regime of accumulation are no 
longer compatible and enter into conflict. These crises, which can be described as 
crises of regulation, may occur when the given mode of regulation exhausts the 
potential of a still viable regime of accumulation or when the emergence of a new 
regime of accumulation is being obstructed by an outdated mode of regulation. 
This type of crisis puts a mode of development under risk. Since crises depend on 
the specific configurations that modes of regulation and regimes of accumulation 
assume – and the articulation among both – at a given time in history, it can be 
said that there are no single and universal explanations of crises; each social 
formation will therefore have the crisis that corresponds to its structure (Boyer, 
2004:38,39; Coriat, 1994:122). 
4. The Regulation Approach and the study of sectors 
As will be clear by now, the main concepts developed by the Regulation Approach 
belong to a macroeconomic perspective of analysis. However, in this dissertation, 

7Though,itshouldbehighlighted,intheirattempttosystematizethebodyofregulationistconcepts,Boyerand
Saillard(2002)analyticallydifferentiatefivetypesofcrises.
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I am applying them to the analysis of one particular sector: the Argentinean wine 
industry (Fair Trade and conventional). It is necessary, therefore, to discuss and 
justify how such a perspective can be adapted to provide an adequate framework 
for the analysis of the (agricultural) sectorial level. 
The challenge posed is not a new one, since this issue has already received 
attention, with some of the main conclusions having been collected in “La grande 
transformation de l’agriculture” (Allaire and Boyer, 1994). However, only a few 
years earlier, it was Pierre Bartoli and Daniel Boulet (1990) who discussed the 
conditions for regulation in the agro-food sector and offered the first valuable 
contribution toward the establishment of sectors as scales of regulation. They did 
so by attempting to find a middle way between what they described as the two 
main risks of adapting concepts that were originally developed for the 
macroeconomic level to a sectorial scale. On the one hand, there is the possibility 
of a mechanical transposition from one level to the other. Such a perspective 
would identify a global8 mode of regulation that is imposed on different sectors, 
simply reproducing the overall pattern without expressing any specificity. On the 
other hand, they identified the opposite danger, that of describing sectors as the 
primary level of regulation, assuming that regimes of accumulation and structural 
forms are originated and find their coherence there. Such a view cannot take into 
account the interdependence and domination exercised by the more general levels 
of capital accumulation or social reproduction (Bartoli and Boulet, 1990:18). 
Instead, they proposed beginning with the hypothesis of the existence of a specific 
sectorial level of regulation, but leaving the empirical case-by-case analysis to 
determine its nature and significance. 
If this enterprise was to be successful, their use of the main regulationist 
categories had to be done through a process of adaptation because “at least in their 
initial formulation, the approaches in terms of regulation cannot be mechanically 
applied to the sectorial level” (Ibid:11). To deal with this shortcoming of the 
original perspective, they proposed working with the sector-adjusted equivalents 
of the central regulationist concepts: “functioning economic regimes” (régimes 
économiques de fonctionnement), understood as the “the group of economic 
mechanisms that ensure the reproduction of a sphere of activity during a period of 
time”, are the equivalent of regimes of accumulation; and “institutional 
arrangements” (dispositifs institutionnels), which are defined as the “group of 

8Intheregulationistliterature,theterm“global”isusuallyusedtodifferentiatethemacroeconomicfromthe
sectoriallevel.Withinthiscontext,itshouldnotbeconfusedwithworldortransnationallevels.
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institutions that produce norms, processes, interventions that frame and orient 
those [functioning] economic regimes”, replace the institutional or structural 
forms. Lastly, the way in which both elements are combined is presented as the 
“mode of sectorial regulation” (mode de régulation sectoriel). 
In a similar fashion, Robert Boyer (1990b) described four different ways in which 
(agricultural) sectorial modes of regulation have been understood. First, many 
scholars have simply projected the global level into the sectorial one. This means 
that the changes in agriculture during the 1960s would have been a result of the 
adoption of the logic and structural forms characteristic of the Fordist mode of 
development, thus evidencing a homology between the sectorial and global levels. 
Second, some researchers have acknowledged the specificities of the agricultural 
sector, but have explained them from a functionalist point of view, in terms of a 
necessity imposed by the global level of accumulation and regulation. Third, the 
path opened by Bartoli and Boulet led to the assumption of the existence of 
specific institutional regimes within sectors, which enjoyed relative autonomy 
from the overall regime of accumulation. While Boyer criticizes the first two 
approaches for being unable to acknowledge any sectorial specificity (the first 
describing the sector’s structure as a reflection of the global mode of development; 
the second explaining the sector’s specificities in terms of the functional 
requirements of the mode of development), he considers that the third 
overestimates the autonomy of the sector and its originality. Alternatively, Boyer 
proposes a fourth approach, which he describes as “synthetic”. This perspective 
sees the sectorial mode of regulation as the result of the combination of sector-
specific institutional arrangements and their articulation with the global mode of 
regulation. This possibility is expected to solve the tension between the 
global/sectorial divide by recognizing agriculture as a specific but not autonomous 
sector.
It is within this synthetic approach that Boyer frames the regulationist contribution 
in “La grande transformation”. This is exemplified by the way in which Lacroix et 
al (1994) postulate the inadequacy of the “wage relation” form for the agricultural 
domain and propose to replace it by the “social work relation”, which grasps more 
accurately the labor/capital relation in the sector. It can also be appreciated in Jean 
Marc Touzard’s (1994) proposal of overcoming the state as the dominant scale of 
analysis in the regulationist literature by focusing instead on sectors, regions and 
their articulation. 
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Even if there are some very interesting discussions in this realm in “La grande 
transformation”, it seems as if the regulationist debate on the agricultural sector 
was then abandoned. This is evidenced by the lack of major publications within 
this field since. The possible exception is “Secteurs et territoires dans les 
régulations émergents” (Laurent and du Tertre, 2008), a collective work focusing 
on the processes of re-sectorialization and re-territorialization of regimes of 
accumulation and modes of regulation – which, however, devotes only one chapter 
to the agricultural sector. It is against this contemporary background that I would 
like to inscribe this dissertation within Touzard’s recent call for a reinvestment of 
the Regulation Approach in the agricultural sector, which should be particularly 
welcomed within a context of “renewal of political debates on the agro-food 
sector, the diversity of its models and trajectories, the questions on the evolution 
of this sector’s specificities and its crises” (Touzard, 2009:1930). 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to what Boyer describes as synthetic 
approaches. The particular way in which I propose to adapt the Regulation 
Approach to the sectorial level is connected with the specific goal of my research 
and, therefore, is not presented as the solution to the debate, but a solution that 
contributes to my methodological strategy. Therefore, while it builds on some 
ideas and proposals presented by previous publications, it does so in a selective 
manner, adopting only those elements that will allow me to grasp better the 
specificities of the Argentinean wine sector that are relevant for the assessment of 
Fair Trade. 
In this sense, unlike most scholars, I have decided to keep the original 
regulationist concepts instead of providing sectorial-adjusted versions. My 
approach to the sectorial level is not framed by an attempt to prove or refute its 
existence as a relevant mode of regulation or regime of accumulation. Instead, I 
use the notion of a mode of regulation, for example, as a heuristic tool, as a 
particular entry point to the reality I want to study. The concept of a mode of 
regulation, and the closely related five structural forms, provide important criteria 
for describing how the conventional wine industry in Argentina is regulated and 
what alternatives Fair Trade actually presents. 
Since I am not focusing on the macroeconomic level but on a sector, I clearly need 
to adapt my understanding of a mode of regulation to that level. However, by 
doing so, I do not attempt to prove the existence of a coherent sectorial mode of 
regulation, specific and different from other sectors and with a distinctive 
autonomy from the global level. Instead, I understand a sectorial mode of 
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regulation as a meeting point between those features defined at the global level of 
regulation and others that are determined within the particular industry. Following 
Boyer, it will be seen as a specific form within the overall mode of regulation. 
This same understanding of the relationship between the global and the sectorial 
underlies my understanding of regimes of accumulation and structural or 
institutional forms at the sectorial level. 
Bartoli and Boulet (1990:11) emphatically rejected the possibility of resorting to 
the traditional structural or institutional forms when analyzing a sector: “The 
notion of institutional form (…) is even less reducible to a sectorial level.” They 
gave the examples of the money form, which is regulated by the monetary 
authorities, and the state and wage relation forms, which respond to the global 
mode of regulation. Bartoli and Boulet’s reason for discarding the original 
conceptualization of the structural forms is based on their understanding of a 
sectorial mode of regulation: “One should account for the eventual relative 
autonomization of a specific sectorial level of regulation, and, therefore, analyze 
what, within the social formation, explains this autonomization.” According to 
their view, a sectorial mode of regulation can be considered as such only when it 
has achieved a relevant level of autonomy from the global mode of regulation. 
That is why many institutional forms – which according to Bartoli and Boulet are 
determined by the global level – are not relevant in a sectorial analysis. 
However, while it is true that sectorial forces might not directly determine most 
structural forms, it cannot be denied that the particular institutionalization that the 
former require – combined with sectorial specific practices and tendencies – will 
have an impact on the latter, deeming them important for analysis. Thus, while 
structural forms might be highly dependent on the global mode of regulation, their 
implementation in concrete sectors will always offer certain margins for 
specificity and for adaptability. The empirical analysis will probably show that 
one structural form is more heavily shaped by the global level of regulation while 
another one responds to a greater extent to the sectorial level. Nevertheless, it will 
not be relevant for my analysis to find structural forms that have been determined 
mainly by sectorial forces, but, instead, to describe the effective characteristics 
that a mode of regulation acquires as a result of the interplay between sectorial and 
global regulatory forces. Furthermore, given that the main goal of this research is 
to assess Fair Trade’s capacity to structure alternative socioeconomic relations, my 
interest will be in describing the specificities of structural forms in the wine sector 
as they occur in practice – making irrelevant the global or sectorial origins of these 
features – to compare them with those displayed by Fair Trade. 
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While I have decided to preserve, and work with, the original five structural 
forms, I also consider it relevant to include a sixth that becomes of fundamental 
importance when applying a regulationist perspective to the study of a sector: the 
representation of the product. While there has not been much theoretical 
elaboration of this concept, different authors have highlighted its relevance, 
precisely because it is around a certain product that sectors are built. Touzard, for 
example, highlights the representation of the product(s) as one of the most relevant 
dimensions to be discerned within the “group of rules, norms and routines, more 
or less homogeneous, interiorized by the agents and that condition their economic 
choices” (Touzard, 1994:298) when studying the features that characterize a 
particular sector. 
A sector is structured around a particular (or a group of) product(s). Therefore, 
important structural characteristics – and their changes – within a sector are 
closely related to the way in which the product at its heart is defined. Bartoli and 
Boulet acknowledge this: “The notion of sectorial regulation refers here to the 
sphere of activity in question. The sector (…) corresponds to the sphere of 
activities of production, transformation and distribution of the product in question” 
(Bartoli and Boulet, 1990:19). And while they do not go into more depth 
conceptually, they use the notion of “system of representation” to explain the 
different definitions that wine, the product they examined in their thesis, has 
received throughout history, and how those changes in the representation of the 
product have been accompanied by changes in sectorial accumulation and 
regulation. 
In his discussion of Bartoli and Boulet’s doctoral thesis, Boyer highlights the 
relevance of the “social construction of use values”, which confers a “social and 
symbolic stratification to the product” (Boyer, 1990b:54) that is the determinant in 
the perception of the product and the definition of its social destination. Following 
Bartoli and Boulet, Boyer explains how the emergence of two different ways of 
representing wine and its consumers in France led to the development of two wine 
sectors with contrasting logics. 
Therefore, it can be said that the representation of a particular product is a key 
feature in drawing the limits of a particular sector and, more importantly, in 
understanding the particular way in which the social relations of production, 
circulation and consumption are articulated in specific ways. This is not to say, in 
an idealist fashion, that the conception of the product will determine the material 
production within the sector. Instead, it attempts to highlight how different 
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material forces within the field need to engage in the struggle for a particular 
definition of the product to guide the sectorial regime of accumulation and mode 
of regulation in a direction favorable to their interests. Consequently, 
“sectorialization” is not objectively given by the existence of a functional division 
of the economy around a diversity of products, but emerges as the crystallization 
of the temporary balance of forces among the players in the sphere of activity: 
Sectors, actually, do not only result from a functional partition of the national 
economy according to the final products. They can also represent domains of 
economic interests’ structuration, places for the formation of professional 
representation, fields of action for public policies, policies that can find the specific 
conditions of expression in this or that sector, or that can also proceed from sectorial 
situations and objectives. (Bartoli and Boulet, 1990:12) 
The analysis of the representation of the product is of fundamental importance in 
understanding how production, exchanges and consumption are shaped within a 
sectorial regime of accumulation and how the main structural forms are articulated 
under its respective mode of regulation. Therefore, it will be considered in my 
analytical framework as a sixth structural form, together with the already 
mentioned wage relation, competition, money, state and international insertion 
forms. 
5. Main shortcomings of the Regulation Approach 
I have presented so far the main theoretical concepts, and their underlying 
assumptions, that I will use in my analysis of Fair Trade as it relates to 
Argentinean Fair Trade wine consumed in the United Kingdom. The concepts of 
regime of accumulation, mode of regulation, mode of development as well as the 
different structural or institutional forms appear as excellent tools for studying Fair 
Trade from a holistic perspective, unlike most of the literature on the topic that 
examines only one phase (i.e. production, circulation or consumption) of the 
whole economic cycle. 
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the regulationist perspective 
presented up to now has some major weaknesses that need to be overcome to 
understand Fair Trade in its whole complexity. First, the French Regulation 
Approach tends to economism. While it is true that one of its major virtues has 
been that of highlighting the social nature of economic relations and phenomena, 
most regulationist work has failed to take into account the cultural, political and 
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ideological elements that interact with – and in many cases make possible – the 
economic ones. Second, it is possible to identify a tendency to structural 
determinism. Of course, most leading regulationist authors would argue that 
economic structures are shaped through class struggle and it is this phenomenon 
that ultimately gives form to regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation. 
The potentiality for explaining agency is thus there, but it has to be admitted that 
a) in their empirical work, the regulationists have not been primarily concerned 
with the actual political moment of agency and b) they have not developed 
theoretical or methodological insights to analyze it. Third, the Regulation 
Approach does not provide a scale of analysis that could be of use in 
understanding Fair Trade. Their initial concern with Fordism led them to focus 
mainly on the national level, as has been explained. Later regulationist work (for 
some examples, see Boyer and Saillard, 2002) has tried to conceptualize 
international regimes and local or sectorial regulation. However, the nature of Fair 
Trade cannot be understood within the national/international dichotomy that still 
underlies the Regulation Approach and which therefore rejects the scales of 
analysis that have been proposed so far. The challenge, then, is to build on a 
critical engagement with the French Regulation Approach, providing concepts and 
categories that would integrate political, cultural and ideological elements with the 
economic domain, offer a deeper understanding of the role of agency and its 
interaction with structures and, finally, provide a scale of analysis that transcends 
the national/international dichotomy. The second half of this chapter is devoted to 
the advancement of the French Regulation Approach through its complementation 
with the Amsterdam Project in International Political Economy. 
6. The Amsterdam Project in International Political Economy 
To overcome the economistic and structuralist tendencies of the Regulation 
Approach, I propose to develop this conceptual framework further along a path 
similar to what Antonio Gramsci proposed as an alternative to orthodox Marxism. 
This section begins with Gramsci’s discussion of the relation between structure 
and superstructure, which provides a frame for the integration of cultural and 
political elements with economic analysis. The remainder of the section, however, 
continues with a neo-Gramscian perspective that has sought to adapt the Italian’s 
main conceptual developments to contemporary transnational capitalism. 
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Crucial for my attempt to transcend the Regulation Approach’s tendency to 
economism is Gramsci’s notion of a historical bloc “in which in fact the material 
forces are the content and ideologies are the form. This distinction between form 
and content is just heuristic because material forces would be historically 
inconceivable without form and ideologies would be individual fantasies without 
material forces” (Gramsci, 2011c:172). With the introduction of the concept of 
historical bloc, Gramsci attempts to overcome simplified readings of the 
relationship between structure and superstructure, by emphasizing their 
interconnectedness and complex co-determination. In a draft note in his Prison 
Notebooks, he writes that an analogy with the relationship between skin and 
skeleton in the human body could contribute to the popularization of this 
conception: 
It would be silly to say that a person stands erect on his skin rather than his 
skeleton, and yet this does not mean that the skin is merely an appearance and an 
illusion – so much so that the condition of a flayed person is not very pleasant. 
Similarly, it would be silly to say that the color of the cheeks causes good health 
rather than the other way around, etc. (…) One does not fall in love with a woman 
because of the shape of her skeleton, and yet that shape, too, is an element of sexual 
attraction since it contributes to the general harmony of external shapes and even to 
the disposition of the skin. (Gramsci, 2011b:157,158) 
Applied to my topic of research, this means that the analysis of the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation and its material effects (content) would only be partial and 
incomplete if it were not complemented by the examination of those cultural, 
political and ideological elements that constitute it. Social reality can only be 
understood “in blocco” (Ibid:538), that is, as the outcome of a “necessary and vital 
connection between structure and superstructure” (Ibid:157). That is why the first 
part of my analysis, which focuses on the concrete ways in which Fair Trade 
structures socioeconomic relations and the specific consequences of these 
configurations, will then be followed by a second part that examines Fair Trade’s 
dominant ideology and its associated politics. 
In a note entitled “philosophy-politics-economics”, Gramsci wrote: 
If these are constitutive elements of a single conception of the world, there must 
necessarily be, in the theoretical principles, convertibility from one to the others, a 
reciprocal translation into the specific language of each constitutive part: each 
element is implicit in the others and all of them together form a homogeneous circle 
(…) For the historian of culture and of ideas, this proposition leads to some very 
important principles of research and criticism. (Gramsci, 2011a:196) 
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Following Gramsci, we can affirm that any conception of the world is composed 
of philosophical, political and economic elements that constitute a whole. While 
each dimension is, of course, irreducible to the others, the possibility of finding 
equivalent formulations in each of the elements, of discovering analogous ways of 
reasoning across this diversity of fields, makes it possible to develop a wider 
“Weltschauung” (Gramsci, 2014:881) that at the same time comprehends and 
transcends particular philosophic, political and economic elements. What this triad 
also reaffirms is the constitutive interconnectedness of philosophical and political 
elements (superstructure) with economic ones (structure), as the concept of a 
historical bloc shows. As a consequence, any conception of the world cannot be 
considered as a “free-floating” element within the social formation but, instead, 
can only be understood in connection with the structure it organically belongs to. 
The remainder of this section presents the theoretical perspective developed by the 
Amsterdam Project, which is inspired by Gramsci’s work and his understanding of 
the relationship between structure and superstructure. While building in the most 
relevant Gramscian concepts and assumptions, the Amsterdam Project has 
attempted to adapt them to today’s transnational capitalism, making this approach 
more suitable for the analysis of my object of study. 
What Jessop and Sum (2006) classified as the “Amsterdam School” refers to a 
group of scholars who have come together to develop a perspective that could be 
described as “neo-Gramscian transnationalism” or “transnational historical 
materialism”. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn stated that: “Far from constituting a 
separate school – and certainly not aspiring to become one – this project must 
instead be seen as reflecting one particular contribution of what was originally a 
single group of researchers from the University of Amsterdam to what has since 
become a much broader perspective” (van Apeldoorn, 2004b:110). Thereby, I will 
not use the term school, but the Amsterdam Project in International Political 
Economy, as it was called in the seventh issue of the Journal of International 
Relations and Development (2004), a special edition whose guest editor was van 
Apeldoorn. 
The initial landmark of the Amsterdam Project was Kees van der Pijl’s The 
Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class ([1984]2012), a volume that sought to explain 
the transnational nature of capitalist regularization and the importance that 
ideological elements play along with economic ones in the constitution of social 
classes as actors and the specific articulation that capitalist social formations 
assume. Van der Pijl was soon joined by a group of scholars working in 
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Amsterdam, who progressively developed a perspective that, working within the 
Marxist tradition, seeks to overcome its main shortcomings: “Such an integrated 
approach offers us an insight in how the structure/agency and economics/politics 
dichotomies can be overruled, and how we can transcend the so-called level of 
analysis problem as well as the question of external versus internal determination” 
(Holman, 1996:20). In doing this, they critically engaged with the French 
Regulation Approach. The Amsterdam Project shares their interest in 
understanding the processes through which capital accumulation is normalized and 
regulated and thereby builds on the main concerns of the regulationists. 
Nevertheless, they highlight three main problems that the regulationists have not 
been able to overcome in their appropriation of Marx. First, the Amsterdam 
Project criticizes the relative neglect of agency and the dominant role that 
structures play in regulationist accounts (Overbeek, 2004:123). Second, the 
Regulation Approach is seen as excessively economistic, ignoring the fundamental 
role that consciousness, ideology and culture play in the regulation and 
transformation of social formations (Ibid:115). Third, the Amsterdam Project 
rejects the regulationist understanding of nation states as self-contained entities 
and the natural scale of analysis for regimes of accumulation and modes of 
regulation (Holman, 1996:11–13; Overbeek, 2004:115,123). These three main 
difficulties are to be tackled by returning to the main concepts that Gramsci 
developed in his reformulation of historical materialism and the adaptation that 
Robert Cox made of the Italian’s work in the field of international relations. 
Though the Amsterdam Project rejects Jessop’s labeling of a “regulation school” 
(or any kind of school, in general), they acknowledge the fundamental importance 
that a critical dialogue with the Regulation Approach had in its development 
(Overbeek, 2004:122), and that is how I propose to read it, as a specific way of 
advancing the regulationist perspective. Van der Pijl was explicit about this by 
recognizing, for example, that their approach aims to “overcome the lack of 
elaboration of the political sphere as a terrain of struggle by the French regulation 
school, and its relative neglect of the transnational/international dimensions of 
political economy” (van der Pijl, 2004:182) or the way in which the Amsterdam 
notion of “concepts of control” adds “the dimension of (international) politics and 
(transnational) class struggle to what Aglietta and others call ‘mode of 
regulation’” (van der Pijl, 2005:51). 
In what follows, I present the way in which the Amsterdam Project has proposed 
to overcome the three main problems of the Regulation Approach: first, by 
theorizing class (formation) and its relevance in the institutionalization of 
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capitalist societies; second, by showing the importance of categories such as 
concepts of control or struggles for hegemony for taking into account the 
fundamental role played by ideological and cultural elements; and, third, by 
developing the notion of “the transnational” and explaining how social, political 
and economic processes take place at that “scale”. The final section of this chapter 
discusses some ways in which the original Amsterdam perspective needs to be 
adapted to be applied more fruitfully to the study of Fair Trade. 
6.1 Class formation and the issue of agency 
One of the main theoretical premises underlying the Amsterdam Project is that 
capitalist societies are class societies in which the capitalist class is the ruling class 
(van Apeldoorn, 2004a:154). This assumption shares the Regulation Approach’s 
concern with the foundational role of social relations and sees the origin of classes 
in the structure of the social relations of production, where social groups occupy 
different positions in the process of production, reproduction and distribution of 
wealth. The most simple class division that can be observed is the relation 
between those who control and supervise the process of production (the capitalist 
class) and those who execute the productive tasks (the working class) (van 
Apeldoorn, 2002:3). As I will explain below, the Amsterdam Project highlights 
the politically constructed nature of class as a social subject; however, this 
process, though not determined, is shaped by material reality (understood as the 
unequal access to and control over material resources), which characterizes the 
capitalist mode of production. Hence, a first necessary and fundamental aspect in 
the study of social classes is the recognition of the objective relations of 
production that lay the ground for its social constitution. 
Capitalist social relations, stipulating an unequal control over the means of 
production, are relations of domination characterized by the uneven distribution of 
material capabilities. This hierarchical distribution of social groups along different 
positions in the capitalist mode of production determines their structural 
conditions of action. Those with no access to or control over the means of 
production will have smaller margins for maneuvering in the exercise of their 
agency. Power relations are settled, with those under less structural restrictions 
establishing relations of domination over those whose possibilities of action are 
much more constrained. The capitalist class owns the means of production and 
thereby, based on a much bigger market power, exercises a structural domination 
that is used in its advantage in the material struggle between wage and profit. The 
asymmetry that characterizes capitalist social relations can therefore be explained 
in terms of its underlying class structure (Ibid:21). 
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The interest in understanding how this domination is imposed has led to the study 
of how the capitalist class achieves hegemony and exercises power over society as 
a whole. This requires going beyond the basic class division I have just described 
between capitalists and workers since, as Kees van der Pijl puts it: “Class 
strategies on the part of the bourgeoisie are determined, first, by the relation to the 
working class in the labor process, and secondly, by the functional positions in the 
process of circulation of capital” (van der Pijl, 2012:31). The capitalist class can, 
initially, be understood in opposition to the working class. It is within this frame 
that the capitalist class can appear as homogeneous and unitary. However, 
remaining at this level hides the complex arrangements among different capitalist 
groups that have been necessary for overcoming their conflicts and acting as the 
same social class. 
The Amsterdam Project goes back to Marx’s second volume of Capital
(Overbeek, 2004:118; van der Pijl, 2012:4, 2009:247,248), and uses his 
conceptualization of the different functional forms that capital assumes (namely, 
commodity capital, money capital and productive capital) to show how capitalists 
in different stages of the reproductive circuit of capital express particular interests 
according to the specific needs and requirements imposed by the way in which 
accumulation takes place in each case. Fractions of capital are consequently 
understood as “units other than individual capitals related to particular functions in 
the reproduction of capital” (van der Pijl, 2012:4). This functional division of 
capital is used by the Amsterdam Project to explain the tensions within the 
capitalist class through the concept of class fractions: “groups unified around a 
common economic and social function in the process of capital accumulation and 
sharing particular ideological propensities organically related to those functions” 
(van der Pijl, quoted in van Apeldoorn, 2002:27). Individual capitalists come 
together and join forces to defend their interests as fractions of the capitalist class, 
separately from and opposing others according to the function in the capital circuit 
that they deal with (van der Pijl, 2012:xv, 2004:183). The bourgeoisie, which 
when opposed to the working class appears so often as a homogeneous and 
compact class, has, actually, conflicting interests and structural cleavages. As van 
Apeldoorn puts it: “Conflict within the capitalist class is endemic inasmuch as 
competition is an essential principle of capitalist accumulation” (van Apeldoorn, 
2004a:154). 
The Amsterdam Project has identified two ideal and typical forms that fractions of 
capital assume (Overbeek, 1986:16). On the one hand, money capital represents 
“capital in its most general and abstract form, as it embodies the total process of 
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capital accumulation” (van Apeldoorn, 2002:28). In the money form, capital 
becomes disembedded from the production process and its technical and social 
requirements. Money capital appears as free floating, independent from spatial 
fixes and the social relations that gave origin to the value it represents. That is why 
financial capitalists’ ideology can be identified with Polanyi’s principle of 
economic liberalism (Ibid), free circulation and deregulation. On the other hand, 
productive capital is more directly tied to the actual process of production and the 
social forces that put it into motion. Industrial capitalists depend on labor, its 
performance, submission to discipline and reproduction; that is why they are more 
oriented toward the principle of social protection (Ibid). Since they are dependent 
on the working class to create and accumulate value, industrial capitalists will seek 
to “neutralise the conflict of interest between the classes on the one hand, and (…) 
emphasise the harmony of interests (e.g. in continued accumulation and growth) 
on the other” (Overbeek, 1986:17). 
Though class fractions are divided as a consequence of the functional nature of the 
capital they operate with, their common position in the mode of production 
(especially vis-à-vis the working class) may become a fertile ground for class 
formation. “May become”, I say, because there is no historical necessity involved. 
A shared position in the mode of production does not guarantee the emergence of 
class as a social actor. The institution of a social class as a political subjectivity is 
the outcome of the construction of common interests and collective identities 
(most probably) by those who occupy similar positions in the socioeconomic 
structure (van Apeldoorn, 2002:3,23). Class formation, then, finds its basis in the 
economic structure but transcends it; it is a specifically political process that 
institutes class as a social actor. It is in this sense that the connection of class to 
both structure and agency can be understood: “It refers on the one hand to the 
specific distribution of the conditions of action inherent in capitalist production 
relations and to the social positions emanating from that distribution, and on the 
other hand, to the agency constituted by those underlying socio-economic 
structure, or to the practices of the persons occupying the social positions related 
to those structures” (Ibid:22). Class is therefore understood as a “position-practice 
system” (cf. Bhaskar, 1979), where position and practices are mutually 
constitutive. In this same line, van der Pijl (2005:31) stated that “by embodying 
the structural inequalities of the social order, classes constitute the living reality of 
this structure”, and it is from this point of departure that social classes, as political 
subjects, unevenly contribute to the reproduction or transformation of capitalist 
social relations. 
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Class agency is described by van Apeldoorn (2002:3) as a higher form of political 
agency that is directed at the constitution of a general capital interest. It goes 
beyond the day-to-day lobbying and sectorial representation activities, defining a 
comprehensive view of the main interests of the capitalist class and how they can 
be best secured. The formation of the capitalist class requires a compromise 
solution for the divergent interests defended by the different class fractions. While 
the formation of class fractions might appear as a simpler enterprise due to shared 
functional roles, overcoming the often contradictory projects pursued by capitalist 
fractions will not prove to be simple. Of course, there is a common ground that 
brings them together and facilitates class formation, as their shared interest in 
“allowing the basic social conditions of the mode of production to be preserved 
and, if possible reinforced” (van der Pijl, 2012:7) is undeniable. Still, though their 
situation with respect to the means of production lays the ground for unification, 
their respective fractions of capital incite divergence. The positions around which 
the different fractions will come together will be the contingent result of the 
balance of forces among groups and their capacity to generalize their specific 
interest, that is, to present their particular project as the project of the capitalist 
class as a whole (van der Pijl, 2012). Van Apeldoorn offers a succinct and precise 
formulation of class formation as: 
a political process in which capitalists transcend the logic of market competition 
and reach a temporary unity of strategic orientation and purpose, enabling them to 
articulate (vis-à-vis other social classes or groups, as well as vis-à-vis the state) a 
“general capitalist interest”. Any formulation of the general capitalist interest is (…) 
always formulated from the perspective of what is only a section or “fraction” of 
total capital, a fraction that has temporarily achieved a leading position within the 
capitalist class. (Van Apeldoorn, 2004a:155) 
This is a continuous process that can be temporarily stabilized but is never 
definitely settled. Changes in the relative importance of capital fractions, in the 
overall balance of class power or the need to re-articulate the hegemonic 
construction that had cemented a social bloc, are all among other causes triggering 
the actualization of class formation. 
6.2 Comprehensive concepts of control 
Fractions of capital set the material basis around which class fractions are formed 
and a common position within the relations of production offers a common 
interest to ground their articulation into a single class actor. However, as I have 
already explained, shared structural positions and material conditions do not 
necessarily translate into class agency. For a class to acquire subjectivity, it is 
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necessary for its members to build a common project and this can only happen 
through political intervention. It is thus necessary to acknowledge the role that 
intersubjective and discursive dimensions play in the process of class formation 
(van Apeldoorn, 2004a:155). Individual capitalists – or class fractions – need to be 
able to imagine themselves as part of a wider community, as a group where the 
general interest transcends the fractional ones, and the possibility of constituting a 
single class actor appears as a logic consequence. The common structural position 
needs to be made visible in discourse and objective material conditions have to be 
complemented by conscious ideological constructions if class subjectivity is to be 
established. To explain the process through which class fractions merge into a 
class actor, through which special interests are arbitrated and synthetized (van der 
Pijl, 2012:7), the Amsterdam Project has developed the term of comprehensive 
concepts of control.
This theoretical category, at the heart of this stream, has been developed by many 
different authors, but at this point I will present the definition provided by Otto 
Holman according to which “concepts of control are long-term strategies, 
formulated in general terms and dealing in an integrated way with such areas as 
labor relations, socio-economic policies, and the international socio-economic and 
political order. These concepts serve to organize and safeguard specific interests 
related to specific social groups or classes” (Holman, 1996:20). Comprehensive 
concepts of control can be understood as frameworks of thought and practice (van 
Apeldoorn, 2004a:155) that lead to particular ways of interpreting reality and 
consequently, acting. They combine reflexive interpretations of capitalist 
development with answers to questions such as the best way to deal with social 
contradictions, producing and accumulating value, and regulating the relationship 
between the economic and political spheres. Comprehensive concepts of control 
are better understood as the conditions of possibility for specific actions and 
policies than those policies per se, as they appear “always implicit rather than 
explicit, a framework for thinking rather than a positive programme. It is what 
Pierre Bourdieu calls ‘a field of the politically thinkable’, a ‘legitimate 
problematic’” (van der Pijl, 2004:183). 
In the process of class formation, comprehensive concepts of control originate in 
the specific class fractions around which individual capitalists have clustered, 
using them as rallying points to unify and represent their interest. It is those same 
class fractions that put them forward and try to advance them as the concept of 
control to be defended by the capitalist class as a whole. Therefore, class 
formation makes different concepts of control compete. The result will not only 
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depend on the relative strengths of the different class fractions in the competition, 
but also on the capacity of a particular group to present its own interest as the 
interest of the class as a whole. Though concepts of control have fractional and 
interest-specific origins, they need to offer concrete material and symbolic 
compensations to the other groups by providing integrated political programs that 
combine “momentarily feasible and desired – if hardly ever mutually compatible – 
strategies of labor relations, competition, and domestic and international politics” 
(van der Pijl, 2012:7) that offer the potential to be generalized as the project of a 
single capitalist class, able to transcend its constitutive particularisms. 
While a comprehensive concept of control is firstly aimed at unifying the different 
views, identities and interests within a class, its ultimate goal is to spill over to the 
other social groups, gaining support and legitimacy as the representative of not 
just a social class, but the society’s general interest (van Apeldoorn, 2002:30). A 
comprehensive concept of control is not only fundamental in constituting a social 
class as an actor, but also in providing ideological and political legitimacy to the 
domination of a social class. In this sense, it works as a multi-layered process: 
A concept of control hence captures: the connection between the process of 
fractional and class realignment, highlighting the pivot around which it revolves in 
terms of fractions of capital (…) and the process of bringing on board other interests 
as the original vanguard strives for comprehensiveness, synthesizing or 
compromising with, and ultimately crowding out, other concepts. (van der Pijl, 
2009:251) 
To understand better the process through which class fractions become unified as 
a class around a comprehensive concept of control and seek to make it the 
dominant framework for interpreting and acting on reality, the Amsterdam Project 
returns to the Gramscian concept of hegemony. This is understood as “a form of 
moral leadership or rule based on consent rather than on (mere) coercion, although 
the latter is always in the background. As such it refers to an institutionalisation of 
a set of ideas and practices (…) constituting a structure of domination” (van 
Apeldoorn, 2002:20). Different class fractions come together to form a historical
bloc,9 that is, the concrete configuration of social forces connected by mutual 
interests and ideological perspectives that defend a shared project and seek to 
make their comprehensive concept of control hegemonic (cf. van Apeldoorn, 
2002:20; Holman, 1996:22,23). In the struggle for hegemony, a historical bloc 

9ItisimportanttohighlightthatinthePrisonNotebooks,Gramsciusestheterm“historicalbloc”inatleasttwo
alternativeways.Firstly,aspresentedintheintroductiontothischapter,ahistoricalblocrepresentsthe
dialecticalunionbetweenstructureandsuperstructure.Secondly,asdescribedinthisparagraph,ahistoricalbloc
representstheallianceofdifferentclassfractionsundertheleadershipofahegemonicgroup.
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with its comprehensive concept of control does not necessarily need to impose its 
own vision of the world on the totality. Instead, its main challenge is to find a way 
of articulating particular concepts of control in such a way that their potential 
antagonism becomes neutralized (Holman, 1996:20). In this process, dominant 
class fractions need to present their own interest as the general interest. However, 
this is not just a rhetorical practice. Actual compromises with other groups need to 
be achieved in such a way that some of their interests become part of the 
hegemonic project but without hurting the hardcore interests defended by the 
leading class fraction: “By building hegemonic coalitions, incorporating or 
otherwise neutralizing countervailing forces, the aspect of generality is 
temporarily secured without ever truly transcending the particularity that is 
inherent in the concept of class itself” (van der Pijl, 2012:xv). However, even the 
most powerful groups at the heart of a historical bloc have to pay a price for 
successfully presenting their individual interest as the general one. No longer can 
they pursue their interest openly and directly, since they now have been become 
the leading force of a wider alliance that is composed of a growing number of 
class fractions and social segments (van der Pijl, 2004:184). 
A concept of control, therefore, represents a bid for hegemony: “a project for the 
conduct of public affairs and social control that aspires to be a legitimate 
approximation of the general interest in the eyes of the ruling class and, at the 
same time, the majority of the population, for at least a specific period” (van der 
Pijl, 2012:7). This last clarification highlights the contingent and transitory nature 
of any hegemonic concept of control and historical bloc. These phenomena should 
not be understood “conspiratorially”, as if they were imposed by the will of a 
social group. They are actually the unpredictable outcome (though within given 
conditions) of struggles among classes and among class fractions: a hegemonic 
concept of control “is shaped, and continuously reshaped, in the process of 
struggle, compromise and re-adjustment” (Overbeek, 2004:115) 
The inherently conflictive dynamics that emerges as different social groups 
attempt to impose their own concept of control as hegemonic can be better 
understood through the concept of war of position. Gramsci, by analogy to 
military strategy, contrasts the concepts of war of maneuver and war of position. 
The war of maneuver, which Gramsci sometimes describes as the strategy of 
“frontal attack”, is directed against “political society”, that is, against the formal 
state institutions. Its final goal is to overthrow the leading classes that manage the 
state and replace them by the subaltern ones. According to Gramsci, the last 
successful example of such a strategy was the Russian revolution of 1917. 
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However, when trying to analyze the conditions for a revolutionary transformation 
in Italy – or Western Europe, more generally – he is skeptical about the potential 
of such a strategy: 
In my view, Ilyich [Lenin] understood the need for a shift from the war of maneuver 
that had been applied victoriously in the East in 1917, to a war of position, which 
was the only viable possibility in the West (…) In the East, the state was everything, 
civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation 
between state and civil society, and when the state tottered, a sturdy structure of 
civil society was immediately revealed. The state was just a forward trench; behind 
it stood a succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements. (Gramsci, 
2011c:168,169) 
Lurking behind this distinction between the war of maneuver and the war of 
position we find Gramsci’s concept of integral state, which he defines as: 
“political society + civil society” (Gramsci, 2014:763) or “dictatorship + 
hegemony” (Ibid:810). This notion seeks to expand and transcend a restricted 
understanding of the state as the sum of political institutions endowed with the 
power to coerce, by making civil society not its opposite (i.e. the realm of the 
private, everything that is non-state), but a constitutive dimension that forms the 
arena where the struggle for granting legitimacy to state power takes place. In this 
sense, state power (class rule) is only possible because it is perceived as legitimate 
by those over which this power is exercised, and this legitimacy is debated, 
contested and constructed by and across the multiple institutions that are part of 
civil society. Gramsci defines those institutions and organizations from civil 
society (including, for example, schools, religious entities, the press, private firms, 
political parties, museums and clubs) as the particular trenches where the struggle 
for hegemony (i.e., for imposing a particular concept of control that would justify 
political praxis) is to be fought: “The massive structures of the modem 
democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil 
society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the ‘trenches’ and the permanent 
fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely ‘partial’ the 
element of movement which before used to be ‘the whole’ of war” (Gramsci, 
1992:243). 
Highlighting the conflictive and polemic nature of comprehensive concepts of 
control shows the inherent interrelation between the political and economic 
dimensions of class domination and struggle. It does so by linking the structural 
conditions, the places certain groups occupy in the mode of production, and the 
objective material interests that are derived from them, with the ideological and 
political strategies through which these groups come together and constitute class 
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fractions, social classes and historical blocs. This concept works also as a bridge 
between the structural conditions that produce shared material conditions for 
particular groups of people and the political agency that is necessary to give entity 
and reality to social classes as social actors. While comprehensive concepts of 
control “find their basis in specific fractional interests (…) at the same time 
transcend the narrow economic field, and necessarily so, because these class 
strategies can only be realised through the political and ideological arena” 
(Overbeek, 1986:16). 
The Amsterdam Project has identified two ideal-typical comprehensive concepts 
of control, which are derived from the already mentioned functional forms of 
capital and thereby express the antinomic positions in which capitalists are 
engaged: the productive capital concept and the money capital concept. The 
former derives from the productive capital function and is structurally linked to 
industrial capitalists. As such, it reflects the productive process and the social 
process where real submission to capital takes place (Overbeek, 2004:119). For 
industrial capitalists, profit appears as the result of the productive function. This 
concept is concerned with neutralizing the conflictive potential present in the 
relations of production, the way in which labor processes are executed and 
controlled, as well as the requirements for and conditions of reproduction. In this 
sense, the productive-capital concept of control includes some of the interests of 
the working class as a political strategy directed to achieving hegemony but also 
because of the specific relationship that they establish due to the productive 
function of capital. The money-capital concept is the one structurally linked to 
financial capitalists, who act as agents in the process of circulation. As bearers of 
fictitious capital, financial capitalists tend to understand money as capital-in-
general, as value in an abstract form, and thereby neglect the social process that 
was at the basis of its creation. Since they relate to surplus creation only through 
circulation, financial capitalists are not interested in the process of production and 
hence advocate a concept of control “in which free flow of their merchandise, 
dividends, or cash crops is guaranteed by a set of conditions including free trade, 
unhampered competition, and cosmopolitanism”. In van der Pijl’s main historical 
study The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (1984/2012), however, it is 
concluded that these ideal-types are found in a synthetic combination in the 
Atlantic area after the Second World War. The corporate-liberal concept emerged 
as a result of the internationalization of productive capital, whose new levels of 
mobility made it more independent of the spatial constraints than it had known up 
to then, bringing it closer to the interest of money capital for more fluid circulation 
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(Holman, 1996:22). State monopolism, that is, a state strongly engaged in the 
mediation between capitalists and workers, was preserved but further events saw 
regulation leading to a more flexible format of labor (van der Pijl, 2012:10). By 
the end of the 1980s, transnational capitalists saw their forces reinvigorated and 
the promotion of a new concept of control began: neoliberalism. Its main goal was 
the dismantling of the welfare state and the restructuring of social relations in 
favor of private enterprises and their interests (van Apeldoorn, 2004a:159–60). It 
emerged from an alliance of the most transnationalized sections of industrial 
capital and liberalized global financial capitalists. 
6.3 The transnational scale 
The third element that I am interested in taking from the Amsterdam Project is 
their criticism of state centrism. This can be appreciated in two different ways: 
first, they reject theories that consider the state as an autonomous agent and the 
main player in world politics; second, they show the futility of explaining 
contemporary capitalist relations and class agency using the state as a scale of 
reference (van Apeldoorn, 2002, 2004a; Overbeek, 2004; Holman, 1996). 
Regarding the first point, the Amsterdam Project only considers the state in 
connection to capitalist relations and the social forces that give them content. 
Since it is not an autonomous entity, independent of the social balance of power 
between class fractions and the historical moment of capitalism, it cannot be 
understood as an actor. Instead, it is proposed to “view them [states] as structures 
that are reproduced or transformed by (transnational) social forces” (van 
Apeldoorn, 2004a:146). They seek to overcome a reified conception of the state 
by embedding it in a broader field of social relations. And it is precisely this focus 
on social relations (of production) that demonstrates the difficulties of working 
with the state as the main spatial framework of reference for examining 
contemporary social processes and actors. A closer look at this leads to their 
theorization of “the transnational”. 
Understanding the relation between states and societies as a relational whole was 
an important first step, but taking societies seriously into the analysis led to the 
recognition that “national” classes or social groups have increasingly engaged in 
social relations that overflow the borders of the nation state. This process has been 
particularly boosted by the historical expansion of capitalism on a global scale, in 
which relations of production between social groups belonging to different state-
society complexes, or equally attached to more than one, have been established. 
The transnationalization of capital and the concomitant formation of a capitalist 
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world market were at the base of the growth of transnational social relations, 
mainly economic at the beginning, but rapidly followed by political, cultural and 
social ones. That is why social relations of production are the most fundamental 
for understanding the transnational character of social reality. This emphasis on 
social relations makes clear how different groups of people become connected 
transnationally and demands the conceptualization of transnational social relations 
as “social relations across and beyond ‘national’ borders” (van Apeldoorn, 
2004a:161), structures that link social lives irrespective of state frontiers. This 
perspective, additionally, helped to overcome the national/international 
dichotomy, subordinating this conceptualization to the dynamics of social 
relations. Framing social phenomena a priori as national or international or trying 
to make them fit within any of these categories forces reality into concepts. 
Beginning the analysis with the very same social relations, on the other hand, 
allows their singularities and specificities to be grasped, irrespective of the scale(s) 
at which they take place. This concern is at the heart of their understanding of “the 
transnational”, which is not defined as a level in opposition to the national or the 
local level – or synonymous with the international or world level – but as “a 
phenomenon that extends across, and thereby links as well as transcends, different 
(territorial) ‘levels’” (van Apeldoorn, 2002:144). 
The transnationalization of the productive process has engendered the 
transnationalization of social forces. It has become, therefore, possible for a 
transnational agency to emerge, constituting “non-state (private) actors whose 
identities and practices transcend the boundaries of a single ‘national’ society” 
(Ibid:2). The primacy of the relations of production in the constitution of the 
structural framework where agency takes place puts classes (or their fractions) 
among the main actors. Capitalist globalization has laid the ground for class 
formation to take place at the transnational level. One of the main arguments put 
forward by the Amsterdam Project is that classes form transnationally (van 
Apeldoorn, 2004a:144): the grouping into fractions and their constitution as a 
class, the generation and defense of a comprehensive concept of control, and the 
struggle for hegemony are phenomena that the globalization of the capitalist 
relation of production has made essentially transnational. However, it is to be 
highlighted that transnational class formation has been mainly restricted to the 
capitalist class. This happens because, through the expansion of capital and the 
internationalization of the productive process, it is mainly capitalists (and not 
workers) who get in contact with each other, not only through private transactions 
and business, but most importantly in transnational forums and planning groups 
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(van der Pijl, 2012), which provide channels for the different capitalist fractions to 
constitute a unified class politically. Hence, even though the possibility of class 
formation at the transnational level is very concrete, this process is mostly 
available to those social forces “whose material interests and key ideas (within a 
broader political consciousness) are bound up with the progressive 
transnationalisation and liberalization of the global political economy” (Gill, 
quoted in van Apeldoorn, 2002:32). Its position in the social relations of 
production, gives transnational capital a privileged structural power that can be 
appreciated at a material level, in its greater “exit option” – the possibility of 
relocating with relative ease – and at an ideological level, in its aspiration (and an 
easier access to the necessary means) to represent the general capital interest (van 
Apeldoorn, 2004a:159). The transnational capital class (or its fractions) appears 
then as one of the key players in the definition and shaping of transnational 
political and economic phenomena. 
7. Advancing the Amsterdam Project 
The main concepts developed by the Amsterdam Project act as a complement to 
the Regulation Approach. They offer better tools to account for the role of agency, 
ideology and the political dynamics that emerge from their interrelations and make 
possible the development of a theoretical perspective capable of critically 
examining Fair Trade. However, some characteristics of my object of study call 
for still further conceptual refinement. More specifically, my case study is about a 
Fair Trade agro-industrial sector in a developing country, evidencing in this way 
some characteristics that cannot be easily grasped within the Amsterdam Project’s 
original formulation. As a consequence, three issues require closer consideration: 
first, the sectorial dimension of my study vis-à-vis Amsterdam’s macro 
perspective; second, the challenge posed by non-governmental organizations 
(important actors in the Fair Trade system) to a class-based analytical framework; 
third, the relatively simplistic take on subaltern classes and their relations – in 
comparison to capitalist fractions – in the analyses developed by the Amsterdam 
Project. The first problem, I argue, can be overcome within the Amsterdam 
Project’s current framework by clarifying the implications of adopting a sectorial 
approach, and that is why my discussion of it will be shorter. The second and third 
points, instead, pose bigger challenges with no ready-made answers in the original 
neo-Gramscian work and, as a consequence, they will require closer examination. 
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7.1 Sectorial adaptations 
The first of these issues is analogous to the discussion on the sectorial application 
of the Regulation Approach. In this case, too, we are faced with the challenge of 
applying concepts that have been developed to account for global phenomena to 
much more restricted, sectorial, realities. Fair Trade, as has been explained, has 
been almost exclusively applied to agricultural value chains and, besides some 
exceptional cases – sports balls and gold – the current tendency seems to privilege 
a consolidation within this sector over an expansion to others. Additionally, its 
requirements for small producer organizations, southern production and 
international trade only deepen its already marked sectorial nature. 
In relation to class formation, this means that class fractions and their articulation 
pre-exist the Fair Trade sphere, as they are formed and struggle in society at large.
Nevertheless, Fair Trade provides an arena, within this overall frame, where the 
possibility for alternative class configurations can occur. As a consequence, class 
formation, its articulation in a historical bloc, power relations and hierarchies 
should be based on the juxtaposition of the overall system of social relations 
evidenced by the mode of production as a whole and the system of positions that, 
within that broader frame, the Fair Trade system manages to articulate. These two 
systems of position, nevertheless, should be understood in hierarchical order: since 
class fractions find their origin in the function they perform in the mode of 
production, the emerging system of positions acquires analytical priority over that 
developed by Fair Trade. This is because the latter, even if capable of putting 
forward alternative structures, is nevertheless still operating within the former’s 
original frame. 
In relation to comprehensive concepts of control, the sectorial dimension implies a 
more restricted interpretation. While concepts of control are macro world-views, 
capable of providing frames to define what is politically thinkable and what is not, 
their application to the Fair Trade sphere needs to take into account the sectorial 
dimension of this field. As such, a Fair Trade concept of control does not propose 
a political project for the organization of society as a whole, but is instead 
restricted to the particular domains of relevance (as mentioned before, agriculture, 
small producers, international trade, etc.). As a consequence, a Fair Trade concept 
of control cannot be granted the same analytical level as the corporate liberal or 
neoliberal concepts of control – which entail a macro world-view encompassing 
the social order as a whole – but should rather be understood as a sectorial 
equivalent. Thus, a similar argument to that of class relations can be made, since a 
Fair Trade concept of control is to be understood as operating within the frame of 
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a broader, already hegemonic, concept of control. Given this different ontological 
scope, the struggle for hegemony by a Fair Trade concept of control should also be 
understood as a localized attempt, that is, as a struggle for hegemony within the 
more limited sectorial field implicit in the concept itself. 
7.2 The role of non-governmental organizations 
The attempt to reconstruct the system of positions and relations composed by the 
actors involved in the creation of a Fair Trade concept of control poses a question 
with no obvious answer in the initial analytical framework: where do we place – 
and how are they to be analyzed – the variety of actors that can be grouped under a 
pure Fair Trade category? Put differently, how is the role of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and their networks to be accounted for in a conceptual 
framework that is drawn following a class-based analysis? 
The Fair Trade category of actors is composed of a large number of NGOs and 
other groups that are commonly classified as belonging to the broader “civil 
society”. Particularly interesting about this category of agency is its a priori 
disconnection from class structures and class interests. While NGOs are usually 
portrayed as a form of organization that can be understood by opposition to the 
state or political parties, their relation vis-à-vis the class structure has been much 
less explored. Therefore, in my analysis I will not only apply the conceptual 
framework developed by the Amsterdam Project, but will also seek to expand it to 
account for the agency and position of NGOs within a class-based analytical 
framework.
From a historical materialist perspective, where social classes are defined by their 
relation to the means of production, NGOs do not present, a priori, any obvious 
linkage to the productive system. As a consequence, if one is to develop a 
conceptualization of NGOs within a class framework, this cannot be done in terms 
of a “class actor”, as some critical literature attempts to do (see, for example, 
McSweeney, 2014). Such an understanding of NGOs as class actors should be 
replaced by an interpretation that sees them, instead, as arenas where different 
class fractions struggle for their direction. In what follows, I will explain two main 
ways in which such an understanding of NGOs can, firstly, move forward the 
conceptualization of them and, secondly, contribute to my analysis. 
First, because “NGOs nowadays are a very decisive part of these ‘private 
initiatives’” (Brand, 2001:16) that constitute the domain of civil society, they 
could be understood as some of the “trenches” where the struggle for hegemony 
77

takes place. From this point of view, NGOs would be a more relevant type of 
institution within civil society, where the struggle between social classes for the 
imposition of their comprehensive concepts of control develops. As a 
consequence, the relation of NGOs to class interests will depend on the balance of 
forces achieved by the relevant social classes: “The ambivalence of civil society 
lies in the fact that here not only are hegemonic tendencies formulated but 
alternative concepts and counter-hegemonic strategies can evolve. Part of the 
interest in NGOs as ‘actors in civil society’ which possibly incorporate other 
interest and rationalities and bring them into the political process stems from 
precisely this fact” (Ibid:8). Thus, conceptualizing NGOs as structures embedded 
within civil society – instead of considering them actors that respond either to 
hegemonic or counter-hegemonic forcers – opens the analysis to the complexity of 
historical contingencies, avoiding the risks of offering a functionalist reading of 
their origins and goals. 
Second, as far as the Fair Trade initiative under examination has been developed 
and is nowadays articulated around a network of NGOs, it is possible to see them 
as constituting the structural framework that governs the Fair Trade system. That 
is, the constellation of NGOs that have come together to put forward this system 
as we know it (and especially Fairtrade International, a federation of national Fair 
Trade initiatives) can be better understood as the structure that shapes, 
administers, regulates, but also acts and speaks for, the overall Fair Trade system. 
In this sense, it is particularly enriching to interpret NGOs more generally, and 
Fairtrade International in particular, by analogy with the state. 
There are many good reasons to justify the conceptualization of NGOs by analogy 
with the state. First, because, as Joachim Hirsch has highlighted, in the context of 
neoliberalism the weakening of state power and the emergence of NGOs has 
produced a transfer of functions and resources from the former to the latter: 
“NGOs indicate how formally private organizations take on the characteristics of a 
state or how organs of the state become ‘privatised’” (Hirsch, 2003:8). In this 
sense, Hirsch wonders whether NGOs can actually be understood as following a 
logic of their own, to be explained within the boundaries of civil society, or 
whether they actually resemble and reproduce a state logic, making it more 
appropriate to consider them as part of an “extended state” (Ibid:18). Second, if 
we look at the role that NGOs play in the Fair Trade system, it is difficult not to 
agree with its resemblance to the state’s role in society. The network of NGOs that 
constitute Fairtrade International provide the institutional framework through 
which the Fair Trade system is reproduced and governed. Fairtrade International 
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itself, plus all the different non-profit bodies that compose it – FLO-Cert, National 
Initiatives, and marketing organizations – represent the specialized organisms that 
are responsible for the effective working of the system. Furthermore, this being a 
private governance initiative, the absence of state power makes Fairtrade 
International the highest political authority – at least formally – of this system. 
The perspective adopted here begins with the assumption that “the state-as-actor 
model is problematic inasmuch it does not make sense to separate the capitalist 
state from the social forces — whether national or transnational — that give 
content to it”, privileging instead a conception of states as “structures that are 
reproduced or transformed by (transnational) social forces” (van Apeldoorn, 
2004:146). What this means is that the state is better understood as a social 
relation than as a unitary rational actor. Thus, the particular world-views and 
political positioning adopted by the state at a particular historical moment will 
depend on the current balance of forces: “The state is neither a neutral instance 
with a rational purpose nor the ‘instrument of the ruling class(es)’, but the specific 
and material condensation of societal relationships of forces” (Brand, 2001:7). 
Common to both standpoints – one that sees NGOs as key civil society institutions 
in the struggle for hegemony and the other that focuses on their role as a structure 
of governance of the Fair Trade system by drawing on an analogy with the state – 
is the requisite to reject any a priori functionalist reading of the relationship of 
NGOs to the class structure or particular social classes. To understand NGOs as a 
set of social relations implies that  concrete historical analyses must determine 
whether certain NGOs are acting in defense of particular class interests or not. 
7.3 The role of subaltern classes 
While the Amsterdam Project has put forward very interesting developments with 
the goal of analyzing agency in terms of class fractions and class formation, two 
main features of the way in which they have done so limit the applicability of their 
approach to my case study: firstly, their analysis has been restricted to “advanced 
capitalist societies”. This has meant that their work has been based on the 
opposition between capitalist fractions and an industrial working class, offering 
little insights about how other subordinated groups could be conceptualized. 
Secondly, the focus put by the Amsterdam Project on transnationalization, “a 
process thus far largely restricted to (fractions) of the capitalist class” (van 
Apeldoorn, 2004a:144), has meant that most of their theoretical discussions and 
empirical analyses have been concerned with capitalist fractions, offering little 
insights or concept development for what they seem to portray as a single and 
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homogeneous working class. The combination of these two features is evidence 
that the Amsterdam Project is still a limited framework for looking at the 
subordinated side of the class structure and offer a more complex picture of its 
internal cleavages – as it has done so well for the capitalist class. In this section, 
therefore, I propose to overcome this weakness by resorting to the Gramscian 
concept of subalternity. As will be now shown, this category offers the possibility 
of conceptualizing the cleavages that divide, and the commonalities that bring 
together, those groups positioned at the bottom of the system of class positions. As 
a consequence, the concept of subalternity makes it possible to offer a more 
detailed picture of the class fractions that stand in the antipodes to capital. 
The concept of subalternity or the subaltern had never been of major relevance for 
Gramsci’s readers until the Subaltern Studies Project brought it to the fore (Green, 
2011:237). By the end of the 1970s, the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group had 
reunited a group of scholars whose main goal was to write histories of colonial 
India and the formation of the Indian nation “from below”, as a reaction to what 
up to then had been a monopoly of elitist historiography (Chaturvedi, 2012). Such 
an attempt at accounting for the political agency of non-elite or dominated groups 
in India entailed not only the rejection of bourgeois-nationalist historiography, but 
also of the approach developed by Marxism. As their main focus was on colonial 
India, their histories from below were not written primarily about industrial 
workers – a minoritarian group in an area of incipient capitalism – but had 
peasants as the main characters. In the view of the Subaltern Studies Group, 
Marxist historiography, as incarnated in the work of Eric Hobsbawm, gave 
primacy to the working class as the most relevant political actor from below, 
dismissing peasants as a pre-political group, incapable of developing class 
consciousness and a unified political program (Staricco, 2014). If Subaltern 
Studies were to write stories of colonial India from below, they needed to develop 
a conceptual framework capable of overcoming the working class fixation of 
Marxist historiography and including the political agency of the peasants. The 
answer to this challenge was found in Gramsci’s work in general and his concept 
of subalternity specifically. 
As with other Gramscian concepts, the idea of subalternity was not systematically 
and explicitly developed by the author. Instead, many mentions of the concept are 
scattered throughout his Prison Notebooks (Gramsci, 2014), with the most 
relevant fragments having been brought together and rewritten by Gramsci in 
notebook 25 entitled: “At the margins of history (History of the subaltern social 
groups)”. Gramsci always speaks of subaltern groups or subaltern classes in the 
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plural, implying the existence of a variety of subaltern actors who cannot all be 
reduced to a common denominator. That is why Gramsci states that: “The 
subaltern classes, by definition, are not unified and cannot unite until they are able 
to become a ‘State’” (Gramsci, 1992:52). That is, subaltern classes are better 
understood as fractions, as differentiated groups that are atomized by definition 
and, therefore, represent a heterogeneous sector of society. This is precisely why 
Guha (and the Subaltern Studies Group) became interested in the concept of the 
subaltern, because it expands the horizons of the more restrictive notion of the 
working class to account for other subordinated groups of a social formation. 
Hence, subalternity, according to Guha, is characterized by “the diversity of its 
social composition” (Guha, 2012:4). What can be appreciated in the fact that “in 
notebook 25, Gramsci identifies slaves, peasants, religious groups, women, 
different races and the proletariat as subaltern social groups” (Green, 2002:2). 
David Arnold supports this view when he expresses that “at a minimal evaluation 
it [the term ‘subaltern’] can be regarded as little more than a convenient shorthand 
for a variety of subordinated class – industrial workers, peasants, laborers, 
artisans, shepherds and so forth” (Arnold, 2012:32). It is worth highlighting 
Arnold’s expression “at a minimal evaluation”, as this indicates that the concept of 
subalternity cannot be exhausted by identifying it with a formation of 
heterogeneous social groups. While heterogeneity is undoubtedly one of 
subalternity’s defining features, so is the idea of a shared social position, a certain 
common ground that allows the social researcher to place these heterogeneous 
social groups together within a same category. 
Subaltern classes, therefore, can be understood as part of a wider group when we 
look at their common position vis-à-vis dominant classes: “Subaltern groups are 
always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise” 
(Gramsci, 1992:55). Thus, what is specific to subaltern groups is their 
subordination “to the power, will, influence, leadership and direction of a 
dominant group or a ‘single combination’ of dominant groups” (Green, 2011:400). 
Subaltern classes are victims of an “ensemble of political, social, cultural or 
economic relations that produce marginalization and prevent group autonomy” 
(Green, 2002:15). This last attribute, as Arnold (2012:30) highlights, is the 
hallmark of hegemonic classes. In Gramsci’s words: “As subaltern groups lack 
political autonomy, their ‘defensive’ initiatives are compelled by their own laws of 
necessity, simpler, more limited and politically more compressive than the laws of 
historical necessity that direct and condition the actions of the dominant class” 
(Gramsci, 2014:2285). Thus, the differences between subaltern groups seem to 
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become minor details when they are confronted by the ruling classes, as this 
perspective sheds light on the common oppression and exploitation exercised by 
the latter on the former. This is highlighted by Guha, who explains that in spite of 
the original heterogeneity among subaltern groups, the subalternity common to all 
(characterized by the conditions of exploitation to which they are subjected and 
the close relation to productive labor of the majority) distinguishes them sharply 
from the elite and provides fertile ground for the development of resistance (Guha, 
2012:4). However, this should be understood in a non-deterministic way, as the 
potentiality for the unification of subaltern classes will depend on the historical 
conditions of the period under examination and the particular balance between 
disintegrating and integrating tendencies. As Guha noted in his empirical studies: 
“There were occasions when its emphasis on sectorial interests disequilibrated 
popular movements in such a way as to create economistic diversions and 
sectarian splits, and generally to undermine horizontal alliances” (Ibid). What this 
last remark should remind us of is that, even if we talk about a subaltern “pole”, 
“group” or “class” in the singular, this entity is always crossed by a tension 
between the heterogeneous origins of its members and a common ground vis-à-vis 
the capitalist or hegemonic class. 
While in some of the quotes above a variety of groups have been mentioned as 
paradigmatic examples of subalterns (proletariat, peasants, women, artisans, 
slaves, etc.), it is important to bear in mind Green’s remark when he explains that 
“the specificity of subalternity is relative to the social, political, economic and 
cultural conditions subordinate social groups confront in specific social 
formations” (Green, 2011:400). Therefore, those groups that form part of a 
subaltern class cannot be defined nominally, but are to be relationally identified in 
the specific social formation and historical period under study. These criteria 
should not be restricted to the identification of those who constitute a subaltern 
group, but also should be deployed in the analysis of the main features that 
subalternity acquires in each particular context – a fact Gramsci himself was very 
well aware of when discussing the dangers of historical analogies: “Even if 
ancient slaves and medieval proletarians were in many aspects under the same 
conditions, their situation was not identical” (Gramsci, 2014:2287). 
It is worth highlighting that when I talk about a subaltern class here, it is more 
from a class-in-itself than a class-for-itself perspective. The Subaltern Studies 
Project was interested in showing that “subaltern classes” have a relatively 
important role as political agents. While Guha still acknowledges that there is not 
a subaltern class for it- in the traditional Marxist sense (cf. Guha, 1983; Staricco, 
82

2014) and that subaltern groups act heterogeneously and without coordination, the 
interesting point here is that the subaltern scholars were looking for concepts and a 
methodology able to account for the agency of subaltern classes. Therefore, they 
were more interested in the dimension of a class-for-itself (subjectivity) than of a 
class-in-itself (objective conditions). In this work, instead, I am more interested in 
the objective dimension of these subaltern classes, since I am not trying to account 
for a unitary subaltern political agency with a shared program and goals, but the 
similarities in their structural positions that might lead to the development of 
common interests and common antagonisms vis-à-vis capital. 
8. Conclusion
This chapter has presented the regulationist framework that will guide my analysis 
of Fair Trade in the Argentinean wine sector. The proposed theoretical perspective 
draws on the French Regulation Approach and its most central concepts: modes of 
regulation, regimes of accumulation, modes of development and structural forms 
(wage relation, money, competition, state and international insertion). While the 
original perspective was developed at a macroeconomic level, in this chapter I 
have proposed their adaptation to sectorial realities. This has entailed not only 
some considerations on the implications of the transition from one scale to the 
other, but also the inclusion of a sixth structural form: the representation of the 
product. Hence, this sectorial version of the Regulation Approach will be used as 
the main analytical framework to assess how Fair Trade attempts to structure 
(alternative) socioeconomic relations. 
However, as has been highlighted, the Regulation Approach suffers from three 
main problems. First, it tends to privilege the analysis of economic factors at the 
expense of political, ideological and cultural elements. Second, the centrality it 
grants to institutions and social structures relegates to a marginal position the role 
of agency in their reproduction and transformation. Third, its use of the nation 
state as the “natural” frame of analysis reduces the applicability of this approach to 
transnational processes. To overcome these weaknesses, a complementation with 
the Amsterdam Project was proposed. The introduction of the concepts of class 
fractions and class formation provides the conceptual tools necessary for the 
analysis of agency in capitalist social formations. The notion of comprehensive 
concepts of controls – and the closely related idea of hegemony – allows us to 
grasp the multiple interrelations and co-determinations that connect economic, 
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political and cultural elements. Lastly, framing the analysis within a transnational 
scale permits to transcend the regulationist fixation with the nation state. 
Nevertheless, the original framework put forward by the Amsterdam Project 
demanded further refinement for it to be fruitfully applied to the case of 
Argentinean Fair Trade wine. As a consequence, three developments were 
provided: first, a discussion of the possibilities and limitations posed by the 
adaptation of global concepts to the sectorial level; second, a proposal for the 
inclusion of NGOs in class-based accounts of agency; and, lastly, the introduction 
of Gramsci’s concept of subalternity to overcome the limited theoretical 
reflections provided by the Amsterdam Project in relation to subordinated classes. 
Overall, the inclusion of this conceptual perspective will make possible the 
analysis of the political processes and ideological struggles that have shaped Fair 
Trade as we now know it. Thus, the Amsterdam-inspired part of the analysis will 
provide the most important elements for explaining the results found in the 
assessment through the application of the most central regulationist categories. 
The next chapter will explain the specific way in which these concepts will be put 
to work together to provide answers to the research questions that guide this 
dissertation.
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Chapter 2: Methodological considerations 
This chapter presents the most relevant methodological assumptions and decisions 
that have shaped my research process.  It is divided into two main sections. The 
first discusses the nature of case study and its potential and limitations for the 
production of knowledge. To do so, I begin by presenting two opposite 
perspectives: a particularist one, according to which case studies produce rich and 
in-depth knowledge of a single phenomenon, and a generalizing one, which states 
that a case can be representative of a larger group and, therefore, the knowledge 
obtained can be generalized. After highlighting the limitations of both positions, I 
propose to overcome them by introducing a dialectical approach to case studies. 
According to this perspective, a case is considered to be a thread that the 
researcher has ripped off of a wider social fabric and constructed as a unit of 
analysis, as a case. Consequently, a case should be better understood as a 
heterogeneous unit crossed by some general and some unique determinations. This 
means that examining a single case allows the researcher to draw a variety of 
conclusions, ranging from very concrete and specific to very abstract and general 
levels. This first section of the chapter finishes with the justification of my chosen 
case of analysis. 
The second section of this chapter presents my overall research design. It begins 
by describing the main moments of my research process in light of the dialectical 
approach to case study. Lastly, it presents the various ways in which empirical 
data was collected and analyzed, specifying the differentiated strategies that were 
used during each of the moments of the process of inquiry.  
1. Case study: a dialectical approach 
This section begins with the presentation of particularist and generalizing 
perspectives on case studies. After having shown their inherent limitations, it 
proposes instead a dialectical understanding of the relation between the general 
and the particular in case-based research. It is within this framework that the 
justification for the choice of my case is presented.  
1.1 Particularist and generalizing perspectives 
The assessment of Fair Trade proposed in this dissertation is done through the 
analysis of one particular case. In opposition to Robert Yin (2009), who proposes 
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to understand case study as a “research method”, I would rather agree with Robert 
Stake when he states that “case study is not a methodological choice but a choice 
of what is to be studied” (Stake, 2005:443). A case study approach is not to be 
understood as a particular methodology because it is not intrinsically related to 
any particular set of methods; even if it is commonly used in qualitative research 
designs, it is actually compatible with a variety of methodological traditions. 
Instead, I consider much more appropriate to identify a case study with a particular 
logic of inquiry that attempts to analyze a social phenomenon through the close 
examination of one of its concrete manifestations.
Developing a research design around a case study, hence, provides with one 
specific entry point to social reality, as it offers a particular way of delimiting the 
empirical reference of our enterprise. In this sense, the case study is not only the 
process through which our object of study will be analyzed, but is also related to 
the construction of this object in itself: “a case study is both a process of inquiry 
about the case and the product of that inquiry” (Stake, 2005:444). Therefore, the 
case study approach is characterized not so much by the identification and 
selection of a unit of analysis as it is found in the social world but, instead, by the 
construction of the case itself: by the enunciation of the main characteristics that 
make it a case of a broader category or class and the drawing of the borders that 
make it a particular and specific phenomenon – different from other cases – within 
that same category or class. Therefore, a case study is an approach that strips off a 
thread from the overall fabric of social reality and, in order to make it accessible to 
the process of analysis, builds it as a case. The key feature of a case study 
approach, consequently, is not so much defined by its interest in a single unit of 
analysis but, instead, by the way in which the case has been constructed and is 
understood. 
The overall logic adopted by a research design based on a case study will change 
fundamentally according to the understanding that the researcher has of the case 
and its relation to the general. In this respect, it is possible to find two main 
positions in the current literature on case studies. On the one hand, we find those 
researchers who consider that the main strength of a case study is given by its 
capacity to produce a meticulous analysis of the singularities presented by a 
specific case: “case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of 
the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, 
programme or system in a ‘real life’ context” (Simons, 2009:21). This 
particularist paradigm sees case study as a powerful tool for the detailed 
examination of the multiple aspects evidenced by a single phenomenon vis-à-vis 
86

those other approaches that prioritize the study of a high number of cases at the 
expense of  the level of detail of the analysis. As a consequence of its exclusive 
engagement with the individual case, the particularist point of view rejects the 
possibility of producing any knowledge that could be generalized:  
What is of interest is the uniqueness of the thing and the thing in its completeness. 
Being about one thing, it is about the particular, rather than the general. You can’t 
generalize from one thing, so there is no point in trying to do so – no point, in other 
words, in trying to say, “this is the case here, so it is also the case there, there and 
there” (Thomas, 2011:3). 
This particularist understanding of case studies, however, seems to neglect the 
essential fact that a case is always “a case of”. If a case is always “an instance of a 
class of phenomena” (Ibid:22), it means that, by definition, it is always connected 
to a higher level of abstraction, to the more general features of its encompassing 
group. Therefore, case studies are never purely singular, specific, but are always 
understood as a case of something. Consequently, there is always some degree of 
generalization. This happens from the very moment of defining the case, as no 
intellectual endeavor could be done without abstracting from reality certain 
features in order to create its research object. Additionally, if the conclusions 
obtained from the analysis of a case were just limited to its peculiarities, the 
relevance of this approach could be questioned, since it would be able to provide 
detailed accounts of multiple individual cases, but never a single statement about a 
more general level of aggregation. Translated to my research topic this means that 
one could produce hundreds of different analyses of Fair Trade products in 
different geographical areas, without ever being able to say something about the 
Fair Trade system in general. A perspective that emphasizes the uniqueness of the 
case and its specificities as intrinsically valuable in themselves – without resorting 
to a more general level for their justification – runs the risk of diverting towards an 
anecdotal position.
On the other hand, we find a generalizing understanding of case studies, according 
to which the study of a case can offer the grounds for more general conclusions: 
“one can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be 
central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to 
other methods” (Flyvbjerg, 2006:228). While most researchers within this 
paradigm would certainly oppose a direct equivalence between the singular case 
and the universal category it belongs to – Goom, Hammerseley and Foster 
(2009:99), for example, reject Denzin’s view according to which “each person, 
and each relationship, studied is assumed to be a universal singular, or a single 
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instance of the universal themes” –, their main interest focuses on the 
identification of the right conditions under which the findings of a case study can 
be generalized. The key for this is given by the careful selection of the case(s) to 
be examined, as its relation to the overall “population” is fundamental for the 
possibility of generalization. In this way, if the researcher is to generalize her or 
his results, s/he will have to focus on a case that is representative or typical of a 
wider group (cf. Gomm, Hammerseley and Foster, 2009; Atkinson and 
Hammersley, 2007; Hammersley, 2012, Tsang, 2014). The goal, therefore, is to 
select a case that reproduces in the best possible way the main characteristics of 
the wider group to which the researcher expects to generalize the results. The 
problem with this position is that, even if it acknowledges the possibility of a 
limited generalization (this is, for certain types of homogeneous groups and within 
particular historical contexts), it works with a simplified understanding of what a 
case is. The generalizing paradigm considers cases as “black boxes”, as some sort 
of self-contained and homogeneous units, that can either be generalized or not 
according to their degree of representativeness or tipicity. From this point of view, 
a case needs to be tested against the overall group it belongs to: if it proves to 
possess the most relevant features common to them all, the conclusions derived 
from its analysis will be generalized, but if it fails, none of them will be 
considered. This dichotomic understanding of the case and its relationship to the 
general it belongs to offers a simplistic account, as it does not acknowledge the 
actual, much more complex, constitution of the case and the different levels at 
which it relates to the general.    
The approach to case study that underlies my research seeks to overcome the 
weaknesses evidenced by both the particularist – which restricts the analysis to the 
unique features of the particular – and the generalizing – which simplifies the 
constitutive complexity of the case and its relation to the general – paradigms. 
Even if both positions stand at odds in their understanding of case study, they 
share a common view of the case as a homogeneous unit, which is either 
representative of the general (or a group within the general) or is totally unique. In 
this way, the case, understood as a homogeneous unit, is either generalized or 
singularized as a whole.  
Instead, I would like to propose a heterogeneous understanding of cases, as units 
composed of various elements or layers that relate differently to the categories of 
the general and the particular. As outlined in the beginning of this chapter, the 
case is here understood not as an actually existing unit of reality, but an object of 
study that the researcher has constructed. To understand the case as a thread of 
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social reality that has been ripped off from the wider social fabric and further 
modeled by the researcher in order to make it comprehensible, rejects a reified 
view of the case – this is, an interpretation of the case as a self-contained unit – 
and highlights its intrinsic connection to a wider set of social relations. The case, 
as one particular aspect of an overall set of social relations, is therefore caught in a 
tension between the particular and the general, between the concrete and the 
abstract. Within each case it is possible to find features and determinations which 
are common to the whole universe within which it is comprised (an element that 
makes it “a case of…”) and other ones that are actually singular and specific to the 
case under examination (an element that makes it “one case within…”). In 
between both poles, it is possible to find other elements or layers that relate in 
different ways to the general and the particular. As a consequence, a case should 
not be valued for its capacity to represent the total universe under investigation or 
due to its specific characteristics that make it unique. Instead, a case has to be 
valued for providing an entry point into the research problem:  while the case 
exhibits characteristics of its own, which correspond to its particular historical 
circumstances, at the same time, the study of the specific case allows us to access 
some features of the general to which it belongs. 
In conclusion, the study of the case is a study of its singularities and, at the same 
time, an investigation of some of the general features common to all other cases 
within the general category. In the following section I present what I have termed 
a dialectical approach to case study, which seeks to account for the actual 
heterogeneity that constitutes any case, crossing it by determinations that are 
common to the general and other ones that make it unique.  
1.2 A dialectical approach 
In this subsection, I begin by offering a brief account of the relationship between 
the abstract and the concrete (or the general and the particular) from the 
perspective of historical materialism. Then, I move on to discussing how such a 
perspective contributes to current discussions on the potential and drawbacks of 
case studies.  
My understanding of the possibilities and limitations of a research design built 
around the examination of a case is informed by a broader interpretation of Marx’s 
dialectics, especially as explained in the introduction to Grundrisse (Marx, 
1993:83-111). In his presentation of “the method of political economy”, Marx 
explains that the only way in which thought can appropriate social reality and, 
hence, produce knowledge is by “rising from the abstract to the concrete” 
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(Ibid:101). This is, the logic of scientific inquiry should progress from the 
identification of general and simple concepts, capable of accounting for a number 
of phenomena, to the acknowledgement of the complexity of its object of study by 
means of identifying the multiple historical determinants that a concrete 
phenomenon adopts in specific contexts. While Marx’s understanding of the 
scientific method as a movement from the abstract and simple to the concrete and 
complex is a prescription to be applied to the overall logic of scientific inquiry, I 
believe that it can also positively contribute to the examination of the potential and 
limitations of case studies. This can be done in two ways: first, from a dynamic
perspective, by describing the overall research process, this is, by establishing the 
different moments of a research design and the ways in which they relate to each 
other. Second, from a static perspective, by making possible the examination of 
each of this individual moments and the identification of the different levels of 
generality and specificity that characterize them.  
According to Marx, the point of departure for the scientific method ought to be a 
general category, this is, an abstraction that emerges from the common elements 
identified through the comparison of a variety of historical phenomena. This 
abstraction is “rational” (and necessary) “in so far as it really brings out and fixes 
the common element and thus saves us repetition” (Ibid:85). In this way, the 
construction of general categories becomes a useful point of departure as far as it 
identifies certain notes or essential components that constitute what we call, for 
example, production, irrespectively of the different specificities or tonalities it 
might acquire in concrete historical contexts (e.g. capitalist production). While this 
abstraction of the defining features of a category is necessary in order to make 
them thinkable by the human mind (Dussel, 1985:33), the general concept, 
nevertheless, does not represent any particular, concrete, social process, making it 
unfit for empirical examination: “there are characteristics which all stages of 
production have in common, and which are established as general ones by the 
mind; but the so-called general preconditions of all production are nothing more 
than these abstract moments with which no real historical stage of production can 
be grasped” (Marx, 1993:88). As a consequence, and as Marx states for the case of 
production: “if there is no production in general, then there is no general 
production. Production is always a particular branch of production” (Ibid:86). 
Even if the general concept is a necessary starting point in the historical materialist 
process of inquiry, its level of abstraction detaches it from any particular historical 
singularity, making necessary to transcend it in order to grasp empirical social 
phenomena.  
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The abstract, which is initially useful due to its simplicity – because it fixes 
common elements and makes the object of study apprehensible –, obscures the 
complexity that characterizes empirical phenomena, as the emphasis that the 
general concept puts on common features does not account for the fact that it “is 
itself segmented many times over and splits into different determinations” 
(Ibid:85). What is particularly relevant about this last quote is the fact that Marx 
identifies a variety of determinations and differentiates them according to their 
degree of generality, as some of these determinations might belong to all epochs 
(or contexts) while others only to a few. In the shift from the abstract and simple 
(general) to the concrete and complex (particular) we begin to move beyond the 
universal determinants that are common to all cases of a general category and start 
to acknowledge the more specific determinations that belong only to particular 
contexts. The more we progress in the study of the concrete, the more specific 
determinations we find: “the concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of 
many determinations, hence unity of the diverse” (Ibid: 101). Going back to the 
example of production, these means that “those things which determine their 
development, i.e. the elements which are not general and common, must be 
separated out from the determinations valid for production as such, so that in their 
unity (…) their essential difference is not forgotten” (Ibid: 85). Concrete 
production, as Marx explains, emerges as the unity of those determinations that 
are common to all forms of production (production in general) and those other 
ones that are specific to the historical case under examination. In this sense, the 
case can be understood as a heterogeneous unit that is crossed by the presence of 
general and universal features (grasped by the abstract concept), particular and 
specific determinations (that are unique to the concrete case) and a variety of other 
intermediate (more or less general) elements. All in all, the historical materialist 
dialectics begins with the identification of simple abstract concepts and is then 
urged to transcend them by rising towards each time more concrete levels of 
analysis that put in evidence the existence of a multiplicity of case-specific 
determinations that come to form a unity with those universal ones.  
Inspired by Marx’s understanding of the scientific method, Althusser (2005:161-
217) sought to provide a systematic account of the overall logic of “the process of 
theoretical practice” following the same premise of moving from the abstract to 
the concrete. Rejecting empiricist and idealistic interpretations, Althusser begins 
by stating that the production of knowledge is always a theoretical practice, this is, 
a practice that works at a certain level of generality because, according to Marx: 
“the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which 
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thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as a concrete in the mind. But this 
is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being” (Marx, 
1993:101). This means, against empiricism, that the object of study is always 
already theoretically constructed, as it is not possible to work on the “real”, 
concrete, phenomenon. It is also a rejection of idealism, as the “real” should not be 
understood as the outcome of the abstraction elaborated by science: while the 
latter is necessary in order to make sense of the former, to make possible its 
examination, they should not be equated. That is why the overall process of 
knowledge production has as its main aim to “reproduce the real-concrete as a 
concrete-in-thought” (Jessop, 1990:164).  
As theoretical practice can only work with “the totality as it appears in the head, as 
a totality of thoughts (…) a product of the thinking head” (Marx, 1993:101), the 
movement from abstract to concrete is always confined to some degree of 
generality. However, through the process of theoretical practice it is possible to 
distinguish various moments with different levels of abstraction, which Althusser 
names: Generality I, Generality II and Generality III. Generality I, according to 
Althusser, constitutes the point of departure of the theoretical practice. It 
represents the general and abstract concepts that pre-exist the process of inquiry, 
as Generality I is “constituted either of still ideological concepts, or of scientific 
‘facts’, or of already elaborated concepts which belong nevertheless to an earlier 
phase of the science” (Althusser, 2005:184). Thus, Generality I is better 
understood as a raw material, since these already existing abstract, general, 
concepts are the objects on which the theoretical practice is to initiate its labor, 
because “theoretical practice produces Generalities III by the work of Generality II 
on Generality I” (Ibid:185). Generality II, “constituted by the corpus of concepts 
whose more or less contradictory unit constitutes the ‘theory’ of the science” 
(Ibid:184), is crucial in the process of theoretical practice as it is represents the 
moment of intellectual praxis: the application of this set of concepts seeks to 
transform the general, abstract and simple concept that was taken as a point of 
departure into “’concrete-in-thought’, that is, into knowledge (Generality III)” 
(Ibid:191). A Generality III is therefore understood as the outcome of the 
theoretical practice, it represents the knowledge that emerges from the work 
through which the abstract becomes the concrete.
All in all, the process of theoretical practice begins with an abstract Generality I, 
with those previously existing concepts that are used as the raw material on which 
a Generality II – the conceptual framework of the theory applied – is to work 
through concretization, through the identification and examination of the many 
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interrelated, context-specific, determinations. The outcome of this process is 
Generality III, the knowledge that emerges from the re-examination of the 
Generality I produced by the theoretical praxis of Generality II. Even if the new 
Generality III is to be posed at the same level of abstraction of Generality I, it 
would be mistaken to equal their essence, as in the movement from the latter to the 
former there is always a process of transformation involved: “either by the 
transformation of an ideological generality into a scientific generality (…) or by 
the production of a new scientific generality which rejects the old one even as it 
‘englobes’ it, that is, defines its ‘relativity’ and the (subordinate) limits of its 
validity”(Ibid:184). In this way, the movement from Generality I to Generality III 
represents Marx’s “rising” from the abstract to the concrete: an initial abstract 
conception is confronted to the analysis of the historical determinations that the 
phenomenon under study presents, producing a new knowledge that has 
transformed the initial generality through a work of concretization.  
Two main lessons can be taken from this account. In the first place, from a 
dynamic point of view, historical materialist dialectics offer a process of inquiry in 
which research begins with the more general and abstract categories (Generality I) 
– that express the common and universal features of the phenomenon under study 
and, at the same time, shows the state of the art of knowledge in the field – and 
continues advancing towards further concretization of its object of study by 
identifying and describing the different determinations that constitute it 
(Generality II). Once the process of research has offered a complex picture of the 
set of determinations (and their interrelations) that crosses the specific case under 
examination, the initial general concept is to be contrasted to the findings obtained 
through the analysis of the concrete, producing in this way a new knowledge 
(Generality III). From a static point of view, however, a second lesson can be 
drawn. Now, instead of focusing on the overall process of research, the historical 
materialist assumptions of dialectics make visible the heterogeneous constitution 
of any particular phenomenon, any case. As it has been explained, any empirical 
phenomenon results from the “unity” of certain determinations that are common 
and universal to all cases within a general category and other determinations that 
are unique to the concrete case under examination. As a consequence, every 
“single” concrete phenomenon, every case, is never fully representative of the 
category it belongs to, neither totally unique: it shall always be better understood 
as a heterogeneous combinations of elements, features and patterns – 
determinations – that make it “a case of” and “a case within” at the same time.  
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It is worth highlighting that, while a superficial interpretation of the movement 
from Generality I to Generality III could be understood as a mechanical process, 
this is not the case. The dynamic perspective entailed by the succession of 
generalities is put forward as a model that represents the overall logic of the 
process of inquiry. However, the process of research is far from being such a 
straightforward task. This will become clear in Section 3, where I will present the 
main moments of my research design and explain how I proceeded during each of 
them. A closer examination of each moment will make visible that, even if all of 
them have contributed to the progression towards new knowledge (a Generality 
III), they are crossed by a dialectical interplay of data and theory. Far from 
consisting in the mechanic application of concepts to reality, each of the moments 
of my research has begun with more general notions that have later on been 
contrasted to different types of empirical data in order to refine them.  
In conclusion, any case-based research design built on the basis of historical 
materialist assumptions should have among its duties: (1) the identification of the 
different moments in the progression from Generality I to Generality III and (2) 
the discrimination between the various levels of abstraction and concreteness 
evidenced by the dimensions under examination during each moment. In this way, 
the analysis of a general phenomenon through the study of a particular case can be 
better understood as a layered enterprise, where it becomes possible to derive a 
variety of conclusions of different scopes, ranging from very abstract and general 
ones (applicable to all cases within a category) to very concrete and specific ones 
(applicable only to the particular case under examination).   
1.3 Case selection 
The implications of a historical materialist approach for the study of Fair Trade 
shall be easy to draw. In the first place, Fair Trade can be understood as a general 
concept, this is, as a set of universal determinations that are common to all cases. 
This abstract understanding of Fair Trade entails identifying all those elements 
shared across the system irrespectively of the country and product under 
consideration. In this way, it is possible to say that there are certain elements that 
make Fair Trade what it is (for example: the use of standards, certifications and 
labels, its governance structure or its market-based logic) that will be shared by 
cases so different as wine produced in Argentina and consumed in the United 
Kingdom, coffee produced in Uganda and consumed in Canada or tea produced in 
India and consumed in Australia. However, in the movement from the abstract to 
the concrete, many “local” determinations will start to emerge, modifying and 
qualifying the initial concept of Fair Trade we had departed from. In this way, Fair 
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Trade will acquire certain distinctive characteristics in the case of cooperatives 
vis-à-vis plantations, or evidence very different effects when shifting the focus 
from one product or country to the other. 
The empirical case of this dissertation – Fair Trade wine produced in Argentina 
and consumed in the United Kingdom (UK) – emerges from the unity of those 
determinations that characterize Fair Trade in general and those other ones that are 
context-specific. As a consequence, both my analysis and my conclusions will 
shift between the Fair Trade system as a whole, my particular case and a variety of 
intermediate levels. In this way, the analysis and conclusions are not restricted to 
the case of Argentinean Fair Trade wine, but I do not aspire to generalize them to 
the overall Fair Trade universe either. They will instead be discriminated 
according to different levels of abstraction and concreteness they refer to.  
What this implies is that the study of any Fair Trade product in any geographical 
context provides already an entry point to the study of some of the more general 
features of Fair Trade. This, nevertheless, does not mean that the strategic 
selection of a specific case becomes meaningless. In the first place, because even 
if any case would permit the examination of more general aspects of Fair Trade, 
different cases will grant access to different general features. In the second place, 
because each case will make possible the examination of a variety of specific 
determinations which are not to be found elsewhere. Both reasons make necessary 
a careful selection of the case of analysis. 
This dissertation works with the case of Fair Trade wine produced in Argentina 
and consumed in the UK. This commodity, though still minor within the whole 
universe of Fair Trade products, was only certified for the first time in 2003, 
showing a strong tendency to growth since then. With its three main producing 
countries (Argentina, Chile and South Africa) being representatives of the trendy 
“new world” wines group, it is expected that the volumes sold and the revenues 
produced will continue climbing in the following years (Ponte and Ewert, 2009; 
Artopoulos et al, 2010). This makes wine an important Fair Trade product to be 
studied. And it is also an important product for Argentina, since it is one of the 
main images associated to the country internationally and, by far, the most 
important commodity being produced under this certification in her territory. 
Being the UK the world’s biggest consumer of Fair Trade wine with almost 11 
million liters during 2013, its centrality among northern markets make it deserve 
special attention. 
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If we focus on those concrete and specific aspects of the case, those features that 
make it different and special, we should justify its selection in relation to the 
opening towards uncharted territories. This dissertation represents the first 
systematic analysis of Fair Trade in Argentina so far. However, its relevance goes 
beyond that. The specificities attached to the case of Argentinean Fair Trade wine 
offer the opportunity to analyze two relatively unexplored dimensions. First, it 
contributes to the analysis of an unconventional Fair Trade product, which has 
become certified very recently and, consequently, has still little tradition within 
the system. Additionally, at the level of representations, wine is not a product 
usually associated to Fair Trade; on the contrary, its traditional connotation of 
sophistication and its complex process of production and valuation appear as 
counterintuitive when compared to the images commonly linked to traditional Fair 
Trade products such as coffee, cocoa or sugar. Hence, the chosen case makes 
possible the exploration of the specificities acquired by Fair Trade in relation to a 
non-traditional product. Second, it embeds the analysis in the context of a 
relatively new country of production. While Argentina had always been 
recognized by FLO as a producing country, the first certification took place only 
in 2005, much later than in most other Latin American countries. In this way, the 
examination of Fair Trade in Argentina offers the possibility to analyze an 
ongoing process, since the recent wave of certification has brought into Fair Trade 
a number of actors with no previous experience in (and until recently, in most 
cases, no previous knowledge of) the system. The novelty of Fair Trade in 
Argentina, therefore, makes possible to explore in a dynamic way the ongoing and 
contested process of Fair Trade’s structuration and institutionalization in the 
country. 
Focusing on a more general level, the case of wine involves the three most 
relevant types of certifications developed by Fairtrade International: Small 
Producer Organizations, Hired Labor situations and Traders. Consequently, this 
case makes possible the comparison of both producer standards and their 
differentiated articulation with that one developed for commercial actors. The 
possibility of such comparative analysis will yield elements in order to participate 
in a more general debate on the implications of the co-existence of Fair Trade 
standards for small producer organizations and conventional firms. This is 
particularly interesting due to the fact that Hired Labor situations and the role of 
Traders have been relatively neglected in the study of Fair Trade at the level of 
production due to a majoritarian preference for the study of cooperatives and other 
associative initiatives.  
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Lastly, having chosen the UK as the market of consumption integrates interesting 
elements to the analysis. The UK is one of the most important Fair Trade 
“societies” in the world. I choose the term society because the relevance of Fair 
Trade in the UK goes beyond its large global market share and extends to an 
important infrastructure of civil society and private institutions that seek to 
communicate its message and promote its growth. As a consequence, working 
with the British case makes possible the exploration of a multiplicity of Fair Trade 
organizations and commercial firms that are involved in the moments of 
circulation and consumption.  This rich quantity and variety of actors connected to 
Fair Trade offer the possibility of a deeper analysis of the system’s political logic, 
inviting to the exploration of the multiple relations established among UK players 
– and between British and Argentinean actors – in order to promote a Fair Trade 
vision of the world and its concomitant praxis.   
2. Research design 
The description of my research design is divided in two parts. The first one offers 
an overview of the process of inquiry. Resorting to the dialectical approach 
outlined above, it describes the five main moments of my research process and 
how they will be presented in the reminder of the dissertation.  The second part, 
instead, offers a more technical description of the processes of data collection and 
analysis. There, I explicit all the different types of data sources used, how they 
were collected, the different methods with which they were analyzed and the 
various ways in which data sources were combined according to the needs 
imposed by each moment of the research process.  
2.1 The process of inquiry: five moments  
Both implications of the historical materialist dialectics – dynamic and static – 
have been fundamental in the architecture of my research design and the structure 
with which this dissertation is being presented. In what follows, I present the steps 
I have taken in order to provide answers to my research questions – the different 
moments of theoretical practice – and reflect on the various determinations at 
stake in each of them and their respective positions in what could be described as a 
continuum between abstract/simple (or what belongs to the general category) and 
concrete/complex (or what belongs to the specific case) (for a graphic overview, 
see Figure 1).   
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First moment: the general concept of Fair Trade 
The process of inquiry should begin with Generality I, this is, with an abstract and 
simple concept of Fair Trade. Chapter 3 seeks to provide such a general concept 
of Fair Trade in two main ways. Firstly, by offering a presentation of those 
elements common to the whole Fair Trade universe. The reader will there find a 
history of the emergence of this Fair Trade initiative, its most relevant 
organizations, its structure of governance, the different types of standards and 
certifications it works with and their main characteristics, as well as the overall 
logic that these tools imprint on the system. Secondly, since Generality I is not 
only defined by the common elements that the phenomenon under examination 
exhibits but also by the current state of knowledge available on the matter, this 
chapter will offer a review of the state of the art in the field of Fair Trade. Both 
elements, hence, will work as the point of departure of my research process. 
If the first moment can be identified with Generality I, the subsequent moments 
should all be understood as developing within Generality II. This is so because 
they entail the deployment of the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 1 
for the analysis of the concrete determinations present in the case under 
examination.  
Second moment: the reconstruction of the “conventional” wine sector 
The goal of the second moment is to produce a regulationist reading of the chosen 
“conventional” sector. By conventional I simply mean the “non” or “pre” Fair 
Trade characteristics of the sector. This analysis, of course, comprises two main 
elements. First, the sectorial regime of accumulation is to be reconstructed. The 
goal here is to describe how accumulation is achieved by observing the main 
patterns of production, consumption and circulation. A historical evolution of the 
regime of accumulation will prove useful in order to understand its crises and how 
they were overcome as well as its current tendencies. Second, by examining each 
of the six proposed structural or institutional forms, an overview of the sectorial 
mode of regulation will be presented. Here it is important to highlight that, while 
the structural forms are quite broad in their theoretical definition, their empirical 
application will define which of their aspects become more relevant for the 
analysis of the chosen sector. Both elements, the sectorial regime of accumulation 
and mode of regulation, are understood as the meeting point between sector 
specific and global forces, what highlights the relevance of studying the 
interaction between the national and sectorial regimes of accumulation and modes 
of regulation. 
98

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focus – in different ways – on the Argentinean wine 
sector, offering an important degree of concretization, as they delimit the process 
of inquiry to one particular sector within one particular country. In Chapter 4, I 
reconstruct the recent historical evolution of the sectorial regime of accumulation. 
In order to do so, however, it becomes indispensable to first account for the recent 
history of the global regime of accumulation together with the transformations in 
the global mode of regulation. A similar path is followed on Chapter 5, as the 
current characteristics of the sectorial mode of regulation are better understood 
when compared to the transformations in the global mode of regulation and 
regime of accumulation. Therefore, the concretization offered in chapters 4 and 5 
is done in two stages: first, by identifying the evolution of the global regime of 
accumulation and mode of regulation in Argentina and, second, by analyzing the 
interrelated transformations of the wine sector’s regime of accumulation and mode 
of regulation.  
The concept of a mode of development, defined in the previous chapter as the 
successful combination of a regime of accumulation and mode of regulation, will 
be a useful analytical tool in order to account for Argentina’s macroeconomic 
periods of stability and their crises that have framed the recent historical evolution 
of its wine sector. However, it will not be possible to directly apply it to the 
analysis of the Fair Trade sector because, even if the next subsection will present 
the notion of a “Fair Trade mode of regulation”, it has not been possible to 
identify empirically a specifically Fair Trade regime of accumulation.   
Third moment: the reconstruction of the Fair Trade wine mode of regulation in 
Argentina 
The third analytical step is to reconstruct the Fair Trade mode of regulation. This 
will be done by analyzing the way in which Fair Trade attempts to structure each 
of the six institutional forms (does it propose changes? In which aspects? How 
relevant are they?), thus identifying the main features of a Fair Trade mode of 
regulation. From my experience, it was useful to do this analysis at two distinct 
levels: first, determining the “ideal-type” Fair Trade mode of regulation – this is, 
as it is defined in the relevant standards and rules. This will allow for a more 
superficial but general analysis of the Fair Trade mode of regulation, based on the 
“face value” of Fairtrade International’s standards and regulations. In this way, it 
will be possible to identify the general requirements faced by all Fair Trade 
producers and traders around the world and, within them, those more specific to 
the wine sector. Second, reconstructing the “actually existing” Fair Trade mode of 
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regulation in Argentina’s wine sector – this is, as it takes place in practice –, since 
both may present differences.  This distinction was not initially planned in my 
research design, but became very relevant as the process of data collection and 
data analysis progressed because not all the elements stipulated in the standards 
are applied in practice or, even when applied, they are sometimes modified or 
produce unintended consequences. This differentiation between the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation “in the standards” and “in practice” offers already some 
interesting inputs for analysis, as presents some gaps between the goals posed by 
the standards and their effective application.  
Fourth moment: the assessment of the Fair Trade mode of Regulation 
The fourth step will be to assess how transformative the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation proves to be. This moment will be divided in two different stages: first, 
a comparison of the conventional and the Fair Trade modes of regulation; second, 
an analysis of the effects derived from the coupling of the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation and the sectorial regime of accumulation. 
The first stage consists of the comparison between the conventional mode of 
regulation and the Fair Trade one and the examination of what the main 
transformations that the latter entails are. The main contrast is done between the 
conventional mode of regulation and the actually existing Fair Trade mode of 
regulation. After the main conclusions are drawn, a secondary comparison is done 
between the conventional mode of regulation and the ideal-typical one, but only in 
relation to those aspects that become relevant. This assumes the form of a 
counterfactual exercise, by answering the question: “could the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation be considered more or less transformative, had it presented all the 
features as defined in the standard?” In this way, the assessment first looks at the 
transformative potential and shortcomings of the Fair Trade mode of regulation. 
Second, it evaluates whether those shortcomings are the consequence of failures in 
the implementation of the standards in the specific case under study or derive from 
the general features of the standards themselves.  
While comparing the conventional and Fair Trade modes of regulation is already 
enough in order to assess the ways in which Fair Trade affects the structuration 
and institutionalization of socioeconomic relations, a further step will be of 
relevance in order to deepen the analysis. The second stage of this assessment 
identifies the specific consequences produced by the coupling of the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation and the sectorial regime of accumulation. This analysis seeks 
to address questions such as: which are the impacts of the Fair Trade mode of 
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regulation on the current patterns of production, consumption and circulation? 
How does it relate to the dominant strategy of accumulation? Which actors are 
better fit to benefit from the Fair Trade mode of regulation? Does the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation provide an alternative for those groups that currently occupy 
marginal positions in the sectorial regime of accumulation? How does the Fair 
Trade mode of regulation relate to the current tendencies in the regime of 
accumulation? Does it pose any challenges to its hierarchies and power relations?  
Both the third and fourth analytical moments of my research design are presented 
in Chapter 6, where the reader will find the maximum level of concretization of 
my analysis, as I look at a sub-group within the Argentinean wine sector – Fair 
Trade producers – and one specific market of consumption – the UK. However, 
the reconstruction and analysis of the Fair Trade mode of regulation takes place at 
two different levels of generality. First, more abstractly, the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation is presented as “in the standards”, this is, in the more general terms that 
apply to all producers and traders of Fair Trade products and, within this group, 
those aspects relevant to the wine sector. Second, at the most concrete level, the 
Fair Trade mode of regulation is constructed as “in practice”, this is, by looking at 
the actual implementation is assumes in the case of Fair Trade wine produced in 
Argentina and consumed in the UK.  
When it comes to the first stage of the assessment of the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation, it is also possible to identify different levels of generality, since it will 
be possible to assess differently those aspects of the Fair Trade mode of regulation 
that are specific to the case under examination and, more broadly, those other ones 
that are common to the whole Fair Trade universe (derived from those aspects of 
the standards that are faced by all actors) and the actors involved in the Fair Trade 
wine sector (as a consequence of the specifications provided in the wine-related 
standards). The second stage of the assessment of the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation, instead, will be characterized by its high level of concreteness, as the 
analysis of the coupling between the Fair Trade mode of regulation and the 
sectorial regime of accumulation will be restricted to the specific features and 
determinations found in the case under examination.  
Fifth moment: the identification of the political processes and ideological 
elements that shape and legitimize the Fair Trade system 
While the second, third and fourth moments were based on the main concepts and 
assumptions developed by the French Regulation Approach, this fifth moment will 
seek to build on the findings obtained so far but also to deepen the analysis by 
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resorting to the Amsterdam Project. While at this point the thesis will have 
explained the most relevant structural forms that characterize the Fair Trade mode 
of regulation, discussed how alternative they prove to be and analyzed their impact 
on the sectorial regime of accumulation, the fifth moment will look at the dynamic 
side of this phenomenon by identifying the political processes and ideological 
elements that are at play in the struggle for the structuration of the Fair Trade 
system and its legitimation. This will be done by: identifying the most relevant 
class fractions and the system of relations between them; reconstructing the Fair 
Trade concept of control and analyzing its main implications; interpreting Fair 
Trade’s political logic; and, lastly, discussing the Fair Trade concept of control 
under the light of historically hegemonic concepts of control.  
The fourth moment of my research design will have offered the most detailed level 
of concretization of the object of study through the analysis of its multiple 
determinations. However, as the dialectical movement progresses, it is necessary 
to confront the concrete findings obtained to the preconceptions presented in the 
first moment in order to offer a final answer to the research question. This means 
that the process of research will now move back towards a higher level of 
abstraction in order to offer a final answer to the research question as a “concrete-
in-thought”. The goal of Chapter 7, therefore, is to offer a transition between the 
maximum level of concreteness and the enunciation of a Generality III. Chapter 7, 
as a consequence, is crossed by more general elements, which are common to the 
Fair Trade system as a whole – the Fair Trade concept of control, structural power 
relations between different class fractions and Fair Trade’s political logic – and 
some other ones which are still specific to the case under examination – how is the 
Fair Trade concept of control appropriated by actors in the wine industry? Which 
are the most relevant class fractions and how do they articulate their relationships? 
How does the war of position take place in the United Kingdom? However, this 
re-approaching to more abstract and general features of Fair Trade is not to be 
done in a mere descriptive way, but has to be done dialectically, by bringing into 
play the findings obtained in the previous moments of the research process. 
Therefore, the Fair Trade concept of control, for example, is not only to be 
reconstructed abstractly, as the general enunciation done by Fair Trade actors, but, 
additionally, it will be contrasted to the actual practices and material process that 
have been described in the chapters that dealt with the most concrete levels of 
analysis. In this way, the more general dimensions of Fair Trade will not simply 
be reproduced – as it was done in Chapter 3 – but will be contested and 
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dialectically opposed to the results obtained from the analysis of the concrete 
determinations examined in the previous chapter. 
In this way, by complementing the Regulation Approach with a neo-Gramscian 
perspective, Chapter 7 will exhaust the work done by the concepts of Generality II 
and, in the Conclusion, the resultant Generality III will be offered. The fact that 
my analysis has been developed at various levels of concreteness/generality makes 
it necessary to present the knowledge produced in a consistent way. Hence, 
Generality III, the knowledge produced by this dissertation, will be discriminated 
according to these different levels, offering certain conclusions that are exclusive 
to the case of Fair Trade wine produced in Argentina and consumed in the United 
Kingdom, other ones that are common to the whole Fair Trade universe and some 
intermediate ones.  
Figure 1 
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2.2 Data collection and analysis 
The ontological assumptions that underlie the regulationist framework presented 
in the previous chapter are inspired by Bourdieu’s attempt to overcome the 
objectivist/subjectivist divide:  
On the one hand, the objective structures which the sociologist constructs in the 
objectivist moment, by setting aside the subjective representations of the agents, are 
the basis of subjective representations and they constitute the structural constraints 
which influence interactions; but, on the other hand, these representations also have 
to be remembered if one wants to account above all for the daily individual and 
collective struggles which aim at transforming or preserving these structures. This 
means that the two moments, objectivist and subjectivist, stand in a dialectical 
relation (Bourdieu, 1990:125-126).  
Accordingly, my methodological strategy needs to account for both levels of 
social reality: on the one hand, it needs to describe objective social relations, 
which exist independently of the actors’ recognition and, on the other hand, it has 
to reconstruct the subjective representations that constitute the actors’ visions of 
the world and guide their actions. The main goal, as highlighted by Bourdieu, is to 
produce a dialectical synthesis in which the positions occupied by actors in the 
structure of social relations contribute to the comprehension of their dispositions, 
practices and representations and, at the same time, an explanation of the social 
genesis of those very same social structures and their reproduction or 
transformation – or, as put by Bourdieu (1973:63): “the principle of the production 
of this observed order”.  
While, as outlined in my theoretical framework, the Regulation Approach seems 
to be better prepared for the analysis of the objective dimension of social reality, 
the inclusion of the Amsterdam Project was intended as a form of making this 
dialectical synthesis possible. Due to this, the reader will find that Chapters 4, 5 
and 6, mostly based on the Regulation Approach, focus mainly on the description 
of objective social relations (a regime of accumulation, modes of regulation, 
structural forms), whereas Chapter 7, guided by neo-Gramscian concepts, begins 
by examining the most relevant categories of actors derived from the systems of 
positions presented in the previous chapters (still working within the objectivist 
moment) but then moves on to a subjectivist analysis, as it seeks to account for the 
contested construction of the Fair Trade concept of control (a representation), the 
different ways in which it is appropriated by social actors and the type of political 
practices it leads to.  
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Such ontology, combining objective social structures and subjective 
representations, leads to a plural strategy of data collection and analysis. As a 
consequence, this dissertation has mostly been based on primary sources, both in 
the form of qualitative data (obtained through semi-structured interviews, 
documents collection, and, more limitedly, observation) and quantitative data 
(descriptive statistics), as well as secondary sources (academic literature and 
reports by experts). The analysis has also followed this differentiation, 
approaching data in a more naturalist way when the goal was to account for 
objective social structures, and in a more constructivist fashion when the objective 
was to comprehend the subjective representations of actors. However, this 
plurality of strategies of data collection and analysis was not anarchically 
deployed but, instead, they were combined differently according to what each of 
the moments of the research process demanded. For a clearer exposition, the 
reminder of this subsection will firstly offer an overview of the overall process of 
data collection and, secondly, explain how different sorts of data were articulated 
and analyzed during each of the five outlined moments of my research process.  
2.2.1. Overview of data collection 
In Argentina, most of the empirical data was collected through fieldwork between 
August and December 2013. Most of it took place in the province of Mendoza (in 
the zones of Mendoza Norte, Luján/Maipú, Luján Oeste, Maipú Este, Mendoza 
Este and San Carlos), the most important wine producing region of Argentina and 
the area that concentrates the majority of certified wine and grape producers. The 
region of Famatina Valley, in the province of La Rioja, followed in importance, as 
it is there that the first – and most important – certified Argentinean winery is 
located. Buenos Aires, Argentina’s capital city, was a relevant point for fieldwork 
too, as the most important representative of Fairtrade International is based there, 
as well as members of alternative Fair Trade organizations. Lastly, one interview 
took place in Córdoba, where the Fairtrade auditor for Argentina is based (see 
Figure 2).
Fieldwork was particularly important because it provided the only means through 
which the implementation of Fair Trade – this is, the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation “in practice” – could be accounted for. Additionally, it offered the 
opportunity to cross check data about the conventional wine industry that had been 
obtained through secondary sources. Lastly, fieldwork was needed in order to have 
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access to the lived experiences and interpretations of those actors that are part of 
the Fair Trade system. For a summary of all interviews conducted in Argentina 
and the United Kingdom, see the Annex. 
Figure 2
Regarding fieldwork, in-depth interviews were the most important source of data 
collection. The process began with the development of a theoretical sample, in 
which the main criteria for choosing the interviewees was given by assuring the 
representation of all relevant categories of actors. Once those categories were 
established, the sampling followed a snow-ball strategy, in which the same actors 
that I interviewed in the field led to other relevant actors. Once all relevant types 
of actors were covered and saturation in the interviews was achieved, the process 
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of interviewing finished. The result was a total of more than 45 interviews to a 
variety of actors linked to the Fair Trade and conventional modes of regulation, 
including representatives of: certified and non-certified wineries, grape growers 
and traders, workers, sectorial entities, relevant state agencies, Fairtrade 
International, other Fair Trade initiatives and FLO-CERT. Semi-structured 
interviews were mainly focused on how the industry’s wage relation, competition, 
money form, state intervention, representation of wine and  international insertion 
were articulated and in which ways Fair Trade provided alternatives. Additionally, 
documents related to the wine industry were collected, consisting mainly of 
national and provincial legislation and the industry’s regulations.  Supplementary 
data was obtained by some documental material provided by actors themselves 
(for example, wine labels, leaflets, promotional material, websites, etc.) and one 
participatory observation that took place during the general assembly of a small 
producer organization. 
In the United Kingdom semi-structured interviews were also used (for a total of 13 
interviews). The process of sampling was developed along the same lines as in the 
case of Argentina. As a result, I held interviews with the three most important Fair 
Trade wine importers (and the only importers dealing with Argentinean Fair Trade 
wine), as well as the biggest Fair Trade  wine retailer in the United Kingdom 
(including the supermarket’s Fairtrade Strategy Manager and Wine Buyer). In 
relation to the Fairtrade Foundation (Fair Trade’s official organization in the 
United Kingdom), my data collection focused mainly on the documents elaborated 
by this organization. The Fairtrade Foundation’s Product Officer for wine would 
have been a very relevant interviewee, however, she did not accept my request and 
granted me an e-mail interview instead. Additionally, I had the chance to carry out 
a participant observation in a Fair Trade wine tasting organized by an important 
supermarket, where I could not only be present during the presentation delivered 
by Fair Trade wine producers from Argentina, but also interview participants. 
Lastly, some supplementary material was obtained from interviews with other 
relevant actors, such as a Fair Trade steering committee member or an 
Argentinean wine retailer.  
Lastly, more generally, over 40 documents produced by Fairtrade International 
were collected. I was able to build an archive consisting of annual reports, all the 
relevant standards and regulations for certification, different kinds of diffusion and 
promotional materials, and other important institutional documents such as the 
Fair Trade Charter of Values and Fairtrade International’s constitution. While I 
have not made a list detailing all the documents collected, I have quoted them 
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throughout my analysis whenever it was relevant and their details can be found in 
the list of references.  
2.2.2 Different uses of data and methods of analysis during each moment of the 
research process 
The goal of the first moment is to offer a “general concept” of Fair Trade. As it 
was explained previously, this is done in two main ways. First, I describe the more 
general and defining features of Fair Trade. In order to account for those elements 
common to the different cases (such as Fair Trade’s history, its main 
organizations, structure, system of governance, typology of standards and 
certifications, overall logic of functioning, etc.) I work with secondary sources 
(mainly, academic literature) as well as primary sources. Among the latter, the 
standards and their explanatory documents, Fairtrade International’s constitution, 
diffusion material and websites created by FLO and its National Initiatives were 
included. That documentary data was complemented with interviews to Fair Trade 
bureaucrats, both in Argentina and the United Kingdom. Second, I present a 
review of the state of the art of current knowledge about Fair Trade. The main 
sources of data, hence, were academic publications on the topic.  
When it came to analyzing this data, the main strategy was content analysis. I first 
went through all relevant documents in order to identify the most abstract and 
general elements that define Fair Trade. Once this was done, I coded these 
documents based on the elements identified (for example: standards, certifications, 
system of governance, etc.), and regrouped the data according to the codes given. 
Lastly, I sought to describe each element with the data gathered from the 
documents. Additionally, when doing interviews, I included some questions in 
relation to these more general elements, treating the resulting data in the same 
way. Lastly, I also resorted to academic publications when they added information 
that could not be obtained from the previously mentioned data. As the goal of this 
moment is to offer a “general concept” of Fair Trade, my strategy was to analyze 
the data produced by Fair Trade actors taking it as “face value”. I was interested in 
reconstructing Fair Trade’s self-presentation, as it would provide a good point of 
departure for the identification of its most defining characteristics and those 
features that are commonly acknowledged by society more generally. The survey 
of the academic literature, instead, was done differently. I began by reading all 
relevant publications on Fair Trade and attempted to identify common patterns in 
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terms of theory, methodology, research goals and conclusions. This allowed me 
not only to group a variety of publications that were initially dispersed, but also 
made possible to detect the main cleavages around which debates on Fair Trade 
have been built. Of particularly interest to my research objective was to identify 
the different ways in which Fair Trade has been conceptualized and assessed so 
far. The result is an overview of the current state of the knowledge about Fair 
Trade and the main debates that characterize it.  
The goal of the second moment is to account for the Argentinean wine 
“conventional” sector. To do this, the first step was to portray the recent historical 
evolution of Argentina’s regime of accumulation, mode of regulation and mode of 
development. Since reconstructing these concepts and identifying their 
transformation goes far beyond the scope of my dissertation, the decision was to 
rely on academic literature. As a consequence, I relied on regulationist accounts of 
Argentina’s recent macroeconomic history. This provided a first element for the 
analysis of the sectorial level. 
The sectorial regime of accumulation was described, mainly, by resorting to two 
types of data: secondary literature and statistical databases. Secondary literature 
was used as a source of data as long as it provided empirical facts in order to 
account for the different dimensions of a regime of accumulation. Once a draft of 
the regime of accumulation had been formed from the analysis of academic 
literature, I resorted to descriptive statistical data in order to identify the overall 
trends and tendencies in production, circulation and consumption within the 
sector. In this way, the initial draft of the sectorial regime of accumulation was 
checked and improved with the integration of quantitative data. A similar process 
was followed when, more generally, I reconstructed the overall trends of the world 
wine industry that framed the transformation of the Argentinean wine sector. 
Lastly, during my fieldwork, I sought to cross-check my draft of the regime of 
accumulation with material arising from  the interviews I held with relevant actors 
in the wine industry. 
When reconstructing the conventional mode of regulation, I once more began with 
secondary data. In a way analogous to what was just explained, I sought to flesh 
out the most relevant features of all six institutional forms by using academic 
publications as sources of data. This initial construction was then contrasted to 
qualitative primary sources of data, which consisted mainly of the documents 
relevant for the institutionalization of each structural form in the Argentinean wine 
sector (regulations, laws, rules, agreements and standards dictated by national and 
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provincial legislation, sectorial organizations and other specialized agencies). 
Lastly, my reconstruction of the conventional mode of regulation was cross-
checked with the use of interviews to relevant sectorial players.  
In the third moment, the Fair Trade mode of regulation was primarily 
reconstructed through the use of semi-structured interviews with relevant actors. 
Interviews focused on finding which the main changes introduced by Fair Trade 
on each of the structural forms were. Since in this moment of my research the 
objective is to reconstruct the way in which Fair Trade institutionalizes objective 
social relations, interviews were used as a way of obtaining data from my 
respondents and not to account for their subjective representations and experiences 
of being part of the Fair Trade system. As a consequence, information from the 
interviews was analyzed in a naturalist fashion: I began thoroughly reading all 
transcriptions of interviews and continued by coding them according to their 
relation to the six institutional forms. Then, I re-organized and re-coded interview 
fragments according to which aspect of each institutional form they were referring 
to. The next step was to produce a meaning condensation for the relevant aspects 
of each institutional form in the conventional and fair trade mode of regulation. As 
a measure of quality and validity, the institutional forms resultant from the 
analysis emerged from the mutually overlapping answers of a variety of actors, 
reducing in this way as much as possible the subjectivity of the data obtained in 
the interviews.  
While I had not previously considered it, after going through the data I found it 
useful to make a sub-division within the fair trade mode of regulation, contrasting 
how different aspects were presented in the standards and how they were actually 
applied in practice. Therefore, the Fair Trade standards became the main source of 
data in order to account for the “ideal-type” Fair Trade mode of regulation.  
The fourth moment of my research seeks to produce an assessment of the Fair 
Trade mode of regulation in two ways, by contrasting the conventional and the 
Fair Trade modes of regulation and by analyzing the particular effects of the 
coupling between the latter and the sector’s regime of accumulation. 
Consequently, these are two analytical processes that do not involve the 
introduction of any new data.  
While the previous moments represent a movement from the general to the 
concrete, the fifth moment represents, instead, a step in the progression back to the 
general. In this sense, the analysis presented in Chapter 7 works at two different 
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levels: on the one hand, it presents more general features of the Fair Trade system, 
this is, the Fair Trade Concept of Control, its overall patter of power relations and 
the political logic that underlies this initiative. On the other hand, these general 
findings are contrasted to the more concrete elements that have been identified by 
the analysis of the case, as I discuss how the Fair Trade Concept of Control and 
the system’s political logic have been embedded in the concrete case under 
examination and how power relations can be identified within this context. 
Additionally, a second element distinguishes the fifth moment from the previous 
ones: while the former were mostly focused on describing objective social 
relations, the analysis of the political dynamics and ideological elements that 
constitute Fair Trade makes necessary to account for subjective representations. In 
this way, the fifth moment seeks to reconstruct the world-views put forward by 
Fair Trade actors, understand how they legitimize certain practices, and discuss 
their relationship to the structural forms identified in the previous moments.  
In order to reconstruct the Fair Trade Concept of Control, I decided to work with 
official documents produced by Fair Trade organization. Since the Fair Trade 
Concept of Control can be identified as a more general feature – a constitutive 
element of the system – I consider that it can be better reconstructed by relying on 
the “official discourse” produced by those agents that have been given the 
authority to represent the system. Data obtained from various official documents 
(specially annual reports, but also other materials produced by Fairtrade 
International and the Fairtrade Foundation in the United Kingdom) were used to 
produce a discourse analysis. Its main goal was to account for Fair Trade’s 
worldview (the problems it has identified, the solutions it has proposed and the 
ways in which it portrays itself) and analyze how it puts forward and attempts to 
legitimize its project. While this process reconstructed a general Fair Trade 
concept of control, a second step in its discussion was to analyze the different 
ways in which the most relevant actors of my case study have appropriated it. This 
was done mainly through the use of interview material, in which I sought to 
identify the various ways in which actors made sense of the Fair Trade Concept of 
Control and resorted to it in order to express their views of the system.  
The identification of the most relevant actors followed the lines of a class-based 
analysis. In this sense, I tried to differentiate actors in the Fair Trade world 
according to the function they perform in this economic system. By relying on my 
previous analysis of Fair Trade’s structure of governance, the system’s overall 
logic and the main ingredients of the Fair Trade Concept of Control, I provided an 
overall picture of the different power relations between class fractions that Fair 
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Trade has articulated. This more abstract analysis was then complemented with 
academic literature on Fair Trade’s internal governance in order to offer more 
concrete evidence of these unequal structural positions. Afterwards, I moved to the 
identification of the most relevant class fractions for my case study. This implied 
revising the Argentinean wine regime of accumulation and the conventional and 
Fair Trade modes of regulation in order to identify the main cleavages that 
organized the relations between different groups of actors. After having defined 
which the most relevant class fractions for my case were, I sought to analyze the 
different ways in which they relate to the Fair Trade Concept of Control.  
My analysis of class fractions and the Fair Trade Concept of Control were used to 
identify Fair Trade’s political logic. This, again, was done at two levels. First, I 
identified the more general characteristics of Fair Trade politics according to the 
constraints imposed by power relations among actors and the worldview it puts 
forward. Second, I analyzed those general features in the light of my case study. 
Key sources of date for this latter step were documents produced by the Fairtrade 
Foundation, in which they provide information about the most relevant political 
tactics to follow in order to expand the system’s legitimacy across society, and 
interviews with relevant actors. This part of my analysis was mostly focused on 
the United Kingdom, due to the fact that no Fair Trade products are 
commercialized in Argentina.   
Table 1 offers an overview of the various types of data sources use and how they 
were collected and analyzed differently according to the distinct moments they 
were relevant for.  
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Table 1 
Moment Chapter Goal Datasources Dataanalysis
1st
General
Conceptof
FairTrade
3
Toidentifyanddescribe
FairTrade'sgeneral
elements
 Primary:standardsand
explanatorydocuments,FLO’s
constitution,diffusionmaterialand
websitesbyFairTrade
organizations,interviews.

Secondary:academicliterature
 Contentanalysis


Datawastreatedasfacevalueto
accountforFairTrade’sself
presentation.
Toprovidealiterature
reviewonFairTrade
(wine)
 Primary:academicliterature  Exploratoryreadingofrelevant
publicationsfollowedbytheir
classification.Maincriteria:
conceptualizationandassessmentsof
FairTrade.
2nd
Conventional
winesector
4
Toreconstructthecurrent
sectorialregimeof
accumulationandits
recenthistoricalevolution
 Primary:statisticaldatabases,
interviews.

Secondary:academicliterature.
 Academicliteraturewasinitiallyused
toaccountforthemainelementsofthe
regimeofaccumulation.Thesefindings
werelateroncrosscheckedand
improvedwithstatisticaldataand
interviewmaterial.
5
Toreconstructthecurrent
sectorialmodeof
regulationanditsrecent
historicalevolution
 Primary:documents(regulations,
laws,agreements,standards,
nationalandprovincial
regulations),interviews.

Secondary:academicliterature.
 Academicliteraturewasinitiallyused
tofleshoutthesixstructuralforms.
Thesefindingswerelateroncross
checkedandimprovedwithinterview
anddocumentarymaterial.
3rd
FairTrade
modeof
regulation
6
ToreconstructtheFair
Trademodeofregulation
"inthestandards"
 Primary:standardsandtheir
explanatorydocuments
 Contentanalysis

ToreconstructtheFair
Trademodeofregulation
"inpractice"
 Primary:interviews  Contentanalysisofinterviewmaterial
andmeaningcondensationforeach
institutionalformresultingfromthe
overlappinganswersofdifferentactors.

DatawasusedtoaccountforFair
Trade’sstructurationofsocialrelations.
4th
Assessment
oftheFair
Trademode
ofregulation
Tocontrastthe
conventionalandFair
Trademodesofregulation
 Comparisonoftheconclusions
obtainedinChapters5and6,no
newdataadded.
Toidentifytheeffectsof
thecouplingbetweenthe
FairTrademodeof
regulationandthe
sectorialregimeof
accumulation
 Combinationoftheconclusions
obtainedinChapters6and4,no
newdataadded.
5th
FairTrade's
politicaland
ideological
dimensions
7
Toidentifythemost
relevantclassfractions
FairTradecleavages:basedon
structureofgovernance,system’s
overalllogicandelementsfromthe
conceptofcontrol(Chapters3and
7)

Conventionalcleavages:basedon
functionaldivisionsandpower
relationsemergingfromtheregime
ofaccumulationandconventional
modeofregulation(Chapters4and
5).

Nonewdataadded.
 Resultingclassfractionsandtheir
powerrelationsresultedfromthe
analyticaljuxtapositionofbothsystems
ofpositions:FairTradeand
conventionalwineindustry.

ToreconstructtheFair
Tradeconceptofcontrol
 Primary:officialdocuments
producedbyFLOandtheFairtrade
Foundation.
 DiscourseanalysistoreconstructFair
Trade’sworldview.
Tounderstandhow
differentactorshave
appropriatedtheFair
Tradeconceptofcontrol
 Primary:interviews  Meaningcondensationinorderto
comprehendhowactorsappropriate
andmakesenseoftheFairTrade
conceptofcontrol.
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Chapter 3: Fair Trade 
The goal of this chapter is to present what I have previously called a “general 
concept of Fair Trade” (Generality I). This will be done in two ways: the first part 
of the chapter will describe the elements of the certification-based Fair Trade 
initiative that can be considered universal this is, common to all cases. The second 
part will review the main debates in the current literature on Fair Trade’s 
transformative potential. In this way, the general concept of Fair Trade will be 
constructed by combining a description of its general features and a survey of the 
contemporary knowledge in the field.  
1. Fair Trade: An overview 
In this first half of Chapter 3, I present three elements that reveal the most 
distinctive characteristics of the Fair Trade initiative. I begin with describing Fair 
Trade’s diagnosis of the main problems of international trade and the treatment 
that has been proposed as a solution. In this way, the general vision and aim of the 
Fair Trade movement will be presented. Afterwards, I offer a historical account of 
the Fair Trade movement, including its transformations and institutionalization. 
Fair Trade’s historical trajectory will be relevant not only to understanding the 
trodden path that has shaped the contemporary system, but also to explain some of 
the tensions, contradictions and debates that will be presented in the subsequent 
chapters. Lastly, I describe the most relevant standards and their main 
characteristics, which is important at this level of generality for two reasons: (1) 
standards constitute universal elements within the system, as all certified players 
need to comply with one or another and (2) standards shape, to a great extent, Fair 
Trade’s overall logic of functioning. 
1.1 International trade: diagnosis and treatment 
The Charter of Fair Trade values offers, in a nutshell, the main diagnosis that 
underlies all the initiatives undertaken by the certification-based Fair Trade 
movement:
Poverty and hardship limit people’s choices while market forces tend to further 
marginalise and exclude them. This makes them vulnerable to exploitation, whether 
as farmers and artisans in family-based production units (…) or as hired workers 
(…) within larger business (World Fair Trade Organization and Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations, 2009:5).  
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The Fair Trade movement has identified poverty, hardship, marginalization, 
exclusion, and exploitation as the main problems experienced by producers and 
workers throughout the global South. In their view, the reason for such situations 
is to be found in the international trade regime, since “despite all the rhetoric about 
globalization yielding prosperity for all, the hard truth is that the world’s rich set 
the terms of trade that deny the poorest a fair chance to sell their products and earn 
a decent living” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2004:3). 
Therefore, the current trade regime—which protects agricultural producers in the 
North with subsidies and marginalizes those in the South with trade barriers 
(Ibid)—is identified as the main factor responsible for the unequal relationships 
established between poor producers and workers in the developing world and rich 
traders and importers in the most developed areas. Poverty and marginalization, 
consequently, cannot be adduced to be the result of misguided investment 
decisions or the lack of managerial skills, but are presented as the systematic 
outcome of an unjust trade structure: “with internationally traded crops, the picture 
is of an hourglass that concentrates power and wealth: for example, five million 
small-scale cocoa farmers sell to just four main traders who in turn sell to millions 
of consumers” (Fairtrade International, 2013:4).  
It is as a consequence of this diagnosis that the Fair Trade movement has emerged 
as a project that seeks to promote fairness in trade relations, encourage more direct 
connections between producers and consumers, and offer more options for 
business partnerships in very centralized markets. Trade, which is initially 
identified as the main source of global inequality, has, at the same time, the 
potential to be “a fundamental driver of poverty reduction and greater sustainable 
development, but only if it is managed for that purpose, with greater equity and 
transparency than is currently the norm” (World Fair Trade Organization and 
Fairtrade Labelling Organizations, 2009:6).  
As a consequence, the certification-based Fair Trade initiative, governed by 
Fairtrade International, has been self-defined as:  
A trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks 
greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by 
offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized 
producers and workers – especially in the South. Fair Trade Organizations, backed 
by consumers, are engaged actively in supporting producers, awareness raising and 
in campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international 
trade (Ibid). 
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Fair Trade seeks to correct market imbalances by targeting third world producers 
and first world consumers. In this system, the former are required to comply with 
certain economic, social, and environmental standards in their organization of 
work and production. In exchange, their products are certified as fair and are 
commercialized with a distinctive label. Consumers are expected to support and 
reward them by paying a price for their products that is high enough to ensure the 
reproduction of sustainable conditions of production. In this way, Fair Trade is 
presented as a praxis that corrects injustices in international trade by putting 
decisions in the hands of ordinary people. Any person concerned about the 
situation of marginalized producers in the third world can simply contribute to 
their well-being by buying the right products. Hence, Fair Trade is portrayed as an 
initiative from below, in which individuals can express their preferences through 
purchases, rewarding companies that support Fair Trade products and punishing 
those that choose not to. Such an approach implies that there is no need for 
government intervention, parliamentary agreements, or institutional reforms: 
social commitment and political convictions can simply be channeled through the 
market.  
While Fair Trade’s diagnosis of international trade can be said to have remained 
more or less unaltered since its origins, its proposed treatment and the particular 
means used by activists to materialize it are the result of a changing historical 
process. The next subsection provides an overview of the evolution experienced 
by the Fair Trade movement and its progressive institutionalization.  
1.2 Fair Trade’s historical evolution and institutionalization 
Some scholars (Gendron et al, 2009; Valiente-Riedl, 2013; Brown, 2015) trace the 
origins of Fair Trade back to the crafts boutiques that appeared in the United 
States and Europe in the mid-20th century. Between the 1940s and 1950s, 
religious groups and non-governmental organizations began to develop production 
chains inspired by “fair trade” norms within their countries in order to favor the 
poorest areas. The products involved, almost exclusively crafts, were sold mainly 
in churches and at fairs (IFAT, 2003).  
What we now refer to as Fair Trade is the result of a variety of different influences 
from different historical periods that converged toward a common project during 
the second half of the last century. Four initiatives stand out among the most 
relevant precedents (Gendron et al, 2009:64-5). First, the oldest one can be found 
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in the cooperativist movement, the roots of which date back to mid-19th century 
Italy and the United Kingdom. Second, the aftermath of the second World War 
witnessed the emergence of the so-called “charity businesses” across different 
points in Europe. These businesses became visible during the 1950s, when 
religious and non-governmental organizations sought to fund their development 
projects in the third world through the sale of crafts. Third, during the 1960s, 
initiatives known as “solidarity trade” began to emerge in the United States and 
Europe. This phenomenon was promoted by activist groups that imported products 
from politically or economically marginalized countries from the southern 
hemisphere in order to sell them to northern consumers. Fourth, towards the end of 
the 1960s, international development organizations and religious associations 
promoted the “trade for development” initiative, which consisted in assisting 
southern producers to develop and export their goods. The spirit of this initiative 
was guided by the famous slogan “trade, not aid,” which emerged, together with 
the creation of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development), in 1964.  
These four movements were the different influences that converged together and 
gave origin to what Le Velly (2004) has come to call “trade of benevolence.” This 
phenomenon is characterized by two main features: first, it constitutes a market 
niche in which buyers are aware of, and convinced by, the fact that by purchasing 
they do not only acquire a product, but also support projects or causes that 
transcend that product. Second, and as a consequence, the product can be sold at a 
price higher than that of comparable conventional goods, without necessarily 
offering a better quality, due to the fact that the purchase of a product through 
benevolent trade is motivated primarily by a desire to help producers or support 
political causes in the global South. In commercial exchanges, the maximizing 
rationality typical of neoclassic economic models is replaced by a normative 
rationality: when a consumer decides to buy a product, the cost-benefit calculation 
is not as much of a determinant as the ethical implications of the action.  
The 1980s and 1990s proved to be a landmark in this historical evolution, as it was 
then that practices of benevolent trade began to converge and consolidate around a 
common idea of just and equitable trade. Raynolds and Long (2007:16) identify 
this process as the “beginning of a common Fair Trade movement, with shared 
norms based on ideas of ‘fairness.’” Alternative Trade Organizations (ATOs) were 
the drivers of this movement; they were in charge of establishing contact with 
producers in the South, building direct commercial channels, and selling products 
in the North. The latter activity was mostly done through World Shops, outlets that 
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specialized in the sale of fairly traded handcrafts. During this period, the growing 
importance of the Fair Trade movement was not only evidenced by the volume of 
sales, but also by its increasing institutionalization, as different ATOs sought to 
coordinate activities through the development of Fair Trade networks such as the 
International Fair Trade Association (IFAT), the Network of European World 
Shops (NEWS!), the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA), and the Fair Trade 
Federation (FTF).
By the end of the 1980s, however, a new strand in the Fair Trade movement, 
characterized by the use of product certification and labelling, began to develop. 
This process was, in part, a reaction to the international context of the mid-1980s, 
which posed a series of challenges to the Fair Trade movement (Gendron et al., 
2009:66). First, the segment of crafts and ethnic products from the developing 
world became increasingly competitive, due to the emergence of businesses that 
continued to work within a conventional frame. Second, recession in industrialized 
economies during the period was translated into diminished purchasing power, 
which led to higher expectations in terms of quality. Third, new dominant forms of 
commercialization and promotion made it necessary for sellers to familiarize 
themselves with marketing techniques. Fourth, the increasing codification of 
international trade norms forced benevolent trade initiatives to comply with 
international health and safety standards. This context promoted a triple evolution 
in the movement characterized by the professionalization of world shops, 
expansion toward the food industry, and the creation of labels in order to improve 
the products’ identification (Ibid). It was at this point that a new approach within 
the Fair Trade movement emerged.
The professionalization of alternative distribution systems went hand in hand with 
the creation and consolidation of a variety of Fair Trade networks that attempted 
to improve this initiative’s position in the market and consolidate it as a political 
project. It is also during this period that crafts—dominant products in the trade of 
benevolence system—started to lose importance due to the continuous growth in 
the production, commercialization, and consumption of agricultural goods. Coffee 
led the expansion, and was soon followed by cocoa, sugar, fruit juice, dried fruit, 
rice, herbs, and nuts. In ten years, between 1992 and 2002, agricultural goods went 
from representing 20% of all Fair Trade world sales to accounting for 69.4 % 
(Nicholls and Opal, 2005:191).  
Even though sales were constantly growing, distribution was restricted by the 
relatively low number of Fair Trade shops in Europe and the United States. 
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Offering Fair Trade products through mainstream channels of distribution 
(supermarkets and retailer chains) appeared at that time as one of the main options 
that had to be considered if the movement was to increase its sales. However, 
expanding and dealing with leading players from the conventional market entailed 
the risk of compromising the trust that consumers had in the product and its origin. 
The main challenge, at this point, was to find a way in which to make Fair Trade 
products available to all and, at the same time, guarantee that conditions of 
fairness in their production and trade were preserved.  
Faced with this situation, in 1988 Frans Van de Hoff and Nico Roozen created, in 
The Netherlands, the Max Havelaar association and the label of the same name. Its 
goal was to promote a distinctive symbol that could be used to identify the Fair 
Trade system and that had the potential to become widely recognized by 
consumers. Its logic was simple: products that were produced and commercialized 
under the (Fair Trade) standards developed by Max Havelaar would be granted the 
right to an identifying label that would allow them to be distinguished from 
products that belong to conventional trade circuits. This marked the beginning of a 
radically new distribution strategy: an efficient labelling process would open the 
doors to massive commercialization. The same labelling system was adopted two 
years later in Belgium and Switzerland. New Fair Trade labels began to emerge 
afterwards in other countries: Fairtrade (the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Canada), Transfair (Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Japan, the United States, 
and Canada), and Rättvisenmärkt (Sweden) (Gendron et al., 2009:66). 
The labelling system proved to be very popular and diffused quickly. However, 
the plurality of alternatives challenged the possibility of a homogeneous 
international definition of Fair Trade, its principles, and its standards. In an 
attempt to unify the different national labelling initiatives and provide a common 
criteria, in 1997, 17 certifying organizations—known as National Initiatives—
came together to create an umbrella organization: Fairtrade Labeling 
Organizations International (FLO).10 The main duties of this emerging 
organization would be threefold: defining unified international trade standards, 
certifying and auditing producers and traders, and providing support to producer 
organizations in need of external help (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 

10In2011,FairtradeLabellingOrganizationsInternationalbegantouseanabbreviatedname(“Fairtrade
International”)torefertoitself.Throughoutthisdissertation,bothdenominations,aswellastheiracronyms,will
beusedindistinctively.Additionally,theterm“Fairtrade”willbeusedexclusivelyinconnectiontothisspecific
organization,whiletheexpression“FairTrade”willbeusedtorefertothebroadermovementandthemore
generalconcept.
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International, 2005:23). This was a major move in the direction of centralizing, 
within one single organism, a plurality of Fair Trade initiatives, making it possible 
to align all the norms and standards that producers and traders have to comply 
with and the processes through which certifications were granted. Another 
important consequence of this reorganization was the creation of the Fairtrade 
Certification Mark, which became the single label promoted by the movement and 
would eventually replace all national labels. The existence of a single image for 
Fairtrade not only made its diffusion and recognition by consumers easier, but also 
facilitated cross-border trade (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 
2008:2). While the creation of FLO proved useful in simplifying and 
homogenizing the main instruments and tools on which the certification 
movement depended, it was also of critical importance in the articulation of a 
more coherent and unified Fair Trade discourse, as part of its mission was to 
“harmonize the Fairtrade message across the movement” (Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International, 2007b:3). All in all, the creation of FLO can be seen 
as the culmination of a shift “from an ATO dominated to a certification/labelling 
dominated movement” (Raynolds and Long, 2007:17).  
As the certification-based system expanded, FLO sought to secure its legitimacy 
and authority. One way of doing so was to comply with the internationally 
recognized standard ISO/IEC Guide 65, which established the general 
requirements for “bodies operating product certification systems.” In practice, the 
main impact was FLO’s split into two different organizations, in order to separate 
the functions of standard setting and certifying. From then on, FLO would be in 
charge of the development of standards, producer support, and, more generally, 
commercial operations, while FLO-Cert would become the technical organism 
that carries out inspections, audits, and grants or denies certifications.  
The most recent developments in terms of FLO’s structure have been 
characterized by a repositioning of producers in its governance. Throughout the 
organization’s history, producers have voiced their concerns about insufficient 
transparency in FLO’s structure, their lack of representation, and the poor 
communication channels within the organization (Renard and Pérez-Grovas, 
2007:148). Together with the growing figures of producer organizations and Fair 
Trade sales, southern actors were interested in moving from being “reduced to the 
role of beneficiaries” (with no participation in decision-making processes) to 
assuming “the status of autonomous partners” (Wilkinson and Mascarenhas, 
2007:135). Some of these concerns have been successfully addressed throughout 
the last decade, as FLO has gradually increased the centrality of producers in the 
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organization’s governance. An important step towards the representation of 
producers has been the formation of Producer Networks: “associations which 
Fairtrade certified producer organizations may join if they wish, and which are 
recognized by FLO as the representative bodies of farmers and workers” 
(Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2007b:6). All three Producer 
Networks, representing Latin America, Asia, and Africa respectively, were 
granted membership in FLO with the same status as National Initiatives. However, 
the commitment towards producer representation was taken a step further in 2011, 
when Fairtrade International made the three Producer Networks equal owners of 
the organization. This meant that Producer Networks and National Initiatives were 
now each 50% owners of FLO, having equal power in decision-making processes. 
This has been assured by granting them each equal representation in the main 
organs: in the General Assembly, Producer Networks and National Initiatives are 
entitled collectively to 50% of the total votes each, while the organization’s board 
must host an equal number of members from each group (plus three independent 
members) (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International’s Constitution). The 
latest landmark for producers, in relation to FLO’s governance, has been the 
election of a producer representative as chair of the board. These recent 
developments in the governance of Fairtrade International have led analysts such 
as Bennett (2015:81) to affirm that: “today’s governance structure is the most 
democratic and representative in the organization’s history.”  
Given that Fair Trade’s evolution can be characterized as a transition from a more 
informal, ATO-dominated system, toward a more formal one, structured around 
the use of certifications and labels, the following section will examine the most 
important tools employed by Fair Trade’s dominant model: standards.  
1.3 Fair Trade’s main tool: standards
The main distinctive characteristic of Fairtrade International has been the 
development of a certification system that guarantees the “fairness” of the product 
and grants it access to a label that allows buyers to identify it as such. The 
certification is only awarded after a successful audit, in which representatives of 
FLO-Cert make sure that the applicant organization is fulfilling the conditions of 
fair production and trade as defined by the standards developed by FLO. In what 
follows, I describe these standards and their main characteristics.  
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Originally, FLO worked exclusively with one standard that had been specifically 
developed for small producers dependent on family labor, since its goal was to 
promote the development and empowerment of marginalized farmers. Since, in 
FLO’s understanding, part of this empowerment would come from collective 
cooperation among producers, the standard was specifically developed for 
cooperatives—or other sorts of organizations—and not for single producers. 
However, this form of organization proved to be popular for certain products (for 
example, coffee) but posed restrictions for others, because some products that are 
typical of the southern hemisphere (such as bananas) are mostly produced in big 
plantations. While FLO’s original goal was to help disadvantaged producers, it 
was faced with the fact that in the South, landless workers are often the most 
disadvantaged groups and that many key export commodities are rarely produced 
in small scale (Raynolds and Long, 2007:28). As a consequence, FLO’s decision 
was to create a second standard that could be applied to products grown under 
those conditions, not with the goal of favoring the companies running the 
plantations, but rather of supporting their workers. That is why, today, we can find 
two different sets of criteria developed for two different productive structures: the 
standard for Small Producer Organizations (SPO) and the standard for Hired
Labor situations (HL).11
Organizations eligible for the SPO certification have to prove that at least half of 
their members are small producers (the criteria to define the size of a producer 
varies according to the product in question and the country where s/he is located) 
and that at least half of the volume of all production exported under Fair Trade 
conditions has been provided by small producers. Even though the ideal-type of 
organization that FLO has in mind for this sort of certification is a cooperative, the 
standard does not stipulate major restrictions about the formal structure of such an 
organization, granting each organization freedom to adopt the legal figure that is 
most appropriate for each case. However, the organization’s democratic structure, 
the possibility for all members to take part in decision-making processes, and the 
transparency of its functioning must all be guaranteed. To do so, the standard 
requires the constitution of a general assembly, which is also the body in which 
decisions concerning the administration of the Fairtrade Premium—one of the 
main benefits of this system—are taken. Additionally, the organization has to 
assume a series of commitments in relation to working conditions, non-

11Thereiscurrentlyoneotherstandardforsmallscaleproducerorganizationsthatarenotdemocratically
organized:“ContractProduction.”However,givenitsverylimitedscopeandapplication—itcanonlybeusedfor
riceandcottoninIndia,cottonanddriedfruitinPakistan,andcocoainOceania—Ihavedecidedtoexcludeit
fromthisexposition.
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discrimination, freedom of expression, and the prohibition of child labor. The 
standard also comprises (not very demanding) criteria in relation to environmental 
protection, which seeks to promote the development of sustainable agricultural 
practices that minimize threats to biodiversity. Among other measures, the 
certified organization has to commit to a safe and reduced use of agrochemicals, 
preserving hydric resources and the soil’s fertility, and abstaining from using any 
sort of genetically modified organisms. Even if not mandatory, the standard 
promotes organic production, which is rewarded with a higher minimum price. 
The HL standard applies to companies whose production is mainly organized in 
plantations and have an important demand of work force. The main goal for this 
certification is to preserve workers’ rights and strengthen their position. The HL 
standard, therefore, demands from the company a commitment against all forms of 
discrimination, guaranteeing freedom of work, freedom of association, and 
freedom to participate in collective bargaining, as well as respecting the 
established minimum wage. The HL standard also regulates the maximum number 
of working hours (48 weekly), a minimum rest period, and the maximum number 
of extra hours that a worker can choose to take (12 weekly). The employer has to 
guarantee social security and the indispensable health and safety conditions 
needed at the work place. The company must assure that all regular work is done 
by permanently hired workers, limiting temporary hiring to non-recurring 
activities. The HL standard defines norms of environmental protection similar to 
the ones stipulated in the SPO standard.  
Probably the most innovative element in this standard is the requirement to create 
the so called Joint Body. 12 The Joint Body is an organ composed by 
representatives of workers from all sectors in the company and members of the 
management. This body has to guarantee a fair representation of all workers (in 
terms of gender, specialization, and geographical distribution, among other 
criteria) and the democratic and recurrent election of its members. The company’s 
management appoints its own representatives, who can never outnumber workers’ 
representatives or be, in total, more than three. The Joint Body is a legal figure 
that owns the Fair Trade Premium and decides in what projects it will be invested. 
It is therefore expected that workers’ and management’s representatives will agree 
on how to best use the Premium, taking into account that the main goal is to 

12Recently,someaspectsofregulationsregardingtheJointBodyhavebeenchanged.However,sinceallmy
fieldworkanddatacollectionwasdoneduringtheperiodwhenthepreviousversionofthestandardwasstillin
place,theanalysisthroughoutthisdissertationwilltakethelatterasitsmainreference.Nevertheless,Iwill
highlightsomeofthesechangeswhenrelevant.
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satisfy workers’ needs or the needs of their families and communities. The 
company must guarantee the resources, physical space, and time that might be 
needed for the periodical meetings of the Joint Body to take place.  
SPO and HL enterprises have to apply for a certification to FLO-Cert, which is in 
charge of organizing the necessary audits. SPO and companies have to bear the 
costs of the audits and, in the case of being granted the certification, must pay an 
annual fee, which FLO uses to cover its operational costs. Once the initial audit 
has been successfully completed, producers are able to commercialize their 
products as Fair Trade. This entails two main economic benefits. In the first place, 
these products are always traded according to the so-called Fairtrade minimum 
price. This price is determined by FLO and aspires to guarantee a ´payment high 
enough for producers to cover the costs of sustainable production (this is, of 
producing according to Fairtrade standards) and obtain a reasonable profit margin. 
All exports made within this system are therefore required to respect this 
minimum price, no matter how much lower the current market price might be. 
However, in those cases in which the market price is higher than the Fairtrade 
minimum price, transactions should take the former as their reference. The main 
goal is therefore to grant certain foreseeability to prices, avoiding sudden 
decreases that might threaten the sustainable development of producers.  
The second benefit connected to the commercialization of a Fairtrade product is 
the Fairtrade Premium. The Premium results from a minimum amount of money 
determined by FLO that a buyer needs to add on top of the price that s/he is paying 
for a product. For example, if the producer agrees to sell a kilo of Fair Trade 
honey at $1, and FLO has determined a premium of $0.05, the total paid for each 
kilo will be of $1.05. The amount obtained in connection to the sale of the product 
becomes part of the SPO or the company’s ordinary income, as it would happen 
with any transaction, be it Fair Trade or not. The total amount which results from 
the Premium, however, has to be transferred to a separate account created for that 
purpose. This money is administered by the general assembly (in the case of 
SPOs) or the Joint Body (in the case of HL-certified companies) and is to be used 
for the improvement of the workers’ or producers’ quality of life. This money can 
be invested in projects that affect producers’ and workers’ lives directly or benefit 
their families and communities. 
Finally, there is also a third standard that has been developed to certify those 
businesses that are willing to commercialize and/or process Fair Trade products. 
Those companies that opt for the Trader certification commit to annual audits that 
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will be used to verify that they have respected the Fairtrade minimum price and 
paid the Fairtrade Premium. Additionally, these criteria stipulate that, upon request 
by producers, the buyer must agree to pre-finance up to 60% of the total value of 
the transaction, with the goal of assisting the producer to prepare and deliver the 
order. The Trader standard also requires the buyer to provide a supply plan in 
advance, in order to allow the producer to foresee the middle-term demand. Last, 
these criteria urge the buyer to develop long-term relationships with producer 
organizations in order to give them stability in their insertion into the international 
market.  
This first half of Chapter 3 has provided a general presentation of Fair Trade, 
including those aspects that are common to all cases worldwide: Fair Trade’s 
diagnosis of international trade and its proposed treatment, its historical evolution 
and institutionalization, and the main features of the standards that Fairtrade has 
developed in order to change conditions of production and exchange. In order to 
complement this general presentation of Fair Trade, the second half of this chapter 
will provide a survey of the state of knowledge in the academic field.  
2. Fair Trade: A state of the art 
The goal of this section is to provide an overview of the main conclusions that the 
academic literature has arrived at—and the debates that have sprung from those 
conclusions—in relation to the Fair Trade initiative. In the introduction, I offered a 
review of the main limitations in the literature that this dissertation attempts to 
overcome, namely: fragmentation and utilitarianism. Additionally, I showed the 
problems inherent to one-dimensional approaches to Fair Trade, proposing instead 
an interdisciplinary perspective. As a consequence, the literature review that 
follows does not focus on the main analytical approaches or methodological 
strategies that characterize the current research on Fair Trade. Instead, it attempts 
to offer a broad picture of the different balances that scholars have made when 
inquiring about the transformative potential of Fair Trade.  
The most comprehensive literature reviews on Fair Trade produced so far have 
shown that an important part of the academic production has tended to offer 
positive evaluations of the system. In her survey, Le Mare (2008:1992) concluded
that: “the outcomes are diverse and complex, though, most studies found 
significant impact on social and economic aspects of development, contributing to 
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the capacity to improve and diversify livelihoods.” Similarly, Fridell’s (2006) 
comprehensive literature review has identified three different positions that, even 
if arriving at diverse conclusions about Fair Trade’s strengths and weaknesses, all 
tend to highlight a certain transformative potential. Following Fridell, then, the 
“shaped-advantage perspective” sees Fair Trade as an initiative that attempts to 
assist producers in developing capacities to counteract the negative effects of 
globalization; the “alternative perspective,” instead, defines Fair Trade as an 
alternative model of globalization that, unlike neoliberalism, seeks to make 
international trade yield benefits for marginalized producers and workers; last, the 
“decommodification perspective” sees Fair Trade as a movement that attempts to 
de-commodify and de-fetishize goods and social relations.
The quoted reviews are correct in highlighting that an important (if not 
majoritarian) part of the literature could be considered to either favor Fair Trade’s 
alleged transformative potential or provide intra-systemic critiques—criticism that 
proposes adjustments or minor changes in order to more effectively fulfill the 
project’s goal. However, they also tend to ignore a relevant strand of critical 
literature in the field, such as, for example, Fridell (2007, 2014); Watson (2006, 
2007), Goodman et al (2014). As a consequence, they present some arguments as 
shared conclusions, when those arguments actually are ongoing discussions. In 
order to remediate this, I have decided to organize this literature review in the 
form of debates. The goal of this section, therefore, will be to confront supportive 
and critical assessments of Fair Trade by presenting the four most important 
current debates in the literature. These debates have been organized according to 
the theoretical or analytical approaches at their core and will be presented 
following an in crescendo logic, moving from those in which divergences are 
smaller to those in which differences appear to be insurmountable. I will hence 
begin by presenting a strand of literature that conceptualizes Fair Trade as a 
quality dimension of products and has examined it, mainly, with concepts 
stemming from Convention Theory. Then, I will continue with another group of 
scholars who understand Fair Trade as a value chain and analyze the relations 
between its nodes and their governance. Afterwards, I will present the two main 
debates that focus on Fair Trade’s transformative potential vis-à-vis global 
capitalism: the first one is built around Polanyi’s notion of the “double 
movement”; and the second one is inspired by Marx’s concept of “commodity 
fetishism.” While all four debates have been structured around certain analytical or 
conceptual approaches, the last section of this chapter will be devoted to a 
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particular case, that of Fair Trade wine. This final section will present the current 
state of the art within that field. 
2.1 How transformative is Fair Trade? Four debates 
2.1.1 Does Fair Trade introduce alternative quality conventions? 
A popular approach to the study of Fair Trade has been that one that has 
conceptualized it as a quality dimension of products by resort to Convention 
Theory. This approach originates from Boltanski and Thévenot’s “On 
Justification,” a work that presents a framework for comprehending how actors 
seek to justify their actions to others. Justifications are used in order to interact 
with others and prove fundamental in the construction of social arrangements: if 
an actor wants to mobilize others, s/he needs to provide justified arguments that 
refer to a common principle shared by them all. This common principle, which can 
be understood as a normative order, provides the ground for mutual acceptance of 
a justification. In this way, social interaction is characterized by the need to find 
suitable justifications for a desired plan of action, with conflict among social 
actors revolving around the deployment of different legitimizing principles.  
In the field of agro-food studies, this perspective has been relevant to the 
examination of “quality conventions.” As the definition of quality is an important 
element in the regulation of market access and exclusion, conventions of quality 
constitute an arena for the “struggle across economic actors within productive 
global networks” (Allaire, 2010:171). Given that quality is increasingly being 
defined, acknowledged, and communicated by the use of standards, certifications, 
and labels (Valceschini and Nicolas, 1995), Convention Theory has been devoted 
to the study of the principles that are put at play in order to define and legitimize 
these quality conventions. While Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) identified six 
principles of justification (inspiration, renown, civic, market, industrial, and 
domestic), Sylvander’s (1994, 1995) application of Convention Theory to the 
agro-food sector has distinguished four main ways in which quality can be 
defined: industrial coordination is based on the use of objectivized standards, 
rules, instruments, and testing procedures; domestic coordination is associated 
with direct relationships between people and the trust generated by certain places, 
brands, or organizations; civic coordination relies on the identification of, and 
adherence to, certain collective principles by a group of actors who renounce their 
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own individual interests; market coordination, lastly, is achieved through price 
mechanisms.
In her discussion of values-based labelling, Barham (2002:16) argues that 
“convention theory could offer us the possibility of developing a deeper 
understanding of the extent of commitment of values-based labelling groups by 
providing some criteria for making this judgement.” In this sense, Convention 
Theory would allow us to determine the lines along which Fair Trade seeks to 
(re)define quality conventions by promoting “alternative” principles of 
justification in opposition to the conventional ones, and to determine the extent to 
which it has been successful.  
These analyses seem to converge around a similar conclusion, according to which 
Fair Trade seeks to justify its project by resort to “civic” principles in opposition 
to “market” ones (cf. Riisgaard, 2015; Raynolds, 2002, 2009, 2012, 2014; Gibbon 
and Riisgaard, 2014; Renard 2003, 2005). Raynold’s work is a clear example of 
such a position, as she argues that “Fair Trade can be seen as questioning the 
legitimacy of ‘industrial’ and ‘commercial’ norms—where items are valued based 
on production efficiency and price and trade is guided by free market 
competition—and promoting a re-qualification of economic activity based on 
“civic” and “relational” ideas and practices” (Raynolds, 2012:279). Riisgaard 
(2015) analyzed the different meanings that a “civic” convention can acquire, 
identifying two main types: a liberal-dominated interpretation, which tends to 
emphasize formal equality and the importance of civil rights, and a solidarity-
dominated interpretation that, instead, focuses on substantial equality. Riisgaard’s 
research, which examined Fair Trade flower farms in Ecuador and Kenya, 
concluded that the case of Fair Trade does indeed promote the dominance of civic 
conventions, though they are interpreted from a liberal perspective, limiting its 
redistributive potential. Additionally, Riisgaard highlights the fact that within the 
Fair Trade system industrial conventions are mobilized in such a way that they 
contribute to the stabilization—instead of the undermining—of civic conventions. 
All in all, Riisgaard (2015:135) offers a positive conclusion: “thus, apart from 
pushing for civic labor conventions (albeit mainly in the liberal interpretation of 
civic), Fairtrade can also help promote the key preconditions for a serious 
stabilization of such a civic inflection.” Renard (2003), instead, seems to be more 
skeptical than Raynolds and Riisgaard. She acknowledges that Fair Trade was, in 
its origins, a “prototype” of civic coordination, but highlights that it has been 
reinforced by market coordination since its insertion into mainstream distribution 
channels through the use of labels. This reinforcement of civic coordination by 
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market coordination, Renard warns, might lead to “a situation where the 
distinctive sign is captured by the dominant actors of the market, and becomes part 
of the mercantile game (…) This would mean the neutralization of the initiative” 
(Renard, 2003:95). As an alternative, Renard suggests the possibility of 
reinforcing Fair Trade’s civic coordination with public authorities’ recognition of 
these criteria as a way to weaken the prevalence that market coordination has been 
gaining as a consequence of Fair Trade’s private-governance strategy.  
Reinecke (2010) has applied this approach in a different way. Instead of looking at 
the overall Fair Trade system, she focuses on the process through which the 
Fairtrade minimum price is determined by FLO. What she concludes is that price 
setting is governed by both industrial and civic principles. First, a minimum price 
is proposed by following an “objective” and “scientific” methodology that is used 
to calculate the producers’ costs of sustainable production: “this was consistent 
with the logic of the ‘industrial’ world, in which coordination was a technical-
scientific task that set out to discover and coordinate general facts that could be 
used for rational planning and calculation” (Reinecke, 2010:570). Second, the 
proposed price is put under the consideration of the main stakeholders (producers, 
traders and National Initiatives) in order to discuss it and reach a general 
agreement. In this way, the initial industrial principle is complemented by a civic 
principle, according to which “the common good was constituted by collective 
solidarity and revealed through the formation of the ‘general will’” (Ibid).
2.1.2 Has Fair Trade structured alternative value chains? 
Global Value Chain analysis has become a popular methodology for the study of 
globalization and international trade. The concept of global value chain seeks to 
account for the new forms of coordination that have emerged as a consequence of 
the increasing fractioning and transnationalization of productive processes (Gereffi 
et al. 2005). To do so, its methodological proposal is to analyze the different 
moments that add value to a commodity in its movement from production to 
consumption. In this way, it renders visible a variety of interorganizational 
networks that are connected to a certain product (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994) 
and seeks to analyze the various ways in which they relate. As a consequence, one 
of the main interests in this field has been that of governance, that is, the 
“authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and 
human resources are allocated and flow within a chain” (Gereffi, 1994:97). The 
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notion of governance, therefore, highlights the political dimension of global value 
chains, as it accounts for the different mechanisms and relations through which the 
activities in increasingly fractioned and geographically dispersed value chains are 
coordinated. As Ponte (2009:237) has noted, coordination along the value chain is, 
each time, achieved less through vertical integration or supervision than it is 
through the successful spread of “specific quality conventions and operational 
procedures.” The development of standards and certifications is a clear example of 
this strategy, and that is why the study of value chains and their governance has 
been of particular interest for Fair Trade researchers, who have sought to 
characterize Fair Trade value chains, compare them to conventional ones, and 
analyze the state of power relations between their nodes. 
In an attempt to analyze the impact of increasing corporate participation in Fair 
Trade, Reed (2009) has produced a typology of Fair Trade value chains that 
includes four ideal types. The “100% social economy” chain is characterized by 
the absence of corporate actors and the goals of maximizing small producers’ 
profit and extending benefits to their communities. These chains tend to be as 
short as possible and are governed by a sense of solidarity and social justice. 
“Social economy dominated” chains are very similar to the previous type, 
differing only to the extent that they include conventional retailers within their 
distribution networks. “Corporate dominated” chains emerged when conventional 
actors began to be granted licensee status, making them officially stakeholders of 
Fair Trade and, as a consequence, providing them opportunities to influence the 
governance of the value chain. This chain is characterized by a “modular” form of 
governance, in which buyers have the opportunity to set quality standards and are 
given the flexibility to switch between producers according to their needs. In this 
way, the possibility of building long-term relationships is undermined. Lastly, 
“100% corporate” chains emerged when FLO introduced standards for plantations 
(HL). Since then, it has been possible for a chain to be fully constituted by 
corporate actors. Moreover, in those cases in which plantations have a 
considerable level of power (due to market concentration or product quality, for 
example), it is common to find important degrees of vertical integration, in which 
most nodes in the chain belong to the same corporate actor. In this way, solidarity 
and modular forms of governance are replaced by hierarchy. Reed concludes that 
Fair Trade’s growth has been connected to a transition from social economy to 
conventional corporate value chains, which has compromised the original goals 
and values of the Fair Trade movement. 
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Ballet and Carimentrand (2010) offer a similar argument, though they also explore 
the ethical consequences of the changes in Fair Trade chains. They distinguish 
three types of chains: “specialized,” which includes only importers and 
distributors who are 100% committed to Fair Trade; “labelled,” which works with 
conventional import and distribution channels, but seeks to guarantee the fairness 
of the product through the use of certifications and labels; and, last, “hybrid,” 
which brings together Fair Trade and conventional importers, distributors, and 
retailers. Ballet and Carimentrand argue that the last decades have witnessed a 
proliferation of labelled and hybrid value chains at the expense of specialized 
ones. This transformation has caused a shift in the ethics that Fair Trade operates 
with, from “relational ethics”—“characterized by the fact that relationships serve 
as a medium for information, create a sense of belonging to a common network 
and are associated with a personalization of ethics” (Ibid:318)—to a situation in 
which ethics are becoming more and more depersonalized due to the replacement 
of relationships by signs as the means through which information is conveyed.  
Offering a more optimistic account, Becchetti and Constantino (2010) analyze the 
case of the Italian Fair Trade market and state that it has produced a 
transformation of traditionally “captive” value chains (in which producers are 
controlled by processors, distributors, and retailers through contracts) into a 
relational global chain: “it does so by offering primary producers, dependent on 
large buyers in standard market relations, a partnership comprising the 
transmission of knowledge and information, the shared discussion of market 
strategies and mutual dependence” (Ibid:186). Macdonald’s analysis of the Fair 
Trade coffee supply chain between Nicaragua and the United States departs from a 
similar assumption, finding that Fair Trade “contributed to strengthening the 
control exercised by marginalized groups over the terms of such [institutional] 
change” and that it has led to “the gradual diffusion of transformed principles of 
supply chain governance more widely throughout conventional supply chains” 
(Macdonald, 2007:808). However, Macdonald also highlights that Fair Trade and 
other initiatives that attempt to transform the governance of value chains are 
limited to producing changes within those chains, but fail to tackle the state and 
other private actors that, though not strictly connected to the chain, affect the 
agricultural sphere.  
In his study of the United States’ Fair Trade movement, Jaffee (2012; 2010:269) 
also identifies such a transformation in value chains. However, he warns that even 
the most progressive relational chains are currently facing the risk of co-optation 
and regulatory capture by corporations, which seek to dilute the standards that 
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give them shape. The Fair Trade movement, Jaffee argues, is faced with the 
dilemma of either resisting corporate co-optation, and preserving the relational 
chains that have historically characterized Fair Trade, or fully integrating major 
commercial actors and shifting back to traditional captive chains. Raynolds and 
Wilkinson (2007:36) raise a similar argument, though they envision two possible 
outcomes if the relational character of Fair Trade is lost: it would either be 
replaced by captive chains, as Jaffee argues, or, alternatively, by “modular” 
chains, in which “standardization, certification and market diversification loosens 
supplier networks.” In their analyses of different value chains linking Ghanaian 
cocoa and South African fresh fruits to UK retailers, Barrientos and Smith (2007) 
find mixed results, with the former being a relational chain and the latter a 
conventional one. While they argue that the inclusion of mainstream retailers may 
lead to the prevalence of a commercial logic in the chain’s governance, they also 
point out that relational chains can be facilitated when supermarkets show stronger 
commitment and develop their own Fair Trade brands.  
Valkila et al. (2010) provide a rather different perspective on the value chain 
concept. Instead of analyzing the kinds of actors that govern Fair Trade chains, 
their concern is related to the distribution of value along the chain. They are 
interested in identifying which proportion of the price paid by the final consumer 
actually makes its way back to producers. The result is rather disappointing, as 
they conclude that “although Fair Trade guaranteed a slightly higher price to 
producer organizations, a larger proportion of the price paid by consumers ended 
up in producing countries in the conventional coffee chain as compared with the 
Fair Trade chain” (Ibid:265).  
All in all, what most scholars within this perspective appear to agree on is the fact 
that Fair Trade has managed to structure relational value chains as an alternative to 
conventional chains. However, the increasing participation of mainstream 
corporate actors seems to be posing a threat to this development, attempting to 
“re-conventionalize” these alternative chains. Fair Trade finds itself at a critical 
juncture, in which it has to decide whether to stick to its original relational value 
chains or surrender to conventional variants. 
2.1.3 Is Fair Trade a case of a Polanyian countermovement? 
Two debates have been highly relevant in the literature when it comes to assessing 
Fair Trade’s transformative potential vis-à-vis global capitalism. The first one, 
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based on Polanyi’s (2001) “Great Transformation,” discusses whether Fair Trade 
could be considered a countermovement that attempts to re-embed market 
relations in their wider social context. The second one, inspired by Marx’s 
“Capital” (1991a), tries to determine whether Fair Trade contributes to the 
dissolution of commodity fetishism or actually reinforces it. I will focus here on 
the former, leaving the latter for the subsequent subsection.  
The “Polanyian debate” centers on Polanyi’s notion of the “double movement”:  
It can be personified as the action of two organizing principles in society, each of 
them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of definite social 
forces and using its own distinctive methods. The one was the principle of economic 
liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the 
support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-faire and free trade as its 
methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation 
of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support 
of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market (…) 
(Polanyi, [1944]2001:138).  
Polanyi describes two movements: the first, inspired by economic liberalism,
seeks to expand the realm of market relations and its logics to society as a whole, 
while the second, described as a principle of social protection, aims at salvaging 
specifically social and environmental domains from an economic logic that is 
foreign to them. The advancement of the first movement has produced a situation 
in which “instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations 
are embedded in the economic system” (Ibid: 63). In Polanyi’s view, this has 
triggered a countermovement of social protection that attempts to reverse this 
situation by re-embedding the market in social relations.  
Raynolds (2000, 2002, 2012) has been one of the most firm advocates of 
identifying Fair Trade as a Polanyian countermovement. According to her view, 
Fair Trade’s emergence can be understood as a reaction to the continuous 
disembedding of economic relations from social relations, which is deepened in 
the context of neoliberalism. Consumers, producers, workers, businesses, NGOs 
and activists all come together in the attempt to enforce a social regulation of 
market activities that can be interpreted as “a challenge to the dominance of 
abstract economic principles and a move to re-embed international trade within 
social relationships” (Raynolds, 2012:279). Archer and Fritsch argue, in 
consonance with Raynolds, that “the Fair Trade movement offers a Polanyian 
solution” to the dehumanizing effects of the market, as it attempts to re-embed 
commodity circuits in social relations.  
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Barham is supportive of these interpretations of Fair Trade as, according to her, 
values-based labelling promotes changes in the economy that “move in the 
direction of Polanyi’s vision,” defending values that “are typically non-market in 
the sense that they cannot be monetized or quantified precisely without doing 
violence to their essential character” (Barham, 2002:352). Guthman (2007) studies 
voluntary food labels as well, but has arrived at the opposite of Barham’s 
conclusion. According to her view, while voluntary certifications might embrace 
certain values associated to Polanyi’s “social protection” movement, they do so in 
a way that is not consistent with the thinker’s approach and, as a consequence, 
provide only partial and uneven protection: “that voluntary, protective labels work 
with the market—indeed extend market mechanisms into realms where they 
previously did not exist—seems to stray from Polanyian thinking” (Ibid: 473).  
In between both polar positions, Jaffee (2007) offers a more nuanced view. From 
an analytical perspective, he argues, the Polanyian approach cannot have one 
unequivocal say about Fair Trade because the system’s degree of embeddedness 
has changed over time. As a consequence, he finds it necessary to analyze the 
historical and evolving relationship of Fair Trade with corporate actors. His main 
conclusion is that “while fair trade has succeeded partially in ‘reembedding’ 
market exchange within systems of social and moral relations, it has also proved 
susceptible to the power of corporate actors who have sought to disembed the 
alternative through an increasingly successful process of co-optation” (Ibid:95). 
This partial success of Fair Trade’s attempt to re-embed market relations shows, 
according to Jaffee, the inherent problems of the use of market mechanisms to 
materialize a Polanyian countermovement.  
Lastly, Watson’s (2006) application of a Polanyian framework to the analysis of 
Fair Trade evidences the system’s contradictory relationship with the 
disembedding hypothesis. On the one hand, Fair Trade introduces a moral element 
to market relationships that induces the consumer to consider producers and their 
hardships at the moment of their purchase. As a consequence, it appeals to a sort 
of rationality that goes beyond the mere economic calculation. However, on the 
other hand, Fair Trade’s attempt to re-embed market relations is self-limiting 
because the movement has chosen to work within and rely upon those very same 
market institutions that it seeks to transform. As a consequence, Watson (Ibid:440) 
concludes that: “it is difficult to see, when adopting a Polanyian perspective, 
exactly how far the re-personalization of the trading relationship can go under 
current conditions of fair trade.” 
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2.1.4 Can Fair Trade fight against commodity fetishism? 
Marx characterized commodity fetishism as an unavoidable phenomenon in an 
economic system based on the generalized production of commodities. What this 
concept means is that, in a capitalist society, in which producers of commodities 
interact with each other through the market, the social relations that make 
production possible end up being hidden behind the commodity itself: “to the 
producers, therefore, the social relations between their private labours appear as 
what they are, i.e. they do not appear as direct social relations between persons in 
their work, but rather as material relations between persons and social relations 
between things” (Marx, 1991a:165-6). The fetishism of commodities is triggered 
by the moment of exchange, as it is then that producers come in contact through 
the products of their labor. And it is precisely because of this that some scholars 
have seen in Fair Trade’s attempt to transform international trade one possible 
way to de-fetishize commodities. 
This debate was initiated by Hudson and Hudson (2003), who examined the case 
of Fair Trade coffee. In their view, Fair Trade’s attempts to inform and educate 
consumers about the difficulties faced by producers in the South and the injustices 
of international trade could be interpreted as a step towards removing “the veil 
obscuring these social relations” (Ibid:414). In their view, providing information 
at the point of sale and offering more information on request enables consumers to 
realize that commodities are the result of social relations and are not entities on 
their own. Their final conclusion is that “at least in the case of coffee, it [Fair 
Trade] provides a much-needed antidote to the cult of the commodity that 
currently dominates society, not only by encouraging consumers to consider the 
production process of commodities but also by fostering a genuinely 
transformative alternative form of production in the South” (Ibid:428). Fridell 
(2007) has also analyzed the case of Fair Trade coffee and arrived at antithetical 
conclusions. According to Fridell, Fair Trade provides only a “symbolic 
challenge” to commodity fetishism (Ibid: 79), because it does not manage—it does 
not even attempt—to transform the economic structure in which it originates. By 
relying on the capitalist market, Fridell seems to argue, Fair Trade commits to the 
Sisyphean task of de-fetishizing commodities through the very institutions that 
fetishize them in the first place. Fridell concludes that Fair Trade has attempted to 
battle commodity fetishism “by promoting a dierent attitude toward market 
exchanges, while neglecting that it is not an attitude but a specific set of social 
relations of production that result in the imperatives of the capitalist market” 
(Ibid:99).  
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Other scholars have argued that Fair Trade has not eliminated, but also does not 
simply reproduce the fetishism of commodities: it, instead, has “reworked” it. 
Watson (2006) explains that when consumers buy a Fair Trade product, they enter 
simultaneously into two different types of market. In the first one, the consumer 
buys the product by consciously paying a price that guarantees conditions of 
fairness and provides a premium for disadvantaged producers. In the second one, 
however, what is being purchased is not the product itself, but the moral 
satisfaction of having made a virtuous choice and the social reputation attached to 
it. In this way, Fair Trade enters in a contradictory relationship with commodity 
fetishism as: “operating on the first of fair trade’s two markets diminishes the 
subjection of the consumer to the conventional commodity fetish, but operating on 
the second adds a new dimension to commodity fetishism” (Ibid: 444). Another 
version of Fair Trade’s re-worked commodity fetishism is offered by Goodman 
(2004), who argues that Fair Trade does not eliminate commodity fetishism but 
rather inflects a “twist” to the advantage of the actors involved in the system. 
Analytically, this re-working consists of two steps: first, it makes transparent the 
conditions of production and consumption of a commodity, advancing its de-
fetishization; second, however, it is precisely the now transparent and clear social 
relationship between consumers and producers that becomes commodified and is 
put on sale. As a consequence, fetishization is not eliminated, but, nevertheless, its 
re-work “allows these [Fair Trade] commodities to perform their ‘magic’ of 
alternative development” (Ibid: 908). As in the case of Watson’s analysis, Fair 
Trade’s re-work of commodity fetishism is crossed by a contradictory relation: 
“ironically, through the very act of revealing the production-commodity-consumer 
relationship in its ‘full glory’, the effect is to commodify, in turn, the ethical 
relationship deemed to be at the heart of fair trade” (Bryant and Goodman, 
2004:359).  
2.2 Literature on Fair Trade wine 
When looking more specifically at the Fair Trade wine literature, one should 
notice that publications in the field are far from numerous. Even though it is 
possible to find certified producers in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Lebanon, and 
South Africa, most research so far has focused on South Africa. Chile has received 
only marginal attention, and Argentina, so far, none.13

13NeitherhaveBrazilandLebanon,thoughitshouldbesaidthatthenumberofcertifiedproducersandtheir
shortexperienceinthesystemmakethemverymarginal.
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The South African Fair Trade wine industry has received the most attention in the 
literature. This might not be surprising, considering that it hosts the highest 
number of certified organizations and is responsible for the biggest volume of 
sales and revenues in the world. Most analyses in the literature seem to conclude 
that Fair Trade makes a difference in the context of the South African wine 
industry, though they also warn about their limitations and propose possible paths 
to further develop its potential. Moseley (2008:303), in this vein, concludes that 
“Fair Trade standards appear to be the most promising approach as these call for a 
combination of worker ownership and distinction in the global market place.” 
However, he warns about the limitations posed by the costs associated with the 
certification and the need to deepen the transformative process with substantial 
assistance to workers—in areas such as skills and confidence development or legal 
support. Last, he assesses Fair Trade as a “useful complement to change” (Ibid.) 
that needs to be accompanied by governmental intervention. 
Herman (2010, 2012) evaluates positively the role played by Fair Trade at the 
level of production, as it “offers participants more opportunities to overcome the 
continuing structural constraints that impact on their everyday lives” (Herman, 
2012:1129). However, she argues that the transformations that take place in South 
Africa are not transparently communicated to consumers: “the producer-side 
materialities that show the contextual adaptability of Fairtrade are not apparent to 
the consumer, who is presented with a more generic message and the standardized 
Fairtrade label” (Herman, 2010:417-8). Herman identifies this “gap” between 
producers and consumers as a form of commodity fetishism, since—in spite of the 
actual transformations and contextual adaptations evidenced by Fair Trade in 
South Africa—the message given to consumers still obscures the process of 
production. However, she proposes to give this concept a twist, understanding it as 
a continuum rather than in binary terms, because “Fairtrade certainly reinstates 
some of the information that is abstracted from conventional trading relationships, 
even if it presents only a partial impression, but its operation within the 
standardized and market-based FLO regulations ensure that it can never truly deal 
with commodity fetishism” (Herman, 2010:419). That the case of South African 
Fair Trade wine can only be located within a continuum between fetish and non-
fetish, instead of entirely belonging to one of these categories, is a consequence of 
the ambivalence produced by the growing importance that quality issues have 
acquired in the Fair Trade world. The paramount importance of quality when it 
comes to wine only strengthens this tendency, producing a situation in which: “fair 
trade has to negotiate a difficult balance between being ethical enough to appeal 
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to, and benefit, producers without being too ethical to attract consumers” 
(Goodman and Herman, 2015:153-4).  
While Moseley highlights the need to complement Fair Trade with state policies 
and Herman criticizes the simplified and fetishized images of producers and 
production that consumers in the UK are offered, both authors, nevertheless, are 
optimistic about the potential of Fair Trade to produce (some) transformations in 
the context of the South African wine industry. McEwan and Bek (2009:257), 
instead, are not so positive about the transformative potential of ethical 
certifications, as they can produce “negative effects, not only on workers who 
ultimately bear the burden of retailer-imposed constraints, but also by 
depoliticizing social and economic transformations.”  
In spite of the varied conclusions that the current research on South African Fair 
Trade wine has achieved, it can be argued that all researchers have worked within 
a common perspective, that of South Africa’s exceptionalism. I use this term in 
order to describe an approach to the study of Fair Trade that has been more 
interested in those aspects that make the South African case “unique” (Goodman 
and Herman, 2015:148), than in the aspects that might be common to the broader 
group of Fair Trade wine producing countries or the whole Fair Trade universe. 
This perspective becomes very clear when Herman (2012:1124) states that 
“Fairtrade standards have adapted to the specific South African context, with an 
unprecedented, and to date unrepeated, national level negotiation of ‘fairness’”. 
This was a consequence of the concern that, when first implemented in South 
Africa, Fair Trade appeared to be “legitimizing the racial and material legacy of 
slavery, colonialism, and Apartheid” (Kruger and du Toit, 2007:203). This fact 
triggered a process of negotiations in which Fairtrade International accepted to 
adapt its standard to the specificities of the South African context, including, for 
example, requirements in relation to workers’ ownership (for a detailed account of 
this process, see: Kruger and du Toit, 2007). All surveyed publications highlight 
this fact (Bek, McEwan and Bek, 2007; McEwan and Bek 2009; Herman 2010, 
2012; Moseley, 2008) and most of them grant it great importance, focusing their 
analyses mostly on those specificities that make the South African case 
exceptional—“newer, South Africa specific, Fair Trade standards” (Moseley, 
2008:303). As a consequence of this framing, most of the current research on 
South Africa provides us interesting insights about the concrete case but, at the 
same time, it offers limited connections to other Fair Trade wine producing 
regions—or to the Fair Trade system in general.  
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Kleine (2008) is the only publication on Fair Trade wine that has not focused on 
South Africa so far. Her work, instead, builds on a participatory action research 
strategy and analyzes the process of creation of a tracking and tracing system for 
Fair Trade products. Different actors throughout the value chain of Chilean Fair 
Trade wine were involved in its development, and Kleine’s analysis focuses on the 
interactions and negotiations among them. Her main conclusion highlights the 
potential of Fair Trade for redistributing power along the value chain from 
retailers to civil society actors: “consumer demand, if it is channeled effectively, 
as in the case of the Fairtrade label, can lead large companies, such as 
supermarkets, in their business behaviour” (Ibid: 120). This is a consequence of 
the moral power that FLO is granted by consumers, as it is recognized as the 
guarantor of the products’ ethicity, what pushes supermarkets to work with them 
and build processes of “mutual legitimization”: “jointly, the producers and the 
certification agency wield considerable moral power which can, to a degree, 
balance the economic power of the supermarkets” (Ibid.).  
All in all, the studies on Fair Trade wine seem to be characterized by the main 
features that dominate the general literature on Fair Trade. First, the reviewed 
publications also show a generally positive, though cautious, appraisal of the 
effects of Fair Trade in favor of small producers and workers. Second, similar 
analytical and conceptual strategies have been used, as is evidenced by McEwan 
and Bek’s (2009) understanding of Fair Trade as a quality convention for the 
governance of value chains, Herman’s (2010) re-worked hypothesis on 
commodity fetishism, Goodman and Herman’s (2015) discussion of the effects of 
quality criteria, or Kleine’s (2008) analysis of power relations along the value 
chain. While conceptually and analytically the Fair Trade wine literature has 
clearly attempted to link itself to the more general discussions on Fair Trade, most 
of it, on the other hand, has differentiated itself through the presentation of South 
Africa as an exceptional case. In this way, its contributions to today’s most heated 
debates on Fair Trade have been marked by the specificities that characterize the 
South African context. 
2.3 Summarizing debates: a Faustian bargain? 
The four main debates presented here – which the literature on Fair Trade wine 
seems to reproduce – rely on very different theoretical traditions and analytical 
frameworks. Consequently, it becomes very challenging, at least at first glance, to 
offer a synthetic view of these varied approaches. However, I believe that in spite 
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of the diverse concepts and strategies deployed, it is possible to identify some 
common underlying concerns.  
Such a proposition is especially clear in the publications inspired by Convention 
Theory and the Global Value Chain perspective, as they provide analogous 
arguments. In the first case, it is affirmed that Fair Trade attempts to replace 
market principles of coordination with civic ones. While that assumption seems to 
be shared by most of the literature, the debate springs from FLO’s more recent 
historical evolution, as some argue that its increasing mainstreaming – and with it 
the introduction of major, conventional commercial players – threatens to 
undermine its originally successful enterprise.  A very similar form of reasoning 
can be identified in the global value chain perspective, which argues that the 
increasing participation of corporate actors in the system threatens to re-
conventionalize the alternative and relational forms of governance that 
characterize Fair Trade value chains. While most scholars who resort to Polanyi’s 
countermovement and Marx’s commodity fetishism are much more radical in their 
criticism of Fair Trade, the main target of their attacks is also related to Fair 
Trade’s reliance on mainstream channels of commercialization and conventional 
economic structures.  
All in all, these four strands in the literature seem to reflect a common concern 
with the internal tensions faced by FLO as a consequence of its attempt to change 
the system from within. In this way, I believe the common problems underlying 
contemporary debates on Fair Trade can be condensed into the idea of Fair 
Trade’s Faustian bargain, a situation in which “mainstreaming has allowed 
market share to grow and thus brought more development, but at the price of 
shifting the cultural material politics of fair trade away from its original grounding 
in transparency, direct producer/consumer relations, and global justice” (Goodman 
et al, 2014:200-1). The argument developed by Goodman (2010; Goodman and 
Herman, 2015) seems to include many of the elements present in the different 
debates: Fair Trade’s mainstreaming strategy was based on articulating the system 
in terms of conventional value chains. In this context, the previously more socially 
or ethically driven principles that were used to define Fair Trade products were 
replaced by conventional representations that were dominated by the price/quality 
relationship. These transformations, on the one hand, have made possible an 
important expansion of the system; however, on the other hand they are 
responsible for internalizing tensions that seem to threaten Fair Trade’s original 
goals.
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The concept of a Faustian bargain, I argue, does not necessarily provide a definite 
answer to any of the current debates in the Fair Trade literature. However, I 
consider it enormously appropriate as a condensation of the different concerns that 
underlie the various discussions on the topic. In this way, the Faustian bargain can 
be considered an indicator of the defining problems that the current literature 
attempts to tackle: the tensions produced by Fair Trade’s mainstreaming. 
3. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to provide a general presentation of Fair Trade. Following 
the premises presented in the methodological section, this has been done in two 
steps. First, the most abstract and general features that characterize Fair Trade, 
irrespective of its concrete manifestations, were presented. Three main elements 
were identified: Fair Trade’s diagnosis of and proposed solution for the problems 
of international trade, its historical evolution and progressive institutionalization 
and, lastly, its main standards and certifications.  Second, a review of the current 
literature assessing Fair Trade’s transformative potential was presented according 
to its most important debates. Four analytical perspectives, based on Convention 
Theory, Global Value Chains, Polanyi’s “countermovement” and Marx’s 
“commodity fetishism” were highlighted. In spite of their differences, a common 
preoccupation with the tensions that spring from Fair Trade’s mainstreaming 
process was identified. The literature that specifically deals with Fair Trade wine 
appears to reflect the dominance of these four approaches. However, most 
contributions have been strongly marked by their framing of South Africa as an 
exceptional case, pointing in this way towards the need of further research on Fair 
Trade wine with the capacity to reconnect case specificities with more general 
sectorial features.   
All in all, the general concept of Fair Trade that emerged from these two 
operations represents a Generality I, and will be used as the point of departure 
from (and against) which my research will be developed. In the following 
chapters, the analysis will proceed to increasing levels of concretization, which 
will allow me to critically re-examine the initial assumptions about Fair Trade 
presented so far.
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Chapter 4: The Regime of Accumulation of the 
Argentinean Wine Sector 
The previous chapter offered a general concept of Fair Trade. The present chapter 
instead signals the beginning of the process of theoretical practice (Generality II), 
in which my conceptual tools will be used to analyze empirical social phenomena 
and produce new knowledge by critically examining the initial general concept of 
Fair Trade. Theoretical practice is characterized by the process of concretization it 
involves. In the present chapter, this will be evidenced by the movement from a 
national mode of development (composed of a global regime of accumulation and 
mode of regulation) to the regime of accumulation in the Argentinean wine sector.  
The main goal of this chapter, hence, is to describe the defining characteristics of 
this regime of accumulation and its recent historical evolution. This examination 
shows that the current sectorial regime of accumulation is divided in two: on the 
one hand, we find a quantity-led regime that was historically dominant but has 
contracted in recent decades; on the other hand, there is a quality-led regime that 
emerged in the 1990s and has grown considerably since then.  
In order to demonstrate this structural split, the chapter begins by examining the 
changes that the Argentinean macroeconomic mode of development has 
experienced since the end of the 1980s. As we will see, many of its alterations 
were critical for the transformation of the wine industry, while others passed 
almost unnoticed. The chapter continues by describing the quantity-led regime of 
accumulation that traditionally dominated the sector. It will examine its main 
features and the causes that led to its most important crisis in history during the 
1980s. The main focus of this chapter follows, which is explaining the emergence 
of a quality-led regime of accumulation and its growth at the expense of the 
previously hegemonic one. This historical event will be described comparatively, 
looking at the main sectorial modifications that the developing regime entailed. 
Lastly, the chapter finishes by discussing the implications of this evolution in the 
sectorial regime of accumulation and the current state of forces within. 
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1. Argentina’s modes of development 
Having defined sectorial modes of regulation and regimes of accumulation as 
specific forms that result from the interaction between global and sectorial forces 
and structures, an understanding of the main transformations that the Argentinean 
national mode of development has undergone becomes relevant. Therefore, this 
section presents a brief description of these changes. In order to account for the 
most recent and important evolutions in the wine industry, it is necessary to 
introduce two global modes of development: first, one that spans between 1989 
and 2002 and is characterized by a competitive mode of regulation and a partially 
intensive regime of accumulation; second, one that emerges in 2002 and still 
continue at the time of my study, which combines an administered or monopoly
mode of regulation and an extensive regime of accumulation. Since the empirical 
investigation of Argentina’s modes of development goes beyond the scope and 
actual possibilities of this dissertation, in this section I follow Julio Cesar Neffa 
and Demián Panigo’s (2010) work, who have analyzed its evolution from a 
regulationist perspective.  
In macroeconomic terms, the period that goes between 1989 and 2002 has been 
described by Neffa and Panigo as being characterized by a competitive mode of 
regulation, based on currency convertibility, and a partially intensive regime of 
accumulation with predominance of foreign capital and no mass consumption 
(Ibid). GDP growth was expected to be fueled by the private sector, that is why the 
main goal of this mode of development was to stop the fall of (and eventually 
increase) the rate of profit of private firms in order to encourage investment. An 
important strategy to do this was the flexibilization of the organization of 
companies, production and work, with the goal of increasing productivity, 
reducing costs, moderating or reducing wage increases and expenditures in 
indirect wages.   
The alarming process of hyperinflation14 suffered by the end of the 1980s was 
effectively tackled in 1991 by establishing a 1:1 convertibility between the peso 
and the dollar.  This overvaluation of the peso had a particularly negative 
incidence on national industry because imported manufactures became relatively 
cheaper and exports of locally produced goods and services more expensive. 
Convertibility offered the structural conditions for the base of the regime of 

14Between1975and1991,Argentinaexperiencedanannualaverageof80%inflation,whichwasparticularly
acutein1989(4923%)and1990(1343%)(Krikorian,2012:534)
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accumulation to shift from the real economy to the financial sector, where 
profitability was higher. And within the real economy, another shift occurred from 
industry to the exporting primary sector where it was possible to obtain 
extraordinary profits due to the high international prices of commodities. In spite 
of the increase in agricultural exports, the foreseeable deficit in the balance of 
trade produced by the high valuation of the peso was expected to be compensated 
by the attraction of foreign direct investment. In order to promote it, the 
government eliminated all controls of incoming and outgoing capital flows and 
guaranteed a non-discriminatory treatment of all foreign capital. Deregulation was 
not only limited to this, it was the leading principle in the relationship between the 
state and the economy more in general. Most markets and spheres of the economic 
circuit were freed from state control and opened to self-regulation. What actually 
meant, far from the neoclassical fantasy, that a process of re-regulation took place, 
with the most powerful capitalist players taking the lead and defining the rules. 
The state, however, had an active role in adapting regulations to market 
imperatives and the primordial objective of increasing profit rates. A clear 
example of this was the labor reform, which established more flexible ways of 
hiring workers, reduced costs associated to direct and indirect wages, and 
promoted the decentralization of collective bargaining. 
In 1991 the government passed de decree N°2284/91 entitled “economic 
deregulation”. Its main goals were the elimination of state regulation of the local 
commercialization of goods and services and international trade, the abolition of 
regulatory entities, the possibility of freely choosing the level of collective 
bargaining and the derogation of previous legislation that used fiscal tools as ways 
of intervention in the market. While most of the articles comprised in the decree 
importantly affected the functioning of the wine sector as a part of the overall 
economic regime, there were also measures directed specifically to it. The decree 
criticized regulatory legislations that had caused disequilibrium in the wine, must 
and grape markets by stimulating or discouraging the activity according to 
changing and contradictory policies. Therefore, it was decided that any kind of 
changes in the extension of cultivated surfaces and their characteristics, the 
production of grapes and their possible uses were to be freely elected by market 
agents. Restrictions – such as quotas or prohibitions – on production and 
commercialization of wine were abolished and all wine stocks were authorized to 
be sold right after the harvest was finished. Lastly, the National Institute of 
Viniculture (INV, from its initials in Spanish) – which had up to then been the 
most important public regulator – would have its functions reduced to the 
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technical evaluation and control of products derived from grapes, being expressly 
forbidden to “interfere, regulate or modify the functioning of the free market”. 
With the state stepping aside of the wine industry for the first time after two 
decades of particularly strong interventionism, the sectorial actors were offered the 
possibility of restructuring the field in the direction they considered better without 
the need of restricting their actions to fit a national policy. 
By the end of the 1990s, however, this mode of development proved to be 
exhausted, evidencing not only its inability to produce economic growth15 but also 
a delicate social situation.16 This explosive socio-economic landscape led to a 
political crisis in 2001/2002, which signaled the end of the mode of development.  
Neffa and Paniago’s periodization of Argentina’s macroeconomic history uses 
2002 as a landmark, when a competitive mode of regulation and a semi-intensive 
regime of accumulation started to be replaced by an administered or monopoly 
mode of regulation (characterized by wage determination through collective 
bargaining and growing state investment) and an extensive regime of 
accumulation (mainly based on the expansion of agricultural areas promoted by 
high commodity prices, while leaving productive processes untouched). This 
period is marked by the maxi-devaluation of 2002 (of approximately 300%) which 
came to replace convertibility for a system of multiple exchange rates (governed 
by differential retentions on certain exportable products), high rates of GDP 
growth (until 2011 – with the only exception of 2009) due to exports of little 
elaborated primary products and some industrial manufactures, and a rise in the 
production of intermediate and consumption goods, creating a considerable 
increase in employment but without a strong increase of real salaries. Its main 
problem being that inflation, though not a major challenge during the first years, 
grows faster than productivity.  
This new period comes to rectify in many ways the policies of the 1990s that had 
led to stagnation by the end of the decade and a major crisis at the beginning of the 
century. The government intervened actively in order to keep a competitive 
exchange rate that, unlike before, boosted exports and made imports more 
expensive. One of the main goals of this model was to accumulate capital through 
agricultural exports in order to redistribute part of its rent in favor of industrial 

15TheGDPshowednegativegrowthin1999(3,38%),2000(0.78%),2001(4.40%)and2002(10.89%)(The
WorldBankDatabank).
16Thepercentagesofpovertyandunemploymentwere,respectively:26.7%and14.4%in1999;28.9%and14.7%
in2000;35.4%and19%in2001and54.3%and18.8%in2002(NationalInstituteofStatisticsandCensuses)
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production, with the hope of activating a process of industrialization by imports 
substitution. The state becomes much more active and visible, settling controls to 
capital flows, re-nationalizing various privatized companies, regaining control of 
the pension system and actively developing an extensive fiscal policy that 
provides subsidies and monetary transfers to unwaged or marginalized sectors of 
the population as a way of boosting consumption through the increase of indirect 
wages. This greater public expenditure was, nevertheless, a controlled one, 
because during the first years of this period the state enjoyed a twin surplus in the 
fiscal and international trade balance, leading to a sustained growth of GDP and 
the central bank’s reserves. Due to a boom in commodity prices (particularly, soy-
bean), the government was able to collect an important amount of resources by 
establishing retentions to the exports of goods with extraordinary rates of profit.  
Interestingly, while the period 2001/2002 signaled the ultimate crisis of one 
national mode of development and the emergence of a new one –  producing a 
break with many important features of its predecessor –  at the lever of the wine 
sector it only proved to strengthen the transition towards a new structure that had 
already begun in the 1990s. This process will be now discussed at length in the 
following section. 
2. The sectorial regime of accumulation 
Argentina has historically been one of the world’s main wine producers by volume 
and is currently the world’s 5th, only behind France, Italy, Spain and the United 
States (OIV, 2011). While it has also traditionally been a country with high levels 
of wine consumption, the last three decades have witnessed a significant and 
constant decrease. This has resulted in an important increase in the gap between 
production and consumption (from 11% in the period 1986-1990 to 37% in 2011), 
what led the International Organization of Vine and Wine (OIV, from its initials in 
French) to change Argentina’s classification from consumer to net exporting 
country (OIV, 2009). Graph 1 shows how since 1977 the tendency of demand has 
been negative, pushing also the levels of total production downwards.  
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Figure 3 
This change has been accompanied by a paradigmatic shift in the industry, which 
has begun to produce fine wines specifically for the international markets. While, 
as it can be appreciated in Figure 3, exports had always been insignificant before 
1995, they have now become a fundamental alternative to the declining rates of 
local consumption. This transformation has divided the industry’s regime of 
accumulation in two: a growing and expanding reconverted sector that produces 
higher quality wines, mainly, for the international market, and a traditional and 
contracting one, which produces table wine for the domestic market. This division 
can also be appreciated geographically, with the historic wine producer region of 
Mendoza leading the reconversion process and monopolizing exports (which in 
2013 represented 75% of the total volume and 88% of the total value of exported 
wine), and other traditional but secondary zones (such as San Juan or La Rioja) 
showing much more heterogeneous profiles. 
147

2.1 The quantity-led regime of accumulation 
Argentina has historically been a country with high volumes of wine production 
and consumption. During most of its history, the local wine industry had been 
structured around a productivist (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2001; 2003; Bocco et al., 
2007; Bocco and Dubbini, 2007) regime of accumulation, which was based on the 
elaboration of table wine for massive local consumption. Known as the centennial
model (Mateu and Stein, 2008; Mateu, 2007), its origins can be traced back to the 
last decades of the 19th century, when the increasing number of Italian and 
Spanish immigrants settling in the country brought with them the know-how of 
winemaking and constituted an important local market for this product. High and 
constantly growing levels of consumption was one of the main characteristics 
during the initial decades, soaring from 23 liters per capita in 1880 to 31.68 in 
1895 and 62.2 in 1914 (Mateu, 2008:26). While the 20th century would evidence 
variations in the level of wine consumption as a consequence of changes in its 
price and the purchase power of wages, the dominant tendency continued to be 
that of growth, achieving its peak in 1970 with 92 liters per capita at the national 
level and 114 in the greater Buenos Aires, placing this metropolitan area close to 
the figures of Paris and Rome, the most important consumer cities in the world 
(Stein, 2008:41).   
The main focus of the industry was on producing large quantities of low quality 
wine for a quite undifferentiated and homogeneous national demand.  The 
dominant conception of the product understood wine as a commodity to be 
produced massively due to its importance as a wage-good. A clear example of 
how this logic worked is given by Stein (Ibid:38-9) when he describes how 
between 1943 and 1973 the total surface of vineyards used for wine production 
increased from 150,000 hectares  to 330,000, but the total output of wine more 
than tripled, moving from 9,000,000 hectoliters to 28,000,000. This means that the 
increase in production was not only achieved through the expansion of vineyards, 
but also with the increase in their yields. The main way of achieving this was by 
planting more productive varieties of grape, what was widely done during the 
1960s and 1970s. The local variety known as criolla grape – of low enological 
value – became dominant due to its high yields: 6 times more than its closest 
competitor, Pedro Giménez – another low quality variety – and 15 times more 
than high quality malbec (Ibid.). By the beginning of the 1970s the Argentinean 
wine industry could proudly describe itself as a champion of the quantity 
paradigm, as it became the country in the world with the highest production of 
wine per hectare, doubling the yields of France and Italy (Costa, 1972:16).  
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Technological advancements were put to the service of this conception of the 
product, since most developments sought to increase vines’ yields and wineries’ 
capacity to process grapes, as well as to accelerate winemaking (Stein, 2008:34). 
The result was a little differentiated product, which was chosen by consumers 
more because of its brand than due to certain specific characteristics (Bocco et al. 
2007:47). In this inward-looking industry, exports to neighboring countries had a 
marginal role and the access to more distant markets was left to sporadic 
opportunities. There were no attempts either of developing products specifically 
for foreign consumers or cementing stable flows of exports, as it is shown by the 
fact that until 1995 exports never represented more than 3,5% of the overall 
production (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2003:9).  
Figure 4 
In spite of its long-term activity, the wine industry has always been far from 
stable. Throughout its history, it has always been victim of cyclical crisis of grape 
and wine oversupply and required active state intervention in order to overcome 
the most troubled times (Mateu, 2008:29).However, while the constant downturns 
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had always been a distinctive feature of the sector – some important crises of 
overproduction took place in 1903, 1914, the 1930s and the 1960s (Tacchinni, 
2008; Mateu, 2007) –, the crisis that took place between the 1970s and 1990 
proved to be a major landmark. During these two decades the industry was not 
only faced to the usual problem of oversupply, but this time the problem was 
worsened by a constantly diminishing rate of local consumption. As Figure 4 
shows, consumption descends from 88.45 liters per capita in 1977 to 53.67 liters 
per capita in 1989, its lowest level in 30 years. While changes in consumption per 
capita were not foreign to this industry, the contraction that began in the 1970s is 
different in two ways. First, because it presents a new pattern when compared to 
previous contractions. As Figure 4 shows, between 1930 and 1970 most changes 
in consumption could be explained by changes in GDP per capita (they correlate 
with a Pearson coefficient of 0.9), while after 1970 this joint variations do not 
occur anymore (between 1970 and 2001 the Pearson coefficient is -0,2). The 
1970s represents a break: while up to then consumption per capita had always 
grown and its contractions were the result of reductions in income disposal and the 
purchase power of wages, it now reflects a change in consumer taste and 
preferences, which evolve independently of economic conditions. Second, and 
closely related, the decrease in consumption per capita that begins in the 1970s has 
no precedents because of its sustained and constant decline. 
This new trend in consumption put in evidence the futility of the sectorial tools of 
intervention previously used to adjust production levels and prices. While the 
industry’s logic had always been that of expanding supply due to expectations of 
an ever increasing consumption, this sudden and sustained decrease would alter 
the basic assumption that had underlain the system since its inception. Numerous 
and varied measures were taken directly by the state (both at the national and 
provincial levels) in an attempt to stabilize the situation – price controls, the 
prohibition to plant new vineyards, purchases of wine to take it out of the market 
or distillate it, acquisitions of grapes to small producers by state-owned wineries – 
or indirectly, through the guidelines established by the main regulating body of the 
sector, the INV –  for example, the settlement of wine production and/or 
commercialization quotas for the national, regional and individual levels, the 
prohibition to vinify certain percentages of grape production, among others. 
 In spite of active governmental involvement, the crisis that reached its peak 
during the 1980s – with its own sectorial causes worsened by a macroeconomic 
context of high inflation and negative growth – led to the eradication of enormous 
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surfaces of vineyards and wineries.17 The crisis triggered in the 1970s proved to be 
intractable, as none of the policies that had been successful during previous 
downturns could initiate a process of recovery. While preceding crises could be 
understood as crisis in regulation (cyclical imbalances that could be corrected 
within the current mode of regulation) the one that reached its climax during the 
1980s should best be described as a crisis of regulation: an important alteration in 
one of the main features of the regime of accumulation (the sustained decline in 
demand) had made the mode of regulation obsolete, requiring the transformation 
of its structural forms if the emerging regime was to be regularized and the path of 
sectorial accumulation re-established. Furthermore, as the sectorial crisis deepens, 
so does the national mode of development, what further contributes to its 
destabilization.  In this way, the crisis of the quantity-led regime of accumulation 
coincides with the crisis of the current mode of development, and it will not be 
until a new national mode of development emerges that a renewal of the sectorial 
regime of accumulation will begin to take place (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5
2.2 The emergence of a quality-led regime of accumulation 
While already during the 1980s some individual wineries had begun to experiment 
with the development of new styles of wine that could be commercialized in the 
international market instead of the declining local one, it would not be until the 

17AccordingtoINV’sfigures,inbetween1979and1990thetotalsurfaceoccupiedbyvineyardsdecreasedfrom
316,355to210,371hectaresandthetotalnumberofvineyardsfrom29,391to20,118.
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1990s that a transformed national macroeconomic context and an changing global 
market would provide the frame for the restructuration of the sectorial regime of 
accumulation.   
Internationally, a landmark in the history of wine took place during the 1976 Paris 
Wine Tasting (also known as The Paris Judgment – see: Taber, 2005), when two 
US wines defeated their French counterparts in a blind tasting. For the first time in 
such events French wines would lose to a non-traditional wine producer, opening 
the door for new actors to emerge in the international wine scene. The key for 
producers from the United States had been to compensate their lack of a well-
known terroir and the traditional know-how possessed by the French producers 
with the development of technological and scientific methods of grape growing 
and winemaking, pioneering in this way a style that came to be known as new
world.
From the 1970s onwards important changes in wine consumption began to take 
place at the international level. Countries with historical high rates of consumption 
(such as France, Italy or Spain) faced fast declining tendencies, while in some 
other non-traditional markets consumption was growing (the United States, the 
United Kingdom or Russia, for example). Together with this, a shift in preferences 
begun to occur. While in the past the international wine market was dominated by 
old world producers (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal), a trend started to emerge – 
especially among new consumers – in favor of more fruity and fresher wines, 
precisely the type that new world producers (the United States, Australia, Chile, 
Argentina, South Africa, New Zealand) could offer.  
Table 2 shows the importance acquired in the global wine industry by new world 
producers from 1990 onwards in three key dimensions: share of world wine 
production, world wine exports by value and world wine exports by volume.  It is 
interesting to note that in the 20 years period between 1990 and 2009 the 
aggregated data of new world and old world producers presents only minor 
variations as shares of the total world figures:  an increase of 1.8% in production, a 
decrease of 1.6% in exports by value and – the most noticeable change – an 
increase of 5.1% in exports by volume.  However, important changes can be found 
when we compare the relative weight of these two groups separately: in terms of 
total world production, new world countries move from representing 18.2% in 
1990-94 to  26.7% in 2005-09, while old world producers descend from 58% to 
51.3%. The share of world exports by value of new world producers grew more 
than threefold in the same period, moving from 6.4% to 23.1%, while old world 
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producers’ share contracted from 81.2% to 62.9%. Lastly, when exports are 
analyzed in terms of volume, new world producers grow even more, passing from  
7%  of the world’s total in 1990-94 to 29,3%, in 2005-09, as old world producers 
shrank from 73.4% to 56.2%.  These figures show the increasing importance that 
new world producers have acquired in the global market and the success they have 
had in increasing their shares of production and exports at the expense of 
traditional producers. 
Table 2 
 Shareofworldproduction Shareofworldexportsbyvalue Shareofworldexportsbyvolume
1990-
94 
1995-
99 
2000-
04 
2005-
09 
1990-
94 
1995-
99 
2000-
04 
2005-
09 
1990-
94 
1995-
99 
2000-
04
2005-
09
Australia 1,8 2,5 4,3 4,6 2,5 4,3 8,5 8,5 2,3 4,7 6,8 8,8 
New 
Zealand 
0,2 0,2 0,3 0,6 0,2 0,4 0,9 2,0 0,1 0,3 0,7 1,0 
USA 6,4 7,7 8,3 9,3 1,7 3,1 3,8 3,3 1,9 3,4 4,5 4,4 
Argentina 5,7 5,3 5,2 5,4 0,3 0,9 1,0 1,9 0,6 2,5 1,4 3,8 
Chile 1,3 1,6 2,3 3,2 1,3 3,1 4,4 4,6 1,7 3,1 5,2 6,5 
South 
Africa 
2,8 3,0 2,9 3,6 0,4 0,0 2,2 2,6 0,4 0,0 3,0 4,7 
Total NW 18,2 20,5 23,2 26,7 6,4 11,8 20,8 23,1 7,0 14,0 21,6 29,3 
France 20,9 21,6 19,8 17,7 48,8 43,2 37,3 33,3 27,4 25,6 22,2 16,6 
Italy 22,9 21,1 18,4 17,9 18,0 18,1 17,8 18,2 27,5 27,4 22,3 21,3 
Portugal 3,0 2,5 2,7 2,4 5,5 4,3 3,4 3,0 4,3 2,8 3,4 3,3 
Spain 11,3 11,0 14,4 13,3 8,9 9,5 9,0 8,4 14,2 12,1 14,9 14,9 
Total OW 58,0 56,2 55,4 51,3 81,2 75,2 67,5 62,9 73,4 67,9 62,8 56,2 
Total 76,2 76,7 78,6 78,0 87,6 87,1 88,3 86,0 80,4 81,9 84,4 85,5
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2011). 
The increasing relative weight of new world producers has also been translated 
into institutional impacts. This is particularly clear with the systems of wine 
classification. European producers have historically distinguished wines according 
to geographical indications, this is, according to the particular characteristics that a 
wine produced in a certain area should have. Therefore, the terms Bordeaux, Rioja
or Chianti are linked to specific regions in France, Spain and Italy respectively 
and represent a particular tipicity that the wines from these areas (with their 
respective specific grape varieties, techniques, soil and weather) shall have. The 
main problem of this system of classification for newcomers is the monopoly over 
production that European players are given due to geographical indications. 
Instead, new world producers have shifted the focus from the place of origin to the 
types of grapes being used, promoting a system of classification based on 
varietals. Here, the terms cabernet sauvignon, chardonnay or malbec represent the 
153

variety of grape with which a certain wine was made and are connected to the 
tipicity that certain varietal-based wines are expected to have. The increasing 
importance of new world producers in the global market has led to the recognition 
of varietal indications, which nowadays coexist with geographical indications.  
These structural changes in the world market had a direct impact on international 
trade: between 1988 and 1998 it increased by 50% in volume and 80% in value, 
evidencing not only a higher number of transactions, but also the higher prices 
(and quality) of the traded goods (Bocco et al. 2007:49). These figures are 
reflected in the degree of internationalization of the wine industry, which moved 
from a world average of 14% by the end of the 1980s to over 25% in 2001 (Ibid.). 
All in all, a new international context emerged, where old world producers’ 
supremacy began to be contested by non-traditional producers, international trade 
grows significantly and fine wines become increasingly important.  
Argentina’s position within this context was quite particular. On the one hand, its 
wines had little or none international reputation, making it an emerging country in 
the global market among other new world producers. On the other hand, it was – 
as Italy, France or Spain – a traditional wine producer with a very important local 
market, unlike most other emerging producers. While Argentina was experiencing 
a tendency similar to traditional wine consumer countries, with the rate of 
consumption falling drastically since the 1970s, during the 1990s it also began to 
experience a shift in consumption patterns. A comparison of the consumption of 
high quality18 and lower quality wines between 2004 and 201319 (see Figure 6) 
shows an important increase of the former’s share in the first years (from 10% in 
2004 to 20% in 2007) and its further stabilization in between 22% and 23% during 
the subsequent ones. When consumption is analyzed in terms of price segments 
(see Figure 7), the tendency becomes even clearer, as the important decrease in 
low price and increase in intermediate and high price products seem to support the 
argument of a shift in consumption patterns towards higher quality. Overall, this 
means that while total consumption continued to fall, it also changed its structure 
with the demand for fine wine slowly but constantly growing at the expense of 
table wine. 

18Underthecategory“highquality”Ihaveaddedthefiguresforvarietalandsparklingwines.
19In2004,theINVdecidedtherecategorizationofwinesinordertodistinguishmoreclearlybetweenfineand
tablewine.Itisthereforeonlyfrom2004onwardsthatstatisticsthatdifferentiatebetween“varietal”and“non
varietal”winesareavailable,makingitdifficulttoprovidealongtermhistoricalevolutionofconsumptionineach
segment.
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Recent changes at the international and local level offered Argentinean producers 
the possibility of following the path opened by US producers as a way of insertion 
in the global market, but to do so, a radical process of reconversion was needed. It 
was necessary to move from the traditional production of table wine for mass 
consumption in the local market to the adoption of new techniques needed to 
produce fine wines that matched the taste of overseas consumers.  Argentina’s 
wine tradition was initiated mainly by European immigrants, therefore, the 
country had inherited old world techniques. However, since there was virtually no 
significant production of fine wines, this form of production was only used for 
table wine. Simply moving to fine wines was not an option to access the 
international markets, as European wine producers were the only ones considered 
to master properly the old world techniques. Shifting production to that of fine 
wines and commercializing them internationally meant that Argentinean producers 
would have to embrace the new world paradigm, re-founding its centennial 
industry. 
At the center of this process of reconversion was a new representation of the 
product. While up to the moment the success of accumulation in the productivist 
wine industry had been determined by quantity, the transition towards fine wine 
settles new parameters that are now determined by the idea of quality.  As a 
consequence, profits are not to be obtained anymore by the growing volume of 
sales, but through an upgrade in the quality and value of each individual unit.  On 
the one hand, this implies a transition from generic to varietal-based wines, 
offering in this way a diversification of products with their own distinctive 
features and specific requirements of elaboration. On the other hand, the quality 
imperatives of wine production are closely linked to a radical transformation at the 
agricultural level. Criolla grapes, the most dominant variety in a country focused 
on table wine, are to be replaced by grapes of high enological potential. 
Furthermore, the transformation at the agricultural level is not just restricted to the 
replacement of one variety of grapes by another. A good wine can only be made 
with high quality grapes, and the quality of grapes is inversely proportional to its 
quantity, demanding very low yields in comparison to what local producers had 
historically sought. Argentinean grape growers would therefore need to adopt the 
scientific innovations and techniques promoted by the new world paradigm in 
order to control the yields of their vineyards. 
Logically, this new representation of the product demands a complete 
restructuration of the sector, affecting the whole process of value creation. The 
new focus on quality can only be put into practice through the adoption of new 
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technologies and techniques, which will not only have an impact on the 
characteristics of the product, but also on the way in which relations between 
production units and along the value chain are structured and the way in which 
work is organized. A product designed to penetrate foreign markets, additionally, 
demands new forms of commercialization and the development of previously 
inexistent relations for an industry that had been historically centered on the local 
market.  
While this new approach began to be seriously considered already during the 
critical 1980s, the overall macroeconomic situation did not provide the adequate 
context for the important investments that such a reconversion required. It would 
not be until the 1990s, when major changes in the national mode of development 
took place, that this sector would be able to commence its transformation. Favored 
by the deregulation of the capital market, the elimination of taxes on stock 
exchanges, the absence of controls on the movement of capital flows and the 
possibility of making profits in dollars, the reconversion of the local wine industry 
was first driven mainly by foreign capital, which was then followed by large 
concentrated national groups. The absence of state intervention and the context of 
deregulation also implied that there was virtually no protection of weaker players 
in this industry, granting important control capacities to the most powerful 
fractions of capital.  
Most of the new players entering the Argentinean wine industry were subsidiaries 
of international wineries that had already the experience of having reconverted 
their own operations in other countries and were by then already well positioned in 
the international market (for example: Sogrape Vinhos from Portugal, Robert 
Mondavi from the United States, Concha y Toro from Chile and Pernod Ricard 
from France). Besides this know-how, they also had the advantage of already 
having established distribution networks on which they could rely to begin with 
the commercialization of a product that, while with a growing positive image, was 
still new to international consumers. In most of the cases, the participation of 
foreign capital followed a general pattern (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2003): few of 
the investments were assigned to the construction of wineries or the plantation of 
new vineyards; instead, most were directed towards the acquisition of already 
existing firms. The overvaluation of the peso produced by convertibility translated 
into a sudden revalorization of the assets held by local wine businessmen who, 
coming from two decades of crisis, were more than happy to sell them to the new 
investors. Even though transnational capital fractions focused mainly on pre-
existing wineries, they were decided to radically change their profiles, shifting 
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from the production of table wine to that of fine (premium and ultrapremium, 
mainly) and sparkling wine. Considering that the local market was only now 
beginning to become more interested in high quality wines, their main strategy 
relied on exports. As a part of this turn to quality, the new wineries began to apply 
more and more strategies of vertical integration, with own vineyards in many 
cases, in order to closely control the production of grapes of high enological value. 
Lastly, these changes were made possible by the acquisition of new technologies 
and the modernization of already existing ones, together with the introduction and 
diffusion of scientific techniques. The introduction of more sophisticated 
technological capital was favored by the fix exchange rate that made imports 
relatively inexpensive, generating a monopolization of machinery supply by 
foreign companies.  
Transnational wine firms are also joined by fractions of financial capital in the 
form of investment funds, which took control of companies through the purchase 
of stocks and re-oriented their productive and commercializing focus (the 
Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette investment bank and the Galicia Advent  Socma  
Private  Equity  Fund are examples of two US-based financial groups that invested 
in the sector during the 1990s).  
Lastly, transnational capital is joined also by national fractions that direct their 
investment in the same direction, contributing to the reconversion of the industry. 
This is actively done by the most powerful players in the sector that begin to 
acquire competitors in their segment to strengthen their position and begin to re-
orient their profiles towards the production of higher quality wines, but also by 
investment funds and large economic groups that, even if working in unrelated 
branches of the economy, are interested in diversifying their investments and see 
in the wine industry a possibility to do so.  
New world producers distinguish themselves from the old world mainly because 
of the scientific approach they adopt in the production of grapes and of wines. 
Therefore, the process of reconversion headed towards the transformation of both 
the primary and secondary sectors. The shift towards quality has settled new 
parameters of what the right grape for the right wine is. Lower yields are preferred 
because they offer smaller grapes with much more concentrated flavors and higher 
sugar levels (see, for example: van Leeuwen et al., 2009; Tregoat et al., 2002). In 
order to obtain lower yields the amount of water that the plant receives is critical, 
making of fundamental importance for producers to find the right balance between 
low amounts of water to produce more concentrated grapes and watering well 
158

enough not to kill the plant (see, for example:  Hardie and Considine, 1976; 
Matthews and Anderson, 1988; van Leeuwen and Seguin, 1994). To cope with 
this, part of the reconversion of the agricultural side has been closely linked to the 
investment in developing drip irrigation systems, since this allows rationalizing 
the use of water, unlike the traditional way of irrigation that relied on channels in 
between the vines. In order to determine the amount of water that vines need, the 
introduction of technological tools based on low frequency resonance – with the 
capacity of analyzing the soil’s moisture during different stages – and 
dendrometric studies –based on techniques that measure the contractions and 
dilatations of the plants’ trunk in order to determine its water reserves – have been 
of critical importance. Other technological developments have made possible to 
analyze different aspects of soils, water, fertilizers and absorption of nutrients in 
order to produce a general overview of the crops’ evolution and facilitate the 
intervention by producers (Maclaine Pont and Thomas, 2012:6-8).  
Additionally, a process of “varietal purification” (Ibid:7) took place. Fine wines 
cannot be obtained from criolla grapes, which was the dominant variety in this 
quantity-led industry. Reconverting vineyards also implies changing from one 
variety of grapes to another.  Table 3 presents the historical evolution of the 
planted surface occupied by each grape variety. The presented cases are the 13 
most planted grape types in 2012, which all together account for 86% of the total 
surface. Two points of comparison are proposed: the first one is 1979, the year 
that best represents the distribution that characterized the quantity-led regime of 
accumulation. However, the period that followed was the critical 1980s, which 
ended with an important and indiscriminate process of eradication of vineyards 
that affected all kind of varieties (being cereza the only relatively untouched 
important grape). That is why comparisons between 1979 and 2012 do not fully 
represent the impact of the new quality imperative on the changes of each variety. 
Instead, 1990 offers a picture of the surface distribution that emerges after the 
crisis and that the industry will take as its point of departure for the process of 
reconversion. Additionally, it is at this point in time when the new representation 
of the product acquires relevance and will from then on be the main guiding 
principle behind investment decisions.20 However, no matter which date is taken 
as a reference, an analysis of the distribution of the planted surface clearly shows 
the dominant pattern: grapes used for high-quality wines grew a 32.5% in the 

20Thecaseofmalbecisaclearexampleofthisargument:whencomparing1979and2012,thegrowthinthe
plantedsurfaceisofonly1.89%.However,thatcomparisondoesnotallowtoseethatafterthe1980smalbec’s
surfacewasreducedtoathirdand,guidedbytheemergingqualityledregimeofaccumulation,itwasimportantly
replanted,achievingonlyslightlyhigherlevelsthanthoseof1979butimpressiveoneswhencomparedto1990.
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period 1979-2012 or 157.82% when taking 1990 as the point of departure. Grapes 
used for table wine, instead, saw their total surface decline in a 61.06% between 
1979 and 2012 or a 46.10% when comparing 1990-2012. Within this sample, 
grapes of high enological value represented a 32% of the total surface in 1979, 
while the other types dominated with a 68%. After the 1980s crisis, the difference 
is further deepened, with the former representing only a 25% of the total surface 
and the latter a 75%. However, in 2012, more than 20 years after the beginning of 
the process of reconversion, the proportions have been clearly inverted, with 
grapes used for high-quality wines representing a 61% of the total surface and 
other types reaching a historical minimum of 39%. 
Table 3 
Source: INV 
It is worth to highlight, nevertheless, that simply planting new varieties does not 
guarantee success, because the new world approach is very concerned about small 
differences in terroir (combination of soil and climate) and the impact they might 
have on different grapes. It becomes fundamental in this way to first study soil 
conditions and experiment with different varieties of grapes to see which one is 
best fit for a particular terroir. This had led to a fragmentation of territories and 
Grapetype 1979 1990 2000 2010 2012
Change
7912
Change
9012
Re
d
Bonarda* 18.058 12.186 14.989 18.748 18.603 3,02% 52,66%
CabernetS.* 3.098 2.347 12.199 17.672 16.179 422,19% 589,23%
Malbec* 33.237 10.457 16.347 28.481 33.866 1,89% 223,86%
Syrah* 2.047 687 7.915 13.086 12.947 532,58% 1785,81%
Merlot* 2.874 1.160 5.513 6.937 6.219 116,38% 436,13%
Tempranillo* 11.081 5.659 4.335 6.563 6.246 43,63% 10,37%
W
hi
te

Chardonnay* 342 908 4.625 6.524 6.469 1789,80% 612,31%
PedroGiménez 23.271 20.647 15.101 13.449 11.962 48,60% 42,06%
TorrontésRiojano* 11.022 8.625 8.181 8.417 7.832 28,94% 9,20%
Moscatelde
Alejandría 15.530 10.184 5.539 4.034 2.926 81,16% 71,27%
Ro
sé
 Cereza 44.221 43.100 31.666 38.008 29.188 34,00% 32,28%
CriollaGrande 71.248 36.837 24.641 20.822 16.819 76,39% 54,34%
MoscatelRosado 20.494 15.503 10.656 8.709 7.161 65,06% 53,81%
TotalHighQuality(*) 81.758 42.029 74.103 106.428 108.360 32,54% 157,82%
TotalOther 174.764 126.271 87.601 85.022 68.055 61,06% 46,10%
Total 256.522 168.300 161.705 191.450 176.415 31,23% 4,82%
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zones that are more or less prestigious according to their potentiality for a certain 
grape variety.  
This scientific approach produces a high rationalization and technical development 
of agricultural practices (Maclaine Pont and Thomas, 2012) that poses great 
challenges to traditional producers not only from the point of view of the 
enormous investments required, but also the new work logic. The new paradigm 
appears as antithetical to the traditional way of working that the vast majority of 
grape producers had. Their articulation with an industry that had always been 
focused on table wine made of quantity the imperative to follow if profits were to 
grow. In this way, producers would always water grapes as much as possible in 
order to make them grow and produce higher yields. After whole lives of working 
in this way, they would have to change if they were to become part of the new 
regime of accumulation. 
At the industrial level reconversion implied big investments in renewing 
equipment and machinery for winemaking. Among other things, this meant 
purchasing new refrigerating systems, 222-liter French or American oak barrels, 
centrifuge crashers, pneumatic presses, pumps, stainless steel barrels, filters or 
fractioning and bottling equipment. Most of these machines were bought from 
international suppliers because the exchange rate and the absence of tax barriers 
made imports relatively inexpensive during the 1990s. International consultants 
were key in advising local wineries on the technological adaptation and 
transmitting the know-how that the new processes of wine production needed. At 
the industrial level, as well as at the primary level, big amounts of capital had to 
be invested in order to take part in reconversion. 
The emerging regime of accumulation has altered the way in which the 
agricultural and industrial levels are related (Aspiazu and Basualdo, 2003:39-40; 
Maclaine Pont, 2011). As it was noted previously, most of the wineries that have 
pioneered the sectorial reconversion have showed a tendency to vertical 
integration, deciding to run their own vineyards. This has been of particular 
importance because the new focus on quality demands very careful attention to the 
process of grape production. Therefore, the possibility of running an own vineyard 
allows the winery to produce exactly the grapes that its enologists require, 
guaranteeing the supply of raw material for fine wines. A second reason for 
choosing this model is that it makes possible for the winery to determine the 
structure and evolution of the costs of grape production, what will be used as a 
parameter in order to determine the price that it will pay for the additional grapes 
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bought to external producers. Lastly, a third reason is related to prestige, since a 
winery that runs its own vineyards and uses its own grapes in the production of 
wine offers a much better image. 
In spite of the benefits of vertical integration, there are also important reasons that 
have led wineries to limit the extent to which they rely on their own grapes, 
leaving the proportion of own-vineyards production in an average of about 30%-
35%21. The main reason for this is the diversification of risks (for a similar 
argument, but applied to the South African wine industry, see: Ponte, 2009). The 
exposure of grape production to meteorological uncertainties makes it dangerous 
for wineries to rely solely on their own vineyards, making more convenient for 
them to build a decentralized and atomized network of providers who will 
individually assume the climatic, economic and financial risks of grape 
production. This option also diminishes the organizational complexity that the 
winery runs, especially for the biggest ones that tend to develop very diverse and 
fragmented portfolios, demanding a wide variety of grapes and terroirs. Lastly, 
there is also an economic reason for this, since acquiring lands, renewing 
plantations and keeping the vineyards throughout the year demands not only high 
inversion of capital, but also high costs of opportunity because of its 
immobilization (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2001:161-164). 
The remaining 70%-65% of grapes for fine wines is not bought, however, on the 
spot market – which is the main way through which grapes for table wines are 
traded – because it is not possible in this way to know the process of production, 
not to mention the impossibility of “crafting” the grapes according to the 
winemaker’s needs. The preferred option for most fine wine producers, therefore, 
is to rely on semi-captive grape growers (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2003; Rofman 
and Collado, 2005). These are independent grape producers that run their own 
vineyards but under close supervision from the winery, which actively makes 
technical decisions, controls the evolution of crops and defines schedules and 
process, among other things. In this way, wineries have the possibility of growing 
grapes with the characteristics they need but without having the responsibility, and 
running the risks, of assuming the production process themselves. 
For many growers this means, on the one hand, that if they are interested in 
becoming part of the reconverted industry and provide wineries with high quality 
grapes, they are to enter into relationships of “real submission” (Lipietz, 1988:28).  

21INVestimatedthatin2013owngrapesrepresentedthe34,30%ofthetotalgrapesusedforproducingwine,
comparedtothe27,75%registeredin2000.
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In this way, wineries, invested by the possession of a new know-how that is 
unfamiliar for most producers, have the power to define quality parameters and 
practices and the capacity to excerpt control over the process of production and the 
use and intensity of working time. The relationship becomes analogous to that one 
of a capitalist and a worker but, ironically, with grape growers being at least 
formally independent units of production.22 On the other hand, however, this semi-
captive producers have some benefits over independent producers which can be 
appreciated in the transfer of technical knowledge or the provision of certain 
supplies (such as phytosanitary products, or gasoline) that are to be discounted 
from the payment of the grapes.  
While in most of the cases it appears to be that these relationships are stable and 
relatively long lasting, it is important to highlight the high asymmetries involved. 
Most of the times there are no contracts or whatsoever formalizing the agreements 
between grape growers and wineries: their relationships are only based on mutual 
trust and tradition. This leaves scope for both parts – but especially for wineries, 
as we will see – to cancel the transaction at any point in time. Usually, wineries 
decide only between 10 and 15 days before harvest the amount of grapes they 
want to buy and the final price they plan to pay, leaving producers with a very 
limited time to look for other customers if the winery decides not to take their 
production. As for the price, it is defined within the same timeframe and is always 
subject to discussion, especially because it is difficult to discern the quality of the 
grape before it has been harvested. On the one hand, buyers are reluctant to settle 
prices in advance because they suspect that this could lead grape growers to 
neglect their production after certain price has been agreed on; on the other hand, 
producers usually perceive that buyers are unjustly trying to lower the price 
(Artopoulos et al., 2010:86). Even though there is some scope for negotiation, the 
proximity to the harvest (and the very short time in which grapes has to be 
processed into wine) makes very difficult for the producer to reject their buyer’s 
offer, especially because the main alternative, the spot market (dominated by 
generic grapes), does not pay for quality. In most cases, semi-captive producers 
have to agree to the conditions of the winery. Even more risky, a widespread 
solution to the hold-up problem in this industry is represented by the many 
wineries that do not define a price before the wine is produced (taking sometimes 
up to six months to begin with payments - Martin, 2009:87), valuing the grapes 
according to the result of the final product. In this case producers have no choice 

22Fromasimilarperspective,Altschuler(2012:170)highlightsthelossofautonomythatgrapeproducersfacein
theirrelationwithwineries,whileMartín(2009:88)describesthisrelationshipsasadisciplinaryone.
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but to blindly trust their buyers, having no possibility – neither formal nor real – to 
abandon negotiations if they are not satisfied with the final price. However, it is 
also important to highlight that even if producers are the weakest node in the 
chain, among them there are different levels of negotiating power according to the 
quality of their grapes, the zone where they are located, the technologies they 
apply and their tradition in the industry. 
The process of reconversion has been driven by wineries, making them the most 
important actors in the chain. They have moved from the mechanical process of 
turning grapes into wine to having a fundamental role in the adaptation of primary 
production (through the settlement of their own vineyards or the cooperation with 
semi-captive producers) and in the areas of commercialization and international 
trade. This initial lead by wineries produced a gap between the primary 
(dominated by small producers, low productivity and poor quality) and secondary 
sectors (with internationalizing companies, concern for high quality and growing 
productivity). Allegedly, this was one of the main reasons for the initial 
predominance of vertical integration initiatives and a further movement in the 
direction of developing long lasting relations with semi-captive producers. 
Nevertheless, the transfer of resources and know-how to the primary sector has 
been limited to those producers working closely with the leading fine wine 
elaborators, excluding from this new model a vast majority of grape growers. 
Therefore, this initial split between the primary and secondary sector has been 
accompanied by another one between the production of high-quality grapes 
(dominated by big wineries either through vertical integration or different 
associations with semi-captive producers) and the production of grapes for table 
wine by the rest of primary producers.  
The flourishing quality-led regime of accumulation emerges within – and is 
favored by– the mode of development that comes to dominate the 1990s.  
Nevertheless, while the shift occurred after 2002 marked a transformation of the 
national mode of development, at the level of the wine sector it only proved to 
strengthen the transition towards a new structure that had already begun in the 
1990s. While these two stages of the macroeconomic model evidenced important 
differences, at the sectorial level they were able to complement each other in the 
process of reconversion. In the 1990s, currency convertibility, the overvaluation of 
the peso, deregulation and the absence of controls on capital flows provided the 
context for the wine industry’s recapitalization. The process of reconversion 
implied high levels of inversion to produce an important alteration in the sectorial 
regime of accumulation that went from the very concrete technologies and 
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techniques that were applied to the production of grapes to the re-structuration of 
the way in which the different moments of the economic circuit were articulated, 
from the new conception of what the desired product was, to the re-positioning of 
the individual units of production and the industry as a whole in the world market. 
All this transformations required enormous investments of capital which were 
firstly obtained by transnational players and later on by the participation of 
important local economic groups, attracted by the governmental goals of 
increasing profit rates, reducing production costs, integrating the country in the 
global economic circuit and the growing potential of internationalization that 
Argentinean wines were evidencing. 
The largest part of investments and foundational work of reconversion occurred 
during the 1990s, and while this new model relied on and achieved important 
increases in exports, a high exchange rate was still making of Argentinean wines 
little competitive internationally. It is therefore with the devaluation and the 
competitive exchange rate established in 2002 that the wine industry experiences a 
boom in exports with growing figures both in terms of volume and, especially, 
value (see Figure 8). It is after the articulation of a new mode of development that 
the big inversions of capital produced during the 1990s begin to valorize and the 
profit rate to increase. Even if the new exchange rate makes reconversion more 
difficult because imports become relatively more expensive (and the government 
increasingly taxes imports to protect national production) the first years of this 
new economic period continue to see important investments in the process of 
reconversion attracted by the success in exports evidenced by the industry. While 
the end of one mode of development and the inception of the following one were 
marked by the 2001-02 crisis, one of the most serious ones in Argentina’s history, 
the wine industry seems to have been able to survive this period relatively 
untouched. A proof of this is the level of inversions that this sector received in 
Mendoza during 1999 and 2004, which amounted to a total of 860 million dollars 
in spite of the crisis – out of which 62% was of foreign origin and 38% local 
(Bocco et al, 2007:56). 
The relationship between the Argentinean wine sector and the overall economy 
has showed very different patterns in the historical period revised (see Figure 5). 
By the end of the 1980s a crisis of regulation in the national mode of development 
is accompanied by a crisis of regulation in the wine sector. A decade later, 
nevertheless, we find a different situation, where a crisis of regulation at the 
macroeconomic level triggers the replacement of a mode of development for 
another but, at the sectorial level, there is no crisis to be found; on the contrary: 
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the transformation at the national level comes to consolidate the sector’s 
development. In the light of a regulationist conceptual framework, this fact 
supports the initial assumptions according to which it was deeply mistaken to 
understand the sectorial logic both, from a perspective that stresses its functional 
relation to the overall level of accumulation or another that stresses its high levels 
of autonomy. Following Boyer, and understanding a sectorial regime of 
accumulation as a specific form that the global regime of accumulation acquires 
within certain industry, leads to an interpretation according to which a sector is 
never fully autonomous from the global level and, as a consequence, the latter has 
always an incidence in the former. However, such incidence cannot be 
presupposed, as it is characterized by a relationship of no-necessity that 
contradicts functionalist accounts. As a consequence, a regulationist perspective 
will affirm the relevance of the global regime of accumulation for the sectorial 
one, but will always leave to the historical examination the specific ways in which 
such an interaction happens. In the case of the Argentinean wine sector, as it has 
been shown, the 1980s saw the convergence of a national and a sectorial crisis, 
whereas in the beginning of the 2000s the crisis of the national mode of 
development and the emergence of a new one came to foster a transformation in 
the wine sector that had already began ten years before.  
Figure 8 
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2.3 A sectorial regime of accumulation divided in two 
While many observers have celebrated the rapid transformation and success of the 
Argentinean wine industry and highlighted it as one of the most successful 
examples of a sectorial reconversion in the country, fewer have been able to point 
out how heterogeneous and fragmented this process has been. It is true that a 
process of reconversion has taken place and a new regime of accumulation is 
being developed, however, it is not less true that this process has only comprised 
certain sectors of this industry – namely, those with enough capital or access to 
credit to reconvert and those that were favored by the new definition of the 
product –, leaving an important number of grape and wine producers attached to 
the traditional regime of accumulation. Furthermore, even though it has decreased 
enormously when compared to decades ago, there exists an important sector of the 
local market that still demands table wine. Therefore, it is not possible to talk 
about a “reconverted” industry because the quality-led regime of accumulation has 
not replaced the quantity-led one: there is a coexistence of both. Due to this fact, 
some prefer to describe the process as an “unfished” or “incomplete” 
reconversion, highlighting that an important part of this industry has still failed to 
integrate into the new regime of accumulation. This view, nevertheless, suffers 
from a teleological assumption: it considers the quality-led regime of 
accumulation as the ultimate goal towards which the whole industry evolves. 
While the developments in the last two decades may make of this a plausible 
prediction, the present state of the industry still casts some doubt because as long 
as the local market continues to consume considerable amounts of lower-quality 
wine, there will be a reason for the quantity-led regime of accumulation to 
continue existing.  
Instead of celebrating a process of reconversion that has not included the sector as 
a whole or assuming the historical necessity of its success, I prefer to synthetize 
the current state of the wine industry at the level of accumulation in the following 
way: the last two decades have witnessed the decline of the historical quantity-led 
regime of accumulation and the emergence and solidification of a quality-led one. 
This had steered a structural split in the industry, where two competing definitions 
of wine, which demand specific processes of production and commercialization 
and involve different social actors, are at the heart of two alternative strategies of 
capital accumulation.  This structural divide, however, is a hierarchical one, since 
recent history has very clearly demonstrated a tendency in which the quality-led 
regime of accumulation expands and the quantity-led one contracts.  
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The best way to determine the preponderance of one regime of accumulation over 
the other would be to focus on how the total value of the industry is distributed 
between them. However, this is not an easy task, since there is not aggregated data 
available for the total value produced by the industry discriminating, for example, 
high quality from lower quality wine. The best alternative I have found to do this 
was to rely on a report produced by the Wine Division of the Supervielle Bank in 
the Cuyo region. They divided the sector in four segments – fractioned low-price 
wine sold in the internal market, bulk wine for exports, bottled wine sold in the 
internal market and bottled wine sold in the external market – and calculated the 
average price of a 12 bottle case for each – $(pesos)60, $92, 151$ and 253$, 
respectively – , what resulted in four different price categories. These categories 
are quite close to high/lower quality discrimination: the lowest segment 
corresponds to table wine sold mostly in tetra-brick, the one that follows is mostly 
lower quality wine for exports and the highest price segment is composed in its 
majority by premium and ultrapremium wine for exports. The most heterogeneous 
segment, nevertheless, is the $151 one, since the local market for bottled wine is 
composed by the upper section of table wines and varietals, most of which would 
be considered “entry-level” internationally. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue 
that even if this segment is not exclusive to varietal-based wines, its price, which 
more than doubles the lowest segment, is indicative of a difference in quality.  
As Table 4 shows, there have been important changes in volume shares for each 
segment in a relatively short period of time: the two lowest price groups used to 
account for 54% of the total volume in 2005, while in 2013 they were responsible 
for 42.7%. The two highest groups, instead, moved from 46% to 57.3%. However, 
this distribution, which appears as relatively balanced in terms of volume, 
becomes more polarized when the focus is put on value, since in 2013 the lowest 
two price segments represented only 27% of the total and the two highest ones 
were responsible for 73%, instead. While within the $151 segment there is an 
important proportion of non-varietal-based wines, it is still undeniable that there is 
a tendency in the industry towards an upgrade in quality, what is translated into 
growing value shares for those that produce wines of higher quality. Additionally, 
profitability is also importantly connected to the price segment of wines: a case of 
less than $90 and one in between $90 and $180 present an average gross margin of 
19.2% and 21.2% (Banco Supervielle, 2014:8) respectively. Once administrative, 
financial and commercializing costs have been added, the resulting profit is 
reduced to very small levels. It is only above $180 that the margins grow and 
allow for a more sustainable line of business, with a case of between $180 and 
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$300 presenting an average gross margin of 32.9% and those above $300 offering 
an average of 38.4% (Idem).  The increase in volume and value share and the 
much better opportunities for profitability that the higher price segments evidence 
appear as clear indicators of the preeminence that the quality-led regime of 
accumulation has acquired over the quantity-led one. 
Table 4 
Pricesegment Volumeshare% Valueshare%
2005 2013
$253 10.9 14.9 25
$151 35.1 42.4 48
$92 5.5 8.5 9
$60 48.5 34.2 18
Total 100 100 100
                                          Source: Banco Supervielle (2014) 
The newly emerging regime of accumulation has proved its potential with the 
constant growth it has experienced in the last two decades. The recognition 
achieved by Argentinean wines in the world market, the evolution in its exports 
share internationally, the ongoing transformation of the domestic consumption 
pattern and the better ratios of profitability, all of these elements point towards the 
progressive dominance of the quality-led accumulation regime over the quantity-
led one.  Therefore, those actors that have had the possibility to reconvert their 
activities are in a better position when compared to those with equivalent 
functions in the traditional regime of accumulation.  
The current trend has meant that a process of polarization and exclusion has taken 
place. The permanent contraction that the traditional regime of accumulation 
experiences since the 1980s has fostered a centrifuge force that expulses those 
actors that have become superfluous. For them, reconverting and integrating into 
the quality-led regime of accumulation has become the only alternative. 
Consequently, small and medium grape and wine producers that do not fit the 
emerging criteria of quality or do not possess the capital to reconvert and those 
workers who have not acquired the skills needed for the new productive process 
have been expelled from the industry or pushed to precarious situations. 
A very clear example of this can be appreciated in Figure 9, where the evolution of 
the total surface under vineyards and the number of vineyards is presented. While 
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in the period between 1974 and 1992 the change in the number of vineyards 
evolved in parallel to the total planted surface, from then onwards we evidence a 
period that is marked first by stability and then by a smooth growth in terms of 
total surface but, at the same time, by a 30% decrease in the number of vineyards. 
While before the 1990s a reduction in the number of vineyards accompanied by a 
reduction in the total cultivated surface could be interpreted as a symptom of crisis 
in the sector, the fact that after 1992 vineyards disappear but the surface remains 
unaltered or grows is an indicator of crisis that only affects part of the industry. 
This is, small and medium grape producers, traditionally attached to the quantity-
led regime of accumulation, who have had no means to reconvert, are forced to go 
out of business. However, this land does not become unproductive nor is devoted 
to a different activity: it is bought either by those players that are benefiting from 
the success of, or investing in, the quality-led regime of accumulation and have the 
capacity to reconvert the property, or by the most powerful actors in the quantity-
led regime of accumulation, who can integrate this properties to their own and 
make them profitable due to their economies of scale. Therefore, a process of land 
concentration (in 1974 the average size of a vineyard was of 5.72 hectares, while 
in 2012 it was of 8.76) emerges as a consequence of the current split within the 
sectorial regime of accumulation. 
Figure 9
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While the picture offered up to now clearly shows the more disadvantaged 
position of the quantity-led regime of accumulation vis-à-vis the quality-led one, it 
is also important to highlight that hierarchies and inequalities are also relevant 
within them. While the newer regime of accumulation is far from being 
democratic and equitable, it is undoubtedly the traditional one where the strongest 
asymmetries can be found. The quantity-led regime of accumulation is strongly 
driven by three main companies: FECOVITA, Peñaflor and RPB-Baggio, who are 
responsible for bottling, respectively, 26.7%, 24% and 12% of all Argentinean 
wine (Miranda, 2014).  While all three groups have sought to diversify their 
portfolios along the dominant tendencies in the industry – producing not only table 
wine, but also fine wine for the internal market and exports – their main strength 
resides undoubtedly in the position occupied in the quantity-led regime of 
accumulation. The continuous squeeze of gross margins and profitability within 
this regime of accumulation in the last years has led to a process of concentration, 
because it is only those players that enjoy of economies of scale who can operate 
in this context.  This had made of FECOVITA, Peñaflor and RPB-Baggio the core 
within a group of about 10 companies that are responsible for almost the totality of 
the low-price wine commercialized in the country (Banco Supervielle, 2014).  
This degree of concentration grants a very small number of players a very 
important amount of power in the quantity-led regime of accumulation. First, 
because the supply-side of the lower quality grapes market is highly atomized and 
the demand-side so concentrated, this reduced number of leading wineries hold a 
oligopsonistic position, being able to influence to a great extent – if not to 
determine – the price that producers will receive. The latter group has no option 
but to accept this price, because even if they choose to produce wine with their 
own grapes, they end up selling it to these same (or intermediary) wineries 
because no other actors possess the capacity to distribute and commercialize table 
wine on their own.  Second, since all lower quality grapes and wine are sold to this 
small number of wineries, they are not faced with any further competition within 
the segment, holding in this way an oligopolistic position when it comes to the 
table wine market.   
As it was described, there are also important hierarchies and power relations in the 
quality-led regime of accumulation between wineries and producers, as the 
situation of semi-captivity of the latter shows. However, they are in a better 
position when compared to grape producers in the quantity-led regime of 
accumulation due to at least two facts: first, the competition between wineries is 
much more fragmented in the market for fine wines, what gives producers more 
171

alternatives when it comes to choosing their buyers and impedes wineries to 
determine prices in an oligopsonistic manner. Second, producers offer different 
varieties of grapes that, at the same time, were produced in different terroirs and 
possess distinct characteristics, making in this way more difficult for the wineries 
to simply replace one producer for another.  
3. Conclusion
This chapter has offered an overview of the historical evolution of the Argentinean 
wine sector’s regime of accumulation and explained its transformations by placing 
it in the context of the national mode of development and the ongoing 
transformations in the global wine industry. The chapter’s main conclusion is that 
the Argentinean wine industry is currently characterized by a structural split, in 
which a dynamic quality-led regime of accumulation grows at the expense of a 
quantity-led one, which has contracted enormously in the last three decades. While 
this horizontal divide at the level of the regime of accumulation represents the 
main cleavage of inequality in the industry, a second and overlapping vertical 
division takes place within the quantity-based regime of accumulation, in which a 
reduced number of wineries proves to be very successful at the expense of grape 
producers and smaller wineries. 
The juxtaposition of these two divides is fundamentally important for our 
assessment of Fair Trade, as it draws the cleavages along which the powerful and 
the powerless are determined in the sector. If Fair Trade’s general aim is to 
support “marginalized producers and workers,” its commitment within the 
Argentinean wine industry should be mainly directed towards small producers and 
workers attached to the quantitative-led regime of accumulation, as they prove to 
be the weakest players in the field. 
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Chapter 5: The Conventional Mode of Regulation of 
the Argentinean Wine Sector 
This chapter complements Chapter 4, since it describes the mode of regulation that 
accompanies the sector’s regime of accumulation. Consequently, the process of 
inquiry follows a similar logic in which the concrete institutional forms that 
constitute the mode of regulation are to be understood: first, in light of the more 
general structural changes evidenced at the global level and, second, in a 
dialectical relationship with the specific transformations taking place in the 
sectorial regime of accumulation.  
The previous chapter began with a historical overview of the changes that the 
Argentinean regime of accumulation and mode of regulation have experienced in 
recent decades. This account provided a frame within which the most relevant 
transformations of the wine sector’s regime of accumulation could be better 
understood. The analysis showed that a new logic of accumulation began to 
develop within Argentina’s wine industry in the 1990s. While up to that point the 
sector had always been structured around the concept of quantity – the massive 
production of table wine for local consumption – the emerging pattern of 
accumulation privileged the concept of quality – the production of fine wine 
mainly for the international market and, marginally but increasingly, the local 
market. This phenomenon produced a split in the sectorial regime of 
accumulation, with the quality-led part of the industry growing at the expense of 
the quantity-led one. This dynamic has established a hierarchy in which the former 
dominates the latter due to its higher dynamism, profitability, adaptability and 
better prospects of future evolution. However, this unequal power between both 
sections of the sectorial regime of accumulation does not mean that the quality-led 
regime will totally replace the quantity-led one. On the contrary, I have argued 
that the current regime of accumulation is made viable by their co-existence. Even 
if the expansion of the quality-led regime at the expense of the quantity-led one 
continues, the still-significant rates of table wine consumption, the high volumes 
of production, and the important number of actors still involved in the production 
of lower-quality grapes and wine make it hard to imagine a complete transition 
without the explosion of a major crisis.  
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However, in order to fully understand the recent transformations in the sectorial 
regime of accumulation, the ways in which they have been made possible and the 
mechanisms that have facilitated the coexistence of these two logics of 
accumulation, it is important to examine the sector’s mode of regulation. This 
chapter therefore offers an overview of the recent transformations experienced by 
the six structural or institutional forms that constitute the sectorial mode of 
regulation. As will be shown, many of these changes have been fundamental to the 
transformation of the sectorial regime of accumulation. The complexity derived 
from the dual structure of the industry is also reflected in its mode of regulation, 
with some institutional forms reproducing this duality in some of the aspects they 
regulate and others showing much more homogeneous profiles. Lastly, this 
analysis will also make clear that different institutional forms offer sectorial actors 
unequal possibilities to influence their structuration. As a consequence, the 
impossibility of shaping structural forms fully in accordance with the needs of the 
sectorial regime of accumulation makes a crisis an ever-present possibility.   
In what follows, I present my analysis of each of the six structural forms that 
constitute a sectorial mode of regulation: wage relation, competition, money, state, 
representation of the product and international insertion. 
1. Wage relation 
The wage relation is the structural form that has suffered the most as the result of 
the transition from one national mode of development to another, and the 
emergence and progressive growth of a quality-led regime of accumulation at the 
sectorial level. 
Historically, small grape producers have been able to run their own vineyards 
without depending on external workers because the limited surface of their 
plantations did not demand more labor than what the producer and his/her family 
could provide. Bigger surfaces, however, have always required the hiring of 
workers. Traditionally, the dominant type of worker since the 19th century had 
been the contratista. Back then, there were three different types of contratistas: 
plantation contratistas, work contratistas, and vine contratistas.  
Plantation contratistas were particularly important in the initial development and 
territorial expansion of this industry. They would lease lands during a certain 
period of time in order to plant vines and were usually paid either with money, a 
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fraction of the vineyard, or part of the harvest. Plantation contratistas were 
fundamental in colonizing virgin areas with vineyards, not only due to the work 
they did for their employer, but also because it was quite common for them to use 
their income to buy land to plant their own vines. Work contratistas were in charge 
of recruiting and supervising workers for vineyards, functioning as an 
intermediary between the workers and the landowner. While these two categories 
progressively disappeared with time, the one that remained and was dominant in 
terms of workforce was vine contratistas. Vine contratistas were in charge of 
preserving the vineyards and the day-to-day activities (for detailed accounts of the 
different kinds of contratistas, their main features, and their historical relevance, 
see: Richard-Jorba, 2003, 2009; Mateu, 2000; Salvatore, 1986). 
A contratista has been considered from the legal perspective as an “atypical 
subordinated worker” (Pérez, 1983:228-232). This atypicality is due to the fact 
that this figure simultaneously possesses characteristics of a wage earner and a 
small entrepreneur. A contratista does not own any land; he/she only works on 
someone else’s vineyard. The owner is in charge of providing all elements and 
tools to do the work, but the contratista has quite an autonomous status, being able 
to organize the activities and work over the hectares under his/her responsibility, 
having the possibility to make use of family workforce, and even having the 
faculty to hire workers under his/her responsibility when needed. The person who 
hires a contratista is responsible for paying a very small salary per month (the 
amount is determined by a collective bargaining agreement) for ten months and 
for making contributions to social security (accident insurance, pension 
contribution, payments for the trade union’s medical insurance, and family 
allowances). Additionally, the contratista and his/her family are provided with a 
house on the property. Probably the most important benefit among these is the 
possibility of accommodation, because the monthly payments are very low and the 
social services to which contratistas have access to through their trade union are 
rather limited (Interviews AFT9 and AFT10). The biggest monetary profit they 
make, however, is obtained through the percentage of the harvest to which they 
are entitled. Contratistas and their bosses have to negotiate ten days before the 
harvest the exact proportion (which, by law, goes from 15% to 19%) ) that the 
contratista will get from the total production. This major source of income is what 
characterizes contratistas also as entrepreneurs, because they share the risks and 
benefits with the landowner: in case of a good harvest, the contratista will get a 
higher compensation, but if, for example, the crops are affected by hail, the 
contratista’s income will be heavily affected.  
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The contratista has been among the main pillars of the traditional wine industry in 
Argentina. Though in the very early years of its development, such a position was 
a promising point of departure—as many contratistas were able to move on to 
become landowners with relative ease—after the initial expansion of cultivated 
surfaces was achieved, it lost its potential and has never again been a very 
promising alternative for these workers. Nevertheless, it provided them with 
stability: they had a house for themselves and their family—a benefit that no wage 
earner is automatically granted—and their bosses were in charge of their social 
security contributions and, more informally, were there to help them in case of 
need. The national law that regulates their work conditions establishes that a 
contract lasts for a year, and it also states that, except in cases of explicit rejection 
by any of the parts, contracts are automatically renewed. This feature was not an 
innovation by the law (which only came to be passed in 1973) but was taken from 
historical practices, which usually evidenced long-term relationships between both 
parts. Therefore, their modest economic situation could be better handled due to 
the stability and social support provided by their judicial status as an atypical 
subordinated worker, a status that, throughout most of the 20th century, led to a 
situation that Poblete (2008) has described as “controllable poverty”(pauvreté
maîtrisable).  
In 1936, contratistas were responsible for the work in 68% of the total implanted 
surfaces of vineyards. However, this proportion diminished throughout the 
century, accounting for 43.3% in 1979 and 29.9% after the 1980s crisis (Poblete, 
2012:522). This last figure shows that when the process of reconversion was 
beginning, the contratistas were in charge of one-third of the implanted surface. 
However, this proportion would be considerably higher if the estimation had 
considered only the surface covered by non-family labor instead of the total 
implanted surface. While there are no longer official figures for contratistas, it is a 
fact that the emergence and prosperity of the quality-led regime of accumulation 
has enhanced this tendency toward their disappearance and, more in general, 
promoted a wider reorganization of the wage-relation form. In the following, I will 
explain how this process emerged as the result of the transformations that occurred 
both at the national and sectorial levels.  
As it has been described, the advent of the quality-led regime of accumulation 
implied the adoption of new technologies, the rationalization of practices, the 
introduction of scientific principles, and the acquisition and development of new 
work rhythms and techniques. A direct consequence of these changes in the 
process of production was a new labor demand. Workers were expected to possess 
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qualifications that differed from the historically required ones in order to be part of 
a system characterized by growing mechanization and changing techniques. The 
introduction of new technologies produced a modest decrease in the amount of 
work hours per hectare needed (Neiman and Bocco, 2001) but, more importantly, 
a qualitative change in the skills required. The process of reconversion was 
characterized by a reduction in the number of permanent low-qualified workers 
and an increase among the permanently hired and highly qualified ones. 
Reconverted companies are now characterized by their reliance on a small group 
of skilled workers that are in charge of recursive duties and a large group of less 
skilled workers that perform temporal tasks. And this ironically happens in spite of 
the fact that the production of grapes for new-world wines has many additional 
activities to be done during the year (green pruning, thinning, disbudding, 
watering controls, etc.) that soften the otherwise stark seasonal profile of grape 
production, historically characterized by the winter pruning and harvest. However, 
even if these activities take place at many different moments during the year, they 
are conducted during short periods of time. Companies have, therefore, privilege 
to consider them as atomized activities that are to be dealt with separately and—
based on the introduction of new human resources principles as part of the 
reconversion at the management level—decided to execute them with workers 
hired ad-hoc for each of the activities. The new situation has led to the 
disappearance of many permanent positions for lower skilled workers (having a 
direct impact on contratistas) and their replacement with short-term ones, making 
this the dominant pattern in the grape producing sector, which had 23% permanent 
workers and 77% temporary workers during the year 2005 (Poblete 2012:527).  
The new approach to production and management of human resources has made 
flexibility an imperative when it comes to organizing work and hiring personnel. 
Companies were incentivized to find the most flexible ways to legally hire 
workers during limited periods of time and keep their costs to a minimum. This, 
however, has been not only a premise of this sector, but also the logic of the 
national mode of development that, during the 1990s, sought to promote growth 
by reducing production costs and increasing rates of profit. Making work relations 
and its legal regulations more flexible was one strategy toward this direction. The 
transformations in the wage-relation form, therefore, emerged as the result of, on 
the one hand, the changes in the productive process and the structure of the labor 
demand brought forward by the development of the quality-led regime of 
accumulation at the sectorial level and, on the other hand, the promotion of 
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liberalization and flexibility of employment relations by the global mode of 
regulation. 
Different national legislations (Collective Labor Agreement for the wine industry,; 
Employment Contracts Law or the Agricultural Work Law) offer a variety of legal 
figures in order to regulate temporary work, classifying workers as “no 
permanent,” “seasonal,” “occasional,” or “discontinuous permanent.” These 
figures, many times overlapping or complementing each other in a same 
productive unit, make more complex the typical dichotomies between 
permanent/transitory, registered/non-registered, etc. While these figures have been 
used to different extents in order to reduce costs and adapt the relationship with 
workers to the flexibility required by the productive system, there is another one 
that became the most popular during the 1990s—and is still widely used—when it 
comes to making work relations more flexible: autonomous worker. This category 
was first codified in 1955 with the aim of allowing independent workers to have 
access to social benefits such as pensions. The idea was that they would be able to 
register themselves under this category and, according to their level of profits, pay 
taxes monthly in order to contribute toward those benefits. Since the worker the 
legislators had in mind was a small entrepreneur, they settled on a minimum 
income to make sure that autonomous workers earning too little would not see 
their income drastically reduced by the payment of taxes. However, in 1998, a 
small-taxpayer regime was instituted, which lowers the necessary minimum in 
order to contribute within the category, making this new figure, the monotributo, a 
very interesting option for employers interested in hiring workers discontinuously 
and reducing costs.
Due to the new tendency toward reducing the number of low skilled permanent 
workers, many contratistas lose their jobs as such but are offered the possibility of 
being hired again under the monotributo system. For them, as well as for previous 
permanent workers, this is a very disadvantageous change, since they will have to 
take from their salary all contributions toward pension and health insurance and 
will not receive family allowances. In the case of contratistas, the impact is even 
worse, because they lose their houses and are asked to move somewhere else. This 
means that not only is their direct salary reduced because of the lower number of 
working hours, but also some important determinants of indirect wage are 
eliminated. The stability that was previously enjoyed is lost, because now workers 
can expect to be hired only intermittently, during the short periods when there are 
tasks to be performed in the field but remain unemployed during the rest of the 
time. This leaves workers in an unstable position, uncertain about their future and 
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in a precarious work situation due to the extreme flexibility to which they are 
victims. For employers, however, the new situation offers many advantages. Since 
these workers are now considered to be independent providers of a service, the 
relationship between them and the owners of the vineyards is limited to the 
exchange of a concrete service, reducing all the costs associated with the wage 
relation that would be derived from hiring employees. Additionally, it offers the 
flexibility that the new regime of accumulations requires in order to adapt the 
demand for workers to the changing technical demands of the productive process. 
This strategy was especially favored by those vertically integrated companies in 
the reconverted sector because the high valuation of the peso during the 
convertibility period made Argentinean wines more competitive. The main 
strategy they had in order to export their product at more attractive prices was to 
reduce their fix costs through the decrease in permanent personnel and the 
reduction of employer’s charges.  
A similar strategy can be pursued by externalizing the hiring of workers. This 
means that the company would pay a service provider to look for workers, take 
them to the vineyard, and supervise their work. The only responsibility for the 
company is to pay the provider, the latter being in charge of respecting the 
relevant legislation and guaranteeing the workers’ rights. Different ways of 
organization, such as work crews (cuadrillas), firms of occasional services, or 
work cooperatives have been and continue to be used by employers with the 
purpose of saving social contributions and creating a distance between 
management and workers, which allows them to transfer the disputes inherent to 
the wage relation to the service provider.   
While the 1990s witnessed the increased flexibility of work conditions, the mode 
of development that emerged in the 2000s sought to counteract some of its effects. 
One of its most important measures in respect to the wage relation was the 
reinforcement of the institution of collective bargaining, which was promoted and 
revitalized by the state itself. In relation to the wine industry, nowadays most work 
conditions are defined by collective bargaining agreement, as well as direct wages 
and many elements of the indirect wage—with the national state defining some 
other forms of indirect wage in a subsidiary way.  Nevertheless, both the role of 
collective bargaining and the increased level of social benefits received by 
workers during this period have had only a limited impact on the previously 
described situation. The main problem is the limited scope of these measures, 
since they mostly apply to workers hired as employees. The global wage-relation 
form, instead, has left many of the flexibility-oriented features relatively 
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untouched. As a consequence, the dominant form of work for lower skilled 
workers continues to be characterized by discontinuity and precariousness. 
Consequently, it comes as no surprise that in most of my interviews with 
managers of vertically integrated wineries and sectorial organizations, I was told 
that it is currently very difficult to find enough workers for the above-mentioned 
temporary activities. This is probably the central dilemma for a productive model 
that expects to find experienced workers with the appropriate know-how who, at 
the same time, are willing to work occasionally and be hired under 
disadvantageous legal figures.
2. Competition
Competition assumes very different forms when comparing the internal market 
and the international one.  
Locally, in spite of the described tendency toward an upgrade in the quality and 
price of wine consumption, the most relevant product continues to be table wine. 
Together with the lowest-priced fine wines (many times known as “selección,” 
which usually is a type of wine of higher quality than common table wine but 
lower than varietal based ones), they come to constitute the segment that 
dominates the internal market both in terms of volume and value share.  This very 
important section of the market has been controlled during the last two decades by 
a reduced group of wineries and the tendency during the last years has been 
toward a further concentration. In 1997, six companies accounted for 60% of the 
table wine market—Peñaflor (20%), Garbin (10%), Resero (10%), Baggio (10%), 
FECOVITA (10%) – (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2001:184), while nowadays the 
process of concentration has been deepened, with (as it was noted in the previous 
chapter) only three wineries responsible for the production of more than 60% of 
the total wine sold in the local market—FECOVITA (26.7%), Peñaflor (24%), 
RPB-Baggio (12%)– (Miranda, 2014).  
The last years have, therefore, witnessed a marked process of concentration, not 
only within the table wine segment, but also among the lower end of higher 
quality wine. This can be clearly appreciated by the fact that three wineries that 
used to account for 50% of the table wine market now are responsible for more 
than 60% of the total production sold locally. This has two explanations. First, the 
table wine market sector is characterized by low prices and profit margins. The 
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low levels of relative profitability derived from these features forces players to 
achieve economies of scale if they want to remain competitive actors within this 
segment. As a consequence, a tendency toward concentration is established, which 
progresses through purchases, fusions, and bankruptcies. Second, the 
transformation in the consumption patterns has pushed the biggest players in the 
table wine market toward the diversification of their portfolio. That is why 
Peñaflor and FECOVITA, for example, have increasingly engaged in the 
production and commercialization of higher quality wines of low and intermediate 
price, achieving important shares in the initial segments.  
The three biggest players do not share a single strategy: Peñaflor and FECOVITA 
own vineyards, but also buy grapes from captive producers and at the spot market. 
However, this does not mean that they are self-sufficient, since they only produce 
part of their total sales, depending also on wine purchased from smaller wineries. 
RPB-Baggio buys its wine from trasladistas (wineries that either buy grapes to 
produce wine or buy wine from small producers in order to then sell it as bulk) to 
bottle and commercialize it. However, no matter how the chain is structured 
(directly buying from grape producers, buying bulk wine, etc.), most of the table 
wine commercialized at the local market belongs to these three main companies, 
giving them an oligopsonistic power in the determination of prices and the system 
of payments. Therefore, producers of lower quality grapes and wine have limited 
choices when it comes to selling their products and no negotiation power in order 
to determine prices and payment conditions, especially because issues such as 
quality and product differentiation do not have importance within this segment. 
Peñaflor and FECOVITA also have presence in the segment of fine wines, and 
within its lower trench—together with a few other big players such as Finca 
Flichman or Viñas de Balbo—reproduce a structure similar to that of table wine 
(Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2003:37). 
The higher end of fine wines presents a much more competitive scenario, with 
about 45 wineries actively taking part (Bocco et al. 2007:73). Competition within 
this segment is structured around various levels of quality, with different players 
taking part in each, and product differentiation playing an important role. While 
some players may acquire a dominant role within certain quality levels, this upper 
end of the fine wines segment appears to be much more fragmented than the 
previously described ones and is characterized by a constantly growing number of 
competitors. Grape prices in this segment are not only higher, but also subject to 
more negotiation, since the final characteristics of the production may deserve 
higher or lower than average prices.  
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In the international market, Argentinean producers have no power to define prices 
and need to adapt to the internationally settled ones, which is the result of 
competitive processes of price formation.  The international market is particularly 
sensitive to changes in prices, leaving no room for players to incur in major 
increases. International competition is, therefore, structured around price/quality
ratios, with little margin for maneuver. This has been particularly clear for 
exporting wineries in Argentina during the last five years. Given that prices are 
internationally settled in a competitive fashion, Argentinean wineries act as price 
takers and need to adapt their cost structures to the dominant price for the products 
of certain quality. However, the growing inflation that the country experiences 
constantly raises the fixed costs of the companies and, since the exchange rate 
does not change at the same pace, the result is a higher cost of production. In order 
to keep their profits, wineries would need to increase the cost of their product, but 
this is not an option because their buyers are not willing to pay higher prices for 
products of the same quality, and given the overall world supply, they decide not 
to buy from those producers anymore. Argentinean wineries have, therefore, either 
reduced their profit margins (or even renounced them) with the hope of 
maintaining their share of the market and customers or stopped the 
commercialization of their less expensive products. Instead, premium and 
ultrapremium wines can still be commercialized because their profit margins are 
bigger and allow for higher increases in the total costs.   
No matter how fierce price-based competition might be, Argentinean wineries also 
have some scope for cooperation. Because even though they struggle for access to 
international markets and bigger shares of exports, they also have common 
interests. In the wine industry, this is particularly clear in regard to the 
geographical areas where wines come from, which tends to work if not as a brand, 
at least as a way of categorizing products. Therefore, it is in the interest of all 
wineries that the “Argentina” brand enjoys a high reputation internationally. With 
that goal in mind, most collaboration between wineries is channeled through 
sector-specific agencies that tend to promote the Argentinean terroirs and build up 
an image of the country abroad. A key player is Wines of Argentina, an 
organization with over 200 member wineries that is in charge of developing and 
promoting Argentinean wines in the international market. This institution, funded 
by its members and the Argentinean Viniculture Corporation (COVIAR, from its 
initials in Spanish), seeks to orient resources toward the consolidation of 
Argentinean wines as a category and, therefore, arranges events and campaigns for 
not only its members, but also the industry as a whole. And a similar situation 
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might occur at the country level, where competition is sometimes temporarily 
suspended by cooperation. As an example, it is worth mentioning a joint tasting 
organized by Wines of South Africa, Wines of Chile, and Wines of Argentina in 
an attempt to promote “southern” wines.  
All in all, the competition form is structured very differently in the local and 
international markets, providing different challenges to the actors that engage in 
each of them. The local market, where table wine is still the most important 
product, is dominated by three main companies that are responsible for over 60% 
of the commercialized wine. This high level of concentration grants them, on the 
one hand, oligopsonistic power vis-à-vis the multiple and mostly small grape 
producers and trasladistas wineries, which have no power to influence the process 
of price formation. On the other hand, because of multiple buyers and lack of 
comparable competitors, these three dominant groups exercise oligopolistic power 
in the process of price formation of table wine. The situation of high-end quality 
wines in the local market resembles, instead, the form of competition in the world 
market, where an important number of wine producers, each with relatively small 
market shares, enter processes of price formation which are closer to the so-called 
perfect competition. Internationally, Argentinean producers do not have any power 
to influence the processes of price formation. As a consequence, they need to enter 
into price-based competition, within different price bands for determined levels of 
quality.
3. Money 
Transactions in the Argentinean wine industry are characterized by a high degree 
of informality, since contracts are not common. Most usually, wineries will buy 
grapes from their “traditional” suppliers, but no agreements are reached before the 
harvest. Especially in the quality-led regime of accumulation, the characteristics of 
the grape—which are so important for the final wine—cannot be fully appreciated 
until they have been harvested, making it common for this sector to start 
discussing prices once the production has been delivered to the winery or, even 
sometimes, only after some samples of the wine can be evaluated.  Even if 
informal, relationships between grape producers and wineries tend to be stable in 
time. COVIAR is currently running PROVIAR, a program that seeks to facilitate 
the creation of formalized and long-term links between small grape producers and 
wineries through the settlement of ten-year sourcing contracts. While describing 
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this program during an interview, Cristina, general manager of COVIAR, explains 
how even though contracts are not common, they found out that “many of these 
relationships already existed in an informal fashion. There were producers that had 
been selling to the same winery for 20 years.” (Interview AC7). However, these 
informal relationships provide little certainty about the total volume of the 
transaction and even less about the final price. Worse, they place producers in a 
delicate situation, since wineries have the possibility of choosing not to buy a 
single grape or changing the terms of their verbal agreement at the last minute, 
without being liable to any kind of sanctions.   
Martín (2009) describes this relationship as a “diffuse integration via market 
power,” where informality prevails because it favors the position of the dominant 
players. However, he also highlights how agro-industrial articulation in viticulture 
has been transformed with the emergence of a new sectorial regime of 
accumulation. As it has been explained, the emerging quality orientation of this 
industry has made the process of grape growing much more relevant than before, 
requiring careful examination and accompaniment of the agricultural process and 
an important coordination between the vineyard and the winery. These features 
have led toward what Martín calls a “hybrid” mode of integration, where a “total” 
type of integration (characterized by permanent monitoring and technical control) 
is combined with an “informal” one (given by the absence of binding agreements), 
originating a “technical, economic, and political control by the industrial link, to 
the detriment of producers’ decision-making capacity” (Ibid:86). This “hybrid” 
form of coordination boosts unequal power relations in which “big concentrating 
companies “lasso small producers in relationships of commercial dependency and 
even intervene through quality and origin controls, etc. in their own productive 
decisions.” (Chazarreta, 2012a:34).  
The system of payments in the wine industry varies according to the relationships 
built between different players and the quality of the products. However, it could 
be said that in the case of lower quality grapes, the dominant tendency for wineries 
is to pay their producers in a wage-like fashion. That is, once the grapes have been 
delivered and the price agreed upon, the buyer pays for the total production in 12 
monthly installments throughout the following year. Most of the time this cycle is 
followed by a new yearly one based on the next harvest, and so on. For producers, 
therefore, their profit assumes pretty much the shape of a salary paid by the 
winery. In the case of higher quality grapes, the landscape is more varied. While 
there is a tendency to pay in a shorter period of time, this could still be done in 
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three, six, or nine months according to the relationship between buyer and supplier 
and the quality of the product.  
Possibilities of credit have been limited to local sources in the last decade, with 
options of international credit having been seriously diminished after Argentina’s 
default in 2002. Private options of credit have been an option for bigger wineries 
and producers, but in the case of the smaller ones (who are a majority among 
producers of grapes for table wine in Argentina), the conditions have been too 
demanding. Access to credit has been a critical factor in the recent evolution and 
bifurcation of the sectorial regime of accumulation, being more easily available for 
bigger national and international groups that invested in the reconverted sector and 
expensive and scarce for small producers (Rofman and Collado, 2005). Carlos, 
director of the National Institute for Agricultural Technology’s (INTA) Regional 
Center Mendoza – San Juan, highlights how access to credit is still a problem for 
small producers. According to him, productive units become smaller each time 
because once their owner dies, they are divided between their children. This leads 
to a point where vineyards are so small that it threatens their viability, and “these 
people are not subject to credit. Then, well, it’s a non-virtuous circle; a circle that 
generates each time less inversion, less interest, and productivity and quality tend 
to fall.” (Interview AC4).  However, the provincial governments of Mendoza and 
San Juan have developed some credit schemes targeting this group. Additionally, 
the sectorial organization COVIAR, through the above-mentioned program 
COVIAR, provides subsidies to the small producers that join this initiative.
The analysis presented so far has made visible the main features of the money 
form in the Argentinean wine industry. The system of payments is characterized 
by the lack of formal agreements, as grape producers and their buyers rely on 
tradition and mutual trust. Payments to producers tend to acquire a wage-like form 
(12 monthly installments per year) in the low-quality market, while the conditions 
tend to be slightly better in the higher-quality one (with three, six, or nine months, 
according to the case). Credit is rather scarce in the industry for weaker players 
and very difficult to access for smaller producers. This fact has prevented many 
grape producers from upgrading their vineyards or reconverting their production, 
driving them out of business in the last instance. The few, more convenient 
opportunities they have for credit are either credit programs sponsored by 
provincial authorities or sectorial hybrid organizations, such as COVIAR.
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4. State
The state had taken an active role in the development of the wine industry 
throughout most of its history. It is possible to identify three main ways in which 
this has been done. First, by creating, transforming, or abolishing different 
normative frameworks that constrained or promoted the production and 
commercialization of wine, in connection with the cyclical crises of 
overproduction suffered by the sector. Second, by creating public entities in 
charge of regulating the sector. Chazarreta (2012b:208) lists among the main ones: 
the Commission for the Defense of the Wine Industry (1897), the Commission for 
Industrial and Commercial Defense and Promotion (1914), the Autonomous 
Commission of Wine Defense (1933), the Wine Regulatory Board (1934), the 
National Commission of the Wine Industry (1938), and the National Wine 
Institute (1954). Third, by the creation of corporations owned by provincial states 
in order to endow them with regulatory functions—such as the cases of Bodegas y 
Viñedos Giol in Mendoza or Corporación Agroeconómica Vitícola y Comercial 
(better known as CAVIC) in San Juan.   
However, in spite of this long history of state intervention in the sector, the 
process of reconversion, which began with the neoliberal policies of the 1990s, 
was mainly driven by private agents and sought to limit the state’s role in the 
industry. The new global mode of regulation that began to take place during that 
decade envisioned a much weaker and inactive role for the state, as it has been 
explained before. Under the imperatives of deregulation, the state abolished all 
legislation impeding the free play of economic agents in the industry and seriously 
reduced the functions of the National Wine Institute (INV) to quality controls and 
little more. In this sense, the state’s retraction as a policy maker and an active 
player in the sector has to be explained in relation to the overall transformation of 
the global mode of regulation.  
While the national state became much less relevant for the sector, it was at the 
provincial level that it played a more active role. Though provincial governments 
are still involved in buying table wine or determining quotas of must production—
to deal with oversupply—one of the most salient characteristics for the state 
structural form during the process of reconversion was the new way in which it 
came to articulate its actions with the most relevant actors. The provincial 
governments took the lead, and in close cooperation with private actors, came to 
reinforce what could be described as organs of sectorial governance, which are 
characterized by the presence of private actors (wineries, traders, grape producers, 
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and their respective interest organizations) and representatives of provincial 
governments or specialized state agencies.  
A first step in this direction was an Agreement signed by the provinces of 
Mendoza and San Juan (the two most important provinces for wine production in 
the country). In order to reduce overproduction, it stipulated a minimum 
proportion of grapes that each winery should elaborate into must instead of wine. 
Those wineries that did not follow this rule would have to pay a “mandatory 
contribution” (Provincial Law N° 6216).  The money raised by this measure—
which is used in activities that seek to promote wine consumption—would be 
administered by a Viniculture Fund in each province, though this institution was 
only established in Mendoza. It was created as a non-state legal entity of public 
law and its administrative council is composed by eight representatives from the 
private sector—nominated by different interest organizations—and one 
representative of the province’s government (National Decree N° 305). It became, 
is this way, the first successful attempt of a hybrid sectorial entity that was to be 
governed jointly by representatives from the public and private sector. This 
positive enterprise worked as a stepping-stone on which more ambitious 
cooperative projects would be built.  
The clearest example of that was the development of the industry’s roadmap 
known as the Viniculture Strategic Plan 2020 (PEVI, from its initials in Spanish). 
The PEVI ‘s main objective was to survey the current situation of the local wine 
industry and define strategic goals to be achieved by the sector as a whole by the 
year 2020. The elaboration of the plan began by the end of the year 2000 and took 
two years. It involved a wide variety of actors: representatives of grape growers 
and wine producers’ organizations, cooperatives’ associations, exporters, 
universities, and sector-specific governmental and public-private agencies. The 
plan determined three strategic objectives23 and the strategies to be pursued in 
order to attain them. The sector, then, gave itself this plan and presented it to the 
members of parliament from the wine producing provinces who took it, without 
changes, to the national congress, where in 2003 it was passed as a law. One of its 
first consequences was the creation of COVIAR, whose main duty was to 
“manage and coordinate the implementation” of the PEVI 2020 (National Law N° 
25,849). This is again another example of a recently created institution that takes 
an active part in the sector’s governance and can be classified as a hybrid, since it 

23(i)PositioningArgentina’svarietalWinesinthenorthernmarkets,(ii)developingtheLatinAmericanmarketand
revitalizingtheArgentineanwinemarket,(iii)supportingthedevelopmentofsmallgrapeproducersinorderto
integratetheminthewineandconcentratedgrapejuiceindustry.
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is funded and administered by private and public entities: out of the 17 members 
of its Board of Representatives 12 belong to business or producers’ chambers, 
while the other five members represent the public sector (INV, INTA, the 
government of Mendoza, the government of San Juan, and a representative chosen 
by the other wine producing provinces, which may rotate). As it can be 
appreciated, the state’s role in the current industry has been considerably 
weakened. It has stepped aside in terms of legislation and direct regulations and 
seeks to take part in the governance of the industry through its membership in 
hybrid public-private partnerships. Moreover, within these entities, as it can easily 
be seen in the composition of their ruling bodies, private representatives always 
outnumber public ones. And within the public sector, it is provincial governments 
that get seats on the board only, leaving the national state’s representation to its 
specialized agencies.  
All in all, it can be said that in the last years a sectorial level of governance—
composed by public and private actors, but dominated by the former—has 
emerged and has taken the lead in deepening the process of reconversion and 
setting the goals and strategies of the industry. However, it cannot be denied that 
the state both at the national and provincial levels still takes decisions that affect 
the sector: the former, for example, by imposing retentions to exports and, more 
generally, through the adjustment of the exchange rate; the latter, by providing 
accessible conditions for credits or buying wine and grapes. Nevertheless, the 
actual power of the state to shape the industry—through rule-making or as an 
economic actor—has been undermined by the prominence sectorial organizations 
have acquired. The case of PEVI is quite illuminating, since it shows that its 
endorsement by the state was still necessary—that is why it was passed as a 
national law—but its content (the industry’s goals and strategies) was dictated by 
a sectorial forum and approved by the national congress with no changes.  
5. Representation of the product 
As it has been hinted at throughout the previous chapter, the wine sector is 
characterized by the coexistence of two main representations of the product: one 
that follows the logic of quantity and another that is guided by the principle of 
quality. While the former used to dominate the industry during most of its history, 
the last decades have evidenced the emergence of the latter one. Currently, both 
have become important elements within the sector and have been articulated into 
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the dominant logics of the regimes of accumulation. In this section, I offer a 
description of the main features of each representation of the product and the ways 
in which they relate to other structural forms and the split in the regime of 
accumulation. 
It would be a simplification to say that quality was not debated until the 1980s in 
the Argentinean wine industry: even within the historical quantity-led regime of 
accumulation quality criteria have been discussed. However, most of the debates 
related to quality had to do with the creation of certain minimums that wine 
producers should fulfill and emerged as reactions to illicit practices within the 
industry. The dominant representation of the product within the quantity-led 
regime of accumulation was that of table wine for mass consumption: it was a 
product that had to be produced in substantial amounts in order to please the 
demand of a population whose consumption per capita appeared as ever-growing. 
Wine consumption within this representation was not understood as a distinctive 
or conspicuous activity. Instead, it appeared as a basic good to be found at the 
table of any average Argentinean household. Wine was represented as an ordinary 
product for daily consumption and, as a consequence, expectations of quality were 
not very different from those applied to bread: they were reduced to certain 
minimums of acceptability. However, as it also happens with bread, it could not be 
missing.  
In the industry built around such a representation of the product, therefore, the 
current hierarchies, classifications, and typologies of wine were not of major 
relevance.  The main concern, instead, was connected to guaranteeing the 
provision of this very important good. Since quality expectations were limited to a 
minimum, it was not unheard of to use a practice known as “wine stretching,” 
which simply consisted of adding water to wine in order to increase stocks. While 
this was not an accepted behavior, and the authorities regulating the sector sought 
to penalize it, the dominant representation of the product made quantity and the 
product’s availability such a strong imperative that quality appeared to be 
negotiable. A clear example of this took place during Juan Domingo Perón’s first 
government (1946–1955), which was characterized by a process of economic 
redistribution in favor of the working class. One of its effects was an important 
boost in wine consumption per capita, which grew in more than 15 liters during 
that period. The situation was one of shortage, and due to the fact that wine was 
such an important wage-good and massively consumed among the working class, 
the current government decided to intervene. While most measures adopted during 
the period were of an economic nature (establishment of maximum prices, 
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minimum production quotas, or expropriating production, for example), there was 
one of particular relevance for the representation of the product: the establishment 
of a maximum for the alcoholic content of wine, which was fixed at 12% vol. 
(Mateu, 2014:154). Such a decision was the maximum expression of a quantitative 
understanding of the product: while settling a minimum proportion of alcoholic 
content would guarantee certain levels of quality, the imposition of a maximum 
importantly allowed for manipulation. The historian Benito Marianetti (1965:304) 
explains that, normally, most of the wine produced in Argentina evidences levels 
above 12% or 12.5% vol.  While those levels needed to be reduced, it was 
impossible to do it by combining wines of different alcoholic levels, because there 
was barely no production under 12% vol. What this regulation meant, actually, 
was a de facto acceptance of wine stretching through the addition of water. During 
the following years it became common to find wine with levels in between 8% and 
9% vol. (Mateu, 2014:154). Even though this might be an extreme case, it is 
useful to show how the representation of the product prioritized a basic product for 
mass consumption over a sophisticated and distinguished one, privileging in this 
way a logic of quantity over quality.  
Nowadays, this quantity-centered representation of the product has not 
disappeared but has come to share its dominance with another one, which 
emphasizes the importance of upgrading the quality of wine and promotes it as a 
product of high symbolic value. This new approach has brought forward 
heterogeneity to the field, not only because there is now a strong hierarchy 
distancing table and fine wines, but also because the category of fine wines has 
been segmented in different trenches according to quality criteria.  
The sector is currently dominated by these two representations of wine, which 
have been able to coexist but by clearly differentiating each other. This can be 
appreciated in many of the industry’s regulations. PEVI, for example, the 
document that established a 20-year plan for the industry, begins the introduction 
of its vision by clarifying that “the PEVI 2020 is not centered on productive 
expansion or the increase in elaborated volumes” but, instead, it “has been 
designed to create value”. The contrast between what the plan aims to do and what 
it does not want gives a clear signal of the emergence of a representation of the 
product that does not depend on growing figures but quality upgrades. However, 
that does not mean that the quantity-centered representation of the product will be 
eliminated; what the plan seems to propose, instead, is a segmentation. The PEVI 
defines three strategic objectives, out of which the first two are of particular 
relevance here. The first one aims at the positioning of “great” Argentinean wines 
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in the “northern markets.” The goal is to increase the exports of varietal-based 
wines of high quality and price to “developed countries.” The second strategic 
objective could be divided into two, since it sets different goals for the Latin 
American and the local markets. The wine industry is expected to be able to 
penetrate in the former with low and intermediate price wine, while in regard to 
the latter, the objective is to reactivate the national consumption of “basic wines”. 
Therefore, as it can be seen in the plan, both representations of the product are 
made part of the sector’s outlook for the following 20 years. However, they are 
given clearly defined roles: the quality-centered representation should be the one 
fostering the process of reconversion with the goal of gaining market shares 
abroad; the quantity-based representation, instead, is given priority in the struggle 
for maintaining and consolidating the—declining but still relevant—local market.  
At a more technical level, it is possible to see how these different representations 
of the product, and their hierarchy, are operationalized through INV’s regulations. 
This is most clearly appreciated in the resolution 12/2003 adopted in 2003. Its 
main goal was to re-categorize wines, which had up to then been divided between 
table, regional, fine, and reserve wine. While the last two categories were 
supposed to be distinguished by their quality, in practice it was found that many 
wineries would sell their products as “fine” and “reserve” without actually 
matching the expected standards. In order to guarantee a more transparent system, 
INV decides to abolish the previous classification and replaces it with another that 
has two main types of product: “wine” and “varietal.” All kinds of wine need to 
accomplish a minimum level of alcohol, which is not defined by economic or 
other reasons but is calculated yearly by INV after examining a sample of 25% of 
the total harvest. Consequently, according to each year’s particular climatic 
conditions and the final characteristics displayed by the grapes, a different 
alcoholic minimum is decided. Additionally, certain ratios are established for the 
amount of grapes and the resulting wine: for all wines, it is mandatory to use at 
least 122 kg of grapes per every 100 liters, while varietals should use at least 130 
kg of grapes per every 100 liters.  A further requirement is posed for varietals: 
single-variety wines must be produced with at least 85% of the alleged grape, 
while those composed of two or three varieties should be elaborated with at least 
90% of the claimed varieties, with none of them accounting for less than 10% of 
the total grapes used. With these measures, INV seeks to preserve the quality of 
products, but this is done through developing a hierarchical system. Instead of 
simply creating minimum standards for all types of wines, the INV has determined 
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differentiated minimums for generic wines and varietal-based ones, accompanying 
the two most important representations of the product in the industry. 
In 1999, the national law 25,163 created a “system for the recognition, protection, 
and register of Argentinean geographical names” to be applied to wine and its 
derivatives. The goal was to create a framework, similar to the one applied in old-
world producing countries, in order to distinguish the characteristics of the wines 
produced in specific areas. Three main categories were created—Provenance 
Indication, Geographical Indication, and Controlled Designation of Origin—and 
INV was commissioned to develop the criteria that would distinguish each of 
them. While it goes beyond the scope of this section to discuss these criterions at 
length, I am interested in highlighting those aspects that are related to the type of 
product that can be granted each appellation. The Provenance Indication is 
available for any kind of “table wine” that has been made with at least 80% of 
grapes produced in the designated area. The Geographical Indication is preserved 
for those products that have been elaborated with grapes recognized by the INV as 
being appropriate for the elaboration of “quality wines.”24 Additionally, they need 
to respect the 130 kg / 100 liter proportion established for varietal-based wines. 
Lastly, the most distinguished appellation, Controlled Designation of Origin, can 
be awarded only to those wines produced with grapes appropriate for the 
elaboration of “superior quality wines.”25 Additionally, they need to respect the 
130 kg / 100 liter ratio and a maximum yield per hectare that INV will determine 
for the designated region. 
While this system of appellations is currently of little relevance in the Argentinean 
wine sector, its regulations make very explicit how the industry works with 
differentiated and hierarchical representations of the product. The quantity-
centered representation seems to comprise all kind of table wine, which can be 
produced with any kind of grapes. It is basically the same logic that the quantity-
based regime of accumulation has always worked with, except for the addition of 
certain quality minimums that, while not new, had not always been evenly 
respected throughout history. Then, we appear to have two groups of wines that 

24Malbec,Merlot,CabernetSauvignon,Syrah,PinotNegro,Canari,PinotMeunier,Tannat,LambruscoMaestri,
Barbera,Sangiovese,Bonarda,Tempranillo,Cinsaut,Carignan,PetitVerdot,CabernetFranc,Carmenere,Corvina
Veronesse,Rondinella,Ancellota,Croatina,LambruscoGrasparossa,Gewurztraminer,Chardonnay,Chenin,
Sauvignon,Semillon,Sauvignonasse,Riesling,Torrontésriojano,Ugniblanc,Moscatobianco,Pinotblanco,
Prosecco,Viognier,PedroGiménez(NationalDecree57/2004andINVResolutionsN°32/2002,18/2004,22/2006,
7/2009and52/2012).
25Malbec,Merlot,CabernetSauvignon,Syrah,PinotNegro,Tannat,Barbera,Cinsaut,Carmenere,Cabernetfranc,
Gewurztraminer,Chardonnay,Sauvignon,Semillón,Riesling,Torrontésriojano,Pinotblanco(NationalDecree
57/2004andINVResolutionsN°8/2003,18/2004and22/2006).
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respond to the quality-centered representation of the product: “quality wines” can 
only be made from a certain group of grapes and respecting the varietal-based kg/l 
ratio, while “superior quality wines” come from an even more restricted group of 
grapes, also respect the varietal-based kg/l rate and, additionally, need to comply 
to a maximum yield level. In this way, it is possible to see how the different 
representations of the product are not just restricted to the ideational level, but 
become part of the very material process by classifying, categorizing, and 
hierarchizing wines, grapes, techniques, procedures, and terroirs.  
6. International insertion 
This structural form seems to be split along the same lines as that of the industry’s 
regime of accumulation. The production and commercialization of table wine 
targets mainly the domestic market, exporting only sporadically according to 
market opportunities. The reconverted regime of accumulation, instead, has 
always considered exports as the main destination for their products. This can be 
seen by the way in which exports have grown with reconversion and the 
preponderance they have acquired in the last years. The importance of external 
markets can clearly be seen in the PEVI, where one of the main strategic 
objectives is to position Argentina’s fine wines in the “northern markets,” while 
another one targets “Latin American markets” (together with the local one.  
However, the sector’s possibilities of exports are strongly determined by the 
global mode of regulation. As it was noted, the period between 2002–2009 
witnessed a boom in exportations due to the very competitive exchange rate 
adopted by the national government. However, the situation has begun to change, 
especially during the two years previous to my fieldwork. This has been a 
consequence of a new exchange rate policy that has systematically attempted to 
avoid a devaluation (keeping the peso almost fixed at a relatively high rate) and 
the constant high levels of inflation, which have year after year increased the costs 
of production. As it was mentioned, since the international markets show an 
important sensitivity to changes in price, producers have not been able to adjust 
them according to their growing production costs, so they have either reduced 
their profit margins or diverted their products to the local market.  
Figure 8 (page 165) shows how exports have not been able to catch up with the 
volumes commercialized in 2008 and that, nevertheless, their total value increased 
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until 2012. This is the consequence of the upgrade on exports that the industry had 
to do: since there was a point after which it was not possible to reduce the profit 
margins of entry-level and lower priced wines anymore, that segment stopped 
being exported and wineries concentrated efforts in exporting more of their 
premium and ultrapremium products. This strategy explains why the exported 
volumes have not been able to recover totally after 2009’s depression and, in spite 
of that, their total value grew. However, a decrease in the value of total exports in 
2013, for the first time in more than ten years, and the deepening of this tendency 
in 2014, seems to show the limitations of this strategy and cast uncertainty over 
the short-term future of this industry. While exports have been the engine behind 
the sector’s renovation and development, their decrease in value during the last 
two years appears as an indicator of a possible crisis in regulation. Since the main 
cause for this reduction has been the slow pace at which the peso has been 
devaluated in relation to the growing inflation, there do not seem to be major 
reasons to consider the situation as an indication of a crisis of regulation. If the 
exchange rate was adjusted according to inflation or the latter was eliminated, the 
industry would be able to return to its previous path of growth, since most of the 
other conditions that had boosted its development have remained unchanged. 
However, the exchange rate, one of the main elements of the structural form under 
discussion, is clearly determined at the global level of regulation, making it very 
difficult for sectorial actors to influence their determination. What this evidences 
is the fact that the exchange rate, a factor that has proven so relevant for the 
industry—both producing a boom in exports from 2002 onward and inducing a 
decline from 2013—has been adjusted exclusively at the level of the global mode 
of regulation, favoring and hampering the wine industry’s exporting goals 
unintentionally. This shows how a sectorial mode of regulation can be understood 
as the meeting point of global and sector-specific arrangements, where the 
preeminence of one level over the other is decided contingently throughout history 
and present different balances when looking at each particular structural form.  
Furthermore, this highlights the highly contested and complex nature of 
regulation, which should not be understood neither in a deterministic fashion nor 
in a voluntarist way. 
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7. Conclusion
To sum up, this chapter has described the main features of the current mode of 
regulation of the Argentinean wine industry by analyzing the six structural or 
institutional forms that constitute it. In this way, I have described the recent 
historical evolution of this mode of regulation, highlighting the interrelationship of 
its transformations with those experienced by the national mode of development 
and the sectorial regime of accumulation. This chapter, together with the previous 
one, offers a general picture of the Argentinean wine industry, which is the 
particular context in which Fair Trade will be analyzed.  
Additionally, the description of the six institutional forms presented so far has 
highlighted the most important challenges faced by workers and contratistas 
(increasing flexibility of the conditions of employment and work relationships) 
and small grape producers (the increasing domination of a quality-based 
representation of the product, limited access to credit, lack of formal contracts, 
wage-like system of payments and oligopsonistic market conditions). These issues 
are crucial in the following chapter, as they provide the criteria against which the 
Fair Trade mode of regulation will be evaluated in assessing its capacity to 
structure alternative socioeconomic relationships in favor of the subaltern classes 
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Chapter 6: The Fair Trade Mode of Regulation of the 
Argentinean Wine Sector 
Within the proposed dialectical process of inquiry, this chapter represents the 
highest point of concretization, as it will describe the characteristics and effects of 
Fair Trade in relation to one particular product (wine) in particular countries of 
production (Argentina) and consumption (UK). To do so, the more abstract 
features provided in the description of the general concept of Fair Trade, the 
current trends in the world wine market, Argentina’s global mode of development, 
and the regime of accumulation and mode of regulation of its wine sector will be 
further refined and concretized through the empirical analysis of the specific case.  
The goal of this chapter, hence, is to offer an overall picture of the concrete ways 
in which the Fair Trade system structures socioeconomic relations in the 
Argentinean wine sector and to assess how transformative it proves to be. This 
evaluation is done in two different analytical steps. First, by comparing the 
conventional and Fair Trade modes of regulation in the Argentinean industry. In 
this way, it is possible to distinguish the elements that Fair Trade seeks to 
transform from those that remain unchanged. Second, by examining the 
consequences of coupling the Fair Trade mode of regulation and the sectorial 
regime of accumulation. In so doing, the analysis will be focused on the particular 
effects of the Fair Trade mode of regulation when implemented in this industry. 
In order to deliver such an assessment, this chapter begins with a brief overview of 
the Argentinean Fair Trade sector and the situation of the wine industry within. 
This will be followed by a detailed analysis of the six structural forms that 
compose a mode of regulation. In this exposition I will focus on the aspects of 
each structural form that are most important to the industry and prove to be 
relevant for the analysis of Fair Trade. Lastly, the concluding assessment will be 
provided. It will be divided into two parts, with the first synthetizing the most 
important findings obtained by comparing modes of regulation and the second 
focusing on the coupling of the Fair Trade mode of regulation and the sectorial 
regime of accumulation. 
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1. Introduction to the Argentinean Fair Trade wine sector 
The Fair Trade sector in Argentina is still a relatively new phenomenon. Given 
that the first certification was only granted in 2005, the Argentinean Fair Trade 
sphere is still giving its initial steps. Even if the number of certified organizations 
has permanently grown year after year, Argentina’s figures are still modest when 
compared to other countries in the region. At the moment, there are 18 certified 
organizations (both producers and traders) that are responsible for the 10 Fair 
Trade products26 that are currently produced in Argentina. Other countries in Latin 
America, instead, present much higher numbers of certified organizations, for 
example: Guatemala (30), Bolivia (35), Nicaragua (37), Brazil (58), Mexico (68), 
Colombia (161) or Peru (205). This shows that the Fair Trade sector in Argentina 
is still smaller and newer than in most of the neighboring countries. As a 
consequence, many of the actors involved are actual pioneers of its development 
and are still in the process of fully understanding the system’s way of working, as 
well as its benefits and limitations. 
The first Fair Trade certification in Argentina was granted to a honey cooperative; 
however, since then, the lead has been taken by grape and wine producers. 
Currently, wine grapes are the most important product in the Argentinean Fair 
Trade sector, being produced and traded by 11 certified organizations, which 
represent more than half of the total number of certified producers in the country. 
Apples and pears come second, but each of these products involves only four 
certified actors. Honey, which during the initial years was nearly as popular as 
wine, has witnessed a decline, and after some recent de-certifications it is now 
only produced by three organizations. As these figures show, the wine industry 
constitutes the most relevant sector within the Argentinean Fair Trade sphere. 
At the moment of my fieldwork, there were 11 certified actors in the Argentinean 
wine industry. Five of them (Finca Alentejo, Ecowine, Paso Alto, La Mariana and 
Medrano) are certified as Hired Labor, four of them as Trader (Palmer, Mendoza 
Wines, Tres Vientos and Bodega Fabretti) and two of them as Small Producer 
Organization (La Chileciteña – since 2013; before it was certified as Hired Labor 
– and Uvasol).27

26Apples,blackcurrants,blueberries,cherries,honey,oliveoil,pears,raspberries,redcurrantsandwinegrapes.
27ThisoveralldescriptionstemsfrommyfieldworkinArgentina,whichtookplaceduringthesecondhalfof2013.
Whileithasmostlyremainedunchanged,itshouldbenotedthatin2015Ecowinedecertified.Myanalysis,
however,isbasedonthedatacollectedin2013and,hence,theactorscertifiedatthemoment.
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The majoritarian tendency among them, as it happens in the dominant regime of 
accumulation, is vertical integration, as Finca Alentejo, Paso Alto, La Mariana, 
Ecowine, Medrano and La Chileciteña produce Fair Trade wine using exclusively 
their own certified Vineyards. This means that the whole process of production of 
their Fair Trade products is managed by them, without the need of resorting to 
other actors. 
Traders, as it was explained in Chapter 3, do not concentrate the whole process by 
definition, since they either buy, sell and or process Fair Trade products. In our 
case, this happens in a variety of ways and, of course, involves always more than 
one actor, going against the trend of vertical integration. Bodega Fabretti buys 
only certified grapes, exclusively from Uvasol – an organization of grape 
producers.  While in its initial years Uvasol worked exclusively with Fabretti, after 
some time it began to sell certified grapes to other wineries, though sporadically, 
building a longer lasting relationship with Tres Vientos. Mendoza Wines initially 
worked closely with a cooperative of small producers, to whom it bought certified 
grapes. However, this cooperative broke a few years ago and the individual 
producers were not able to re-organize themselves within the Fair Trade system, 
forcing Mendoza Wines to look for a different Fair Trade wine supplier. They 
proposed Medrano – a winery to whom they were already buying conventional 
wine – to obtain the certification and become their exclusive provider of Fair 
Trade wine. Parallel to this, Medrano sold Fair Trade wine in 2013 to the newly 
certified Palmer, which had just obtained its certification as a Trader and decided 
to commercialize a small amount of Fair Trade wine as a test.  An overview of the 
Fair Trade certified actors in the Argentinean wine industry and their relations can 
be found in Table 5.  
All in all, this brief overview of the Fair Trade wine sector allows identifying 
some general features. In relation to the types of certification, there is a clear 
predominance of Hired Labor (HL) over Small Producer Organization (SPO). This 
fact is in part explained by the current tendency in the industry towards vertical 
integration, where players – especially in the quality-led regime of accumulation – 
seek to control the whole process of production of higher quality wines. As a 
consequence, the HL certification allows wineries to certify their own vineyards 
and use their own grapes to make wines. Traders pursue different strategies, as 
two of them buy certified grapes to produce the wine themselves and the other 
two, instead, buy certified wine. This last fact, combined with the predominance 
of vertical integration, reduces considerably the market for certified grapes, 
making it difficult for an organization like Uvasol – an association of grape 
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producers that is not involved in wine production – to integrate into the circuit. 
Lastly, it shall also be noted that an overwhelming majority of certified wineries is 
situated in Mendoza, not only the most important wine producing region in the 
country, but also the one that shows the most important levels of industrial 
reconversion towards the quality-led regime of accumulation. La Chileciteña, 
instead, comes from the also traditional, but much less prestigious, region of La 
Rioja.
Table 5 
Certified
organization Certification Certifiedproduction Location
Originof
investments
PasoAlto HL Verticallyintegrated Mendoza France
Fabretti Trader Workswith certified grapesonly, andbuys themexclusivelyfromUvasol
Mendoza Switzerland/
Argentina
Palmer Trader BuyscertifiedwinefromMedrano Mendoza Austria
FincaAlentejo HL Verticallyintegrated Mendoza Argentina
LaMariana HL Verticallyintegrated Mendoza Chile
LaChileciteña SPO Verticallyintegrated LaRioja Argentina
Medrano HL Vertically integrated. Sells certified wine toMendozaWinesandPalmer
Mendoza Argentina
MendozaWines Trader BuyscertifiedwinefromMedrano Mendoza SouthAfrica
TresVientos Trader BuyscertifiedgrapesfromUvasol Mendoza Chile
Uvasol SPO
Has traditionally sold certified grapes to Fabretti
and in the last years to Tres Vientos. It has also
soldtoMedranobefore.
Mendoza Argentina
Ecowine HL Verticallyintegrated. Mendoza Argentina
   Sources: FLO-Cert and fieldwork data.  
Having now given a general picture of the Argentinean Fair Trade wine sector, the 
following section will analyze the six structural forms that constitute its mode of 
regulation.  
2. The Fair Trade Mode of Regulation 
The goal of this section is to describe the changes that the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation introduces in the structuration of its six institutional forms. Hence, I 
will examine the different ways in which it deals with the wage relation, money, 
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competition, the state, the representation of the product and international insertion. 
However, since this examination is done in order to assess Fair Trade’s 
transformative potential, the analysis will be oriented by this goal. As a 
consequence, my attention will be unevenly distributed among different structural 
forms and, within each of them, I will focus only on selected aspects. The 
prioritization of both, certain structural forms and specific elements of each, is the 
result of two overlapping criteria. In the first place, I have decided to focus on 
those aspects that appear as the most problematic in the conventional wine sector 
and would therefore constitute critical points for intervention if the position of 
small producers and workers is to be improved. In the second place, the fact that 
Fair Trade does not seek to affect all structural forms and all of their constitutive 
elements equally, demands a correlative prioritization in the analysis, i.e., 
producing a closer examination of those elements with which Fair Trade engages 
the most. As a consequence, the reader will find that, for example, the wage 
relation has received much more attention than the state form. The explanation for 
this has to be found in the problems that the wine industry evidences at the level of 
the wage relation and, in parallel, the paramount importance that this structural 
form is given in the Fair Trade mode of regulation vis-à-vis the state form. 
This section is divided in six subsections, each one dealing with a different 
structural form. All of them share a same logic of exposition, where I begin 
highlighting, and justifying , which aspects of each institutional form have been 
considered the most relevant for the analysis. This is followed by the examination 
of the different institutional forms which, as it was explained in Chapter 2, is done 
at two levels: first, I describe the most relevant features that can be found in the 
standards; second, I account for each structural form according to the way in 
which they are found in practice.
2.1 Wage relation 
There are two main dimensions worth examining in order to determine the 
potential that the Fair Trade mode of regulation offers when it comes to the wage 
relation. First, I will focus on the way in which different work conditions are 
regulated, paying particular attention to two elements that are of major relevance 
for the Argentinean wine industry: working hours and overtime and hiring. 
Second, my analysis will turn to direct and indirect wage determinants, specially 
examining the role of the Fairtrade Premium, one of the most innovative features 
of this mode of regulation.  
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2.1.1 Work conditions 
Fair Trade standards for producers, both HL and SPO, include criteria that are 
directly linked to the wage relation. Since the latter standard stipulates that in the 
case of small producers most work should be done without systematically relying 
on external labor, it only regulates certain aspects of this structural form. The HL 
standard, instead, poses much more extensive and detailed requirements in 
connection to the wage relation. Therefore, this exposition will mainly focus on 
the conditions determined by the HL standard (the most demanding one) and only 
highlight differences with the SPO standard when relevant. 
According to the HL standard, all workers must be protected from any kind of 
discrimination, cannot be forced to work and must be free to become members of 
labor unions. The company (or producer) hiring workers must recognize those 
associations, allow them access to workers in their workplace and respect the 
agreements reached in processes of collective bargaining. In cases where no active 
labor unions exist, the employing organization is expected to encourage workers 
to form their own association in order to discuss relevant working issues and raise 
concerns. 
While the employment of children is forbidden before 15 years of age, this rule 
shows some differences according to each standard. In the case of HL, companies 
cannot have children under 15 doing any kind of work and, furthermore, their 
employees are not allowed to bring their children to the workplace because it 
could be considered as indirect employment. While the standard for SPO also 
prohibits the employment of children under 15 years old, it nevertheless accepts 
the possibility of children helping their relatives with work in the field as long as it 
does not interfere with their school attendance or is done during holidays. 
Additional conditions are not clearly defined, but it is stipulated that their personal 
development and health should not be hampered and that “reasonable” limits 
should be put to the amount of working hours. 
Wages need to be equal to or higher than the national minimum wage, sector 
specific collective bargaining agreement or the regional average, whichever is 
higher. Maternity leave (which must be at least of 12 weeks, with no less than 6 of 
them taking place after giving birth), legal social security provisions and non-
monetary benefits (such as vacations or training) have to, at least, equal the 
conditions stipulated in the relevant national regulations.  
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While more broadly the standard for HL states that working hours and extra time 
must comply with the relevant laws and industry regulations, it also establishes 
certain limits. No worker can work more than 48 hours per week on regular basis, 
with exceptions being admitted in cases of “duty work” or when workers are “on 
call”. 24 consecutive hours of rest every seven days are mandatory, however, here 
again the company has the possibility of applying for an exception to the 
certification body in cases of “exceptional circumstances”, which could be, for 
example, periods of peak production. The standard states that “future exceptions 
may also be granted” without setting any limitations to the use of this right. 
However, even when those exceptions might be granted, no worker can work 
more than 18 continuous days without getting 24 consecutive hours of rest. The 
regulation of overtime follows a similar logic: firstly, it is stated the overtime 
(which must be voluntary, cannot be required on regular basis and has to be 
compensated at premium rates) shall not exceed 12 hours per week; however, the 
possibility of exceptions is again granted in cases of peak production periods. In 
any case, it is no allowed to make someone work more than 12 hours of overtime 
during more than 3 consecutive weeks. The premium rate should follow the 
national law, collective bargaining agreements or agreements with working 
unions, whichever is higher. In case that none of those references exist, regular 
extra time should be paid at 50% more per hour and in the case of Sundays, 
holidays or night work, the rate per hour should be doubled. In cases when 
overtime is compensated by time-off work, the premium factor still needs to be 
applied.  
Of particular relevance to my case are the regulations in regard to hiring. 
According to the standard, work should be done by permanent employees “as 
often as possible” and no regular work can be done by seasonal workers. 
However, when it comes to peak periods and “special tasks and circumstances”, 
time limited contracts and subcontracting are permitted. While the coexistence of 
permanent and migrant workers is accepted, no discrimination to any group is 
tolerated and all should be entitled to the same rights.  In situations where 
subcontracting takes place, the contractor is required to declare in writing that s/he 
adheres to the criteria defined in the standard, and the company is responsible to 
ensure that these conditions are met. Anyways, the standard only authorizes this to 
happen during a limited period of time, as after one year of being certified the 
company’s management has to undertake “all contracting of seasonal workers 
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directly rather than through a contractor” (with the possibility of granting 
exceptions to certain products according to product specific standards).28
Most of the mentioned requirements posed by Fair Trade standards that affect the 
wage relation are already included in national or sectorial specific regulations, 
with some further requirements added exclusively by Fair Trade. In this respect, 
managers and administrative staff in the certified organizations have unanimously 
pointed out that since most of these requirements are regulated by law – and the 
state and labor unions make sporadic controls – major changes were not required 
at the moment of applying for the certification. While it would be difficult to find 
a manager recognizing that their company was going against the law, interviews 
with workers seem to confirm in most of the cases this issue: the majority of 
requirements related to working conditions were in place at the moment of 
certifying. However, and against this general background of compliance, my 
analysis will now look at two aspects that have been found to be problematic in 
the conventional mode of regulation: working hours and overtime and hiring.  
Working hours and overtime 
Overtime – especially during the harvest season – has traditionally been above the 
law limits in this industry.  The harvest season demands important amounts of 
labor to be done in a very limited period of time. When the enologist or 
agronomist decides that grapes have reached the right ripeness, they have to be 
immediately harvested because any delays could result in quality losses. The work 
has to be done fast, efficiently and is required simultaneously across the region 
during the entire harvest period, what creates an enormous demand of labor force. 
Nevertheless, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, there is scarcity of workers 
for these temporal duties, making it difficult to, first, find workers and, second, 
rotate them during the harvest season. This has led to intensive and very prolonged 
working days that take place continuously during the two or three months that the 
harvest season lasts. 
While no one would deny the harmful effects that such working conditions have, it 
is also true that workers in the industry count on those peak months in order to 
obtain some extra income. The limitation of extra hours has not been well received 
by workers due to that reason, as the case of Emanuel, a winery worker at La 

28IntheHLstandardforFreshFruit(wherewinegrapesarecomprised)thereisnomentiontosuchexceptions.
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Mariana exemplifies: “in the sense in which I am against Fair Trade is due to the 
fact that they don’t let you work a lot. Because of the hours limitation (…) You 
used to count on a wage and always some extra hours. Now, you receive just the 
basic salary… you can tell a change in your economy (…) With extra hours and 
all I used to get 6,000 pesos, and suddenly I’m earning 4,500 pesos. And you 
begin to be short of money” (Interview AFT29). Minimum wages in the industry, 
no matter if defined by collective bargaining or national legislation, are low, that is 
why workers are used to working each month – and specially during peak seasons 
– an important amount of extra hours in order to achieve a living wage. Even if 
limiting the amount of extra hours undoubtedly produces health and psychological 
benefits, it also (quite dramatically) reduces the final income of those workers 
used to overtime – as the case of Emanuel, who faced a loss of 25%, shows. While 
the limitation of overtime by Fairtrade is indeed necessary and positive, the way in 
which it has been instrumented has serious unintended consequences. This 
situation puts in evidence the lack of a substitutive income in the Fair Trade 
system, because the limitation of working hours necessarily produces a decrease in 
the worker’s income without finding an alternative way to – at least – keep it at 
the previous level.  
This restriction has not been well received by the management either, not so much 
because of financial issues, but due to the difficult logistical conditions inherent to 
rotating workers according to the maximum hours permitted and finding 
temporary workers skilled enough in a context of scarce supply. While smaller 
wineries have not had major problems with this issue, bigger ones have 
systematically applied for exceptions to the rules regulating the maximum number 
of working hours and the number of consecutive days without a full day of rest, 
which the certifying body has always agreed to grant. The situation seems to be 
quite problematic because in the employers’ view, the best solution would be to 
continue asking for exceptions (“asking for exceptions every year” at La Mariana 
and “asking for exceptions in the peak seasons” at Paso Alto), but for workers it 
appears as a dilemma: on the one hand, their wellbeing would demand working 
less but, on the other hand, their economic needs pushes them to complain against 
these new rules and support the application for exceptions. As it will be discussed 
in the following section, the best way in which this dilemma could be solved by 
Fairtrade would be the introduction of living wages. As a consequence, the extra 
income that workers lose due to overtime limitations would be compensated by a 
higher salary. 
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Fairtrade is also caught in its own dilemma, because they have to balance the 
contradictory interests of workers and capitalists: the main goal of Fairtrade is to 
improve workers’ conditions, therefore, they should enforce the standards they 
have created and require the company to limit working hours. However, Fairtrade 
is not a mandatory certification, meaning that those that become part of the system 
do so because they choose it and, consequently, can also choose when to leave it: 
if Fairtrade starts to interfere with the normal functioning of the company, 
management would most probably decide to jump out the system. Therefore, 
Fairtrade incurs in a flexibilization of its own standards, allowing recurrent 
exceptions. While managers allege that “with the time it has been adjusted” 
(Interview AFT5), they also confess that in the future they expect to continue 
making use of exceptions, showing that Fairtrade has not “threatened” to limit 
their use.  
But flexibility and self-contradiction goes even further. For example, Pablo, 
general manager at Paso Alto winery, explained how the standard limits work on 
tractors and fumigation to a maximum of four consecutive hours, while the 
national law regulating these activities allowed up to six. While Fairtrade’s 
general rule is that in case of clashes between the standard and national legislation 
the most demanding criteria must prevail, in this situation the decision was made 
in the opposite direction: Fairtrade gave priority to the less demanding national 
law and allowed this work to take place for up to six consecutive hours. An even 
more flagrant case was the one described by FLO-Cert’s auditor for Argentina.  
She explained how after being faced for a long time with complaints about the 
limitation of extra hours, Fairtrade decided to modify their standard, allowing a 
maximum of 72 hours of total work per week during harvest. This, in the first 
place, goes against the maximum amount of extra hours per week settled in the 
standard (though, it has to be said, there are no specifications for the so called 
“exceptional” cases) and, in the second place, and even worse, goes against the 
national legislation that sets the maximum number of extra hours per week in 12. 
In this case, it is not only that Fairtrade decides to take the less demanding 
regulation as the rule, but also that the maximum settled happens to be against 
national legislation. Therefore, the certified company might be behaving illegally 
but still retaining its Fair Trade status. 
Lastly, in relation to extra hours, it is fair to highlight that there are also cases 
where Fairtrade has proved to be less flexible and contributed with their audits to 
the fulfillment of their own standards and national law. That is the case 
exemplified by Pablo, manager and member of the family that owns Ecowine, 
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who complains about the restrictions that Fairtrade puts to the outside the law 
agreements that they used to achieve with workers when it came to the premium 
rate paid for extra hours: “we receive the water [for watering the vineyard], for 
example, on Saturday at 22. And you have to do it. And we have to pay extra 
hours at a 100%. Sometimes figures don’t add up. And how do you make the 
Fairtrade people understand that? ‘Look, I get the water at 22 on a Saturday’, so 
they tell you ‘no, you have to pay it all’. Well, it’s also about being a bit rational, 
the people [meaning workers] understand it perfectly. Sometimes a middle 
point…” (Interview AFT20). In this way, in spite of the manager’s complaints, 
Fairtrade works as a reassurance of national legislation, making the employer pay 
the proper premium rate for extra hours during a weekend.   
Hiring
The last relevant point for the wine industry in the standard – in terms of work 
conditions – has to do with the ways in which workers are contracted. I have 
previously explained that, especially since the 1990s, this has become a very 
important issue in terms of work stability, social benefits and salaries, as workers 
have become victims of an important transformation in the process of production 
driven by the industry’s reconversion and, closely connected to this, the 
flexibilization in work conditions fueled by neoliberal policies. Fairtrade, with its 
proposal of limiting sub-contracting and increasing the number of permanent 
workers seems to be a good alternative in order to remediate this problem. 
Nevertheless, its potential effects become seriously diminished by the way in 
which the standard is applied.  
Representatives of the wineries argue that, in the first place, the modern wine 
industry has many non-recurrent tasks that need to be done at different moments 
of the year, making it inconvenient to hire permanent employees to cover these 
activities, as they would be unproductive during most of the year. They highlight 
that most workers only know how to perform certain tasks but not others, making 
it strictly necessary to employ different workers for different duties. Furthermore, 
the difficulty to find workers for these occasional activities has made very 
common the use of work crew recruiters (cuadrilleros), who are in charge of 
finding and hiring the workers. In this way, managers continue with the 
outsourcing of hiring described in the previous chapter. Fairtrade, while 
contemplating the possibility of subcontracting during the first year of the 
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certification, requires the company to do all contracting directly after that period. 
Surprisingly, this has also been managed with exceptions up to now and, most 
probably, for the time to come, as the dialogue with Diana exemplifies: 
Diana: The standard norm requires you to contract directly, not to 
include intermediaries. And the way of working in the area and the 
region is through intermediaries. You tell a cuadrillero all the people 
you need for the pruning, the disbudding, the tying-down… You don’t 
have direct contracting because – that’s what we explained also to the 
certification people – the cuadrillero gives them work this month here, 
the following month in the fruit plantations, the following months at the 
olives, I don’t know… He gives them working continuity. If you hire 
them yourself for a period… I don’t know. I think that, as everything, it 
has a process and it may change at some point, but as long as those who 
want to work in a different way are not many, it will be quite difficult. 
So that is being handled with an exception. 
Juan: And what’s your idea about what to do in that area? 
Diana: Continue keeping the exception as long as possible. (Interview 
AFT5) 
Similar situations are presented in wineries that depend on temporary labor, 
showing that this is the most common practice. Instead of pushing companies into 
fulfilling this requirement Fairtrade has, however, tolerated subcontracting as long 
as the company accepts responsibility for the conditions that the contractor 
provides. This is an improvement in itself, because in this way the company 
cannot leave the responsibility for work conditions to the intermediary, but has to 
assure that all the rights stipulated by law are respected. Fairtrade in this way 
works reinforcing the law. It does not, however, put into practice its own standard, 
tolerating still a distance between workers and the company. As a consequence, it 
evidences an important limitation that stems from its legalist perspective: the 
conditions of employment for temporary workers are those regulated by national 
laws, but, as we have seen before, these official regulations are precisely at the 
roots of the processes of labor flexibility and marginalization of workers. While 
Fairtrade proposes in its standards to go beyond them with the promotion of direct 
contracting and the transition from temporary worker status to that of permanent 
worker, it does not actually demand this requirement to be fulfilled, missing an 
excellent opportunity to produce a change in a sensitive area of the Argentinean 
wine industry. 
All in all, this subsection has shown that while the Fair Trade mode of regulation 
defines certain minimum thresholds in relation to work conditions, most 
requirements are settled in accordance with state or sectorial legislation. As a 
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consequence, most of these regulations were already fulfilled before the process of 
certification. While Fairtrade has contributed to the enforcement of some aspects 
of these legislations – as the example of overtime payment showed –, it has failed 
to produce changes in the most critical areas of the wine industry. This has been a 
result of the systematic granting of exceptions in relation to those aspects where 
the standard is more demanding than national legislation or those practices that – 
even if against official regulation – are part of the sector’s traditional way of 
working. 
2.1.2 Wage determinants 
This sub section looks at wage determinants, both direct and indirect. These will 
be examined in two main ways: first, I describe what FLO considers to be a fair
wage and discuss its implications. Second, I present the Fairtrade Premium and 
analyze its relationships to direct and indirect wage determinants. Given the fact 
that the Fairtrade Premium is regulated very differently according to each type of 
certification, the second analysis will require a much more detailed examination.  
Fair wages 
I briefly commented on one aspect of direct wages when discussing the 
remuneration of extra hours, but I will go more into detail now. As it was 
explained, Fairtrade requires wages to be set according to the national minimum 
wage, the collective bargaining agreement for the sector or the regional average, 
whichever is higher. The same criteria apply for indirect wage determinants. 
Basically, Fairtrade expects the minimum wage to be legal (this is, set according 
to official legislation) but does not consider its materiality, this is, the impact it has 
in covering – at least – the conditions for the reproduction of the labor force. The 
actual wage received by Fairtrade workers will always be legal, but will vary 
according to regions and sectors, within a same country, or national legislations, if 
we compare across countries. An enormous array of possibilities emerge.  
In the case of Argentina, it is FLO’s liaison officer who highlights the 
heterogeneity of scenarios in the determination of a “fair” wage:  
(…) but well, there’s a working union [in the wine industry], and the good thing for 
us is that it also determines very clearly what the minimum wage for the sector is, 
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because the criteria says that they have to pay the workers the sectorial minimum 
wage or according to the collective bargaining agreement. So, when we work with a 
farm that produces plums in Patagonia, there is no collective bargaining agreement 
for that product and what do we base ourselves on? In the minimum salary, which is 
very low at the national level… it’s useless! I mean, we’ll tell you that it is Fairtrade 
indeed, because they pay you according to law… Instead, well, even if it’s not a 
great salary, but in the wine sector this was updated yearly, there’s an agreement 
that, even if it’s not ideal, it’s the sectorial agreement (…) (Interview, AFT6). 
This shows, in the first place, that the minimum “fair” wage accepted by Fairtrade 
can be – and indeed is – enormously heterogeneous, since it depends on many 
different issues: how updated is the national minimum wage? Are there processes 
of collective bargaining? Which sector is being considered? How strong is the 
working union in this particular sector? In the second place, even if we decide to 
analyze the case of a country with strong state legislation and within it a privileged 
sector with a very strong union, would that guarantee that the salary is actually 
fair? The main problem I would like to highlight is the formalist approach adopted 
by Fairtrade, who privilege a legal salary over a living wage. Would not this latter 
possibility be much more convincing if one is to talk about a “fair” remuneration? 
A legal remuneration does not necessarily guarantee any sort of fairness. It might 
well be the case – as it is in Argentina – that the national wage is very low and – 
even if slightly better – the sectorial one is not much higher. So, as the FLO 
representative said, it would be considered Fair Trade “but…”  It would be much 
more effective, instead, if FLO would follow a similar approach to the one 
pursued in the calculation of its minimum prices: they could estimate the cost of 
living in different geographical areas (regions, countries, subcontinents, etc.) and 
determine what a living wage would be in each place. Then, if companies would 
want to pay a “fair” wage they would be obliged to pay a “living” wage and not 
merely a “legal” wage. Such a measure would not only be extremely beneficial in 
relation to wage determinants, but would contribute to the better functioning of the 
Fair Trade mode of regulation. In the previous section it was highlighted that 
restrictions in overtime were translated into much lower salaries for workers. If 
Fairtrade would complement the restriction in the amount of working hours with 
the inclusion of a living wage, workers would be obtaining an economic 
compensation for the reduction in overtime and would have no reasons to oppose a 
regulation that is aimed at benefitting them. 
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The Fairtrade Premium as a wage determinant 
So far, I have examined the various elements that the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation includes in its standards in order to affect the different variables that 
determine the wage relation established between producing organizations and their 
workers. Such perspective of analysis has been able to show the requirements 
introduced by Fairtrade International in order to guarantee certain “minimums of 
fairness” within already existing institutional arrangements. In what follows, 
however, my focus will be centered on one of this mode of regulation’s main 
innovations, the Fairtrade Premium, and its impact on wage income.29
Unlike the domain of work conditions – where no fundamental differences are 
found between the two main producer certifications – here it becomes much more 
important to distinguish between HL and SPO. This distinction is particularly 
relevant because in the former case it is much easier to describe the Premium as an 
indirect wage determinant, while in the latter case it is not possible to arrive to 
such a straightforward conclusion. This happens because the Premium cannot 
strictly be considered a wage contribution in the case of producers – therefore, it 
would be more easily associated to an extra profit – but it indeed represents a form 
of direct wage determinant for contratistas. However, as I will explain now, these 
extra funds can be used in a variety of ways, targeting a diversity of groups and 
producing differential impacts on each of them.  
Basically, the Fairtrade Premium is an extra amount of money that the buyer pays 
on top of the settled price. Fairtrade determines its minimum value for each 
product and region (for wine grapes produced in South America, it is currently 
EUR 0.05 per kilo) and while higher rates can be negotiated, no agreement 
between producers and their customers can be signed below that figure or omit its 
payment. As the Premium is accorded per kilo, its total amount does not bare 
relationship to the price of the product but to the volume sold, therefore, higher 
quantities of Fair Trade production exchanged will result in higher Premiums. 
These aspects are common to HL situations and SPO, however, the owners of the 
Premium, the purposes for which it can be used and the ways in which to decide 
its use are quite different in the two cases. 

29Thedescriptionthatfollowscorrespondstothestandardsinforceduringmyfieldwork.However,somechanges
havebeenintroducedafterwards.Sinceallmyfieldworkwasbasedonthe2013versionofstandards,Ihave
decidedtobasethissectiononthem.However,inthischapter’sconclusion,Ipresentthemostrelevantchanges
thathavetakenplacesincethenanddiscusstheirimplications.
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In HL situations the Fairtrade Premium is “the main economic benefit of Fairtrade 
for workers, their families and the community” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International, 2007a:4). This money is expected to contribute to the improvement 
of the socio-economic situation and empowerment (understood as “increased 
opportunity for women and men to exert control over their own lives” – Ibid) of 
workers, their families and communities. A distinction becomes clear between the 
company, which sells the Fair Trade products and makes a profit out of them, and 
the workers, who are those exclusively entitled to be benefited by the Premium. 
While profits and Premium might seem confined to two different realms at a first 
sight, they are actually quite closely connected, since the volume of the Premium 
(this is, of the main economic benefit for workers in the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation) is indissolubly linked to the amount of Fair Trade products that the 
company sells. Hence, while profits are exclusive to the company and the 
Premium is only to benefit workers, their families and community, the conditions 
for their successful increase and accumulation go hand in hand: more Premium 
can only be achieved through an increase in the volumes sold by the company.  
The ways in which the Premium is to be used in HL situations present some 
restrictions. On the one hand, and as a consequence of the separation stated above, 
it is prohibited to use the money from the Premium in order to cover expenditures 
for which the company is responsible, support its running costs or any other costs 
in which the company incurs in order to comply with the Fairtrade standard. On 
the other hand, the ways in which workers can use the Premium for their benefit is 
also regulated, since they are not allowed to fund activities that jeopardize the 
company’s business, are illegal and, most importantly, it is expressly prohibited to 
distribute it among the workers in kind or cash. Besides those restrictions, FLO 
proposes a variety of Premium uses that could be considered, such as: 
development of social projects, organization of subsidized activities, acquisition of 
equipment and facilities relevant for workers and their communities, granting of 
low-interest loans, settlement of projects creating additional employment, creation 
of stores, and education and training for workers, their families and communities.  
In order to administer these funds and make decisions on their use, HL standards 
demand the creation of a quite innovative and original organ within the company: 
the Joint Body. While the Premium is owned by the workers – organized in a 
general assembly –, this Joint Body acts as the trustee and administrator of the 
Premium, being legally responsible for it: “The Fairtrade Premium does not 
belong to the company or to an individual or specific group of workers. The 
Fairtrade Premium belongs to the legal body representing all the workers” (Ibid). 
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The Joint Body must be organized as a legal body, this is, it must be some kind of 
institution recognized by national legislation and capable of having its own bank 
account, directly receiving and managing the Premium, entering into legal 
contracts and officially owning the money and any assets bought with the 
Premium. The main idea of creating this separate entity representing workers is to 
give them independence from the company, making it possible to receive the 
funds or own cash and assets by-passing the firm.  
But what is this Joint Body? Basically, it is a committee composed by 
representatives of the workers and management. Worker representatives are 
expected to be democratically elected and regularly renovated. Additionally, a 
proportional representation of different groups, according to the most relevant 
cleavages in each case, should be guaranteed. Management, instead, has the right 
to appoint its own representatives who can never be more than three and/or 
outnumber worker representatives. The Fairtrade official – the person in the 
management in charge of Fair Trade – has to be part of the Joint Body. All 
members of the Joint Body are equally responsible for its functioning and respect 
of the rules. Decisions are made voting, with management and workers having the 
same voting rights, and no decision can be taken without having the support of the 
majority of workers. The representatives of the management, however, possess 
veto power in those cases when the decisions made by the Joint Body could harm 
the company’s interest, be illegal or put the Fairtrade certification in risk. The Joint 
Body is expected to meet regularly and during work time with the goal of 
discussing proposals of what to do with the Premium’s funds, analyzing how 
projects are progressing, evaluating finished activities and raising other issues of 
relevance to Fair Trade. However, it is not within its scope to assume functions 
typical of a labor union or any other worker’s organization.  
In cases of SPOs, the regulations are much simpler and more freedom is given 
when it comes to the possible uses of the Premium and the processes of decision-
making. Under this scheme, the Fairtrade Premium is described as “an extra sum 
paid to the producer organization in addition to the price for their products and 
serves as a tool for socio-economic and environmentally sustainable development 
and empowerment” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2009). 
Unlike HL situations, we do not have two poles clearly defined 
(workers/company); instead, it is stated that it is the same entity (the producer 
organization) that sells the products and receives the Fairtrade Premium. 
Therefore, the Premium cannot be seen as a contribution to wages – because it is 
not directed to workers – but as an extra profit. In regards to the possible uses of 
212

the funds, there is only one restriction: decisions have to be made “through 
transparent, participative and democratic processes” (Ibid). As long as that 
procedural requirement is fulfilled, the money can be spent on anything that the 
members of the organization consider relevant, including costs directly associated 
to maintaining the certification, investments in their productive units, etc. Only 
two further conditions – to be fulfilled in the medium term – appear: three years 
after obtaining the certification, at least one activity directly benefiting workers 
has to be planned, and after six years have elapsed, one activity in relation to the 
environment has to be funded with the Premium. Besides these few conditions, 
members of the organization are free to choose what they consider to be the best 
uses for the funds according to their or their community’s needs. While workers in 
HL situations can only make use of the Premium in a fashion similar to that of an 
indirect wage determinant (because monetary or in kind distributions are not 
allowed), members of SPOs may decide to spend this money in ways that benefit 
them much more directly. In what follows, I described how these two different 
types of certified organizations have made use of the Premium in the Argentinean 
wine industry.  
The Premium in SPOs 
In order to see how the Premium has been used in the case of SPOs, I will focus 
on Uvasol.30 Uvasol, as it was explained in the beginning of this chapter, is the 
only certified organization that produces and commercializes grapes. Additionally, 
it represents a very special case in the Fair Trade sphere (both in Argentina and 
internationally) because – after a few rounds of negotiation with FLO – they have 
included contratistas as members of their association with the same status as 
producers. Hence, Uvasol is not only constituted by small producers but also 
contratistas who, in spite of their hierarchical relations (as they were highlighted in 
Chapter 5 and will be analyzed more in depth in Chapter 7), stand on equal 
footing. As a consequence, producers and contratistas make decisions on Premium 
uses together and are equally entitled to be benefited. In relation to its uses, 
Uvasol decided to create five general categories in order to distribute their 
Premium funds: association’s functioning, individual projects, an emergency fund, 
opening up to the community and socialization.  

30Eventhoughatthemomentofmyfieldworkthereweretwoorganizationswiththatcertification,LaChileciteña
hadjustchangedfromHLtoSPOin2013,nothavingatthattimemadeanyuseofthePremiumunderthenew
regulations.
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Under the first category we find one very important item, the yearly payment of 
the certification costs. In the beginning, Bodega Fabretti (winery certified as 
Trader) encouraged a group of grape producers and their contratistas to come 
together in the form of a civil association in order to be certified as SPO under 
Fairtrade. In this way, Uvasol would provide Bodega Fabretti with grapes and the 
latter would produce, bottle and commercialize the wine. As part of this initial 
agreement, Bodega Fabretti was in charge of paying the initial audit and yearly 
certification costs – mainly, because it was at the base of this initiative (and a 
groups of producers that still did not understand what this was all about would not 
be willing to invest money) and due to the high cost that the certification implies 
for a group of small producers. However, when Uvasol saw its Premium incomes 
increased in 2009,31 the first decision they took was to assume by themselves the 
cost of the certification in order to obtain more independence from Bodega 
Fabretti. This helped them to widen their horizons and consider the possibility of 
selling certified grapes to other wineries, what they certainly did from that 
moment on, though without much stability. Since then, paying for the certification 
has always been part of their annual budget. Other costs paid with the Premium in 
relation to running the association were a salary for the agronomist that assists 
them, creating and updating a website and buying working clothes for their 
employed workers.  
Under the label of “individual projects” we find a multiplicity of activities, since 
the money available is used according to what each member of the association 
needs the most. For example, Rosa, a contratista, has used some of it to pay for 
construction materials for a house (outside the property where she works), 
computing courses for her children and glasses, among other things. Chino, 
another contratista – who, nevertheless, has not been granted a house in the 
property where he works – used the money to finish the construction of his current 
house. Some owners of vineyards have used the money to invest in infrastructure, 
while all members have agreed on group initiatives, like buying together low-
energy bulbs and light breakers or promoting the development of vegetable 
gardens.  
The emergency fund is an amount of money that is saved to help members in 
unexpected situations. It has been used many times to contribute towards surgeries 

31ThiswasduetoanewregulationbyFairtradeinternational.Uptothemoment,aTrader(inthiscaseFurlotti),
wouldbuycertifiedgrapes,producethewineandsellitlateron.Thepremiumwouldonlybepaidwhenthe
certifiedwinewassoldbytheTrader.Underthenewregulations,theTraderhastopaythePremiumforevery
singlekiloofcertifiedgrapestheybuy,nomatteriftheysellthewineornotafterwards.
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and medical treatment (especially because most small producers in the association 
are quite elder), help contratistas when the frost has damaged the year’s 
production or buy a new mule for one of the producers when his got stolen. 
Opening up to the community has taken form in a variety of ways, like donating 
hygienic elements, hot chocolate and toys to a rural school, assisting children with 
learning problems or donating equipment to schools.  
Lastly, a part of the Premium has been used to promote socialization among the 
members of Uvasol, with the after-harvest barbeque being organized every year 
for the association members, their families, and some of the representatives from 
the wineries that buy their grapes.   
All in all, it is possible to identify four main kinds of benefits which the members 
of Uvasol have obtained/produced with the Premium: first, direct personal 
benefits, in the form of investments to the units of production or money available 
for consumption; second, socializing benefits, derived from the stronger bonds 
created with the recurrent participation in the general assemblies and social events 
organized; third, benefits as a group, in order to keep the certification and the 
association running; and fourth, extra-group benefits, those associated with 
opening up to the community.  
This overall picture, however, has not been always the same, as the Premium 
peaked in 2010 and has since then diminished, with a small recovery in 2012 and a 
drastic fall in 2013. Some criteria has been established in order to deal with this 
changing panorama: first, the priority has been to always save money for the 
yearly certification fee, what during 2013 meant that Uvasol had very little money 
left to do other kind of activities.  The instability in the Premium’s volume has 
also effects on the way in which the money for individual projects is allocated, 
affecting not only the total amount per member, but also the category of members 
that receive it. María Laura, the agronomists that works as a bridge between 
Uvasol and Bodega Fabretti explains it: “in good years, like the ones we had up 
to… 2009, 2010, 2011… until 2012 have been good years, 50% was set aside for 
what we call individual projects, which has increased from 900 pesos to 4,500 
pesos and then went down to 3,000 pesos and now is going down to 2,000” 
(Interview AFT8). A similar trend was followed by those entitled to receive these 
funds: it began exclusively being for contratistas, later on producers with 
vineyards of less than 1 hectare were added, and in the best year also those under 3 
hectares were included. However, this last group was again excluded in 2013, 
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together with the diminution of the amount of money per person for individual 
projects.  From what María Laura, some of the producers and contratistas have 
said, these decisions, though unhappy, have been taken with general agreement 
and broad consensus, with all member prioritizing the situations of those in more 
need: “we reach agreements because they know that the needs are more of the 
contratistas, and they help the landowners too, but most is for contratistas” 
(Interview AFT10). Those members in a better position, however, due to the still 
small volumes of the Premium, have not been able to obtain many benefits from it, 
as it is the case of Uvasol’s president, and this said not by him, but by one of the 
owners of Bodega Fabretti “Eduardo is in the same situation as I am, he gets a 
price for the grapes and nothing else. And I pay him. But he doesn’t get much 
more. Because the Premium… ask Eduardo what has he done with the Premium, 
nothing. Then, it makes sense” (Interview AFT14). In this way, Uvasol has 
prioritized its weakest members – contratistas and those producers with the 
smallest vineyards – in the distribution of benefits. 
All in all, the case of Uvasol shows the different ways in which the Fairtrade 
Premium can affect wage determination. While in the case of producers one 
cannot properly speak of wages, it can be said that the Premium appears to them in 
the form of an extra income. In the case of contratistas, instead, the Premium can 
easily be considered as a direct wage determinant.  Members of Uvasol have 
important levels of freedom in order to decide the uses of the Premium – 
especially under the “personal projects” category. As a consequence, even if they 
never simply divide the Premium among members in cash, they have the 
possibility to decide its uses according to their preferences. In this way, the 
Premium could be said to be a form of profit for producers and direct wage for 
contratistas, as it provides an extra amount of income available to be used in the 
way they deem most suitable. At the same time, nevertheless, some other ways in 
which Uvasol uses the Premium –the emergency fund, development of vegetable 
gardens – could also be considered as indirect wage determinants.  
The Premium in HL situations 
When it comes to the ways in which the Premium has been used by the members 
of HL companies, we find a much less varied set of alternatives because of the 
regulations defined by the standard. Benefits in the form of contributions to direct 
wages are not allowed, as is the case with investments in relation to keeping the 
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certification. Therefore, initially, most investments have been directed towards 
opening up to the community and socializing activities. Among the first group, we 
find the leading examples of the high-school and drinking water facilities that La 
Chileciteña Cooperative built in the village of Tilimuqui with the Premium funds 
and the donations made by their main Fair Trade buyer – The Cooperativist  
supermarket in the UK – and a huge array of donations (equipment, repairs, 
money, etc.) to schools, kindergartens, geriatrics, sport clubs, NGOs, health 
centers, local institutions, learning centers, among other organizations done by all 
Joint Bodies. When it comes to socializing events, some of the wineries organize 
once a year what they call the “Fair Trade event”, a big barbeque open to all 
employees and their families with sport competitions, games, etc.  
Nevertheless, this has been changing, with workers trying more and more to find 
Premium uses that would represent contributions in the form of indirect wages. 
This transition is acknowledged by Julie, the FLO representative in Argentina:  
the Premium’s money was mainly focused on zonal projects like schools, clinics, 
and maybe some got a bit discouraged, they would say ‘this is very good, we put the 
money in the town’s kindergarten, but if I’m 70 and do not have kids, why is it 
relevant for me to put the money in the town’s kindergarten, I don’t feel benefited’. 
But it was as if they were blocked a little bit by the lack of inspiration about what to 
do with the money. Then, we worked a lot in order to expand the horizons and to see 
what could be done with the Premium in order to provide a more direct benefit to the 
workers (Interview AFT1). 
Two things are relevant in this quotation: the worker’s complaints about the ways 
in which the Premium is used and the development of strategies in order to obtain 
more direct benefits. The first issue has been reported unanimously: workers have 
repeatedly posed the question of whether they actually get benefits from the 
money that is supposed to contribute to their socio-economic development. The 
prohibition to divide the money (and hence use the premium as a contribution 
towards direct wage) appears as the most controversial issue, as Florencia, FLO-
Cert auditor for Argentina confirms: “There’s also an initial resistance – and I’ve 
seen it in almost all the Joint Bodies – about saying ‘if the money is ours, why 
don’t we divide it?’” (Interview AFT30) 
This issue, however, seems to be perceived differently according to the position 
that each actor has. As I have just explained, workers tend to be more critical 
about not being able to incorporate the Premium as part of their direct wages, 
while managers, producers or Fairtrade bureaucrats defend a more philanthropic 
view, as is the case of a medium grape producer, member of La Chileciteña 
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Cooperative: “schools, hospitals, there to the North, some departments of 
Catamarca and Salta – where the people that come to harvest the grapes are from – 
have been helped with Fair Trade. Then, help was given, not specifically to one 
employee, but help for the whole village. Then, I see that it’s interesting, very 
good, very important” (Interview AFT17). It could be well argued that it is not 
surprising that a worker with a relatively low wage would be interested in getting 
a direct monetary benefit from this fund, which they are told to own, prioritizing 
their many concrete needs over a more abstract idea of collective good or charity. 
Managers and Fairtrade bureaucrats, instead, most probably due to their better 
economic position and the fact that this money is not to report them any kind of 
benefit (direct or indirect), seem to be much more prone to support those 
investments inspired by the more abstract ideals of common good or charity. This 
latter group, however, does not seem to take very seriously the workers’ concerns, 
and explains their attitude due to some incapacity to go beyond their self-interest: 
“sometimes, they don’t see it reflected so much in their own pockets, what Fair 
Trade is. Then they say ‘well, we have this fund, buy what do we earn, what’s our 
benefit?’ That’s the most difficult part, to raise awareness among the personnel of 
what Fair Trade is and the benefits it has. Because even if it doesn’t reach their 
pockets, they don’t have a salary increase, but they have a benefit in their kid’s 
schools, or the health center they go to” (Interview AFT21), “this of understanding 
that it couldn’t be a personal benefit but that it had to be a common benefit, it’s a 
very important exercise” (Interview AFT19), “they are people with many 
deficiencies, many lacks, so they might not be willing to accept that a money that 
is supposed to be theirs could be invested in a primary school, when their kids 
don’t go to school, for example. All this solidary and social spirit takes its time” 
(Interview AFT30). As the quotations clearly show, when workers complain about 
their lack of direct benefits from the Premium, members of management and FLO 
bureaucrats tend to dismiss their view in a rather paternalist way (they still do not 
see it, they still do not understanding, it is a learning process) instead of seriously 
engaging with it.  
The workers’ position has then slowly shifted towards looking for alternatives 
through which, within the settled boundaries, they could obtain more direct 
benefits form the Premium. This does not mean that the opening up to the 
community has disappeared – far from that, it continues to be the most important 
use for most of the Joint Bodies – but its original dominance has stepped 
backwards a little bit and offered room for some alternatives. Omar, a winery 
worker at Paso Alto and president of its Joint Body, explains their budget: “we 
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have a 30% for consumable goods, a 20% for health and a 20% for education, and 
the remaining 30% we keep it in case of emergencies” (Interview AFT4). While 
the budget for health and education goes mostly to community organizations – 
with some of it, however, being used to fund some activities designed specifically 
according to the workers’ needs – the category of “consumable goods” 
exemplifies one way in which the Joint Body at Paso Alto has sought to give a 
more direct benefit to workers, this is, producing an impact in the form of indirect 
wage. What they did was to create a program for employees that focused on 
nutrition. They hired a nutritionist that first interviewed workers in order to get an 
idea of their alimentary habits, their family structures and routines, among other 
things, in order to develop a plan describing what a healthy and balanced diet 
would require. This plan was used as a source from which to create a “basket of 
healthy products” which was given to each of the 65 permanent workers. Since the 
standard does not allow the Premium to be divided among workers in cash or kind, 
the strategy followed here was to frame this benefit within a wider 
educational/health concern, as the manager of Paso Alto and member of the joint 
body explains: “the objective of this basket is a balanced nutrition, to give some 
tools for a better nutrition of the family and that obviously results, we won’t talk 
about everything it results in… it’s an economic help, it’s in the edge of what it 
should be done with that money, but it is also understood that there’s a nutritional 
project, of integral health… you need to give them elements to eat better and not 
everyone has access to that”  (Interview AFT3). Roberto, member of the Joint 
Body of Finca Alentejo, describes how they have also joined this trend of 
interpreting the Premium as a form of indirect wage. While they initially had 
understood that the money had to be mandatorily used for opening up to the 
community, a better explanation of the possibilities by the FLO representatives led 
them to think about ways in which they could receive a “more direct” benefit. At 
the time of our interview, they were considering the possibility of covering the 
costs of visiting a dentist and associated treatments for those temporary workers 
that were not permanently covered by medical insurance or those other ones who 
were not fully covered by their current ones. While this was one possibility among 
others, Roberto has no doubts about the main criteria for making a final decision: 
“to produce a saving in some other way” (Interview AFT26). 
As a conclusion, it can be said that in the case of HL situations the Premium was 
initially used exclusively as a source to finance opening up to the community 
activities. However, with time and increasing experiences, workers have begun to 
find ways in which to use it as an indirect wage determinant.  
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A closer look at the Joint Body 
In the case of HL situations it is the Joint Body that owns and administers the 
Premium. Since such an organ is unique to the Fair Trade mode of regulation, I 
consider highly relevant to examine it more closely.  
The Joint Body is perhaps one of the most debatable institutions created by 
Fairtrade. On the one hand, it can be praised for opening a space of dialogue and 
communication between workers and management within the company. It is 
highly innovative, because it creates a unique organ – inexistent in most private 
firms -  where workers’ elected representatives take part in the discussion of what 
to do and how to administer some funds that they own collectively. The Joint 
Body undoubtedly possesses the potential of empowering workers through the 
exercise of democracy in their work place, the responsibility of administering a 
shared amount of money, the development of ways in which to identify needs, 
propose solutions, debate the best ways to achieve them, plan projects and, finally, 
evaluate them. It gives them the opportunity to  develop skills that are not usually 
learnt within a company and that can be put into use in many other situations of 
their life – this is, they are not just restricted to their functional position. A very 
interesting example took place in La Mariana. The workers of this winery had 
little tradition of labor union activity, with the aggregate that the local labor union 
(in the quite isolated region of Valle de Uco) had always been known for its 
passivity. However, the need to choose worker representatives for the Joint Body 
and their responsibility for surveying problems and needs among their represented 
ones, the discussion of these problems and possible solutions in the Joint Body, 
the need to get in touch with other relevant organizations and groups many times 
from outside the company, among other issues, led to an awareness of the 
potentialities of organizing. The most significant result of this being, at the time of 
my visit, that one of the members of La Mariana’s Joint Body – who had never 
been politically active – was running for elections against the current 
representative of the local labor union. 
On the other hand, the institution of the Joint Body can be criticized because of the 
relevant role that it gives to the representatives of the management. A very simple 
question should me raised: if the Fairtrade Premium belongs to the workers, why 
are they to discuss their use with the management? Fairtrade International would 
probably argue that, in the first place, no decisions can be made without the 
consent of the majority of workers, that the management representatives are 
always a minority and that, since February 2014, they do not even have voting 
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rights. However, my same question would persist: why would there be a need for 
workers to discuss with the management? Fairtrade International seems to quite 
naively suppose that their formal rules about voting rights and representation 
proportions might guarantee the independence of workers. However, it would also 
be fair to discuss how independent the decisions of workers could be when they 
are to discuss and justify them to their bosses. Can there be symmetry within this 
organ, when symmetry does not exist in the day-to-day work? Up to which point is 
the lack of voting rights of the management enough to secure the autonomy of 
workers in making decisions? How do we know that a person whose orders are not 
discussed when it comes to the productive process would inflict no intimidation on 
her/his daily subordinates? Fairtrade seems to assume – in quite a liberal fashion – 
that all individuals comprised in the Joint Body are the same, and that the rules of 
its composition and procedures guarantee the autonomy and independence of 
workers; an ambitious set of assumptions that shall quickly blush when we 
confront them with the actual social relations that managers and workers have in 
the productive process. 
And still, one more question would remain relevant: why would the management 
be in a better position – or in any kind of position – to give opinions about what 
the workers’ needs are and what they could do with their own money? This leads 
us to the criticism of what could be described as the paternalist view that Fairtrade 
(and actors within the Fairtrade system) have of the dynamics and roles within the 
Joint Body. According to the Fairtrade standard for HL situations and its 
explaining documents, the management “is an important partner in the 
development of the Joint Body and Fairtrade Premium projects” (Fairtrade 
Labelling Organizations International, 2007a:7). This is due to the fact that 
workers are assumed not to have the capacity to face these activities by themselves 
and, therefore, need guidance – at least initially – from those who possess more 
skills. The asymmetry between the boss and the worker that takes place in the 
domain of the workplace is reproduced within the Joint Body, with the most 
powerful actor being in charge of facilitating, guiding, advising, encouraging, 
supporting, providing critical feedback and questions, transferring knowledge and 
training, assuring documentation and compliance to the standard, etc. But this 
superiority of the management is not only linked to the more bureaucratic 
dimension of setting up an organization, running it, keep it working; it is also 
assumed to be of relevance in the processes of identifying (the workers’) needs 
and proposing ways of satisfying them: “developing ideas and concrete plans for 
how to use the Fairtrade Premium can often be a challenge for the Joint Body and 
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the workers. Management often plays a key role in the early stages of this process. 
Management should guide and advise the Joint Body on suitable projects” 
(Ibid:8). This paternalist view of the management-workers relation in the joint 
body is omnipresent in the speech of all categories of actors. Julie, the FLO 
representative, highlights the specificity of the case of the wine industry because 
within their Joint Bodies there are people with all levels of education – from 
engineers to vineyard workers – and therefore more knowledge might exist, but 
then she refers to cases where such a plurality does not exist  and members of the 
Joint Body “demand from the company a lot, to support them [workers] in this, it 
is the duty of the company to support all the first period, to help with all this 
internal knowledge” (Interview AFT1). And still within the official Fairtrade 
sphere, Florencia explains that “the figure of the direction is like very important, 
because otherwise they [workers] don’t get to organize themselves (…) You have 
to think that they are not well-prepared people either, they are people that… not all 
have participated in social things or in their kid’s schools, that don’t know what 
their interests are” (Interview AFT30). The same kind of arguments can be – less 
surprisingly – found among managers and owners of the wineries. Manuel, one of 
the owners of Finca Alentejo highlights his role: “how to do it, how to set up the 
Joint Body, all that… I ended up doing it from the direction’s side and not from 
the employee’s side” (Interview AFT25). Pablo, one of the owners and manager of 
Ecowine talks about how difficult has been for workers to apprehend the logic 
around the Joint Body “it’s difficult, it’s not easy. It’s not easy because it’s not 
people with education, they are people that maybe never went to Mendoza city, 
and they are at 150 km from there. Imagine those people, who always lived in the 
same place, with a minimum and don’t want more and they are fine and that’s it” 
(Interview AFT20). As a last example of how managers reinforce the paternalist 
view already withheld by Fairtrade (or other way round) a quote by a manager 
from Bodega Medrano: 
It was difficult to make them understand, because it’s rural people, of low resources, 
some don’t know how to read or write, so it was complicated. It was also very 
complicated to make projects because many projects we had to make them directly, 
looking for the needs they had or make them completely… but letting them alone to 
make the projects was difficult because not all have the capacity and not all have 
gone to school or have finished it, not even to mention university studies. Then, it 
was very difficult for them to formulate these projects and all that, so it required a 
person from the company to be looking after everything (Interview AFT12).  
While the fact that managers held this views on workers’ abilities and capacities 
might not be surprising considering the overall position of superiority and 
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dominance they have in the productive structure, what appears to be more 
worrying is the fact that the paternalist view of the interaction in the Joint Body 
promoted by Fairtrade has also been internalized by the workers, as the winery 
worker and president of Paso Alto’s Joint Body, exemplifies: “every step we take, 
we make the decisions, but once we have made the decision, we discuss it with 
him [the manager] and he gives us advice on whether we are right or not, because 
we cannot get off the path, because if we do so, we can lose the certification” 
(Interview AFT4).  
If Fair Trade is to actually foster worker’s empowerment, it should seriously 
reconsider the presence of management representatives in its Joint Body. While 
the creation of this institution should be welcome as a positive innovation that 
might lead workers to adopt a more active role and develop new forms of 
organization, it’s current constitution seems to undermine this potential. The 
presence of management in the Joint Body and the leading role that Fairtrade 
expects it to have appears to be reproducing within this institution the same 
hierarchies and prejudices already present in the relations of production.  
All in all, this section has analyzed the main elements that Fair Trade introduces in 
relation to wage determinants. It was first shown that Fair Trade’s conditions for 
the definition of a “fair wage” are given by its prioritization of the legal minimum 
wage over a real living wage. As a consequence, Fair Trade legitimizes with the 
status of fairness those companies that simply pay legal wages in spite of its actual 
purchase power. The second part of this section analyzed the Fairtrade Premium 
and the effects it produces in different types of organizations. In the case of SPOs 
the Premium provides an extra profit for producers and functions as a direct wage 
determinant for contratistas. Additionally, some of the uses it is given can be 
considered as forms of indirect determinants for both, producers and workers. In 
the case of HL, instead, the Premium used to play no significant role in relation to 
wages, but it is increasingly being used as a form of indirect wage determinant. 
Lastly, a closer look at the Joint Body showed that its current structuration may 
undermine the empowerment it is expected to produce among workers in HL 
situations. For a synthetic overview, see Table 6.  
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Table 6 
InstitutionalForms ConventionalModeofRegulation FairTradeModeofRegulation
Inthestandards Inpractice
Wage
Relation
Work
conditions
Flexibilizationofworkrelationsandincreasein
contractwork

Mostconditionsdefinedbysectoralcollective
bargainagreement(CBA)


 Mostworkingconditionsareset
accordingtostateorsectoralregulation;
minimumthresholdsaredefinedforsome
aspects
Mostorganizationsalreadyfulfill
regulationsrequiredbythestateor
sectoralregulatorybodies

Incaseswherethestandardismore
demanding,manyexceptionshave
beengranted
Wage
determinants
Directwages:determinedbyCBA

Indirectwages:partlydeterminedbyCBAand
thestate
Directandindirectwages:determined
bystateofCBA

FairtradePremium
Directandindirectwages:
determinedbyCBAand/orthesate

FairtradePremium:
*indirectwage(hiredlabor)
*direct“wage”/profit(small
producerorganizations)
Competition
Priceformation
Internalmarket:mostlydeterminedbyan
oligopsonisticstructure

Worldmarket:closerto‘perfect’competition
 Semiadministeredprocessofprice
formation(minimumprice+premium).
Weakenedbyirrelevanceof
minimumprice
Formof
competition
Internalmarket:oligopsonisticcompetition

Worldmarket:pricebasedcompetitionwithin
differentiatedqualities
Internalmarket:n/a(verysmallmarket
forfairtradewine)

Worldmarket:elementof‘ethical’
addedvalue.
Internalmarket:n/a


Worldmarket:pricestillplaysan
importantroleincompetition
betweendifferentFairTradewine
origins
Money
Systemof
payments
Informalagreements



Wagelike(12installments),especiallyforlow
qualitygrapessupplyandsupplytocooperatives;
fewerinstallmentsforhigherquality
 Longtermrelationshipsbasedintheuse
ofcontractsandsourcingplans(tobe
confirmedatleastthreemonthsbefore
harvest).

Nomorethan30daystopayafterthe
invoice’sdate.
Nolongtermrelationships;flexible
applicationof3monthnotice



Veryflexibleapplicationofrules,
paymentsrarelydonewithin30days

Credits
Limitedpossibilityofcreditforinvestment

Harvestandhaulageadvancepaymentsystem
(bybuyers)
 Prefinanceofupto60%ofthetotal
contract
Littleuseofprefinance,only
conventionaloptionsapplied
State
Rulemaking
role
Widermacroeconomicregulationbynational
state

Sectorlevelregulations,mostlybyprovincial,
sectoralandhybridinstitutions
Nationalstateastheparameterformany
aspectsofthestandard

Incaseofcontradictionbetweenstate
regulationsandtheFairTradestandard,
themostdemandingapplies
Flexibilityinfavor ofcompaniesby
FairtradeInternationalincaseswhere
stateregulationsandFairTrade
standardscontradicteachother
Asanactor
Muchlessinvolvedthanintheperiodpre1980

Attheprovinciallevel:possibilityofproviding
credit,buyingwine

Emergenceofhybrid(private/public)
institutions
Thestateisnotgivenanyroleasan
actorintheFairTradestandard

Potentiallyimportantincreating
demand(e.g.statemonopoliesin
importmarkets)

NoinvolvementbytheArgentinean
state.

Exploratoryinterestbylocal
governmentinafewprovinces
Representationoftheproduct
Dominanceofaquantitybasedrepresentation
intheinternalmarket,thoughlosinggroundtoa
qualitybasedone.

Dominanceofaquantitybasedrepresentation
intheinternationalmarket.
 Anyproductthatisproducedand
commercializedaccordingtoFLO’s
standards.

Compositeproductsneedtosourceall
possibleingredientsfromFairTrade
producers.However,aoneingredient
policyappliestocertainproductswithin
Fairtradesourcingprograms.
Theincreasingimportanceofquality
inrelationtoFairTradeandits
dominanceintheinternationalwine
markethaveprivilegedthequality
basedrepresentationofwine,de
factoexcludingtablewinefromFair
Trade.

InternationalInsertion
Mainoptionforthedominantregimeof
accumulation.


Facingdifficultiesduetointernalinflation,fixed
exchangeratesandpricesensitivedemand.
 Historically,FairTradegoodswere
mainlyproducedintheSouthand
consumedintheNorth

Inthelastyears,effortstodevelop
domesticmarketsforFairTradeproducts
intheSouth
FairTradewineisexclusively
producedfortheexportmarket
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2.2 Money 
Fair Trade, being a non-state initiative, has clearly no impact on the macro-
institutional conditions that make the money form possible. Therefore, it is playing 
within an already settled structural form. However, the definition provided in my 
conceptual framework of a monetary regime as the set of rules that organize and 
structure the system of payments and credits signals some important aspects in 
which Fair Trade could be of relevance.  
The main instrument through which Fairtrade attempts to regulate the system of 
payments is the use of contracts. The specificities of Fair Trade contracts can be 
found in two different aspects: first, there is a temporal dimension that has to be 
accounted for, as Fair Trade aims at developing long-term relationships that 
would provide the framework for a system of payments more favorable for 
producers. Second, we should identify the specific terms and conditions that apply 
to those payments involving Fair Trade products.  The other main area of 
relevance to the money form is that of credits and pre-financing. In what follows, 
hence, I present my analysis of Fair Trade’s system of payment – by looking at the 
temporal horizon that frames it and its concrete terms and conditions – and the 
possibilities it offers for access to credit and pre-financing.
2.2.1 System of payments 
Long-term relationships 
One of the fundamentals ways in which Fairtrade International seeks to strengthen 
the position of producers and marginalized workers in international trade is 
through the establishment of long-term trading partnerships. The possibility of 
reaching agreements that go beyond a single purchase and extend over years 
appears as a critical and strategic goal in the struggle to reduce the uncertainty and 
unpredictability typical of market relations. As it is stated in official documents: 
“Fairtrade  International  seeks  to  build  transparent  and sustainable  trading  
relationships  between  Fairtrade producers  and  buyers  that  allow  for  long-term 
planning  (several  years  ahead)  and  sustainable production  practices” (Fairtrade 
International, 2011b:12). The possibility of actually achieving long-term 
partnerships that define clear features for the upcoming years – and not only the 
upcoming harvest – appears to be one of the most fundamental potential 
transformations that the Fair Trade mode of regulation could offer to the 
Argentinean wine industry. As it has been explained before, most relationships 
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between wineries and grape producers are informal, allowing any of the parts to 
step back at the last minute. Usually, grape producers do not have any guarantees 
of whom and how much they will sell until the harvest beings. Even if they can 
rely in keeping previous years’ buyers, the price they will receive is not agreed 
until the grapes arrive their final destination or – in those cases when the winery 
rents its facilities to the producer and then buys the wine instead of buying the 
grapes – until they have been made into wine and the final result can be evaluated.  
The possibility of signing long term contracts would therefore, in the first place, 
make official the relationship between the producer and the winery,  not leaving 
without consequences any last-minute withdrawals and, in the second place, give a 
certainty to the producer about the final price that s/he will obtain and the form in 
which it will be paid. 
According to the standards, the way in which Fairtrade attempts to do this is by 
requiring the buyer to provide the producer with a sourcing plan which, in the case 
of wine grapes “must cover each yearly harvest” and “must be renewed a 
minimum of three months before they expire” (Fairtrade International, 2013a:10). 
These sourcing plans need to contain details about future estimated purchase 
volumes, qualities, dates of delivery and prices. 
The first thing one would notice when comparing Fairtrade’s general aim of 
“sustaining trade” and the way in which it has been operationalized as a 
requirement in the standards is that their very ambitious initial expectation of 
developing long-term plans for “several years” is suddenly reduced to a yearly 
plan. And, in the case of wine grapes, this actually means the annual harvest. But 
even more, the second condition is that the minimum period for “renewing” the 
sourcing plan (meaning that, if there’s no renewal, the relationship is over) is of 
three months in advance. Therefore, simply by reading the standard – and not 
getting into the details of how it actually works, this means that producers need to 
receive a sourcing plan with all the details of the transaction at least three months 
before the delivery date – i.e. the harvest. We can look at this in two ways, on the 
one hand, as a drastic reduction in the expectations of Fairtrade, who does not 
require buyers to provide sourcing plans covering several years but, simply, a 
three-months in advance sourcing plan for the year’s harvest, which implies no 
commitments for the future. On the other hand, from a more pragmatic point of 
view, one could say that even though signing a contract three months in advance 
might be far from Fairtrade’s original goals, it is still a big improvement for an 
industry where contracts virtually do not exist and producers are selling their 
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production – many times – without certainties about the price they will get and 
how they will be paid. 
We could place Eduardo’s position –the president of Uvasol – within this second 
group. Even though he says that the agreements on prices and quantities with their 
buyers have usually taken place “one or two months before the harvest” (so, we 
are not anymore talking about several years or three months, but just two, maybe 
one month in advance), he considers this to be already a success because “what the 
struggle is about here in Mendoza is to have the possibility of agreeing on the 
price before the harvest (…) A protection to say ‘well, I am satisfied with this, I 
know I can make it through the year, period. (…) That’s the relief that Fair Trade 
gives you” (Interview AFT11).  
However, when we see this same process from the point of view of one of 
Eduardo’s buyers – Tres Vientos, which was actually his only certified buyer of 
2013 – that relief does not seem to allow for much more peace than the ordinary 
market. Nicolás, Fairtrade officer for Tres Vientos, begins by explaining how the 
ordinary market for grapes looks like in Mendoza “here, the grape market or the 
must market or whatever fluctuates every year, it depends on the quality of the 
harvest, making it very difficult to agree on  the price of the grape in February, 
when the harvest takes place two months later (…) a normal contract, non-Fair 
Trade, you conclude it here [the winery] at the moment in which I’m bringing you 
the grapes” (Interview AFT7). Then, Nicolás moves on to explaining that this 
commercial conditions are the direct consequence of the product’s characteristics 
(the uncertainty about the final quality of the grape) and therefore, even if the 
grape might be Fair Trade, it does not change these intrinsic limitations: “Fair 
Trade requires something different, it requires the price to be fixed in advance, 
with a long-term contract and a higher minimum price. How do you do this? It’s 
the same, even if they are Fair Trade grapes, they are exposed to the same 
conditions as normal grapes” (Interview AFT7 ). The solution that Tres Vientos 
has agreed with Fairtrade is, as many of the disagreements between companies and 
Fairtrade International have been resolved, a flexibilization of the requirements. A 
flexibilization that stretches so much the original intention of the standard that, at 
the end of the day, makes it possible for the observer to question how relevant the 
benefits obtained actually are: 
What we do is a pre-contact guaranteed by FLO’s auditory, a pre-contract with the 
producer is concluded in which you say ‘how’s the harvest looking like?’, ‘well… it 
looks as if it would be like this, this and that’. Well, we agree on the minimum price 
that we are required. At the end, it might be still the same price, as it can be also a 
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bit higher, but we make this pre-contract for the producer not to worry. Then, when 
the moment of the final price has come, we respect the terms in that pre-contract but 
we set the definitive price at which you will actually pay for the grape (Interview 
AFT7).  
I will go much more in detail about Fairtrade’s minimum price and its relevance in 
the Argentinean wine industry when I focus on the process of price formation 
under the “competition” structural form. However, what matters here is to mention 
that the current Fairtrade minimum price for wine grapes in Argentina is 
enormously outdated, being set at a level that is well under the conventional 
market’s price and, therefore, offers the producers no guarantees. Once again, we 
could have two views on the process that Nicolás describes: on the one hand, we 
could say that it offers some benefits such as, at least, an agreement based on a 
minimum price (even though it’s outdated) and the formalization of the relation. 
However, it could also be criticized not only for not living up to Fairtrade’s initial 
aim, but also for not producing a major change: the price that it guarantees is a 
price that is irrelevant to today’s industry, therefore, the producer is neither being 
guaranteed a fair price, nor an acceptable price. In terms of long term partnerships, 
we see that Fairtrade requires no commitment from the buyers, limiting the 
contract to a single harvest and nothing more than that. Uvasol has experienced 
the consequences of this, with only one longer-term buyer (8 consecutive years, 
though, suddenly, with no purchases during 2013), another that has bought for the 
last 4 years, but then, 3 more buyers that have bought only one or two years. 
This impossibility to assure longer trading relations, and an accompanying stable 
system of payments as a consequence, becomes also a problem when it comes to 
Premium payments.  At Bodega Medrano, for example, the last two years have 
seen drastic reductions in their Premium incomes, producing a discouraging 
situation for workers, who were used to planning bigger projects but at the time of 
my fieldwork were considering whether it was worthy investing the money they 
had or waiting until they collected a more important amount. Chino, a contratista 
at Uvasol, expresses his feelings on this issue: “the first year I got in, I got a 
subsidy that was of 4,000 pesos, which I used to finish my house. That’s now 
there, finished. And now, this year, it has gotten a bit more complicated, the 
subsidy has been lower. And now we are a bit tight, it’s not the same anymore. 
Now we’ll see what happens next year, we’ll see if we are lucky enough to get a 
better subsidy. Let’s pray it happens (interview AFT9). The consequence of 
Fairtrade’s unsuccessful attempt to build stable trading relations and a foreseeable 
structure of payments, hence, affects not only the organization of productive 
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activities, but also those activities related to the Premium. The uncertainty about 
the frequency and volume of Premium inflows, makes it very difficult for 
producers and workers to make projects for the middle-term.   
While the situation of the sourcing plan and predictability allows for some 
discussion when it comes to certified grapes, the case of wine exports can be 
analyzed much more simply. The described objective and/or its operationalization 
in the standard do not apply. And this is something that has been unanimously 
acknowledged by all wineries: when it comes to exporting their Fair Trade 
products the conditions and processes are exactly the same as in the conventional 
market. There is nothing like a sourcing plan, it is business as usual. Therefore, 
while a winery is expected by Fairtrade to fulfill their criteria at the moment of 
buying grapes, their importers do not work under these constrictions. Gabriela, 
one of the owners of Bodega Fabretti has bitterly experienced this:  
Wal-Mart did that to me. They stopped from one day to the other and I was left with 
all the stock here. They wanted me to produce Cabernet, I produced cabernet, I had 
FLO to change the definition [of what a small producer was, in order to include 
Cabernet Sauvignon producers], I did everything, here’s the cabernet. They bought 
two containers, ‘we don’t want cabernet’ anymore. Thank God now Sweden is 
taking it. But I tell you, it’s a big issue and the production is not elastic. Wine 
production is not elastic. It has its own time (Interview AFT14). 
Wineries, certified as Fairtrade producers, do not receive any of the benefits in 
relation to stability in trade that Fairtrade so much promotes and, as Gabriela 
highlights, this becomes much more of a problem in the wine market, where the 
possibility of developing a product for a client might take many years and, at the 
end of the day, it is a risk that the producer has to assume on its own.  
Pablo from Ecowine has faced similar issues: “they [FLO] don’t demand much 
from the importer. It happened to us. We sold to an importer in the United States 
two pallets and the guy never bought from us again” (interview AFT20). 
According to the official documents  “along  with  the  required  sourcing  plan, 
Fairtrade  International  encourages  buyers  and producers to regularly exchange 
information (on prices, market, etc.) and buyers to offer additional support in 
training or risk management to Fairtrade producers” (Fairtrade International 
2011b). What, according to Gabriela’s experience, does not seem to be actually 
controlled by FLO “when you tell them [big importers]: how much are you going 
to buy from me? How are you planning to sell? What happened? How is it 
working? They don’t answer. So, there’s much ado about Fair Trade, but… there’s 
no feedback, there’s not a joint work” (Interview AFT14). This leads to the 
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conclusion that Fairtrade’s aim of developing long-term partnerships varies along 
the chain: being non-existent at the level of importers and being (quite flexibly) 
regulated at the level of the winery and grape producers. The main problem of this 
being that if importers do not provide long-term source plans to wineries, then it 
becomes also more difficult for wineries to do the same with their grape providers. 
Richard from Mendoza Wines complains about this heterogeneous requirements 
along the chain, when, right after pointing out that Fairtrade is not very demanding 
with importers, he adds “yes, it’s a chain, it begins by the other side and finishes 
with the producer (…) If they [importers] find someone with a lower price, 
goodbye, they forgot about us, the business we have, the project, everything” 
(Interview AFT27). At the end of the day, stability, foreseeability and stable 
trading relations do not seem to happen in the case under analysis. 
Terms and conditions 
In this subsection, I will now look at the specific way in which this mode of 
regulation seeks to change the requirements of a Fair Trade payment. The generic 
standard for Traders sets a maximum of 30 days after the invoice’s date in order to 
pay the Fairtrade minimum price and the Fairtrade Premium, leaving to the 
particular product standards the possibility of changing the rule. In the case of the 
Fresh Fruit standard, we find that “if the fruit is accepted by the importer after 
inspection in the port of destination, payment must be made within seven days of 
the arrival of the shipment at the destination”, while in the case of purchases made 
at farm gate or ex works levels “payments must be made upon receipt of the 
product” (Fairtrade International, 2013a). In the case of wine grapes an exception 
is allowed in those cases involving producers, conveyors and Fairtrade payers, 
giving the conveyor up to 30 days from the moment when they receive the 
payment from the Fairtrade payer. 
The possibility of being paid at the moment of delivering the harvested grape 
would be a dramatic change for producers in Argentina compared to the industry’s 
normal way of working, where it is quite common to pay producers in up to 12 
monthly instalments. This happens, for example, with the sales of bulk wine in the 
case of the second-level non-certified cooperative of FECOVITA, whose general 
secretary explains that once the price is agreed with its members, they sign a 
contract and the payment is made in 12 instalments (interview AC15). However, 
as in the case of contracts, Fairtrade does not seem to be delivering its full 
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potential. The president of Uvasol, again in this case, prefers to look at the bright 
side of the situation: “the deadlines, they are fine, maybe in the case of grapes they 
have been made in up to six payments, six payments. In this case, Fairtrade says it 
should be paid in cash, but talking about six payments in the sale of grapes is, 
compared to the other transactions, is to say that that you are being benefited up to 
more than a 50% in comparison to other transactions ” (Interview AFT11). The 
only two buyers of certified grapes from Uvasol confirm this flexibilization of the 
rule. Nicolás from Tres Vientos, for example, is not aware of the requirement to 
pay in cash and assumes that they have up to 30 days to pay for the grapes after 
they are received at the winery “that [the conditions of payment] depends on each 
company and each contract, the way of payment with grape producers or suppliers 
are agreed with the supplier and it’s done at the moment of the contract. There are 
suppliers that get paid in 30, 60 or 90 days, it all depends on the relationships with 
the supplier also. For that, Fairtrade requires you a much shorter payment, faster, 
if I’m not mistaken it’s of 30 days” (Interview AFT7).  María Laura, instead, 
explains that at Bodega Fabretti they are aware of this requirement, but since it is 
not economically feasible, they have negotiated the terms with Fairtrade: 
With time we’ve been trying to cope with it [the requirement] and also to make 
Fairtrade understand. Because, what happens, we say: ‘yes, this is what you require 
from me, but the truth is that in Mendoza the grape is paid in 12 instalments’. We 
cannot pay in cash because – besides the fact that the other wineries would kill us – 
we don’t have the financial capacity. I’m still selling some wines produced in 2006. 
Hence, I’m still recouping investments from those times. Then what, let’s negotiate, 
guys. They allow me a maximum of 6 months for the bigger vineyards, the other 
ones up to 2, 3 or 4 months according to the year (Interview AFT8).  
However, María Laura also highlights that Fairtrade is less flexible in terms of 
Premium payments, which can only be done within a maximum period of 30 days, 
having to pay interests if they are late.  
Interestingly enough, these conditions for grape trade only apply for the payments 
made by a Fairtrade buyer to a Fairtrade producer, not being applicable to the 
transactions taking place within a certified organization. This is the case of the 
cooperative La Chileciteña which, now certified as SPO, continues to pay for the 
production of its members in 12 instalments, without receiving any objections 
from Fairtrade International. This situation is acknowledged both at the 
managerial and producer level: “we harvest, right? The grape comes here [the 
winery] and we are being paid in June, until June we’ve been being paid for last 
year’s grape. From June to June. Each month one accreditation. And then in July 
we start being paid for this year’s grape” (Interview AFT17). It would be 
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interesting to know why the criteria that are (quite flexibly) applied to transactions 
between a certified organization and a buyer are not required to take place within 
the certified organization itself. This is particularly relevant in the case of 
cooperatives, where members do not sell their production directly to the Fairtrade 
buyer but to the cooperative, who is entitled to receive the Fairtrade benefits as an 
organization.
Lastly, it is worth highlighting that, as it was the case with long-term relations, 
Fairtrade seems to be concerned about the sale and purchase of certified grape, but 
not the export of wine itself, since importers just make the payments in the 
conventional way, as María Laura complains about: “supposedly, in order to make 
certified wine, a certified product, the whole chain has to be certified and audited. 
But what we notice as a winery is that the commercial requirements that we have 
to meet are not required at the level of importers” (Interview AFT8), bringing in 
again the issue of the heterogeneous level of compliance and control among the 
different actors in the chain.  
All in all, Fairtrade states in its standards the goal of transforming the system of 
payments through the enforcement of contractual relations with requirements that 
do not exist in the local industry or the international market. This is to be done by 
framing trading relationships within long-term partnerships and transforming the 
conditions of payments in favor of producers. Such a goal entails an enormous 
transformation for the Argentinean wine sector, since the lack of contractual 
relations puts producers in a precarious situation. Furthermore, Fairtrade’s 
requirement of paying for the purchased production in cash could be described as 
quasi-revolutionary in an industry where grape producers are paid in 12 
instalments. However, as the analysis has shown, the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation has failed to deliver these important transformations. Both in terms of 
the construction of long-term relationships and the transformation of the terms and 
conditions of payments, Fairtrade ends up capitulating to the industry’s 
conventional logic, either by giving up its goals (as it is the case of long-term 
relations) or relaxing its requirements (as in the case of the terms of payment).   
2.2.2 Credits and pre-financing 
The last relevant dimension for the money form in which Fairtrade attempts to 
bring some innovation is through the creation of opportunities for credit. Presented 
under the figure of pre-finance, it is described as “one of the core benefits for 
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producers within the Fairtrade system” (Fairtrade International, 2013b:14). The 
goal behind it is to “help producers gain access to reasonable forms of financial 
assistance so that – in the case of small producer organizations for example – they 
can easily buy the product from their members”. The Fairtrade standards give 
producers the possibility to demand up to 60% of the total contract as pre-finance, 
with the buyer being obliged to provide it at least 6 weeks before the shipment of 
the products. The buyer has the right to charge interests, however, these cannot 
exceed the buyer’s cost of borrowing.  While, as a general rule, the buyer must 
provide the pre-finance if requested by the producer, an exception might be 
granted for those cases when “a high risk exists that a certain producers’ 
organization will not be able to deliver products or repay loans” (Fairtrade 
International, 2011b:13). By trying to secure the buyer’s economic interest in this 
way, Fairtrade puts at risk the access to credit of those poorer or more 
disadvantaged producers, who are precisely the ones more prone to be found 
insolvent.  
This possibility of access to credit for producers has to be welcome as a 
reinforcement of their position – though the potential exclusion of “risky” debtors 
would require a deeper examination of the ways in which it has been applied. In 
the case that concerns us, however, it has had no impact. On the one hand, because 
wineries, once more, do not make use of this possibility when exporting. When 
asked about whether they had required pre-finance most of them agreed on the fact 
that they did not even consider the possibility. Probably because, as it has been 
showed up to now, most of the conditions for international trade of Fair Trade 
Argentinean wine seem to be the same as in the case of conventional wine (except 
for the Fairtrade premium), not making it expectable to demand extra conditions 
on top of that. On the other hand, and looking now at the case of grape producers, 
because the Argentinean wine industry already has a somewhat similar figure 
known locally as “harvest and haulage advance payment”. This is usually agreed 
between the producer and the buyer and the total amount is decided according to 
an estimation of how much would the producer need in order to secure the harvest 
and transport of the agreed commodities. Unlike Fairtrade’s pre-finance there is no 
interest involved, as money is just discounted from the final payment. However, it 
never reaches such important proportions as Fairtrade’s pre-finance does. Eduardo 
from Uvasol chooses to focus on the potential benefits of the standard, though he 
has not actually experienced them: “For example, in my case, I have asked Tres 
Vientos for harvest advance payments. Which, let’s see, normally wineries also 
give it to you, because it’s a producer’s need, but I have never asked more than 
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what I have needed, as a mean of self-regulation. But if one wanted, in case of an 
eventuality, you can ask for up to 70% [sic] of what would have corresponded 
according to the previous year’s sale” (Interview AFT11).  In this way, Eduardo 
acknowledges the importance of such a possibility but, at the same time, explains 
that he has not made use of it and, instead, has continued operating within the 
conventional pre-financing arrangements.  María Laura, intermediary between 
Uvasol and Bodega Fabretti, supports this view:  
The pre-finance was left a bit… a way in which is done here at the level of Mendoza 
that is called harvest and haulage. It is estimated if the producer requests it, but it’s 
never of 60%. We estimate, well, the token32 costs so many pesos, it’s so many 
kilos, we estimate it. Plus, a journey with a truck costs 300 pesos, three journeys I 
don’t know, and they are given so they have something, the ones that don’t have the 
capacity to finance the harvest (…) We have never done, as it says, the 60% of the 
grape. We have not either asked for it or received the offer by the importers 
(Interview AFT8).  
What these views would seem to show is that whenever the standards do not make 
some regulations mandatory – pre-finance is an option, not an obligation – actors 
just stick to conventional institutions. In the previous chapter, it was stated that 
credit opportunities are very scarce for small producers. However, even though 
Fair Trade’s pre-financing offers a good opportunity for producers to access forms 
of credit that go beyond the usual – and limited - harvest and haulage advance 
payment, none of them uses it, preferring to rely on conventional arrangements.  
All in all, what this section has shown is the fact that whenever the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation offers benefits that directly clash with the conventional one – 
pre-financing, long term contracts, better payment conditions –, they are very 
difficult to implement. Long-term relationships and in cash payments within 30 
days, explicitly stated in the standards, are ignored and relativized respectively in 
favor of the most powerful actors. Pre-financing, which does not constitute an 
obligation but an option at the disposal of producers, is simply ignored by its 
potential beneficiaries. As a consequence, both the system of payments and credit 
opportunities that constitute the Fair Trade money form end up differing very 
modestly from the conventional structural form. For a synthetic overview, see 
Table 6. 

32Duringtheperiodofharvest,workersaregivenatokenforeachbucketfullofgrapes.Attheendoftheharvest,
theyexchangethetokensformoney.
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2.3 Competition 
The discussion of the competition structural form will be done by looking at two 
of its most relevant aspects: in the first place, I will focus on the price formation
processes involved in Fair Trade, while, in the second place, I will describe how 
Fair Trade affects the logic of competition, this is, the way in which different 
centers of accumulation organize their relations. 
2.3.1 Price formation 
The most innovative feature of Fair Trade in regards to the process of price 
formation – and, in my view, the most interesting arrangement put forward by this 
mode of regulation – is the settlement of a minimum price for certified products. 
Fairtrade International presents it as one of its key tools: “Fairtrade hopes to 
achieve economic development by a number of means. Increased sales of products 
will be one thing. The fact that these sales are at or above a minimum price which 
should cover the cost of production is another” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International, 2006:7). What Fairtrade International does is to estimate the costs of 
what they term sustainable production – this is, how much it costs to produce in 
the way that the standards demand – and add to that a margin for investments and 
a margin for profits, obtaining at the end a minimum price under which no 
agreement can be achieved. In cases of organic production, a higher price is 
determined.  Its main goal is to protect producers from sharp drops in the 
international price of their commodities. In cases when prices at the conventional 
market rise above the Fairtrade minimum price, the buyer has to pay the higher 
value. In this way, the producer is to be protected from unsustainable levels of 
income and, at the same time, will preserve the possibility of accessing the 
potential advantageous conditions that the market might offer at certain points. It 
is worth highlighting that in the case of SPOs this minimum price is defined at the 
level of the organization and not of the individual producers.  
In the case that concerns us, there is a minimum price for the kilogram of wine 
grapes from South America currently set at 0.25 euros (in between 1.86 and 2.17 
pesos during my fieldwork) in the case of conventional production and 0.30 euros 
(between 2.23 and 2.61 pesos) in the case of organic production. However, this 
applies to grapes, making it necessary for those that commercialize wine to define 
an alternative parameter. This is particularly relevant for the case of Argentina, 
where many Fair Trade wine producers are vertically integrated and therefore do 
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not commercialize any grapes, but wine. In those cases, the standard for traders 
clarifies what to do: “if a producer processes an agricultural product himself and 
sells this product, then the producer and the buyer must negotiate the price of the 
final product. This negotiated price must cover at least the Fairtrade minimum 
price of all Fairtrade inputs and the processing costs. The Fairtrade premium 
comes on top of the negotiated price and amounts to the Premiums of all inputs” 
(Fairtrade International, 2013b:18). This shows that there is not actually a 
minimum price for wine in itself. Instead, the only requirement is that the price at 
which certified wine is sold should be high enough in order to cover the grape’s 
minimum price.   
At this point, it is clear how Fairtrade prices are formed: they consist of a 
mandatory Premium and, when applicable, a non-market based minimum price. 
Both the Premium and the minimum price are defined by Fairtrade International, 
and are therefore not subject to discussion by economic actors. While the Premium 
is without exception defined in this way, the minimum price might be applicable 
or not according to market conditions: if the market price is under the minimum 
price, the latter is used, but in the opposite situation, it is the former one that 
applies. However, there is not a minimum price for every single product: for 
example, at the moment of writing, cane sugar, some herbs and spices, flowers and 
sports balls do not have a minimum price. In those cases “the relevant market or 
negotiated price has to be paid” (Fairtrade International, 2011b:15). Consequently, 
it is not possible to affirm that Fairtrade prices are universally composed by a 
minimum price (or a higher market prices, when applicable) plus a Premium, since 
some products would just rely on the market price (without discussion on whether 
it is sustainable or not) plus a premium. 
All in all, the regulation of prices in the Fair Trade mode of regulation can be 
described as semi-administered, where a minimum price and the payment of a 
premium is established by an authority (Fairtrade international) but market-based 
definition of prices become mandatory when they are higher than the minimum 
price or in those cases where a minimum price has not been defined.  
As it is explained in the standard, Fair Trade prices in the Argentinean wine 
industry vary according to the product: they consist of a minimum price (or the 
market price, when higher) plus a premium in the case of grapes, but only of a 
premium (on top of the negotiated price) in the case of wine. The possibility of 
having a minimum price is more than welcomed by (especially small) grape 
producers in Argentina since, as it has been explained before, this industry has 
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historically suffered crisis of over production, pulling prices down to very low 
levels. This is highlighted by the producer association of Uvasol: “the minimum 
price has something that, to me personally, was initially one of the big attractions 
of Fair Trade vis-à-vis any other kind of conventional trade. It’s the minimum that 
it’s possible to pay for that product. Then, it’s an insurance for that producer. Here 
there have been crises, not only the Greco’s33 one, some previous ones, that my 
grandmother used to tell me that they would throw the wine into the ditch, it 
wasn’t even worthy to put it in a truck to sell it as bulk wine” (Interview AFT8). 
Eduardo recognizes the uniqueness of such an institution, which would never be 
applied in the conventional market: “that’s one of the aspects that first caught my 
attention, that someone could fix a minimum price, what no one does. No winery 
would tell you… ‘the market’s price is this, whether it’s good enough for you or 
not, that’s the price’. Instead, in a period of crisis and getting a minimum price 
that is above the one being paid, well, it’s a benefit, a great tranquility” (Interview 
AFT11).  
This feature, so well received by grape producers, does not have much impact, 
nevertheless, among those that commercialize certified wine. Both, vertically 
integrated wineries and those that buy certified grapes, do not count with a 
minimum price settled by Fairtrade International and therefore negotiate the price 
of their products according to the conventional market’s conditions. As most 
managers at the certified wineries have explained, prices are decided according to 
the usual quality parameters and no differentiation is made according to whether 
the wine is sold as Fair Trade or not. The only impact in the final price paid by the 
buyer is given by the premium, but not by the existence of a minimum price, as 
Diana explains: “the price is the same one, the only thing that’s added is the 
premium, but the price is the same” (Interview AFT5).  
However, not all wineries have the same structure of costs, since those that have 
bought certified grapes from independent producers have paid a minimum price 
plus a premium, while those that are vertically integrated have not, giving Fair 
Trade a different impact when it comes to the calculation of their costs and the 
definition of the price. The former group seems to be in a more disadvantageous 
situation, since they need to offer their wines at a price (which is not regulated by 
Fairtrade) that competes with those others set by the latter group, where the impact 

33The“Grecocrisis”–namedinthiswaybecauseitwastriggeredbythedismantlementofHéctorGreco’s
speculativemodelthatshookthesectorduringthelastyearsofthe1970s–isrememberedasoneofthemajor
crisesinthewineindustry,asitproducedadropof82%inthepriceofwinebetween1979and1982.Fora
detailedaccountoftheGrecocrisissee:Mount,2012:78104.
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of producing Fair Trade certified on their costs has been smaller. While wineries 
buying certified grapes need to show in the audits that they have paid to their 
suppliers the minimum price (or above) and the Fairtrade Premium, vertically 
integrated wineries simply need to show that in the calculations they have done in 
order to determine their structures of costs grapes have been given a value that is 
not below the minimum price.  
While the minimum price should be undoubtedly welcomed as an innovative and 
important development by Fairtrade International, the truth is that in Argentina’s 
current context it has proven to be useless. The main reason for this is given by the 
country’s steady inflation (which has been growing, at least, at 25% per year 
during the last years) that has demanded a permanent update of the estimation of 
the costs of production, which FLO has been unable to do. Its representative in 
Argentina explains this:  “what doesn’t help about inflation is that we normally 
revise minimum prices every two or three years34 so that they continue tied to the 
sector faster (…) [minimum prices] are based on costs analyses, of production, 
that we do with producers here in the field, then there are delays of between 2 and 
4 years, but if in Argentina you’ve got an inflation of 25% in costs annually, 
already one third of three years is as if it was the price of two decades ago” 
(Interview AFT1). The irrelevance of the current minimum price is unanimously 
acknowledged by all actors, who simply deal with market prices that are much 
higher than the minimum price: “because of our own problems, or the country’s 
economy, well, that minimum price has been set aside, very low, in relation to that 
market price” (Interview AFT11), “the minimum price is actually very low” 
(Interview AFT5). María Laura from Uvasol confirms this and explains the 
consequences: “if we had a crisis today… the cheapest we paid during harvest 
was… we have a price range between 3.8 and 5.5 pesos,35 hence, we are very well 
above the minimum price. But if – god forbid that – a crisis breaks, it will drag us 
all, we cannot cover the current production costs with that. It needs to be updated”. 
In sum, the Fairtrade minimum price has been of no use in the Argentinean wine 
industry: in the case of wine, because it does not apply, and in the case of grapes, 
because it is so outdated that it does not represent the costs of a sustainable 
production anymore. Having the minimum price out the equation, prices are 
purely determined by conventional mechanisms and, once the buyer and the seller 
reach an agreement, the mandatory premium is added.  

34Theminimumpriceapplicableatthetimeofmyfieldwork(AugustDecember2013)wasactuallyestablishedon
31March2010)
35Theminimumprice,atthetimeoftheinterview,wasof1.91pesos.
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The Premium, the second administered element in the process of price formation, 
is decided by Fairtrade at a minimum, leaving it to the seller and buyer to agree on 
a higher level. Since the premium is set at 0.05 euros per kilo of grape, it does not 
depend on the actual price at which grapes or wine are sold (which would be 
closely related to the quality and supply/demand conditions) but on the quantity of 
the production that is traded. In the case of SPOs both the entity selling the final 
product and receiving the premium coincide, making it easier to agree on a 
strategy that promotes the accumulation of higher premiums. However, the 
situation is different in the case of HL situations. Here, instead, it is the company 
that sells the final product (in this case, bottled fine wine) and makes a profit out 
of it, while it is the Joint Body (representing workers) that received the premium. 
This means that profits benefit one actor – the company – and the Premium a 
different one – workers – making it more difficult to reach a mutually beneficial 
path. Why? As the company obtains no benefits from the Premium, it appears to 
the management only as an extra cost for the buyer. Increasing the premium would 
only mean increasing the price, making the product less competitive and, 
therefore, reducing sales, eliminating any motivation for the company to negotiate 
higher premium levels. If according to this, we accept the fact that the levels of 
premium will, most probably, remain at the minimum dictated by Fairtrade, the 
only possible strategy for achieving higher amounts of premium would be to sell 
more bottles (since the premium is agreed individually on each of them). 
However, the current wine export-oriented industry is not based on selling 
quantity, but quality. This means that the tendency is not so much towards selling 
great volumes of wine, but a less impressive number of bottles with higher 
individual prices. In this way, the possibilities of increasing premiums appear also 
to be curtailed. And if we take into account that the premium is the same for every 
kind of grape, we can see that it will differently impact on wines of different 
quality/prices, affecting more the competitiveness of the cheaper ones (threatening 
in this way the possibility of selling larger volumes) that the more expensive ones, 
where the added premium will be proportionally smaller in the final price. This 
brief analysis shows the intrinsic difficulties that the Fair Trade projects 
encounters when trying to tie together the benefit of capitalists and workers. While 
in the case of small producer organizations a unity of profit maker and beneficiary 
of the premium predicts a more simple way of defining a strategy, the case of HL 
situations is critically crossed by two contradictory interests that, of course, pre-
exist Fairtrade in the conventional mode of production, but appear to be 
reproduced in this “alternative” mode of regulation. 
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All in all, this subsection has described a semi-administered process of price 
formation, where FLO defines a minimum price and a Premium for grapes, but 
market prices are of relevance when above the minimum price or in the case of 
wine. The Fairtrade minimum price has been highlighted as the most innovative 
and, potentially, most important element incorporated by the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation. Its introduction is particularly welcomed in the Argentinean wine 
industry, which displays a long history of over production and sharp price 
declines. Its implementation, however, has produced no impact because FLO has 
not managed to update its minimum price at the same pace at which the costs of 
productions have increased. Lastly, an analysis of the role that the Fairtrade 
Premium plays in the formation of the price of wine has shown that it can lead to 
different approaches in the case of SPOs and HL situations, with the former 
having much more incentives than the latter to accumulate higher Premiums.  
2.3.2 Logic of competition
Fairtrade International, basing its system on a voluntary certification, needs to 
offer some benefits to the certified organizations in exchange for the “sacrifices” 
they may have to incur in as part of their adaptation to the standards. If Fair Trade 
did not offer any advantages to the players that enter its system, then why would a 
company or producer organization want to freely assume extra, non-mandatory 
controls? We have already seen some of these rewards: a minimum price for their 
products and some extra money for producers in the form of extra profits through 
the Premium. However, one of the most attractive features that Fair Trade offers 
and motivates many producers to join the system, is the way in which competition 
is regulated. 
One of the main aspects of the Fair Trade mode of regulation is that the 
certification and its label grants certain products – and excludes others from – 
access to a market niche, that one of ethical or responsible 
production/consumption. Therefore, a Fair Trade certified wine is not just one 
more wine competing against all other wines, but is part of a differentiated 
category competing only with those that have also obtained the certification. The 
key here, as it is evident, is the necessity of creating a constant or growing 
demand, so that the Fair Trade market niche appears attractive enough for 
producers to take the decision of certifying. As long as a considerable demand for 
Fair Trade (ethical/responsible/moral/etc.) products exists, producers and their 
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importers will have incentives to access this market niche, incentivizing them in 
this way to adopt the extra controls and responsibilities posed by the Fairtrade 
standard. 
Therefore, Fair Trade is based on a market niche with reduced competition (where 
all non-certified producers are excluded). This reduction in competition seems to 
be of particular relevance in the case of wine, a product which has only recently 
(2005) become Fair Trade certifiable, making this market even more appealing: 
There are also many other competitors that are not Argentinean, I mean, they are not 
wineries from Argentina, but from other countries. There is always competition, of 
course, but not the competition that you will have in a traditional world or wine 
market that’s not Fair Trade. In the case of traditional, non-Fair Trade, wine 
competition is abysmal because everybody is present, all producer countries are 
present. In Fair Trade that is still not the case, so I think it’s the moment to exploit it 
to the maximum” (Interview AFT7). 
In the last quote, Nicolás from Tres Vientos highlights another important way in 
which competition is reduced in the case of Fair Trade wine. The entry-barrier is 
given by the certification, those who do not possess it cannot sell their products as 
Fair Trade. However, this entry-barrier is also importantly constituted by Fair 
Trade’s geography. As it will be explained more in-depth in the following chapter, 
an important ingredient of Fairtrade’s ideology is the division of the world in two 
hemispheres separated more by socioeconomic than merely cardinal criteria: the 
South (whose role is mainly that of production) and the North (whose role is 
exclusively that of consumption). This means that producers in wealthy countries 
are not allowed to apply for the Fairtrade certification. Now, if we superimpose 
Fair Trade’s geography with the geography of wine, we can easily conclude that 
competition in Fair Trade wine is not only shaped by the reduction of the number 
of competing producer organizations or companies, but also by the restriction in 
the number of countries of origin. And, as it has been explained, the terroir of 
origin is a determining feature when it comes to fine wines. The wine geography 
restricts drinkability mainly to those wines produced in certain parts of the world. 
I mentioned earlier that the main producers are divided between Old World and 
New World producers. The first group is composed only by European countries, 
meaning that all wine producers from the Old World cannot certify Fair Trade. 
The second group, however, is more diverse: the United States is clearly in the 
northern Hemisphere and so are (though less geographically evident) Australia 
and New Zealand. This leaves us with only three countries of internationally 
relevant wine production: South Africa, Argentina and Chile. Therefore, the 
competition in Fair Trade wine is reduced to producers from those three countries 
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and, potentially, any other producer from Fair Trade’s south. At the time being, 
only very few certified producers can be found outside the mentioned countries. 
They come from Brazil, Lebanon and Tunisia, all of them countries relatively 
unimportant in the world of wine, what makes them look as little threatening.
All in all, certified wine producers in Argentina perceive competition in Fair Trade 
wine to be much more benign than the one going on in the conventional market. A 
very neat example of this – and quoted by most actors – was the case of Sweden’s 
purchases. Managed by a state monopoly, Sweden periodically requests tenders 
with certain characteristics (country/region, type of wine, price range, amount of 
bottles, etc.) and then organizes a blind-tasting among all interested suppliers, 
choosing those of the highest quality. In the last years, the Swedish monopoly has 
begun to include Fair Trade among the attributes of some of its tenders, offering 
very good possibilities of success in an industry with very few certified producers. 
Richard from Mendoza Wines describes how this has worked as a motivation for 
wineries to certify: “many wineries have certified Fair Trade to be able to take part 
in the tenders. To be able to get in. Because for the tender you have 200 wineries 
that want to send samples, but if they put Fair Trade, I don’t know, we are 15 in 
competition” (Interview AFT27).  
A second aspect in which competition is altered by the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation appears to be the logic on which it is based. For some of the certified 
players, Fair Trade allows them to escape from the price-based competition (which 
is particularly disadvantageous for smaller producers) and add some other 
symbolic and differential dimensions to their product, making it more competitive 
through other means. That is what Pablo from Ecowine explains: “having a label 
means to have an added value, what’s super important to differentiate us in the 
market. You were asking me about the advantages of having these labels… and 
it’s basically that, look for a niche and not to compete on the price, because if it’s 
on the price we’re dead, if we compete on price. We cannot sell so cheap because 
we have less volume, the amount of supplies we buy is smaller than Peñaflor, for 
example. Then we look for that differentiation” (Interview AFT20). As in 
Ecowine’s case, the Fair Trade label is seen as a strategy in order to mitigate 
competitive disadvantages. For smaller players it represents a way of 
differentiation and adding value, what would make them interesting for potential 
buyers looking for this “extra” dimension. At the same time, this makes it possible 
to escape the conventional logic of competition, where they appear least attractive 
to buyers who compare their quality/price relation to that of much bigger players. 
This is exactly the same benefit that Julie highlights: “there are very small 
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wineries that had no fame or reputation and weren’t well-known that could get 
into other countries through Fair Trade” (Interview AFT1). Gabriela, from Bodega 
Fabretti, also sees the label as a strategy to compensate their more disadvantaged 
position in the export market: “we have our two most important clients only 
because we have the label. Because I’m small, I can’t reach a good review by I 
don’t know who, because I don’t have access to the journalist, because I don’t 
have I don’t know what and because I don’t have a seller in each market that 
would understand where he has to go and sell. It’s very understandable. And the 
label communicates much faster everything that’s behind” (Interview AFT14). 
All in all, Fair Trade seems to innovate in the competition structural form in two 
ways: first, by reducing the number of competitors (both at the level of individual 
companies and countries of origin); second, by shifting the main parameter on 
which competition is based (from price to moral attributes). However, these 
affirmations are to be nuanced by the declarations made by some of the actors 
involved. Eduardo, Vice-president in La Chileciteña Cooperative, was glad to 
acknowledge that Fair Trade reduces the number of competitors, however, he 
believes that it is not so important to consider how many producers you compete 
with, but who your competitors are:  
It will depend a lot on what will the certifying body target, which profile of 
company they will certify. Because if you certify the group Constellation, one of the 
big groups out there, like saying Coca-Cola, it’s very good, but you will compete 
again, you enter in a segment to compete in unequal conditions. I see that Tres 
Vientos is about to certify or has certified, and Tres Vientos is Concha y Toro, then 
we are fighting David against Goliath, something like that. They have multinationals 
and commercialization systems. They have a different economic power that we as a 
cooperative don’t have (Interview AFT15). 
That is, competition is reduced, because a different submarket with fewer players 
is created. But letting all kind of companies in only brings back inequality to this 
new arena. Inequality between players is reproduced again in the Fair Trade 
sphere, according to Eduardo, because Fairtrade International has not made a 
decision on the type of producer organizations that they want to favor. They, 
instead, certify any firm that abides to their standards, without taking into account 
their position in the industry, resources, capacities, etc. Eduardo seems to believe 
that a full commitment to Fair Trade (vis-à-vis the permanent possibility of Fair 
Trade and non-Fair Trade duality), instead of its instrumental use, should be one 
of the criteria to follow in order to admit new actors to the system: 
It’s not a problem of competing between equals, but who you give the tools to 
compete to. Why? Because maybe you, in order to be organic, you have to be all 
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organic. What happens with these big companies, very big ones. They create 
corporations. Then, to this one that I’ll call El Viento, I make it certify as organic. 
This other one, I make it certify as Fair Trade. This other one, I make it to obtain 
these other benefits. At the end, it is still the same one. Concha y Toro is still 
Concha y Toro (Interview AFT15).  
Lastly, and in relation to the logic of competition, I would like to cast some doubt 
on the assumption according to which Fair Trade can produce a shift of paradigm. 
One thing is the potential effects that Fair Trade might have or the effects that 
those who obtain the certification would desire it to have, and something very 
different is what actually happens. When it comes to competition, it is true that the 
number of competitors is importantly reduced as I explained before. However, 
price, at the end of the day, seems to continue being the main driver of 
competition. It could be said, then, that Fair Trade acts as a first filter, eliminating 
many potential competitors and letting in many that – probably – would have a 
harder time to compete with bigger companies in the conventional market. 
However, once this smaller arena of competition has been arranged, the price of 
the product is still determinant. This has been evidenced in some of the interviews 
with the example of South Africa. This country, unlike its competitors, seems to 
be able to offer much more attractive prices, dominating as a consequence most 
markets of Fair Trade wine, while showing that even within Fair Trade 
competition the price is still determinant: “wine has a lot of competition, I mean, it 
does have Fair Trade competition in the sense that a wine from South Africa is 
much more inexpensive that a wine from Argentina or Chile, therefore, you do 
have there the direct competition within the same market” (Interview AFT30). 
Richard, from the South-African owned Mendoza Wines, gives a similar 
argument: “at the moment, competing with South Africa is impossible. South 
African wine costs, I don’t know, 40% cheaper, Fair Trade wine. And they have a 
lower minimum price than here. Then, 15 euro cents, here I think we are in 25 
euro cents, then they are more competitive. That’s it. Because it may be Fair 
Trade, but at the end there’s a competition, there’s a business. At the end it’s a 
business in which you help people, but it continued being a business” (Interview 
AFT27).  
This subsection has analyzed the competition structural form by looking at two of 
its most relevant dimensions. Firstly, an examination of the process of price 
formation evidenced its semi-administered nature, as minimum prices and 
Premiums are determined by FLO but any levels above them are left to market 
dynamics. In the case of the Argentinean wine industry, however, the minimum 
price proved to be seriously outdated, making it not only irrelevant for current 
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transactions but also as a safeguard in times of crisis. Secondly, an analysis of Fair 
Trade’s competition logic showed that even though this mode of regulation 
succeeds in reducing competition (in terms of number of individual producers and 
countries of origin), price continues to be the main driver of competition. In this 
way, the Fair Trade mode of regulation structures a playfield with fewer 
competitors, but reproduces within it the conventional logic of competition. For a 
synthetic overview, see Table 6. 
2.4 State 
When analyzing the previous structural forms, the state has let itself be seen, 
offering some important details about its significance and position within this 
mode of regulation. Therefore, this section will not reveal many new facts to the 
reader. However, I will systematize all the fractioned and dispersed mentions to 
the state that have been offered so far in order to present two angles from which its 
relevance for the Fair Trade mode of regulation can be analyzed: its rulemaking 
role and its importance as an actor.
Fair Trade, as many other similar voluntary certifications, works as a form of 
private regulation (cf. Pattberg, 2005; Bartley, 2007; Chan and Pattberg, 2008; 
Vogel, 2010). By private, I mean a regulation that is not designed or enforced by 
the state, but by relevant actors from civil society (in this case, mostly NGOs, 
producer organizations and corporations). Fair Trade is expected to act as an 
alternative or complement to the state, since many of its attributions are quite 
similar: setting certain minimum working conditions, inspecting whether these 
conditions are being respected, sanctioning those who are not following the rules, 
etc. Its importance appears to be particularly relevant in those countries where the 
capacity of the state to accomplish those duties is very low and/or the laws 
regulating the productive process are not demanding enough. The emergence of 
Fair Trade (and other ways of private regulation) seems to be a reaction to the 
inefficiency or impotency of the state to take the lead in providing the conditions 
for the sustainable development of its population, a reaction commanded, 
precisely, by those actors that are not part of the state apparatus but aspire to 
emulate its functions. We therefore find Fairtrade International – a federation of 
national Fair Trade NGOs, whose board is formed by representatives from 
producer organizations and the NGOs themselves – as the central authority that 
dictates the areas to be regulated by the standard and determines what the benefits 
for those following their rules – and sanctions for offenders – will be. Its sister 
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organization, FLO-Cert,  is in charge of auditing those actors that want to join the 
system and regularly inspecting those other ones that are already part of it. 
Corporations and small producer organization decide to opt for the certification 
not because it is required by any national government, but due to the potential 
benefits that joining this system may offer them. They are free to certify and de-
certify whenever they find it appropriate, being liable only to Fairtrade 
International in any matter that regards the standards. It is quite clear, then, that 
Fair Trade appears as a para-state system, with its own governing, legislative, 
judicial and police functions.  
Such an initial diagnosis would lead us to think that the state has no relevance in 
the Fair Trade mode of regulation. However, that is not the case. In this section, I 
propose two main ways in which the state’s relevance for the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation can be appreciated. In the first place, I will describe what I consider to 
be state’s relevance as a parameter for the development of standards. In the second 
place, I will move on to see the (potential) relevance of the state as an actor within 
or in connection to the Fair Trade mode of regulation.  
2.4.1 The state’s rulemaking role 
As I have described while analyzing the previous structural forms, many of the 
minimums and other requirements demanded by FLO are set in accordance to 
national legislation. In those cases, the standard does not dictate a substantive 
norm (e.g. specific situations and ways in which fire can be used to clear fields) 
but a procedural one (e.g. the specific issue is regulated as “defined by the state”). 
Another group of issues, instead, are settled substantively by the standard and, 
when differing from what has been determined by national legislation, the most 
demanding condition should prevail as the mandatory one: “if national legislation 
sets higher standards on an issue than FLO, it supersedes Fairtrade Standards. The 
same applies to regional and sector-specific practices” (Fairtrade International 
2011c:3).  
What we find is that an important amount of relevant issues are defined according 
to the state’s official minimums: wages must be at the level of the national or 
sectorial minimum wage, working hours and overtime have to comply with the 
applicable laws, premium rate factors for payment of overtime is again decided 
according to state regulation (and only if this is not regulated by it, Fairtrade 
International proposes a way of defining it). Other elements are also required to be 
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in line with the state or the relevant sectorial/regional levels: annual leave, 
maternity leave, social security provisions, non-monetary benefits, the regulation 
of areas used for or converted to production, the use of fire for land clearing or, as 
I have explained more in detail before, the applicability or not of the obligation for 
buyers to pay the pre-finance.   
The important role given to the state as a parameter setter seems to make the 
following question unavoidable: how transformative can Fair Trade claim to be, 
when most of its standards are based on already existing state regulations? Up to a 
certain point, most of what Fair Trade does is to secure that companies and 
producer organizations are respecting national legislation. Fair Trade does help to 
enforce state regulation and runs audits that are in many cases much more frequent 
than state inspections, but is that enough to talk about empowerment or a way out 
of marginalization? During my fieldwork, all managers of wineries (but also many 
workers) agreed on the fact that adapting their production to the requirements was 
not a major challenge in general terms, because most of what they were required 
was exactly the same that the national legislation demands:  
Many of the aspects that the norm [Fairtrade standard] demands, we had them 
already fulfilled and in compliance because the Argentinean legislation demands 
them. Then, in that sense, we didn’t need to make major changes (…) The 
fulfillment of all legislation in relation to the workers is systematically being 
monitored. The collective bargaining agreements, the working unions, they are 
permanently supervising the company” (Interview AFT19). 
Most workers interviewed also agreed on the fact that no major changes in their 
working conditions have been noted since the certification has been obtained. 
Ironically, the same representative of Fairtrade International in Argentina seems to 
agree with the fact that their standards do not produce major transformation in the 
requirements that companies and producer organizations face, but are relevant 
mainly as a way of supporting national laws: “if you are working by the books 
within Argentina’s law, you are fulfilling almost all the work requirements. Of 
course, not everyone is working by the books in Argentina, then, the issue is trying 
to put them on the books, but it’s not that we are requiring things beyond the law 
(…) it works as a back up to the law in a certain way” (Interview AFT1).  
These observations suggest that Fair Trade, for most issues, simply adopts state 
parameters. However, the fact that Fair Trade justifies itself as a way of helping 
societies in weakly regulated states, highlights the ambivalence in this 
relationship.  On the one hand, Fair Trade seeks to assume some of the 
responsibilities that the state does not assume or inefficiently deals with. But, on 
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the other hand, they do it, by defining standards according to what the state had 
already defined. If trade is here qualified as “fair” in opposition to conventional 
trade which, one assumes, is unfair, then: how is the situation to change if the 
alternative offered is taking those regulations that are already shaping (the unfair) 
conventional trade as their defining parameters? Is Fairtrade International in a 
position to affirm that their certified producers are sustainable when they are 
required to do little more than what their state demands? Going back to the 
discussion on the “fair” wage can be illuminating. Fairtrade’s definition of the 
wage is procedural, not substantive. This is, Fairtrade disregards the possibility of 
estimating how much should a person earn in order to cover their basic needs (a 
very modest definition of fairness) and instead simple determines that the wage 
has to be at least equal (not even “at least higher”) to the minimum national, 
sectorial or regional wage. And once again the question shall be raised: is a legal 
wage actually a fair wage? In Fair Trade’s terms, it is.  
The problems derived from using national legislation as a parameter can be seen in 
other ways. For example, a buyer in the United Kingdom will recognize a Fair 
Trade product because of its label, a label that is the same for all products, 
therefore, implying that they are all – somehow, whatever that means – equally 
fair. But this assumption cannot be taken for granted. Since most standards in 
relation to working conditions are defined according to the relevant state, we will 
find that workers in countries with stronger legislation and states work under 
much better conditions than their fellows in place with weaker states and less 
demanding legislation. And this can also be said about workers within a same 
country. As explained earlier, workers in different sectors or affiliated to stronger 
or weaker unions are entitled to unequal benefits and conditions. Therefore, a 
whole universe of heterogeneity and difference is hidden behind the same Fair 
Trade label. The only way in which a more homogeneous situation among 
different workers and producers could be achieved, and more effective standards 
for “minimums” and requirements could be developed, would be if FLO engaged 
seriously with the possibility of developing substantive standards and nor merely 
procedural ones. Otherwise, it would be more appropriate to call this initiative 
“legal trade” instead of fair trade. 
In conclusion, this subsection has highlighted one of the main ways in which 
states are of relevance to the Fair Trade mode of regulation: as parameters for 
setting standards. This fact has put in evidence an important contradiction 
incorporated by the system: if Fair Trade is supposed to empower producers and 
workers in weakly regulated states,  how is this goal to be achieved when those 
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same states are used as parameters for the definition of many of the minimums 
contained in the standards? Fair Trade’s transformative potential becomes 
importantly diminished when they privilege legal regulations defined by the state 
over the possibility of developing substantial alternatives.    
2.4.2 The state as an actor 
The second way of interpreting the state in relation to the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation is to conceive it as an actor. Although the relevance of the state as an 
actor is quite limited (unlike its centrality as a parameter for the standards), 
alcohol state monopolies are an exception. Of particular relevance to Argentinean 
wine producers is the case of Sweden, who in the last years has been committed to 
requesting tenders of Fair Trade wine. In this way, the Swedish alcohol monopoly 
has become an important Fair Trade buyer, being responsible for sustained levels 
of demand. Requesting tenders exclusively for Fair Trade wine is a key 
contribution to the development of global demand, promoted not so much by 
profit-oriented market conditions, but by the intervention of a state and its more 
normative-oriented interest in this kind of products. As a consequence, the 
participation of a state agency in the system strengthens it in at least two ways: 
first, it makes a voluntary certification quasi mandatory, as all those actors that 
want to sell certain categories of wine to the Swedish state must have the 
certification. Secondly, because the decision to buy Fair Trade products is 
political, it is to be expected a more stable and sustained demand than that one 
determined merely by market conditions. As a consequence, this can be seen as a 
reversal of the relationship between Fair Trade and the state as it was presented in 
the previous subsection: it is not anymore that Fair Trade supports the 
enforcement of state regulation, but it is a state itself that contributes to Fair 
Trade’s smooth functioning.  
However, if we go back to Argentina, it is easy to see that the state has very little 
relevance as an actor when it comes to the Fair Trade mode of regulation. In this 
case, the power to support the system could be much bigger than the potential 
offered by the Swedish example  – where it could only happens through the 
generation of demand – as the Argentinean state could, for example, sanction 
legislation making the use of this certification mandatory or at least offer certain 
benefits for its adoption. The truth is, however, that the Argentinean state has not 
showed major interest in Fair Trade up to know. At the national level the concept 
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of Fair Trade is almost uniquely associated to social or family economy initiatives. 
At the provincial level, instead, there has been some interest in, at least, diffusing 
information about the certification or, in more exceptional cases, contributing 
towards the certification costs, mainly by those organs in charge of promoting 
exports from their province. Besides these small and isolated actions, no more 
state involvement is occurring.  
For Fair Trade promoters, however, some degree of support from the state would 
be important to help this initiative grow. Mariano, member of Fundación 
Fortalecer (Fairtrade International’s unofficial main partner in Argentina), has 
some ideas in mind: “in France, where yes, it is regulated, equitable commerce, as 
they call it, defined two or three certifications. Fairtrade and two more. What 
Argentina actually does with organic. To put something is organic, it needs to 
carry a certification. It’s regulated. Even if it’s quite badly used, because may 
times it says organic without being certified, but there’s a law in Argentina that 
says it has to be” (Interview AC3). And later on, when asked about the desirability 
of involving the state in the development of Fair Trade, he adds: “Yes, yes, I 
believe it is. It could be at the level of public policies, yes. From this honey 
network they are trying to do with retentions as it is done with the organic, where 
they reduce a 5%, trying to make Fair Trade equal that. So, if that happens, you 
would also need to involve the state. So, yes. Or even making a Fair Trade law or 
creating something that would regulate the term.” (Interview AC3). The 
possibilities mentioned by Mariano point towards other areas in which the state 
could contribute to the strengthening of Fair Trade. Most of these areas are related 
to different forms of state enforcement, which would come to correct one of the 
main weaknesses of private regulation: its voluntary nature. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the Fair Trade mode of regulation offers very 
limited possibilities for the state as an actor. However, the state has the potential to 
contribute to Fair Trade’s consolidation by grating the system some of its 
regulatory authority: either by making it a condition for state purchases, enforcing 
it at the level of production or offering some benefits to certified organizations. 
Nevertheless, as the case of Argentinean wine evidences, it is only the former 
possibility – through the Swedish alcohol monopoly – that takes place in practice. 
When we look at the state from the perspective of its rulemaking role instead, we 
find that it acquires a much more central position in the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation, as many of the requirements in the standards are set according to 
national legislation. This, however, acts as a limitation of Fair Trade’s 
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transformative potential, as it evidences its implicit acceptance of the status quo in 
multiple problematic issues. For a synthetic overview, see Table 6. 
2.5 Representation of the product 
This section provides a discussion of the representation of a Fair Trade product, 
more generally, and Fair Trade wine, more specifically. I will first present the 
definition of a Fair Trade product as in the standards and then move on to the 
different representations at stake when it comes to Fair Trade wine. Lastly, I will 
discuss the implications of the combination of Fair Trade and conventional 
representations of wine.  
The standard for Traders defines a Fairtrade product as “any certified product that 
has been produced and traded according to both the specific requirements for that 
product and the requirements in the relevant Fairtrade generic standards” 
(Fairtrade International, 2013b:21). In this way, the definition of a Fair Trade 
product is not related to its intrinsic, material, characteristics, but is given by its 
compliance with the Fairtrade standards. Hence, any sort of product that has been 
produced and traded under Fair Trade conditions can be considered a Fair Trade 
product. The only limitation is given by the number of current standards, as only 
those products for which standards have been developed can be certified, denying 
the Fair Trade status to those other non-certifiable products.  
The products comprised by FLO standards are defined as “main products”, as they 
are the principal products that come out of the production process and is it on them 
that the minimum price and Premium are paid. However, many of these main 
products can further be used in so called “composite products”, this is, products 
that are made from multiple ingredients. Fairtrade International stipulates special 
rules for these cases. The general norm is that Fair Trade composite products must 
“contain as many certified ingredients as available” (Fairtrade International, 
2011d). This means that composite products have to use as many Fair Trade 
ingredients as possible. However, in those cases where certain ingredients are not 
available as Fair Trade, exceptions can be applied. The only limitation being that 
in order to authorize a composite product to use the Fair Trade label, it must 
contain at least a 20% of Fair Trade content.  
All in all, any composite product shall, first, source from certified producers all 
available Fair Trade ingredients and, second, make sure that Fair Trade ingredients 
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account for at least 20% of the total product. However, some exceptions have been 
introducer recently by Fairtrade International. In order to promote more sales, 
FLO has launched the “Fairtrade Sourcing Programs” for cocoa, sugar and cotton. 
In an attempt to increase market opportunities for the producers of these goods, 
FLO has developed this scheme, which allows companies to use the “Fairtrade 
Program Mark” (a modified version of the original Fairtrade Mark) on those 
products whose cocoa, sugar or cotton is 100% Fair Trade certified. While the 
general rules for composite products establish that all available certified 
ingredients have to be used, these programs require only one certified ingredient 
and do not set a minimum threshold in relation to non-certified ingredients. In this 
way, sourcing programs promise to enhance the demand of the chosen products at 
the expense of any others, since composite products can now be certified by 
including only one Fair Trade ingredient.  
As it shall be clear by now, Fairtrade standards do not include regulations in 
relation to the product’s quality and main characteristics; a Fair Trade product is 
simply defined by its compliance with Fairtrade International’s rules. However, 
when we look at the more concrete level of this structural form in the case of Fair 
Trade wine, we find a more complex panorama, where the different 
representations from the conventional wine industry and the representation of Fair 
Trade products come to interact.  
In the wine world quality is a major issue, as it has been noted in the previous 
chapters.  It is probably because of this fact that the production and 
commercialization of wine within the Fair Trade system has provoked skepticism 
among most critics. The main problem seems to stem from the fact that Fair 
Trade, historically associated to the production of commodities with little added 
value in contexts of poverty, does not seem to match the much more sophisticated 
infrastructure that supports the representation of wine. This conflicting views are 
well summarized by Mike Veseth (2009), Professor in International Political 
Economy and author of the blog “The Wine Economist”: “Fair Trade programs are 
typically organized through grower cooperatives and coops have a famously bad 
reputation for quality (…) so the paradox is that while wine might be an ideal Fair 
Trade product from the consumer standpoint, the cooperative production model 
dooms it to failure because of the low production quality”. An article at Decanter – 
one of the world’s leading magazines in the wine industry – supports this view: 
“wine has a perception problem: most respondents [to a survey] said they thought 
organically produced and Fairtrade wine would not taste good” (Rosen, 2007). 
Similarly, Wine Spectator, another prestigious publication, quotes a US Fair Trade 
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wine importer stating with frustration that “before tasting, I’ll hear people in the 
trade say ‘Oh I’ve heard fair-trade wines aren’t that good because it’s hard to 
source the grapes because there aren’t that many fair-trade growers’” (Nigro, 
2013). As the excerpts from these different specialized publications show, the 
inclusion of wine within the Fair Trade constellation has been accompanied by a 
clash between the perceptions of what a Fair Trade product and good wine are.  
It is not surprising that, against this background, some of the most renowned 
British wine critics have generally offered negative evaluations of Fair Trade 
wines. Fiona Beckett, one of the biggest names in the field, has been among the 
most critical voices. In an article published in 2011, she  stated: “having tasted a 
number [of Fair Trade wines] recently, I was underwhelmed by the overall quality 
– I’d say Fair Trade wine is where Fairtrade chocolate, tea and coffee were four or 
five years ago” (Beckett, 2011). Even though she published articles in 2012 and 
2013 where she stated that FT wine seemed to be improving, her latest words on 
the topic do not seem to be very optimist: “the discouraging thing about Fairtrade 
wines is that it seems like it’s one step forward, two steps back. Last year, I 
thought the overall quality had improved; this year, I’ve really struggled to find 
wines to recommend” (Beckett, 2014). By the end of that same article she 
concludes: “Here’s an idea, though. Why not buy a non-Fairtrade certified bottle 
that’s on offer from one of the Fairtrade wine-producing countries (South Africa, 
Chile and Argentina) and drop the money you save in the collection box next time 
you’re near an Oxfam?” (Ibid). Victoria Moore (2009), another authorized voice 
in the UK, has stated that “it feels churlish to admit that the reason I rarely 
mention Fairtrade wines is that I’ve rarely enjoyed drinking one”. However, other 
wine critics have recently softened these judgements, acknowledging some 
improvements in the category. The wine journalist Patricia Langton (2010), for 
example, wrote: “Generally I’ve been presented with very little to excite the 
palate, and have rarely found a wine that I’d share with friends. Thankfully this is 
changing. Recently I tasted around 50 wines which are currently available and 
found that the quality has improved enormously and the choice is becoming much 
more varied”. Tom Atkin (2009), another acclaimed British wine critic, would 
seem to agree with such an assertion, as he has found that “this [Fair Trade wine] 
is not the gamble it once was (…) and quality is much better than it was even two 
years ago”.  
All in all, even if not unanimously condemning the category, most wine critics 
tend to be skeptic about the quality of Fair Trade wines. The main reason for this, 
I argue, has to do with the clash of two very different representations of the 
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product, one belonging to Fair Trade and the other one to the wine universe, which 
in the eyes of many tend to collide. Victoria Moore’s  (2012) explanation for the 
low quality of Fair Trade wines exemplifies this perfectly: “One of the reasons 
why Fairtrade wines disappoint is that they are often disadvantaged from the 
outset. It’s not possible to make good wine unless you start with good grapes. 
Good grapes need decent vineyard sites and, to be blunt, those in the most need 
are usually working the worst land”. From Moore’s point of view, the quality-led 
representation of wine conflicts with that one put forward by Fair Trade, as the 
marginalized producers that it seeks to help do not possess the resources necessary 
for the elaboration of good wine. However, as it will be seen now, the 
relationships between these representations might be more complex. 
The fact that Fair Trade presents itself as a form of helping others while buying 
and promoting an alternative market rationality has led to a representation of the 
product in which its quality/price relation comes second to the purchase’s moral 
dimension. If buyers are willing to pay a price premium in order to support small 
producers and workers in the developing world, they would not necessarily expect 
the product to be of the same quality as a non-Fair Trade one with the same price. 
Or at least that was the original view in Fair Trade’s origins. Such an assumption 
belongs to what Goodman and Herman (2015) call Fair Trade’s “originalist 
moment”, where the provision of information about producers worked as an 
appeal to consumers in order to shop politically and choose those products that 
could make a difference. However, the increasing mainstreaming of Fair Trade 
brought a massive presence of these products in conventional distribution channels 
and big retailers, becoming available to much wider and heterogeneous audiences. 
One of the main consequences of this development was, according to Goodman 
and Herman, the transition to a “quality moment” in which “marketing fair trade 
goods as quality items began to overtake the previously semiotically frontloaded 
moral economy embedded in its network” (Ibid:143). As a consequence, Fair 
Trade products would not be presented simply as ethical products, but also as 
products of good quality. This means that Fair Trade products are not only 
expected to be fair in their production and commercialization, but they are also 
required to deliver a fair quality/price relation.
Fair Trade wine seems to be currently caught somewhere in the transition from the 
originalist to the quality moment. This can be evidenced not only by the 
skepticism shown by critics (can a fair product actually be good?) but also among 
producers. The latter, however, do not doubt about their product’s quality, but tend 
to believe that the representation of the product that dominated the originalist 
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moment might go against wine. Gabriela, for example, who produces wines of 
premium quality, believes that being a new product in the Fair Trade universe, 
wine might still need to fight its way to be perceived as a product of high quality: 
“It’s much newer, it’s true. I think that maybe it is associated to something of bad 
quality” (Interview AFT14).  
Most producers seem to understand the emergence of the quality moment and 
believe that the only way to seduce buyers and sell their wines is by offering 
products of high quality; the moral dimension is not enough: “as long as Fair 
Trade becomes a quality product, it will grow. Because people won’t consume… 
let’s be clear… there must be people that buy it for social reasons, but they won’t 
buy a bad product, a product they don’t like” (Interview AFT3).  Pablo (Ecowine) 
seems to agree in this view, and explains that Fair Trade’s ethical dimension might 
be a nice complement to the product, but if the latter cannot stand on its own, then 
the consumer will not get it: “Fair Trade wine, even if Fair Trade, it needs to have 
a competitive price – it’s basic –, a good presentation and a good quality. If you 
don’t fulfill that… You might be Fair Trade, organic, anything you want… but 
wine is wine, it’s wine, hence, you buy a wine to enjoy it, for a dinner, for an 
anniversary, a birthday… which gives you pleasure. And, if it’s Fair Trade and 
organic, even better” (Interview AFT20). Richard, from Mendoza Wines, recalls 
the experience of his wine group in South Africa as an example of how not to 
proceed: “when we made organic wine in South Africa we were sending a poor 
product and selling it expensive. We killed for a time the organic brand, because 
the final consumer is not stupid. They won’t pay more for a bad wine, it doesn’t 
work like that. The same quality and the same price that a conventional wine on 
top of the Premium” (Interview AFT27).  As these statements show, wine 
producers believe that Fair Trade wine has to offer the same quality/price relation 
as conventional wine, because the fact of being an ethical product is not enough to 
secure consumer acceptance.  
The same awareness can be appreciated within UK actors. Ed, The Cooperativist’s 
wine buyer, puts it very clear when he explains that Fair Trade wine needs to offer 
the same quality as any other conventional wine of the same price: 
Fair Trade wine at a certain price point should match absolutely in quality to a 
similar wine at that price. The idea customers should be paying more for the same or 
worse quality (…) isn’t acceptable. And that’s where we are now. The malbec we 
have gets lots of positive press because it’s nice Argentinean malbec. The fact that 
it’s Fair Trade is a welcomed addition, that’s exactly my vision for Fair Trade wine. 
You pay certain amount for a variety you like and the Fair Trade is a plus. It’s not 
charity, is not a choice you make just to, in a condescending way, help the 
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producers. This is a wine produced under very high standards, like any other wine. 
The difference is that producers are getting a fair price and there’s a premium 
attached to it. And in my view that’s ok, that’s commercially possible, we proved it 
(…) (Interview UFT6). 
Christian from the importer Herrmanns explains how they have sought to change Fair Trade wine labels, 
moving from a style clearly inspired by the originalist moment – but associated to lower quality – 
towards a new one which would de-emphasize the Fair Trade nature of the product and highlight its 
quality attributes: 
I would say with Fair Trade wine you almost have a theme or a brief or a sort of pre-
conception of what a product should be like. So we’ve been trying to sort of play 
with that a little bit and try to move it away slightly from how it marketed those 
products. So, we used to have two brands called, this is a good example, Los Robles 
and Los Unidos, which were from Arg... well, from Chile. Bought in bulk that we 
shipped over. They very much had a Fair Trade feel about them. The text was 
earthy, there’s a lot of foil and gloss in the label, the Fairtrade symbol was very 
large, prominent, in its green and blue coloring, and the imagery was very much 
community, very ethnic kind of feel to it. The sales were starting to dip and the 
consumers were losing interest, and it also wasn’t associated to the key problem 
that… we thought it wasn’t associated with good quality. Because a lot of Fair Trade 
wine is fantastic quality and it can be both Fair Trade and great quality. So our 
mission was to separate, you know, separate it from that ethical, earthy, nature. We 
came up with very artisanal style labels, which had hand-drawn, painted illustrations 
on (…) We made the Fairtrade logo black and white, a little bit more recessive, so 
it’s not such a prominent bold feature, but it’s still there and very much part of the 
wines. And that seems to be working quite well (Interview UFT1). 
As the quotations show, both in Argentina and the United Kingdom there is an 
increasing awareness about the need to promote Fair Trade wine as a product of 
high quality and not merely on the basis of its ethical credentials. This is a reaction 
of the skepticism with which Fair Trade was welcomed in the wine world and the 
more general transition towards quality that the Fair Trade universe has 
experienced.  
In conclusion, when it comes to the representation of the product for the case of 
Fair Trade wine, the result seems to be a convergence of two tendencies. On the 
one hand, the increasingly dominance of a quality-led representation in 
Argentina’s and the world’s conventional wine markets, as it has been explained 
in previous chapters. The tendency towards a “premiumization” of the 
internationally traded wine36  supports a definition of wine where quality becomes 

36Anoverviewofthecurrenttendencyininternationaltradetowardshighervalueandqualitywasofferedin
Chapter4.Lookingforward,astudybytheInternationalWineandSpiritRecord(IWSR)(quotedinBanco
Supervielle,2015:156)foreseesPremiumwines(between10and20dollarsperbottle)tobethecategorywith
thehighestgrowthintheupcomingyears,achievinggrowthratesthreetimeshigherthanthegeneralaverage.
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central. On the other hand, the Fair Trade representation of the product, which in 
the standard is simply defined by the process of “fair” production and 
commercialization, is increasingly informed by a notion of quality that puts this 
category to compete with any other conventional products of similar price. As a 
consequence, Fair Trade wine should be better understood as a product that offers 
a seductive quality/price relation and is produced and traded within a framework 
that empowers producers and workers. For a synthetic overview, see Table 6. 
The consequence of such a representation of the product has been that all certified 
wine in Argentina comes from the quality-led regime of accumulation. Even if 
there is discussion about the quality of Fair Trade wines, it should be noted that all 
certified products are varietal based wines. As a consequence, some of them might 
be entry-level but, nevertheless, they still belong to the fine wine segment of the 
industry. The combination of the quality imperatives from the conventional and 
Fair Trade international markets seems to offer no room for the certification and 
commercialization of table wine, excluding from Fair Trade those actors attached 
to the quantity-led regime of accumulation.  
2.6 International insertion 
Most dimensions relevant to this structural form have been presented along this 
chapter because of their relation to the previous forms. As a consequence, this 
section will systematize the different aspects presented so far offering a summary 
of the most important effects that Fair Trade’s international insertion has had 
when it comes to the case of Argentinean Fair Trade wine.  
Fair Trade has historically been linked to international trade. Its idea has always 
been to support and empower producers in developing countries (the South) by 
achieving better exchange terms when exporting their production to richer 
societies (the North). Given the fact that only a few countries in the South have 
recently begun to develop local Fair Trade markets,37  in practice commercializing 
Fair Trade products internally is not an option for most producers. As a 
consequence, even if Fair Trade nowadays promotes the development of local 
trade as an alternative, it is still de facto an initiative that depends on exports. 
Therefore, Fair Trade becomes of interest only for those who: a) have the capacity 

37SouthAfrica,Kenya,MexicoandBrazilarebecomingnotonlyplacesofFairTradeproduction,butalso
consumption.InArgentina,FLO’slocalrepresentativeswouldliketoseethesamedevelopmentindomestic
markets,butthesizeoftheFairTrademarketinthecountryisforthetimebeingverysmall.
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to export and b) offer a product that is of interest to importers and consumers in 
the northern hemisphere. The first condition, however, is more relative, since 
standards only demand from HL certified companies to show that they have the 
basic facilities to trade internationally. This requirement, instead, is not posed to 
SPOs. As a consequence, the capacity to export is not demanded from all certified 
organizations. It could be the case that a SPO – or even a HL organization – sells 
its production to a processor or exporter who gets in charge of trading it 
internationally, making it possible for the producer to do without the export 
process. The second condition, however, cannot be avoided. Even if the Fair 
Trade producer might not need to take part directly in the process of international 
trade, they need to offer a good that is attractive for consumers in the North. As a 
consequence, products without an international demand do not have the potential 
to join the system, leaving those actors connected to their value chains excluded.  
In this way, when it comes to the Argentinean wine sector, Fair Trade is 
inherently connected to international trade. The main consequence of this has 
been the prioritization of products that fit the current international dominating 
representation of the product, which, as it was explained in the previous section, is 
that of fine wines. In the context of the Argentinean wine industry this has meant 
that the inclusion into the Fair Trade mode of regulation has been exclusively 
limited to those actors that are part of the quality-led regime of accumulation and 
a concomitant exclusion of those actors linked to the quantity-led regime of 
accumulation.  
Fair Trade appears to be of interest only to those wineries that sell their wine in 
the international market and the smaller grape and wine producers that can supply 
them. Since Fair Trade products are normally traded internationally, it does not 
offer major advantages to the actors who are not linked to the chain that produces 
fine wines for exports. A quick look at the certified producers can confirm this 
observation: out the currently 11 certified actors, five are owned by foreign capital 
and belong to international wine groups, being fully integrated from the onset to 
international circuits. Out of the six remaining ones, one is a very big cooperative 
that produces both table and fine wines, but has already had an international 
presence for many years. The three remaining wineries have already gone through 
the process of reconversion and now produce exclusively fine wines and target the 
international market. The last certified actor is a group of medium and small grape 
producers. It is probably among them that we find the most heterogeneous 
presence, with some vineyards producing high quality grapes and other ones of 
lower quality. However, their integration into the Fair Trade system is only done 
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through the commercialization of high quality grapes. This shows that Fair Trade 
has meaning only for those actors that are part of the regime of accumulation 
whose dominance has grown recently due to its insertion into the international 
market, while it does not provide opportunities for those producers who have been 
unable to convert to the production of fine wines. For a synthetic overview, see 
Table 6. 
3. The Fair Trade mode of regulation: An assessment 
The findings presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6—built on the basis of the main 
concepts developed by the Regulation Approach—make it possible to offer an 
initial assessment of Fair Trade. Its definitive assessment, however, will only be 
possible after the conclusions presented here are complemented by those achieved 
in the following chapter, which develops its analysis according to the Amsterdam 
Project’s framework. Consequently, this section will offer an evaluation of the 
Fair Trade mode of regulation’s transformative potential, while Chapter 7 will 
provide a discussion of the underlying causes that explain the main conclusions 
achieved here.
The initial assessment presented here, hence, will be done in two parts: first, the 
transformative potential of the Fair Trade mode of regulation will be evaluated by 
comparing it to the conventional mode of regulation and analyzing the changes 
entailed. Second, the particular effects produced by the coupling of the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation and the Argentinean wine regime of accumulation will be 
discussed. In this way, a conclusion of Fair Trade’s capacity to promote the 
institutionalization of alternative socioeconomic relations will be offered. 
3.1 How alternative is the Fair Trade mode of regulation?
Most of this chapter has been dedicated to the analysis of the six structural forms 
that compose the Fair Trade mode of regulation. To do so, I have reconstructed 
them according to the standards and contrasted their content to their actual 
implementation. The analysis of each structural form has been done taking into 
special consideration the current structure of the conventional mode of regulation 
in order to provide comparisons of the most critical aspects for the Argentinean 
wine industry. A detailed summary of this analysis can be found in Table 6. In the 
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rest of this section I will use the partial findings produced in relation to each 
structural form in order to provide a more holistic view of the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation as a whole and its success in providing alternatives to the conventional 
one.
The analysis of the Fair Trade mode of regulation done in this chapter allows 
drawing conclusions at two levels. In relation to the standards, a more abstract and 
general level, it can be said that Fair Trade does not attempt to produce structural 
transformations in the conditions of production and international trade, but 
proposes instead more modest reforms in order to reposition small producers and 
workers within those structures themselves. However, when looking at the more 
concrete level of the Argentinean wine sector, it becomes evident that the already 
modest transformations proposed by Fairtrade end up being diluted in their 
process of implementation.  
One of the main limitations of the Fairtrade standards is given by their recursive 
use of state regulation as a parameter in order to define many minimum 
requirements. This fact became particularly visible during the examination of the 
wage relation. In this way, Fair Trade’s most relevant impact can be seen as a 
supplement to the state in the inspection and enforcement of national or sectorial 
regulation. This, of course, shall be welcome as a positive contribution, especially 
in contexts of low state capacity. However, Fair Trade’s adherence to official 
regulations is ill-equipped to improve the situation of workers and producers in 
those aspects that are actually a consequence of those same regulations. This 
strategy, which I have previously described as a legalist or formalist approach, 
evidences all its limitations when one looks at the case of direct wages. The fact 
that Fairtrade requires in its standards that all wages should refer to the national or 
sectorial minimum wage expresses all the naivety of such a formalist perspective. 
This is the case because nothing guarantees that a minimum wage will equal a 
living wage. Hence, if a Fair Trade mode of regulation was to guarantee “fair” 
wages, this would only be done through the inclusion of a living wage in the 
standards. Otherwise, Fairtrade would be guaranteeing the legality of wages, but 
not their fairness.  
Given the fact that Fairtrade’s wages are not living wages, one would expect the 
Fairtrade Premium to contribute toward that goal. However, standards regulate its 
use in such a way that the Premium can only become a direct income (or profit) 
for small producers, but not for workers, as they have historically not been 
allowed to simply divide the Premium in cash or kind. This last rule was adapted 
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in the HL standard revision that took place during 2014 and since then workers 
can do so with up to 20% of the Premium. However, this still leaves 80% of the 
premium to be used only as indirect contributions to wages, in the best of cases, or 
broader community projects. As a consequence, the absence of a living wage in 
the Fair Trade mode of regulation is not supplemented by the Premium, leaving 
the direct wage determinants of workers at the same levels that official legislation 
does. Such a situation is worsened with the introduction of Fair Trade regulations, 
as the case of overtime restrictions show, because their implementation entails 
many times the reduction of income without a substitutive compensation. 
It is against this background that Fairtrade’s recent project to develop living wage 
benchmarks should be warmly welcomed. While HL standards have for a long 
time urged companies to progressively advance toward living wages, the lack of 
precise figures made it difficult for Fairtrade to evaluate this point. As a 
consequence, Fairtrade is currently running four pilot calculations of living wages 
(in South Africa, Dominican Republic, Kenya, and Malawi) in order to produce 
these benchmarks. However, their future relevance is still not guaranteed, as 
Fairtrade does not plan to make living wages mandatory for companies, but 
expects instead “employers to negotiate with workers’ representatives on wages if 
these are below the living wage benchmarks.” (Journey Towards a Living Wage,
2014). In this way, the calculation of living wages would become a useful 
parameter for negotiations, but its adoption as a general rule is far from 
guaranteed.  
Even if Fairtrade’s legalist approach to standard-setting and the limitations 
imposed on Premium uses for workers undermine the mode of regulation’s 
transformative potential, it is also true that the Fairtrade standards present some 
elements that differ from the conventional economy and open the doors to 
interesting innovations. Three aspects of the standards are particularly relevant to 
the case of the Argentinean wine industry. First, even if Fairtrade mostly bases its 
work conditions on state regulation, it also introduces its own minimums and 
requirements, which may differ from the official ones. As it was explained, 
Fairtrade’s requirement in relation to working hours and overtime restrictions, 
together with its regulations on forms of hiring, would constitute important 
improvements in the wine sector. Second, the proposal of a minimum price that 
assures the reproduction of sustainable conditions of production irrespective of 
market values has to be highlighted as Fairtrade’s most innovative contribution, as 
it provides a protection for producers. Third, Fairtrade requires the establishment 
of long-term trading relationships between producers and their buyers, which 
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would offer the former certitude and foreseeability in relation to volumes, prices, 
and the terms and conditions of exchanges. In this way, even if the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation is far from a revolutionary irruption into the economic system, 
it can be said that its standards possess a reformist spirit that aims at improving the 
position of (especially) producers and workers in some aspects.  
While the analysis of the Fair Trade mode of regulation as it appears in the 
standards might highlight its reformist tones, the assessment of its implementation, 
that is, of the Fair Trade mode of regulation as it happens in practice, offers much 
more modest conclusions.  
The analysis of the six institutional forms showed that the three most important 
areas in which the Fairtrade standards offered opportunities for relevant changes in 
the Argentinean wine industry were not fully implemented. Regulations in relation 
to direct hiring, overtime, and working hours were systematically by-passed with 
the use of exceptions; minimum prices proved to be extremely outdated, being 
irrelevant in practice but also in the hypothetic case of an overproduction crisis; 
and last, the requirement to build long-term trading relationships is neither 
practiced by the certified actors, nor demanded by Fairtrade authorities. While the 
failure of the minimum price could up to a certain point be blamed on Argentina’s 
“exceptional” economic conditions (constant and high inflation rates), the other 
two areas seem to suffer from the same problem: Fairtrade’s self-defeating 
behavior. 
Fairtrade standards, as it was explained, are far from radical, however, they 
propose some interesting new elements. Nevertheless, these few transformative 
innovations of Fairtrade are lost in the process of implementation. This has been a 
consequence of Fairtrade’s tendency to make its own regulations more flexible 
whenever its requirements have superseded those posed by the state or even in 
those cases in which they matched official legislation but were above the 
traditional institutions of the sector. In this way, the potential offered by the Fair 
Trade mode of regulation to produce some relevant changes in the conventional 
economy ended up being withered away by their actual implementation. 
Fairtrade’s self-defeating behavior included not only the granting of exceptions to 
its own regulations (e.g., direct hiring), but also the lack of enforcement (long-
term relationships) and the adaptation (maximum amount of working hours during 
harvest) of the requirements in their own standards.
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As a conclusion, it can be said that at the level of standards the Fair Trade mode of 
regulations offers scope for limited reforms, which do not entail structural 
transformations but aim instead at better positioning small producers and workers 
in the conventional economy. However, when looking at the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation as it actually takes place in the Argentinean wine industry, my analysis 
has highlighted its tendency to undermine those few elements that have the 
potential to bring some relevant transformations in the sector. At the end of the 
day, the Fair Trade mode of regulation does not go beyond modest changes, 
proving unable to structure a real alternative to the conventional mode of 
regulation. 
3.2 The coupling of the Fair Trade mode of regulation and the Argentinean 
wine regime of accumulation.  
In Chapter 4, I described how the Argentinean wine sector is currently divided 
between those who have reconverted and are now integrated within the quality-led 
regime of accumulation (an each time more dominant sector) and those others that 
because of their lack of resources have not been able to reconvert their productive 
activities and are still nowadays attached to the decaying quantity-led regime of 
accumulation. It is within the latter that we find the most vulnerable actors in the 
Argentinean wine sector, especially among small wineries and grape growers. 
These two groups not only are faced with a decline in the value of the 
commodities they trade and a constant diminishment in their demand, but also are 
prey to the very concentrated power possessed by the three major wineries that 
control the quantity-led regime of accumulation. If Fair Trade is to support and 
contribute to the development of marginalized producers and workers, it should 
undoubtedly target those grape growers and small wineries that are nowadays 
linked to the quantity-led regime of accumulation.  
However, this is not the case: on the contrary, the Fair Trade mode of regulation 
has so far only integrated—and benefited—those actors which are part of the 
dominant quality-led regime of accumulation. This fact is mostly a consequence of 
the ways in which two structural forms have been institutionalized: the insertion 
into the international regime and the representation of the product.  
International insertion in the Fair Trade mode of regulation is almost exclusively 
the unique alternative for Fair Trade producers. Even if some southern countries 
have begun to commercialize Fair Trade products in their domestic markets, these 
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are still very small and not well developed. While the standards do not restrict Fair 
Trade production to exports, in practice it appears as the only choice for a vast 
majority of producers around the world. This fact is already privileging the 
quality-led regime of accumulation in Argentina, as its emergence and growth 
have always been linked to exports and the international market, whereas the 
quantity-led regime of accumulation has mostly focused on the local market. As a 
consequence, if the Fair Trade mode of regulation involves only products that are 
exported, it does not provide any opportunities to those producers that sell their 
wines in the local market. In this way, producers and workers attached to the 
quantity-led regime of accumulation end up being excluded from the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation. 
This pattern is reinforced when we look at the effects of the representation of the 
product. As we have seen, the Fairtrade standards do not regulate quality attributes 
and simply define a Fair Trade product as one that has been produced and 
commercialized according to Fairtrade’s rules. However, the examination of the 
actual practices of Fair Trade made visible a general tendency in this sector toward 
an upgrade in quality: Fair Trade products are to be marketed and bought not only 
due to their moral significance but also, as any other commodity, for the excellent 
quality-price relation they offer. This shift towards quality comes to perfectly fit 
the representation of the product in the wine world. International trade is more and 
more based on high-quality products, displaying higher increases in value than in 
volume, as it was shown in Chapter 4. As a consequence, the global market for 
wine is dominated by a high-quality representation of the product that does not 
easily fit with Fair Trade’s original image. As a consequence, those actors 
involved in the production and commercialization of Fair Trade wine have sought 
to articulate a representation of the product that emphasizes its high quality and 
convenient price-quality relation, following in this way the tendency towards 
quality that is found both in the Fair Trade and wine spheres. The fact that the Fair 
Trade mode of regulation is intrinsically connected to the international market has 
reinforced this tendency, privileging the quality-based representation of the 
product that dominates globally at the expense of the quantity-based one that is 
still so relevant in the Argentinean local market.  In this way, the representation of 
the product structural form comes to reinforce the exclusion of those actors 
attached to the quantity-led regime of accumulation: since the product they offer 
does not match the representation articulated by the Fair Trade mode of regulation, 
they cannot become part of it. 
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In conclusion, the intrinsic relation of the Fair Trade mode of regulation with 
international trade and the representation of Fair Trade wine it has articulated have 
privileged the inclusion of those actors connected to the quality-led regime of 
accumulation over those that are still part of the quantity-led regime of 
accumulation. This outcome is paradoxical, to say the least, as the actors excluded 
are precisely the ones occupying the most marginal and precarious positions in the 
wine industry, while those part of the Fair Trade mode of regulation belong to its 
dominant sector. As a consequence, the Fair Trade mode of regulation does not 
only offer very modest benefits, but also delivers these modest benefits to the 
actors that already enjoy a relatively better situation. The Argentinean wine 
industry, crossed by a hierarchical split between a modernized and dominant 
quality-led regime of accumulation and a declining quantity-led regime of 
accumulation, sees its inequalities deepened and reproduced by its articulation 
with the Fair Trade mode of regulation.  
4. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have assessed Fair Trade’s transformative potential. This has 
been done in two complementary ways: first, by comparing the Fair Trade and 
conventional modes of regulation; and second, by analyzing the effects of 
coupling the Fair Trade mode of regulation and the Argentinean wine sector 
regime of accumulation. 
The first analytical step showed that the Fair Trade mode of regulation does not 
entail major transformations and could be considered in the best of cases as a 
limited reformist project. As such, the Fair Trade mode of regulation does not try 
to produce structural changes, but rather aspires to introduce some changes to 
strengthen the position of small producers and workers. Some examples of these 
would be the introduction of a minimum price, regulations to reduce labor 
flexibility and the promise of developing long-term trading relationships. While 
these more progressive elements clearly appear in the standards, their 
implementation falls considerably short of these standards. In some respects, this 
outcome might be importantly affected by my case’s specificity – e.g., Argentina’s 
constant and high inflation making the minimum price obsolete. However, there 
are many other dimensions in which Fair Trade’s failure cannot be blamed on the 
context, but should be better understood as the consequence of a self-defeating 
behavior. The granting of exceptions to many regulations that would entail key 
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changes in the industry, the lack of control over contractual relationships, the lack 
of long-term relationships and, especially, the marginalization of actors linked to 
the more precarious regime of accumulation in the industry are all the result of 
Fair Trade’s incapacity or lack of will.  
Consequently, two conclusions are evident in regards to the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation. First, at a more general level, according to the standards, it is far from 
promoting a structural transformation in international trade. Even if it evidences 
some elements that would promote positive changes, which would be welcome as 
possible improvements in the conditions of production and exchange, these do not 
go beyond a strategy for limited reform. Second, at a more concrete level, 
according to its implementation, the Fair Trade mode of regulation in many 
respects deepens its initial limitations through a process of self-defeat, in which it 
rules out or adapts its own regulations. 
The second analytical step, instead revealed the fact that Fair Trade’s limited 
transformations and benefits do not reach the most marginalized actors in the 
industry – i.e., grape producers and small wineries attached to the quantity-led 
regime of accumulation – but are instead delivered to those that are part of the 
already-dominant quality-led regime of accumulation. In this way, Fairtrade not 
only does not challenge the most relevant hierarchy in the Argentinean wine 
industry, but it also reproduces it.  
This chapter has assessed the Fair Trade mode of regulation and made clear its 
limited transformative potential and the reproductive effects in acquires in the 
context of the Argentinean wine industry. However, this chapter has not explored 
the underlying causes behind Fair Trade’s limited transformative potential, the 
self-defeating aspects of its implementation and its reproductive effects. In order 
to offer an explanation of these phenomena, the following chapter will look at the 
most relevant political processes and ideological elements that are responsible for 
the current structure of Fair Trade and its legitimization. Describing the most 
relevant actors engaged in the Fair Trade system and their power relations, 
reconstructing the Fair Trade Concept of Control and examining the political 
dynamics derived from it will help clarify the inherent contradictions at the heart 
of the Fair Trade system that are responsible for its limited transformative 
potential, self-defeating behavior and, at least in the case of Argentinean Fair 
Trade wine, reproductive effects.
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Chapter 7: The Fair Trade Concept of Control 
Chapter 7 represents the last moment of theoretical practice (Generality II). While 
Chapter 6 offered the highest level of concreteness of this work, the present 
chapter should be better understood as a return to more general levels of 
abstraction – however, on the basis of the findings and conclusions achieved so 
far. In this way, Chapter 7 analyzes more general features and structural relations 
of the Fair Trade system in order to identify the underlying causes that explain the 
many limitations of its mode of regulation.  
As noted in the conceptual framework of this dissertation, the main concepts 
developed by the Regulation Approach prove to be convincing tools for the 
analysis of economic relations. However, even if they allow us to understand the 
economy as an inherently social phenomenon, this does not apply to the analysis 
of the political and cultural dimensions that constitute it. Hence, while the analysis 
of the Argentinean Fair Trade wine mode of regulation has identified the specific 
ways in which socioeconomic relations are institutionalized, and the specific 
impacts that such a mode of regulation produces when coupled with the sectorial 
regime of accumulation, little light has been shed so far on the ideological 
elements and political dynamics that underpin Fair Trade. As will be shown in this 
chapter, these dimensions of analysis are fundamental in order to account for the 
world-view that legitimizes the existence of a Fair Trade mode of regulation, as 
well as the political processes that shape it. Including these elements in the 
analysis will complement what has been presented thus far: while the previous 
chapter concluded that the Fair Trade mode of regulation provides a very limited 
scope for transformation and, in the case of the Argentinean wine industry, has 
reproductive effects, the current chapter will instead identify the political and 
ideological processes that are responsible for such an outcome. 
The notion of comprehensive concepts of control, as developed by the Amsterdam 
Project, provides the ideal framework with which to examine the relationship 
between ideology, politics and economy and the specific ways in which they are 
articulated in the Fair Trade system. Through the empirical application of this 
concept, this chapter will attempt to reconstruct the world-view put forward by the 
Fair Trade movement, analyze how it contributes to this initiative’s legitimation as 
an alternative project, examine how it leads to – and is the result of – a specific 
conception of political action, and discuss the multiple ways in which it relates to 
the Fair Trade mode of regulation. 
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A comprehensive concept of control can only be understood in connection with 
the political actors that develop and support it and, ultimately, struggle for its 
success as a legitimate world-view. A concept of control is intrinsically linked to 
political subjectivities in a bi-directional way: on the one hand, because the former 
are deployed by the latter in political struggles; on the other hand, because 
hegemonic concepts of control come to legitimize certain power positions and 
class privileges, and thus have the capacity to alter or reproduce the balance of 
forces between social classes.  
Therefore, this chapter will begin by presenting the most relevant categories of 
agency for the analysis of the Argentinean Fair Trade wine mode of regulation. 
The following section will describe the content of the Fair Trade concept of 
control (FTCC) and explore how its most central elements can be understood as 
the outcome of power relations in the system and the way in which they 
differently affect the position of the most relevant actors. A third section will look 
at the FTCC’s political implications in two ways. First, I will analyze its potential 
for the agglomeration of diverse class fractions and the conditions under which 
this is done. Second, I will describe the way in which the FTCC is propagated 
within society at large.  Lastly, this chapter will contrast the main features of the 
FTCC with historically hegemonic concepts of control in order to discuss its 
implications and potential as a transformative political project. 
1. Capitalist fractions, subaltern classes and Fair Trade actors 
When it comes to identifying the most relevant actors involved in the contested 
construction of the FTCC, this section will follow the approach offered by the 
Amsterdam Project and focus on class fractions as the most appropriate cleavage 
to identify agency. The role of agency acquires a double relevance in the study of 
the FTCC: first, because it puts the focus on which the main groups that take part 
in its definition are. Second, because these actors are not only active subjects in 
the creation of the FTCC, but also are affected by the main features it assumes: by 
the elaboration of a common Fair Trade view of the world and its materialization 
through specific Fair Trade rules, institutions and processes, social actors boost a 
political project that seeks to govern, reproduce and modify a variety of economic 
relations in which they are already engaged.  
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In what follows, I present the three main groups of actors (and their internal 
cleavages) that are relevant for the examination of the Argentinean Fair Trade 
wine sector: capitalist class fractions (commercial and productive), subaltern 
classes (workers, contratistas and small producers) and Fair Trade actors 
(bureaucracy and grassroots organizations).  
1.1 Capitalist class fractions  
The Amsterdam Project has identified three main forms of capital fractions, from 
which class fractions tend to develop: a commodity-dealing (or commercial) 
fraction, a money-dealing (or financial) fraction – both of which are part of the 
sphere of circulation –, and productive (or industrial) capital, which, of course, is 
part of the sphere of production. However, when it comes to the role of capital in 
the Argentinean Fair Trade wine sector, financial capital acquires only marginal 
importance when compared to the other two fractions.  
Financial capital is undoubtedly the hegemonic capital fraction when looking at 
the economy as a whole, both in Argentina and globally. As it was explained in 
Chapter 1, this power has allowed financial fractions to command a re-
structuration of the capitalist order around a neoliberal concept of control. As a 
consequence, today’s macroeconomic architecture, in which my case is embedded, 
is characterized by the dominance of financial class fractions. However, when the 
focus is put on the sectorial nature of my study, it can be said that not many 
relevant actors are linked to the Argentinean Fair Trade wine industry on the basis 
of financial functions. In this way, the identification of key actors (wineries, 
exporters, importers, retailers, etc.) has shown that most of them perform either 
productive or commercial functions, but none strictly financial ones. This is not to 
say that financial fractions are completely irrelevant. In relation to production, for 
example, Chapter 4 described the importance of investment groups in the 
reconversion of many Argentinean wineries. However, while most of the certified 
wineries do not belong to this category, it is relevant to argue that even if it was 
the case, their main function – this is, the way through which profit is realized – 
would still be attached to production. This means that the ownership of a 
productive unit by a financial fraction does not imply the dilution of the former’s 
economic function and imperatives. In relation to trade, a similar argument can be 
made. A recent survey by Gibbon (2014) exploring the financialization of the ten 
most important trading houses in the world, concludes that even if “some 
evidence” of financialization can be found, this has not resulted in relevant 
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transformations: “trading houses’ business models were generally more 
financialized in 2013 than 2004, but for most this development does not seem to 
have brought about fundamental changes” (Gibbon, 2014:25). All in all, even if 
production and commercialization are experiencing the effects of increasing 
financialization in various ways, this does not translate into a radical 
transformation of their functions in the mode of production and the interests 
attached to them. Nevertheless, the position of financial fractions is not simply 
dismissed in this research: while they are not directly involved in the Fair Trade 
system and the development of its FTCC, financial fractions, however, affect its 
development more indirectly, as they are responsible for the broader neoliberal 
concept of control that frames the construction of Fair Trade’s one.38 As a 
consequence, I argue that given the sectorial interest of my study (Fair Trade more 
generally and Argentinean Fair Trade wine more concretely) it is reasonable to 
assume that the two most relevant capital fractions involved are those whose main 
functions are connected to the production and commercialization of commodities. 
While in its origins Fair Trade emerged as an initiative to improve the situation of 
small, marginalized, producers in the global South (mostly in the form of 
cooperatives), its subsequent development witnessed an expansion that brought 
into the game other types of players. As it has been commented earlier, one of the 
major changes throughout this process was the introduction of a standard for HL 
situations, making it possible from that moment on to certify not only SPOs but 
also any sort of firm that employed a high number of workers in its plantations. 
That is why it is nowadays possible to find a wide range of products – as it 
happens in the case of wine grapes – whose Fair Trade production can be 
organized both within the context of SPOs or HL situations, the main difference 
being that in the former case it is small producers and their organizations who are 
to benefit from Fair Trade, while in the latter, Fair Trade is expected to empower 
and improve the situation of workers. Additionally, the third most relevant 
certification administered by Fair Trade has been developed almost exclusively in 
order to certify capital, since the “Trader” standards are to be adopted by those 
actors that buy FT products either in their final form in order to commercialize 
them or to further process them, ultimately selling the resulting product. 
What this means is that, even if the most widespread image of Fair Trade is 
usually connected to small producers, at the level of production it is possible to 
find both cooperatives (or other sorts of associative undertakings) and traditional 

38Thislastpointisdiscussedinsection5ofthischapter.
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capitalist companies. When looking at the Fair Trade certified actors in the 
Argentinean wine sector, the distribution at the time of my fieldwork was the 
following: there were two actors certified as SPO, five as HL and four as Traders. 
This brief review already shows the big importance that capital fractions have in 
the case under examination: only two out of 11 certified actors belong to the 
subaltern classes (Uvasol gives the same status to producers and contratistas, 
while the majority of La Chileciteña’s members has vineyards of less than three 
hectares), being all the rest conventional private firms. In this way, in the attempt 
to improve the situation of workers, this system integrates capital as a Fair Trade 
actor, granting it the same status as small producers. A Fair Trade product, 
therefore, can be either produced by a SPO – i.e. an organization constituted by 
subaltern actors – or a conventional private firm – i.e. productive capital.
As I have stated in the beginning of this subsection, productive and commercial 
capital are the most relevant fractions in the Fair Trade system. However, when 
we look at the Argentina-based Fair Trade actors, it has to be acknowledged that 
the capital fractions we find are almost exclusively linked to production. While 
such an assertion will appear to be more obvious in the case of those actors 
certified as (HL) producers, I would argue that it is also the case for those that 
have been integrated into the system as Traders.39 I do so by following Marx’s 
criteria for identifying the specificity of commercial capital. In the beginning of 
Chapter 16, Volume 3 of Capital he distinguishes industrial capital – which is 
engaged in production – from merchant’s or trading capital – which is engaged in 
circulation. And within this latter category he defines two main capital fractions: 
money-dealing capital and commodity-dealing capital, which he also terms as 
commercial capital throughout his analysis. The role of commercial capital is to 
buy and sell commodities, appropriating part of its surplus-value in the process. In 
this sense, as commercial capital does not take part in production it does not create 
surplus-value, but instead takes a share of it by being in charge of the 
commodity’s realization in the market. This becomes its specific function within 
capital’s division of labor: 
Thus the way that commodity capital assumes in commercial capital the form of an 
independent variety of capital is by the merchant advancing money capital that is 
valorized as capital, and functions as capital, only because it is exclusively engaged 
in facilitating the metamorphosis of commodity capital, in making it fulfil its 
function as commodity capital, i.e. its transformation into money. Money capital 
does this through perpetually buying and selling commodities. This is its exclusive 

39Trader,withacapitalletter,standsforthe“Tradercertification”grantedbyFairtradeInternationalandshould
notbeconfusedwiththecommonnoun“trader.”
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operation; this activity that facilitates the circulation process of industrial capital is 
the exclusive function of the money capital with which the merchant operates 
(Marx, 1991:386). 
However, in order to grasp commercial capital’s specificity Marx warns that it 
comprehends only “a part” of the circulating capital to be found in the market 
because “another part of the buying and selling of commodities always takes place 
directly between the industrial capitalists themselves. We shall ignore this other 
portion of the circulation capital completely in the present investigation, since it 
contributes nothing to the theoretical definition, to our understanding of the 
specific nature of commercial capital (…)” (Marx, 1991:380). 
In this sense, I agree with Marx when he rejects to consider those transactions 
between industrial capitalists as equivalent to the operations done by commercial 
capital, as it would undermine our understanding of the latter’s specificities. It is 
precisely because of this that the actors certified as Traders in the Argentinean Fair 
Trade wine sector shall be better understood as belonging to the industrial capital 
fraction. In the first place, because these are not trading companies (their business 
is not based on the purchase and sale of commodities), but they are wineries 
themselves. Therefore, even if they might perform some commercial functions, 
their main activity is concerned with the production of wine. In the second place, 
and looking more strictly at their role within Fair Trade, all four traders are not 
completely detached from the productive process. Two of them, for example, buy 
grapes as the raw material with which to produce wine (Tres Vientos and 
Fabretti), while the other two (Palmer and Mendoza Wines) buy wine from other 
wineries that still needs to be bottled and sometimes kept in cellars. All in all, the 
Argentina-based certified traders can much better be understood as part of the 
productive capital fraction due to their overall strategy of accumulation as 
business units and the particular functions they perform within Fair Trade.
While productive capital is preponderant among the Argentina-based Fair Trade 
actors, commercial capital cannot but have a fundamental role in a system whose 
backbone is based on international trade. From the moment of export or import 
(according to the case) onwards, commercial capital becomes fundamental for the 
entrance of Fair Trade products in the northern markets, their distribution, retail 
sales and promotion of their consumption. Even if this functions might not have a 
very visible role within the FTCC (a detailed analysis of the importance of 
commercial capital and the place it is given within the FTCC will follow later in 
this chapter), it is undeniable that any market-based system depends, at the end of 
the day, on the realization of the commodities produced, making the role of 
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commercial capital particularly important in this transnational mode of regulation. 
In the United Kingdom, while no official data on the issue is available, interviews 
with different relevant actors showed that three main companies concentrated the 
highest volumes of Fair Trade wine imports in general, and from Argentina in 
particular. Additionally, a very important number of retailers (ranging from the 
biggest supermarket chains to Fair Trade shops) are involved in the 
commercialization of this product. Retailers most usually buy it from any of the 
three main importers or, more exceptionally, seek to import it themselves directly 
from producers. 
All in all, two capital fractions, those linked to production and commercialization, 
occupy very relevant positions in the case of Fair Trade wine produced in 
Argentina and consumed in the UK and should therefore be considered as key 
players when analyzing this concept of control.  
While both fractions share a common dominant position vis-à-vis the subaltern 
classes, their different functions in the circuit of capital causes at many points 
tensions and is at the base of unequal power relations. David Harvey has reflected 
on how these hierarchies between capital fractions with different functional 
positions might result in the emergence of fractional disputes and threaten the 
overall capitalist interest: 
The merchants (wholesalers and retailers) take on both the costs and the risks of 
selling the product to final consumers. (…) This smooths out the flow and provides 
producers with a more secure market. But, on the negative side, the merchants may 
end up exercising considerable power over the direct producers and force the latter 
to take lower rates of return (…) Social strategies to maintain the continuity of 
capital flow constitute a double-edged sword. While they may succeed in their 
immediate aim of smoothing out and facilitating the circulation process, they 
simultaneously create active power blocs among the merchants (…) and the 
financiers (…) who may pursue their own specific interests rather than serve the 
interests of capital in general (Harvey, 2014:75). 
As Harvey insightfully shows, capital fractions do not mechanically constitute a 
broader capitalist class, because their different functional positions put their 
interests at odds in many ways. As it will be shown, in the case of the wine sector, 
this can be appreciated in the relations between wineries and importers, and, 
especially, in the centrality acquired by retailers. As this chapter progress, the 
relationship between commercial and productive class fractions will be analyzed 
in detail by looking at its cooperative and conflicting dimension. 
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1.2 Subaltern classes 
The social actors that appear as structurally opposed to capital in the Argentinean 
Fair Trade wine industry cannot simply be conceptualized as belonging to the 
working class. While, for example, productive and commercial class fractions 
could be analytically integrated into the broader category of a capitalist class 
without raising major objections, the specificities that differentiate workers, 
contratistas and small producers make such a straightforward classification more 
difficult. When faced to the challenge of accounting for the common pole 
conformed by workers, contratistas and small producers (this is, the groups 
situated in the lowest hierarchy of the class structure of the Argentinean Fair Trade 
wine sector) a first option could have been to rely on the most basic Marxist class 
division – that one also followed more generally by the Amsterdam Project – and 
argue that if productive and commercial fractions could be more broadly 
understood as sharing a common capitalist interest, then workers, contratistas and 
small producers could be understood as different groups sharing the most general 
features of capitalists’ antagonist: the working class. While it is actually my goal 
to justify in this section that these three groups occupy an antagonistic position to 
that of productive and commercial capital fractions, encompassing them under the 
concept of working class (fractions) would either entail a reductionist approach to 
their main empirical features or an abusive stretching of that analytical category. 
This is due to the fact that even though all three groups occupy a subordinate 
position to that of capital (both, when we look more specifically at the wine 
industry and, more generally, when we analyze the general FTCC and its 
institutionalization), none of them is entirely equal to the others. That is why, in 
consonance with the proposal for advancing the Amsterdam Project that was 
presented in Chapter 1, I consider that all three groups are best conceptualized as 
subaltern classes.
Workers, broadly understood as wage earners, are not a homogenous fraction. 
Following the definition provided in Chapter 1, the most basic class division is 
established between those that control and supervise the process of production and 
those who execute productive tasks. The advantage of this definition, which does 
not restrict the main cleavage to the property of the means of production, is that it 
allows identifying different positions within the broader category of wage-earners. 
In this way, managers and executives, while not owning the means of production, 
are responsible for the organization and supervision of production, making them (a 
subordinate) part of a broader capitalist class. At the other end, we find a variety 
of workers who are in charge of the actual productive, administrative and 
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commercial activities. Independently of whether they work in a vineyard or a 
winery, their structural position in the productive process and vis-á-vis capitalist 
fractions makes it possible to group them together as part of a same working class. 
In a somewhat more intermediate position, the role of certain professionals (for 
example, enologists and agronomists) is highly important in the wine industry, 
both at the vineyard and the winery level. However, the actual hierarchy they 
occupy and their power to rule over the process of production often depends on 
the particular company under examination, since my fieldwork has shown that 
these features tend to vary importantly between situations where agronomists and 
enologist have manager-like capacities and others where their power is much more 
restricted to their technical area.40
As it was described in Chapter 5, contratistas – especially in practice – come very 
close to the figure of wage-earners. However, this figure still bears some 
important differences that make it difficult to argue that their position can be 
reduced to that of an ordinary worker: firstly, a contratista assumes a risk that 
workers do not, since most of their income depends on the realization of 
production in the market (which is not only subject to demand conditions, but also 
the specific characteristics of each year’s harvest), while workers, instead, are 
entitled to a wage in exchange for their labor, what guarantees them a payment 
independently of the performance of commodities at the marketplace. This fact not 
only puts contratistas’ interests more in line with those of the vineyard’s owner 
than in the case of workers, but also makes them more vulnerable to changing 
market conditions, inclement weather or unexpected problems in the productive 
process. Secondly, contratistas are entitled to a house in the property, obtaining in 
this way an important contribution in the form of indirect wage. This feature also 
means that the contratista, living with her/his family in the same place where s/he 
works, develops an important engagement with the productive unit and – in many 
occasions – with the landowner. This proximity to the vineyard’s owner is 
sometimes seen by contratistas as an outcome of their shared entrepreneurial status 
(Poblete, 2012). However, such a resemblance is more apparent than real, since 
the income a contratista makes does not allow them to accumulate and is restricted 
to reproduction only. Furthermore, even if contratistas become owners of a share 
of the total production, they have no ownership of the land they work on or the 
tools needed for their tasks. Lastly, while ordinary workers are hired for specific 

40ThesamehappenswhenlookingatthewayinwhichFairTraderegulationshavebeenputinpracticein
differentwineries:insomecompaniesenologistsandengineersarerepresentedintheJointBodyasonemore
groupofemployees(especiallyinbiggerwineries),whileinotheronestheyareconsideredaspartofthe
managementandthereforeobtainnorepresentationasworkers(especiallyinsmallerwineries).
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activities to be accomplished within defined timeframes, contratistas enjoy a much 
higher level of autonomy in the organization of their work (what includes even the 
possibility of hiring workers), as they are entitled to a certain degree of freedom in 
the organization of productive activities and their working time. 
While workers and contratistas share some important features, the figure of small 
producers is more clearly different from the previous two. The most evident 
reason for this is the fact that small producers (usually) own their means of 
productions, this is, the land where they grow their vineyards, the tools needed for 
their job and some economic resources in order to guarantee the necessary 
supplies. This means that, in principle, small producers are their own bosses, what 
gives them the capacity to organize the productive process and, in some cases, 
even hire workers. However, when looking at the actual practices and relations in 
which small producers engage in the Argentinean wine sector, there are some 
important reasons that tend to fade these capitalist-like attributes and make it 
necessary to find a concept that encompasses small producers together with 
workers and contratistas.  
In the first place, and focusing on the wine industry, it is clear that small producers 
occupy a precarious position in this sector, as it has been shown in the preceding 
chapters. If we understand “small” not only in terms of the surface occupied by the 
productive unit, but also taking into consideration its profitability,41 it is 
undeniable that a process of pauperization is affecting this group. This can be 
evidenced in various problems faced nowadays by small grape producers in 
Argentina: the permanent division of productive units – what makes them so small 
that they become unprofitable and forces their owners and their families to go out 
of business and look for employment opportunities in urban areas –, the usual 
wage-like terms in which they are paid for their production, the very little 
bargaining power vis-á-vis their buyers and the limited selling options (either due 
to the market’s oligopsonistic structure in the quantity-led regime of accumulation 
or the relation of semi-captivity with wineries in the qualitative-led regime of 
accumulation). Additionally, while it is true that unlike workers and contratistas 
small producers own capital, it is also true that they rely mostly on their own (and 
their family’s) labor power. In this way, and contrary to owners of bigger 
vineyards and wineries who own capital but purchase labor-power, small 
producers evidence much more even contributions in their capital/labor ratios. All 
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41Asithasbeenexplained,someproducerswithbelowaveragesurfaceofvineyardscanstillbeprofitableifthey
havetherightvarietyof(highquality)grapes.
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these facts, therefore, tend to nuance the centrality that capital takes when it comes 
to positioning small producers in the system of class relations of wine production: 
on the one hand, they possess capital and this would entitle them to be considered 
as a capitalist fraction but, on the other hand, it has to be noted that their capital is 
relatively small – even more if we consider it in relation to the important amounts 
of own and family unpaid labor that is involved – and the overall trend of the 
industry points towards their progressive marginalization in the system. This 
means not only that they tend to be displaced more and more to the periphery of 
the objective class structure, but also that they are more and more impeded of 
exercising their agency in the terms that a capitalist fraction would.  
While the position occupied by small producers in the Argentinean wine industry 
already expresses the need for an analytical concept that puts small producers 
together with the most subordinated groups in the sector, taking into consideration 
that one of the main goals of this chapter is to reconstruct the FTCC provides a 
second reason for this enterprise. Fairtrade International has defined workers and 
small producers as the main victims of the global trade system and, therefore, as 
its main beneficiaries. In this way, both groups appear to share a same pole that is 
opposed to capital. As a consequence, if one wants to comprehend the FTCC, it 
becomes necessary to provide a concept capable of accounting for the similarities 
that both constituencies possess and the cleavages that the system itself builds.  
All three groups – in spite of their differences and irreducibility to one same 
encompassing category, i.e. labor or working class – can be considered as part of a 
broader collective due to their subordinate condition vis-á-vis the capitalist class. 
Hence, even if these groups occupy different positions in the productive system 
and, as a consequence, do not experience strictly the same material conditions of 
existence or derive from them identical interests, all of them share a position of 
subordination to capital fractions, who are those that actually dominate the sector. 
Workers may be subordinated to managers, recruiting companies and winery or 
vineyard’s owners, contratistas respond to the owner of the vineyard where they 
work and have very little bargaining power when trying to sell their production to 
wineries (in most of the cases, it is the vineyard’s owner who decides on the sale) 
and small producers, too, are subordinated to buying wineries. In this way, the 
three groups come together by their shared domination under the rule of capital 
and it is precisely because of this common situation that I consider that the best 
way to account for them as a collective is the concept of subalternity. 
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All in all, the subaltern classes relevant to my case-study result from the 
juxtaposition of two different systems of positions: on the one hand, it has to be 
taken into account the positions occupied by the relevant actors in the Argentinean 
wine sector and, on the other hand, this should be complemented by the 
examination of the different positions distributed in the Fair Trade system. 
Building on the analysis presented in the previous chapters, it seems quite 
reasonable to state that at a more general level – that of the Fair Trade system – 
two main constituencies form the subaltern pole, i.e. workers and small producers. 
More specifically, when looking at my case study, we can identify three main 
subaltern classes: workers (both industrial and rural), contratistas and small grape 
producers. These three groups will constitute my subaltern classes in this 
dissertation. If I dare to speak of subaltern classes, it is only under the assumptions 
that underlie the concept of subalternity: the presence of heterogeneous groups, 
irreducible to one another in terms of position in the productive system or their 
capacity of (surplus) value creation and appropriation, who, nevertheless, can be 
identified as occupying a common “region” of the social space when analyzed by 
contrast to the dominant classes. In this way, a small producer cannot be equated 
to a worker because the former is owner of productive capital while the latter 
possesses only labor power and, therefore, their interests tend to diverge (the small 
producer, for example, might employ some workers for the harvest in the same 
fashion as any other capitalist, introducing to its circuit the most basic 
contradiction between capital and labor). However, when opposed to any of the 
big winery owners that concentrate most of the local market for wine, both a 
worker and a small grape producer can be identified as being subordinated to the 
capitalist’s power.  
1.3 Fair Trade actors 
The analysis of the political processes around the FTCC cannot be limited to 
capital fractions and subaltern classes, since it needs to introduce a third category 
of actors, which – at least a priori – is not organically connected to any of the 
other two classes. This third group, which I call “Fair Trade actors”, is composed 
by the network of organizations that provide the institutional framework for the 
Fair Trade certification-based system, but also all those other organizations that 
seek to promote this initiative and/or cooperate with it in a variety of ways.  
Within this category, therefore, it is possible to distinguish two groups. Firstly, 
those that compose what I call the Fair Trade bureaucracy, this is, all those 
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“official” organizations (and their members) that have the capacity to engage in 
the governance of, and keep running, the Fair Trade system. They are legitimized 
as the authoritative voices of the movement. This category, for example, includes 
the main organs of the Fair Trade system’s structure: Fairtrade International – 
composed by the three producer networks and 25 Fair Trade National Initiatives – 
and FLO-Cert, the autonomous organization in charge of auditing and certifying. 
Of particular relevance to my case study is the Fairtrade Foundation, which is the 
UK-based Fair Trade National Initiative. As a member of Fairtrade International, 
it takes part in the governance of the system and, as its main representative in the 
UK, it is in charge of licensing the use of the Fairtrade label on products. This 
more administrative duty – mostly related to auditing and overseeing that licensees 
fulfill all conditions and pay their fees – is complemented by more community-
oriented activities, which are mainly related to raising awareness, campaigning 
and promoting demand. In Argentina, instead, the presence of Fair Trade 
bureaucracy is limited to two liaison officers, who are in charge of supporting 
producers in the process of certification, promoting the system among non-
certified producers and, more generally, representing FLO in the producing 
countries.  
A second group within the Fair Trade constellation, which I call grassroots Fair 
Trade organizations, is composed by a variety of initiatives (sometimes run by 
more or less formal organizations, while others simply emerging from informal 
groups) that seek to cooperate in different ways with the institutionalized Fair 
Trade system, be it by disseminating information, creating awareness, promoting 
consumption, raising funds, etc. When it comes to my case study, this category of 
actors was only found in the United Kingdom. While Argentina is still a relatively 
new territory for Fair Trade production and is far from the leading countries in the 
number of certified producers, the UK is not only a traditional market for Fair 
Trade products, but also one of the biggest in the world. Additionally, Argentina is 
limited to being a place of production, while the UK is instead a place of 
consumption. As the following sections will show, consumption is fundamental 
for the sustainability of the Fair Trade system, making an imperative to promote 
an ever increasing number of sales. That is why the promotion of Fair Trade is so 
important in consumer societies, which has led to the emergence of an important 
number of organization that are in charge of spreading the message. As a 
consequence, it is possible to find in the UK an important variety of grassroots 
actors that seek to raise awareness of Fair Trade and promote its consumption. 
Among others, it is possible to identify steering committees in many cities or a 
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multitude of supporting groups that are arranged around particular institutions, 
such as schools, universities, religious organizations, etc. Additionally, one can 
find many ad-hoc groups that organize themselves for specific events. These 
varieties of grassroots organizations collaborate many times with the Fair Trade 
bureaucracy even if they are not part of it officially. Lastly, they also engage in 
shared projects with retailers or other commercial actors.  
All in all, this section has presented the main actors that will be relevant for the 
analysis of the FTCC. A first group of actors is composed by the productive and 
commercial capitalist class fractions. The second group of actors, which I have 
termed subaltern, is composed by three different classes – workers, contratistas 
and small producers – who occupy a common subordinated position. Lastly, two 
different types of Fair Trade actors have been identified: those belonging to Fair 
Trade’s bureaucracy and those that constitute grassroots organizations. The 
reminder of this chapter will reconstruct the FTCC and critically examine the 
different ways in which it relates to this variety of actors. This will be done by 
looking at how they take part in the contested construction of the FTCC and by 
analyzing how the final shape acquired by the latter affects the position occupied 
by the different class fractions in the system.  
2. The three pillars of the FTCC 
The Fair Trade movement’s vision is one of “a world in which justice and 
sustainable development are at the heart of trade structures and practices so that 
everyone, through their work, can maintain a decent and dignified livelihood and 
develop their full human potential” (World Fair Trade Organization and Fairtrade 
Labelling Organizations, 2009:6). This broad statement of intent appears 
ambitious and vague at the same time: while probably no one would object a trade 
regime in which “justice” occupies a central position, it would surely be more 
difficult to agree on how justice should be understood. The same reasoning applies 
to the means through which Fairtrade seeks to materialize this vision: while that 
ultimate objective might be shared universally, which would be the best (fairest) 
means to achieve it? At a first glance, Fair Trade does not provide an unequivocal 
answer. The analysis of its most relevant institutional documents provides a wide 
range of alternatives that differ from each other to a great extent. On the one side 
of the spectrum, we can find that “the bottom line for Fairtrade is impact: a better 
life for small-scale producers in developing countries” (Fairtrade Labelling 
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Organizations International, 2004:3). From such a pragmatic perspective, fairness 
means better living conditions, without specifying the degree of such an 
improvement (is any kind of advance good enough to consider the Fair Trade 
mode of regulation as fair?) or the means through which it should be achieved (is 
it the same if the Fair Trade movement transforms the international trade regime 
or simply repositions its producers within?). On the other end of the spectrum, we 
find more radical claims, according to which Fair Trade is committed to major 
structural transformations: “we have the capacity to change the terms of trade” 
(Fairtrade International, 2011a:4) in order to “overcome the challenges that keep 
them [people] locked in poverty and create opportunities for greater impact for 
those who need it most” (Ibid:6).The very broad range of answers that seems to be 
available for the question of what Fair Trade stands for shows that the meaning of 
the FTCC is far from being self-evident and demands a critical reconstruction. 
That is precisely the goal of this section.  
Since the FTCC can only be best understood at a more general level – as an 
element common to the Fair Trade system as a whole – its reconstruction cannot 
be derived from the data collected specifically in connection to my case study. 
That is why the analysis of this section will be composed by two main levels: on 
the one hand, the FTCC will be presented as a general element that underlies Fair 
Trade’s institutionalization and practices all around the world; on the other hand, I 
will discuss how this general FTCC is embedded in the case under examination 
and how the different relevant actors have appropriated it.  
In order to reconstruct the FTCC, I undertook a thorough analysis of the most 
relevant institutional documents (annual reports, standards and their explicative 
documents, brochures and various sorts of promotional materials) produced by 
those organizations identified as part of the Fair Trade bureaucracy. In this way, 
by relying on the sources produced by the system’s official, authoritative, voices, 
it was possible to identify the most defining features of the FTCC. These can be 
condensed in three main elements: firstly, a Fair Trade geography, which uses a 
North/South dichotomy in order to explain the main problems of international 
trade and offer a solution. Secondly, a fairness principle, according to which a 
more balanced global distribution of wealth can be achieved by the mutually 
beneficial collaboration of actors with conflicting interests. Thirdly, the postulate 
of a consumer-producer nexus emphasizes the new relations of proximity that Fair 
Trade can build between both poles of the commodity chain, and how this would 
create mutual empathy and trigger transformation. 
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These elements, I argue, constitute the three pillars on which the FTCC is 
structured. While all three are closely interrelated and overlap in various aspects, I 
have decided to present them separately for the sake of clarity. Hence, this 
subsection will offer an examination of the main elements that constitute the 
FTCC. This will be done in the following way: I will begin by reconstructing each 
element along the same lines that the official Fair Trade discourse does. After that, 
these initial assumptions will be contested by putting them in relation to the actual 
workings of the Fair Trade system and the power dynamics in which different 
actors engage. This will make possible a reconstruction of the FTCC that takes 
into consideration not only discursive elements, but also the ways in which they 
come to fit the particular social relations that the Fair Trade system structures. 
Lastly, I will examine and discuss the concrete ways in which these general 
elements of the FTCC are specifically embedded in the case of Fair Trade wine 
produced in Argentina and consumed in the United Kingdom.  
2.1 Fair Trade’s geography: A North-South divide 
The FTCC is characterized by two main pairs of concepts: North/South and 
producer/consumer. While both of them are presented as intrinsically interrelated 
– and many times even as synonyms – each couple is articulated in a different 
way, with the first pair being usually depicted as a dichotomy and the second one 
as complementary. In this subsection, I will engage with the North/South couple, 
leaving the consumer/producer relation for the third subsection. 
Fair Trade’s “I” has been identified with the northern hemisphere socially-
concerned individuals that, given their better economic situation, are interested in 
supporting poor, third world producers by buying their commodities. This 
identification of the official Fair Trade structure with the North is a consequence 
of the historical development of this initiative, which has been driven by NGOs 
and other associations based in Europe and the United States since its inception. It 
was these organizations that came together to create Fairtrade International and 
gave shape to the Fair Trade system as we know it today. While the last years have 
witnessed the acquisition of full membership and 50% ownership of FLO by the 
three producer networks (representing Africa, Asia and Latin America 
respectively), the Fair Trade bureaucratic structure – and most of the grassroots 
organizations that support it – are still rooted in the richer countries. As a 
consequence, Fair Trade’s representation seems to continue unchanged, being 
identified with the North, while the South encompasses those producers and 
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workers, in the developing world, that are needed of their help in order to escape 
from their subordinated position in the system of international trade.  
Therefore, the South is usually understood because of their ‘lack of’ when 
compared to the North: lack of economic resources, lack of access to basic 
services, lack of infrastructure; but also lack of initiative and power to change their 
situation. Thereby, it is the North that takes the leading role and appears as the 
active side that seeks to empower those marginalized by conventional trade. An 
alliance of wealthy consumers, shops, retailers and importers has to coordinate 
actions in order to help them export their production, which is appreciated not so 
much because of its intrinsic characteristics, but mainly due to the humanitarian 
sense of the action. On top of social and economic aspects, this construction 
comprises racial attributes. A careful analysis of pictures and illustrations included 
in Fairtrade International’s last five Annual Reports and two brochures produced 
for farmers and workers shows that Fair Trade activists and executives as well as 
exporters, importers and consumers are always white, while that is never the case 
when it comes to producers. The Fair Trade’s other is exotic and ethnic by 
definition. They wear traditional clothes and use obsolete tools. As it becomes 
clear, a divide between North and South is at the heart of the Fair Trade proposal, 
with two well defined poles constructed by multiple antinomies: rich/poor; can 
help/needs help; imports/exports; consumer/producer; powerful/powerless; 
white/non-white; western/exotic. This dichotomous Fair Trade geography 
underlies not only the diagnosis put forward by Fair Trade (in terms of unfair 
international terms of exchange, where the North enriches at the expense of the 
South), but also one of the most defining attributes of their political project: “the 
unique relationship between the North and the South, a strong voice and role for 
producers and workers, makes Fairtrade different from all other competing ethical 
schemes” (Fairtrade International, 2013c:6).  
This North/South divide, therefore, constitutes one of the main axis along which 
the FTCC is built. These concepts become central categories for understanding 
social reality and, at the same time, defining the targets towards which the Fair 
Trade movement is to direct its actions: “Fair Trade connects the aims of those in 
the developed world who seek greater sustainability and justice with the needs of 
those in the South who most need those changes” (World Fair Trade Organization 
& Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2009:6). However, its centrality 
is not only limited to that. The Fair Trade geography also fulfills a cartographic 
function, since it provides the coordinates along which all relevant actors 
connected to the Fair Trade system can be positioned and their mutual connections 
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established. In this way, the North/South divide contributes to the FTCC with an 
organizing principle that makes possible – through the classification of relevant 
groups into the two main categories, the definition of equivalences among them, 
and the establishment of specific relations – to convey a more synthetic image of 
the system: the South equals producers and workers (subaltern classes), while the 
North comprises consumers, importers, processors, distributors, retailers, etc. 
(mainly, capital fractions). As a consequence, what this particular geography 
explains is that a praxis inspired by the FTCC would entail a redistribution of 
wealth flowing from the North to the South, from capital to the subaltern.  
The relevance of Fair Trade’s geography is such that it transcends the mere 
rhetorical level. This can be best seen in the fact that, beyond the discursive 
construction, Fairtrade International has elaborated a “Geographical Scope Policy” 
that determines the countries where producer organizations can be Fairtrade-
certified – or, in other words, that establishes the territories that are officially 
considered as the South. The definitive list of “producer” countries is divided into 
three main groups: Africa and the Middle East, Asia and Pacific, Latin America 
and the Caribbean. According to Fairtrade International, the selection of countries 
is based on a three-dimensional criterion: “income per capita, wealth disparity and 
other economic and social indicators, as well as long-term impact for producers 
and Fairtrade International’s ability to support producers” (Fairtrade International, 
2015). However, these technical criteria are complemented by some restrictions 
that seem to be more closely related to ideational factors (the particular 
imaginaries that the FTCC has created about North and South), as the exclusion of 
members of the European Union and G8-countries shows. What this evidences is 
the fact that the North/South divide has become such a representative component 
within the FTCC that Fairtrade International – even if allegedly including socio-
economic criteria – is not open to risk its credibility by certifying producers 
located in what is conventionally considered as the North. While most of the 
European Union member countries would probably not qualify as “South” 
according to socioeconomic criteria, the fact that not a single Eastern European 
country has been considered as “certifiable” could be a more contentious issue. In 
relation to this, the Geographical Policy explains that “it would be necessary to 
consider, for example, before proposing to include any European countries, 
whether they are likely to join the EU within the next 10 years or so” (Ibid), as 
members of the European Union are not able to certify. In these cases, we actually 
see the primacy of the North/South construction over the actual analysis of 
socioeconomic conditions, as the very real possibility of including some of the 
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poorest European countries among those places deemed to be certified as 
producers is denied in order to preserve the coherence of the FTCC’s geographical 
element. 
Such policy puts in evidence that the Fair Trade geography operates from a state-
centric perspective. This is given by the fact that the North/South division – which 
is many times equated to a rich/poor divide – is operationalized through the 
classification of nation-states. As a consequence, it is countries “as a whole”, as 
homogeneous entities, that are to be considered places of exploitation and 
marginalization or wealthy areas prone to ethical consumption. In this way, Fair 
Trade’s geography both excludes from the possibility of certification the subaltern 
classes of “Northern” countries and allows dominant groups in “Southern” 
countries to take park in the Fair Trade production. 
So far, I have presented Fair Trade’s geography as a “general” element (i.e. an 
abstract feature common to the whole system) of the FTCC. However, in what 
follows, I proceed with its critical examination by looking at the way in which the 
FTCC is embedded in the case of Fair Trade wine produced in Argentina and 
consumed in the United Kingdom. To do so, I will contrast the North/South 
cleavage proposed by the FTCC with a class-driven reading and discuss the 
implications that the latter has for our understanding of the former.  
As it was described in the previous section, the distribution of class fractions in the 
case under analysis seems to be quite homogeneous, with a minority presence of 
commercial vis-à-vis productive capital among the Argentina-based actors and the 
exactly opposite situation in the United Kingdom. At a first glance, this would 
seem to point towards a divide that is drawn along Fair Trade’s geography: on the 
one side, we find a global South, characterized as the “producing pole” of the 
relationship (be it in the form of local SPOs or, as we have seen, any other firm) 
and in a disadvantaged position due to the unfair terms of exchange under which 
their commodities are sold. On the other side, we find the global North, who is 
responsible for these unfair terms of exchange and shall be committed to fairer 
commercial relations with the producers of commodities in the global South in 
order to help them improve their situation. In other words: commercial capital 
cooperates in order to improve the situation of those engaged in production 
(subaltern classes and productive capital) through the construction of a more 
balanced distribution of value between South and North.  
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However, upon a closer inspection of the certified organizations, the North/South 
contradiction becomes more difficult to sustain. Simply by looking at the capital’s 
origin of each actor, we can find a heterogeneous profile, quite different from the 
purely national composition one might have derived from the North/South 
dichotomy. Out of the 11 certified organizations (for an overview, see Table 5), 
five are from Argentina. These include, of course, the two SPO (La Chileciteña 
and Uvasol), which are owned by their members, plus three private firms 
(Medrano, Finca Alentejo and Ecowine). Bodega Fabretti is owned jointly by 
Argentinean and Swiss capital, though the biggest economic contribution has 
come from the foreign investor (Interview AFT14). Two wineries belong to 
Chilean wine groups: La Mariana is one of the nine wineries that Grupo San Pedro 
Tarapacá, the second biggest Chilean wine exporter, owns in Chile (7) and 
Argentina (2). Tres Vientos belongs to the Viña Concha y Toro Holding, a wine 
group that is not only Chile’s number one exporter by volume, but also the world’s 
5th during 2013. Bodega Palmer has belonged to Gernot Langes-Swarovski since 
the Austrian magnate bought it back in 1989, while Paso Alto is part of the French 
wine group Edonia, who possesses wineries in France and Hungary too. Lastly, 
Mendoza Wines is part of the South African Original Wine group, which runs 
wineries in South Africa and Chile too. When looking at commercial capital in the 
UK, three main companies concentrate the majority of Fair Trade wine imports: 
Herrmanns, a British wine importer and distributor, Original Wine Ltd., the UK-
based commercial branch of the South African Original Wine and Larex A.B, a 
joint venture between La Chileciteña and the Swedish company Giertz A.B., 
which is based in Stockholm but manages La Chileciteña’s imports around 
Europe.
Two preliminary conclusions that question the South-poor and North-rich 
dichotomies built by Fair Trade can be drawn from this overview. In the first 
place, Fair Trade’s main cleavage that opposes South and North does not seem to 
apply. As it is evident, almost half of the certified wineries are owned by 
transnational capital, while one of the main Fair Trade wine merchants in the UK 
is owned by a South African group and another one is half-owned by an 
Argentinean cooperative. The heterogeneous origins of the capitals involved 
among the Fair Trade actors make it in extreme difficult to buy into Fair Trade’s 
narrative of northern buyers helping southern producers.  
In the second place, one of the most widespread chain of equivalences, 
south=producer=poor, does not hold either. The standard for the certification of 
HL situations stipulates an interesting condition: “applicants shall be asked to 
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demonstrate the way in which they are currently disadvantaged by market and 
trading conditions” (Fairtrade International, 2011c:6). In this way, the standard 
seeks to guarantee that the private companies that certify Fair Trade in the South 
are “disadvantaged” and not dominant ones. However, when looking at the HL 
certified actors in the Argentinean wine sector, the findings are paradoxical, to say 
the least. How could, for example, Tres Vientos, which was Argentina’s 4th 
biggest exporting winery by volume during 2013 (Fronzo, 2014) and is part of the 
Concha y Toro Holding (one of the biggest wine groups in the world), 
demonstrate that it occupies a disadvantaged position within the current market 
and trading conditions? Similar questions could be raised about Palmer, 5th 
biggest exporter during 2013 (Ibid) or La Mariana, who has access to the 
commercialization channels of the international group it belongs to. Last but not 
least, while SPOs do not need to prove their disadvantaged position, the fact that 
La Chileciteña cooperative is co-owner of its own importer and distributor in 
Europe is at least counter-intuitive, especially if one considers the average image 
of a Southern producer that the FTCC transmits.  
What these findings seem to point towards is the convenience of analyzing the 
conflictive interests that Fair Trade seeks to arbitrate along the lines of class 
fractions. Because, at the end of the day, is it not Fair Trade attempting to regulate 
the relationships between groups with different functions and positions in the 
economic system (workers, small producers and their organizations, contratistas, 
productive capital, commercial capital) much more than North-South relations? 
Adopting a North/South perspective, instead, does not offer any clear patterns, 
since, for example, at the level of production it is possible to find individual 
capitals that are attached to local circuits in the South and other ones that belong to 
transnational groups, while the level of circulation evidences the presence of 
capital originating both in the South and North.  
What the FTCC does when insisting on the North/South cleavage is actually a 
displacement: it has found a pair of concepts that do not directly find the roots of 
injustice in the capitalist system as such, in its social relations, tensions and 
contradictions, but, instead, in the geographical distribution of value. In this way, 
the problem is not posed in the terms of the exploitation of labor or small 
producers by capital, but it is found in a much vaguer, superficial, dichotomy with 
no direct, evident, links to the economic structure that causes this unequal 
distribution. In this way, Fair Trade functions as an alternative, capital-friendly, 
way of denunciation. And, as it will be explained in the following subsection, this 
capital-friendly denunciation that the North/South divide makes possible is one of 
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the key elements in order to grant coherence to the FTCC and make the Fair Trade 
system’s smooth functioning possible.  
2.2 The fairness principle: capitalist and subaltern interests’ conciliation 
While the analysis of Fair Trade’s geography gave us an insight into what the 
FTCC seems to pose as its objective (a transformation of commercial relations 
between North and South), the current subsection will instead look at the way in 
which such transformation is expected to be achieved. Under the title of “the 
fairness principle”, I would like to present the particular understanding of justice 
that underlies the strategy adopted by Fair Trade: the conciliation of capitalist and 
subaltern interests. In order to provide this analysis, I begin by describing the way 
in which the FTCC proposes to remediate poverty and marginalization through a 
mutually beneficial collaboration between the subaltern and capital. Then, I move 
on to discuss the way in which this fairness principle has been institutionalized in 
different key features of the Fair Trade system. Lastly, I present the concrete ways 
in which the principle of subaltern and capital conciliation is appropriated by the 
relevant actors of the Argentinean Fair Trade wine industry and discuss its 
consequences.  
At the core of the FTCC rests the idea that the interests of capital fractions and 
subaltern classes can be conciliated. The guiding principle of the FTCC is that the 
system can bring together capital and labor, producers and their buyers, and make 
them cooperate in order to improve the situation of workers and small producers 
while providing benefits for firms, commercializing companies and retailers at the 
same time. The FTCC rests on the commitment to this convergence of interests 
and that is why it seeks to present the socio-economic development of producers 
as a business case: “strong, independent producer organizations rooted in fairness 
and striving for social, economic and environmental sustainability are good for 
businesses too. They are reliable partners, who know their farmers and crops, and 
what the market needs” (Fairtrade International, 2014:4). It is clear how in this 
quote the Chair of the Fairtrade International Board stresses that the improvements 
experienced by producers do not threaten in any way the interests of businesses 
but, on the contrary, benefits them. The same reasoning applies to the case of 
workers, as Fairtrade’s liaison officer for South East Asia explained: “a happy 
worker is a good worker. A good worker is an asset to the plantation as well as to 
its owning company” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2004:9). 
Here, once more, the improvement of the subaltern subject (presented as an asset)
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is not portrayed as an end in itself, but as a means to improving capital’s position. 
That Fairtrade seeks to benefit both, producers and traders, is also explicitly stated 
in the explanatory document that accompanies the standards: “the aim of these 
standards is to foster the establishment of mutually beneficial and sustained trade 
relationships between Fairtrade certified producers and traders” (Fairtrade 
International, 2011b:3). 
This principle of interest conciliation is already inscribed in the main tool that Fair 
Trade has chosen: voluntary-certification. Fair Trade is part of a broader trend of 
ethical initiatives that seeks to transform corporate behavior without resorting to 
the state, previously described as private regulation. Due to the absence of a 
formal political authority typical of this sort of schemes, these initiatives cannot be 
imposed to all relevant actors in the form of compulsory regulation and, therefore, 
depend on the voluntary acceptance by those same entities on whom the norms are 
to be applied. The voluntary nature of the system determines from its inception the 
overall logic of private regulation: if the standard setter expects producer 
organizations and firms to incur on the extra costs associated to the adoption of the 
new norms (an extra cost that does not apply to their competitors if they choose 
not to take part in the system), it will have to offer certain benefits in exchange. 
Otherwise, in the absence of a formal political authority with the power to enforce 
the new rules, no private actor will be willing to assume additional costs or 
burdens. In the case of Fair Trade, as it has been explained in the previous chapter, 
the certification grants access to a market niche in which consumers are aware of 
the ethical added value of the brand and competition is reduced to certified 
products. Other forms or reward are related to symbolic recognition, as 
commercializing Fair Trade products can be presented as a proof of the 
corporation’s ethical commitment. 
As a consequence, the decision of constructing the Fair Trade system on the basis 
of a voluntary certification provides a first and original structural constraint: 
business-friendliness. If the Fair Trade movement wants to improve the situation 
of workers in plantations, it needs those same plantations to be certified; if they 
want to improve the situation of small producers, they need them and their buyers 
to be certified. And, most importantly, if the Fair Trade system wants plantations, 
traders, importers, exporters and retailers to work within their certification-based 
framework, they need to offer them some incentives to do so. And this does not 
only mean providing economic or symbolic rewards, but also tempering the 
conditions set by their standards: because if standards become excessively 
demanding, they will eclipse the potential benefits of joining the system, 
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frightening away potential members. Consequently, Fair Trade needs to achieve a 
balance between, on the one hand, what would constitute ideal conditions of 
production and trade and, on the other, the initial limited interest that firms have in 
subjecting themselves voluntarily to an extra body of regulations. All in all, if the 
certification-based Fair Trade mode of regulation is to function smoothly, it needs 
to work within the self-imposed imperative of providing benefits to companies. If 
it fails to do so, no plantation, processor, exporter, importer or retailer will be 
interested in certifying and, consequently, no worker or small producer will be 
benefited.
While subaltern and capitalist interests are included in the FTCC, and their 
convergence seems to be the ultimate goal, both social classes are endowed with 
very different amounts of power. This happens as a consequence of, first, the 
already explained structural constraint imposed by a system based on voluntary-
certification, and, second, due to the critical importance of capital for the 
functioning and growth of the system. This second reason is quite simple to 
understand: even if SPOs and companies relying on HL have obtained their 
respective certifications and comply with them exemplary, they will not yield the 
main benefits of Fair Trade if they fail to secure sales. Both the Fairtrade 
minimum price and the Fairtrade Premium – the most important innovations 
offered by the Fair Trade system – depend on the (volume of) sales achieved by 
the producer. Here again capital – and more precisely, commercial capital – is 
invested with a fundamental importance, because for Fair Trade to provide 
benefits to producers and workers, it depends on capital’s purchases. And these 
purchases will only occur, of course, if the processors, traders, exporter, importers, 
distributors and retailers are presented with a business opportunity. If producers 
and workers are to be benefited by Fair Trade, so is capital. Therefore, it is not 
only the nature of voluntary-certification-based systems, but also the particular 
position occupied by capital in the Fair Trade mode of regulation, that reinforces 
the principle of mutual benefits at the heart of the FTCC: “FLO is here to 
introduce companies to producers and open doors for both” (Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International, 2010:4).  
The unequal hierarchical position that capital occupies in the system grants an 
important degree of immunity: if it is to take part in the system in order to 
alleviate the suffering of workers and producers, capital needs to be guaranteed 
that this will not be done at its expense. This is particularly relevant in the case of 
HL certified firms, since here Fair Trade attempts to regulate the relationships 
between wage-earners and their employers. However, if the relationship between 
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capital and labor is understood primarily as a conflict over the distribution of 
surplus value, the immunity imperative leaves very little scope for transformative 
actions. While the promise of immunity is, of course, unwritten and tacit, there are 
different ways in which it can be appreciated. One clear example is the presence of 
members of the management in the Joint Body. While they have historically been 
in a secondary position vis-á-vis the workers’ representative (having only a 
minority of votes in the past and – since 2014 – no voting rights at all), 
management representatives have always preserved their veto power in order to 
block any project financed with the Fairtrade premium if “it has demonstrable 
negative structural, financial or social impact on the company”.  
Another clear example of the way in which Fair Trade protects businesses from 
negative impacts derived from empowering workers and producers can be seen in 
the adjustments of the balance between minimum prices and Premiums. In 2007 a 
minimum price for tea was introduced for the first time. This product was not new 
to Fair Trade, since it had been produced under its standards for a long time, but 
has up to that moment benefited only from the Premium. Now, with the 
establishment of a minimum price, tea producers face the risk of seeing their sales 
reduced due to the higher overall price faced by eventual buyers. Faced to this 
situation, what FLO decided to do was to “slightly reduce the Fairtrade Premium” 
which has “traditionally been set at a high level” in order to “help maximise 
market access opportunities” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 
2008:17). If this was the case of a SPO one could describe this measure as a 
simple redistribution of benefits for producers, which flow from one category 
(premium) to the other (minimum price). However, Fairtrade tea is almost 
exclusively produced in plantations. What this means is that the establishment of a 
minimum price only benefits the company – who is the one selling the product – 
while the workers’ main benefit is restricted to the Premium. FLO’s decision of 
introducing a minimum price at the expense of the reduction of the Fairtrade 
Premium was actually a redistribution of the Fair Trade benefits, which actually 
flowed from the workers to the plantation owners. Exactly the same situation took 
place in 2006, when a rise in the minimum price of bananas (another of the most 
popular products among HL certified companies) was compensated by a decrease 
in the Premium. This shows that when market opportunities have been at risk, 
adjustments have been done in favor of capital. 
While capital power in the system is clear and undeniable, the FTCC presents the 
relationships between managers and workers and producers and their buyers as 
horizontal partnerships. Capital fractions and subaltern classes are presented as 
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equals who share decision making faculties. This, in the first place, covers the 
actual unequal structural power that each class possesses in the system. In the 
second place, it implies that most decisions have to be taken consensually by 
capital and the subaltern classes, limiting in this way the freedom and autonomy 
the latter in the process of creating a fair productive and commercial regime. This 
last consequence can be seen in a variety of situations. The presence of 
management representatives with veto-power in the Joint Body – as it has been 
explained – is a clear example of this. Even if the role of management in this 
organ has been weakened with the last reform, a major interrogation remains 
pertinent: if the Fairtrade Premium constitutes a fund that is to benefit workers, 
their families and communities, why should worker representatives discuss their 
ideas with the management? The idea of a partnership between capital and 
subaltern classes is also embedded in the practice of standard setting, as FLO 
explains: “we consult both producers and business partners to regularly review our 
standards and prices” (Fairtrade International, 2012:8). Here, once more, the 
acceptance of the possibility of convergent interests limits the transformative 
potential of Fair Trade: standards can promote improvements for workers and 
small producers only as long as the measures taken are acceptable to managers and 
buyers.  
Reinecke and Ansari’s (2015) analysis of the introduction of a Fairtrade minimum 
price for the production of rooibos tea in South Africa offers a valuable practical 
examples of how FLO’s belief in a common interest and a capital-subaltern 
compromise undermine the possibility of advancing decisions in the direction of 
an emancipatory position for small producers and workers. As it has been 
explained, the Fairtrade minimum price is supposed to be based on what FLO 
describes as costs of sustainable production, which shall constitute an objective 
point of departure for the discussion of the final minimum price. However, the 
application of this principle is not as simple as it might appear at a first glance. 
After the relevant price researches for rooibos tea production in South Africa were 
done, the results showed very disparate costs structures, where HL certified 
companies put forward a figure that was less than half of the one presented by 
SPOs. This created a conflict at the heart of the negotiation: on one side, small 
producer representatives demanded the fixation of a price high enough to cover 
their costs of sustainable production. On the other side, however, representatives 
of plantation managers (backed up by traders) opposed any price that would 
exceed their costs, arguing that it would jeopardize their opportunities for market 
access. Representatives of NGOs sided with the small producer’s position. The 
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Standards Unit (composed by two representatives from Labelling Initiatives, 
producers and traders each) was therefore to agree on the final price. At the end, it 
was decided “to make a compromise” (Ibid:878). The compromise was a “middle 
ground between CoSP [costs of sustainable production] of Hired Labour and 
Small Farmer” (Ibid.), a middle ground that, nevertheless, “was a price about 1/3 
below the CoSP of Fairtrade’s key constituency; marginalized, smallholder 
farmers lacking access to conventional markets” (Ibid:875).  
In a different publication, Reinecke (2010) presents a very similar situation, which 
took place during 2006-7 when the Latin American Fairtrade network of small 
producers (CLAC) presented a cost study according to which, in order to account 
for inflation and increased costs, the Fairtrade coffee minimum price should 
increase from 1.21 USD/lb to 1.41 USD/lb. As in the case of rooibos tea, 
producers and traders adopted clashing positions in the negotiation, but this time 
representatives from the Labelling Initiatives openly opposed the producers’ 
position and any kind of change in the minimum price: 
Opposition came from some of the National Labelling Initiatives. They had invested 
tremendous energy into mobilizing civil society groups and convincing significant 
brands and supermarkets to adopt Fairtrade. Afraid to alienate some of their own 
new corporate supporters, they justified their reluctance to increase the coffee price 
by appealing to the risk that a significant fall in coffee sales would be harmful to 
producers. That behind each pricing decision lurked the uncertainty of how the 
market would react was one of the most powerful ways in which market rationality 
affected judgements on prices (Reinecke, 2010:572) 
The position adopted by the same Fairtrade bureaucracy here can only be 
described as paradoxical: while their claimed mission is to improve the livelihood 
of small producers and one of their main tools to do that is the promotion of a 
minimum price that takes into account the costs of sustainable production, in this 
negotiation they were opposed to the price increases demanded by the Producers 
Network. Instead of backing up small producers, they supported the view held by 
traders (and, implicitly, retailers), by arguing that an increase in price would 
threaten their market opportunities. The final result of this negotiation was an 
increase of four cents to 1.25 USD/lb, instead of the 20 cents suggested by 
CLAC’s study, or the 10 cents to which their demand decreased when the 
negotiations deadlocked. Once more, the goal of conciliating conflicting interests 
– added in this case to the explicit concern by Fairtrade officials about the 
structural market-dependence of the certification system – led to a 
disadvantageous result for small producers, who saw an increase in the minimum 
price which was far from what they had originally demanded. What these two 
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examples clearly show is that Fairtrade’s aim of reconciling the interests of small 
producers (subaltern class), large plantations owners (productive capital) and 
traders (productive and commercial capital, depending on the case) results in a de-
radicalization of its potential. And this does not only mean that Fairtrade fails in 
moving towards major transformations, but also that they fail to deliver one of 
their most basic promises: providing a price that covers the costs of sustainable 
production.
When analyzed in the context of my case study, the fairness principle at the core 
of the FTCC seeks to legitimate a variety of subaltern-capital relations across the 
Argentinean Fair Trade wine sector: labor and capital (mainly in the cases of 
wineries, but also in some cases of grape production), grape producers and 
wineries, contratistas and, on the one hand, vineyard owners, and, on the one hand, 
wineries. In the reminder of this section, I offer an account of how the fairness 
principle is appropriated by the most relevant actors in the sector. 
In general terms, my experience in the field showed that, far from provoking 
skepticism, the overall logic of interest conciliation at the heart of the FTCC is 
welcomed by all relevant actors, especially those belonging to the subaltern 
classes. This can be seen in two main ways. Firstly, the mutual compatibility of 
interests is many times portrayed as an objective fact, this is, it seems to be 
naturalized by the actors involved: what is positive for capital is also positive for 
the subaltern. Chino, for example, one of the contratistas from Uvasol, explains 
that if this SPO wants to benefit more from Fair Trade, they need wineries (their 
buyers) to boost their sales: “the issue of wine sales [is the key]; to be able to 
export, which has become increasingly difficult lately. And then, if the bodegueros 
do well, we do well too” (Interview AFT9). In Chino’s view, Fair Trade seems to 
perfectly align the interests of winery owners (bodegueros) and contratistas: the 
latter will only benefit from Fair Trade if the former are successful in increasing 
their exports. A very similar argument is made by the grape producer Eduardo, the 
president of Uvasol, when explaining that their association and big wineries can 
benefit from Fair Trade as partners: “we are very hopeful, because we know that 
the benefit is immediate. If the sales grow for Tres Vientos, Palmer, La Mariana, 
for the certified wineries, then we too go hand-in-hand with them. It’s like that, 
it’s a direct benefit” (Interview AFT11). Lastly, Gilberto, a vineyard worker 
employed at Ecowine, also highlights the coincidence of interests between labor 
and capital: “I hope that sales increase a lot, for the benefit of everyone, for the 
owners and for us” (Interview AFT24). This same “spill-over” logic is presented 
by Richard, manager at Mendoza Wines, as a pre-condition for the effective 
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functioning of Fair Trade: “sometimes Fair Trade doesn’t help small producers. It 
doesn’t help us, but if it doesn’t help us, we cannot buy small producers their 
grapes” (Interview AFT27). As the quote shows, in the view of this manager 
capitalist and subaltern possibilities of benefits are entangled: if the former is not 
“helped” by the system, it cannot “help” the latter.  
Secondly, the coincidence of interests is many times not only described as the 
natural course of the Fair Trade logic, but it is also perceived positively, especially 
by the subaltern. This is precisely what Eduardo sees as the most interesting 
element within Fair Trade, the possibility of improving the situation of small grape 
producers and wineries at the same time, diving benefits in a balanced way: “it is 
more than reasonable that the agreement you’ll reach with the winery will be more 
than beneficial for oneself and for the winery too. Because that’s what matters. I 
think that what sparks interest the most in the Fair Trade system is that balance, 
that it is useful for both parts” (Interview AFT11). Within the FTCC labor and 
capital become partners, the intrinsic conflictive characteristics of their relation are 
shaded by an ethos of solidarity, where not only capital has accepted to enter the 
system in order to favor its workers, but also workers feel responsible for the 
success of capital. Omar, president of the Joint Body at Paso Alto, gives a clear 
example of this when explaining the reasons for behaving in accordance to the 
Fair Trade rules: “that’s why, if we do something wrong we run the risk of losing 
the Fair Trade certification, and that’s not what we want (…) As much for us as 
for the association and also for the company” (Interview AFT4). In Omar’s view, 
it is not only important to remain within the Fair Trade system because of the 
impact it produces on workers, but also because of a sense of responsibility 
towards the smooth functioning of the firm. Juan, president of the Joint Body at 
Ecowine, highlights the convergence of interests as a positive aspect – “at the 
same time happy, because while we benefit, the owners benefit” – and has no 
hesitations to identify the workers’ well-being with the company’s success: 
“what’s fundamental here – I think – is to hope that the owners continue selling 
and that the owners continue adding up, because we will all benefit from it” 
(interview AFT22). 
As this brief overview of interviews excerpts show, representatives from all the 
relevant subaltern classes (contratistas, workers, small grape producers) seem to 
have appropriated the FTCC’s view of the mutual compatibility of capitalist and 
subaltern interests as natural and desirable. It is worth highlighting that this is not 
necessarily done in a naïve or misperceived way: the subaltern actors do not see 
Fair Trade – and the role of businesses within – as a purely charitable matter. 
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Instead, they are well aware of the fact that the company they work for or the 
buyer they sell to engages with the system because it provides them with certain 
benefits. However, what is interesting here is the fact that they are aware of this 
and see it as legitimate. They see the interests behind the firm’s involvement and 
their position in the system as a fair choice that benefits everyone.  
But, why is it relevant that subaltern groups perceive the convergence of interests 
as “fair”? Fair Trade, a system that appears as a higher level of justice (rising 
above the ordinary economy), portrays the interests of subaltern classes and 
capital as convergent and equally considered. In this way, it legitimizes its 
political project on the basis of the compatibility of contradictory interests, which, 
as it has been shown, actually limit Fair Trade’s potential. The previous chapter 
described Fair Trade’s self-defeating behavior in a variety of situations, including 
the relaxation of standards, the lack of implementation of certain aspects, etc. This 
self-defeating attitude is the direct outcome of the fairness principle described 
here: in an attempt to conciliate subaltern and capitalist interests, Fair Trade 
capitulates to many of the requirements posed by the latter, limiting importantly its 
potential to improve the situation of small producers and workers.  
In the Fair Trade system capital continues to have a privileged position over the 
subaltern class, but because it has accepted to grant minor concessions in favor of 
weaker players, its domination re-emerges legitimated by a halo of ethicity. The 
FTCC prefigures an image according to which employers and workers, producers 
and buyers coincide in this system because they want to cooperate with each other 
in order to yield mutual benefits. However, as it has been showed in the previous 
chapter, the actual changes and impacts produced by Fair Trade are not much 
more than cosmetic adjustments. In this way, what the FTCC does is to take away 
the conflicting aspects of economic relations, legitimizing domination, and 
granting them an appearance of justice. As a consequence, a system that seeks to 
empower workers and small producers in order to grant them “more control over 
their lives” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2010:2) actually 
institutionalizes and coats with a veil of legitimacy the power of capital and the 
control it exercises over the subaltern classes. 
2.3 The subaltern-consumer nexus: an unmediated relationship 
Fair Trade seeks to correct market imbalances by targeting third world producers 
and first world consumers. In this system, the former are required to comply with 
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certain economic, social and environmental standards in their organization of work 
and production. In exchange, their products are certified as fair and are 
commercialized with a distinctive label. Consumers are expected to support and 
reward them by paying a price for their products that is high enough to ensure the 
reproduction of these sustainable conditions of production. Fair Trade is presented 
as a praxis that corrects injustices in international trade by putting the decision in 
the hands of ordinary people. Any person concerned about the situation of 
marginalized producers and workers in the third world can simply contribute to 
their well-being by buying the right products. Fair Trade is portrayed as an 
initiative from below, where individuals can express their preferences through 
their purchases, rewarding those companies that commercialize Fair Trade 
products and punishing those that choose not to. In this way, there is no need for 
government intervention, parliamentary agreements or institutional reforms: it is 
much simpler, as consumers can simply “respond to the invitation not to wait until 
politicians live up to their task, but to make this world a better place for all just by 
changing everyday shopping habits” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International, 2004:1). 
Of course, Fair Trade consumers are not any kind of consumer, but individuals 
who express their civic and moral concerns through acts of consumption. FLO 
distinguishes Fair Trade consumers from consumers in general by a recursive use 
of adjectives, alternatively speaking of “informed consumers”, “consumers who 
care”, “conscious consumers” or “ethical consumers.” All these different 
conceptualizations can be brought together by a common shift in consumer values 
“from pragmatic, price and value-driven imperatives to a new focus on ethical 
value and on the story behind the products” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International, 2007b:12). More generally, Fair Trade consumers are many times 
equated to “people” or “citizens”.  
Fair Trade consumers are endowed with a political halo, since they are the key 
actors in fueling the Fair Trade system and providing transformation. They are 
people who do not (only) consume with the goal of fulfilling their own needs, but 
with the intention of producing a transformation in the direction of justice. Some 
of Fair Trade slogans appear as excellent condensations of this view: “shopping 
for a better world” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2004), “grab a 
Fairtrade banana and change a life” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International, 2007b:16). They decide to buy Fair Trade products because they 
want “the world’s disadvantaged producers to have a chance to realize their 
dreams of a decent living” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 
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2004:1). Given that consumers are given a role with such a transformative 
potential, it should not be surprising that the FTCC presents them as the main ally 
of producers and workers. 
Althusser (2001:118) says of ideology that it has the function of constituting 
individuals into subjects: “ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it 
‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (…) or ‘transforms’ the individuals into 
subjects (...) by that precise operation which I have called interpellation or 
hailing”. The FTCC, by offering a story of poor and marginalized producers and 
workers in the South and the need to transform their situation, hails consumers. It 
does not only say something about third world producers and farmers but also 
about consumers themselves. When interpellated by the FTCC, they are given a 
place within it and constituted as particular subjects (and not any individuals). The 
following quote – taken from Fairtrade’s “the Power of You” global campaign – 
clearly shows the way in which the subaltern-consumer nexus is expressed as an 
interpellation to individuals that attempts to constitute their subjectivity as Fair 
Trade consumers: “you have the power to do something amazing. The power to 
help farmers build better futures for themselves, and improve working conditions 
around the world. We salute you. The world needs more like you. Fighting for 
fairer trade, a fairer world. Once purchase at a time” (Fairtrade International, 
2014:12).
In this way, consumers are represented as a sparkle of hope in the global North, 
since they embody the potential for change and will for justice that has the 
capacity to trace back and transform commodity chains: “we also believe that 
people and institutions in the developed world are supportive of trading in this 
way when they are informed of the needs of producers and the opportunities that 
Fair Trade offers to change and improve the situation. Fair Trade is driven by 
informed consumer choices, which provides crucial support (…)” (World Fair 
Trade Organization and Fairtrade Labelling Organizations, 2009:6). Fair Trade 
consumption, it seems to be argued, depends on building and strengthening laces 
between subaltern classes in the South and consumers in the North. It is only in 
that way – by reducing distances, by bringing them together – that consumers will 
be better informed about the situation of the subaltern and, therefore, express their 
solidarity and commitment in the form of purchases.  
While both groups stand at the opposite extremes of the commodity chain, it is 
them who constitute the essence of Fair Trade. That is why Fairtrade International 
has stated as its mission “to connect disadvantaged producers and consumers” 
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(Fairtrade International, 2011a:3) and ensure a win-win situation for both parts. In 
this way, Fair Trade emphasizes the fundamental role that consumers occupy in its 
systems and includes among its main goals the task of bringing producers and 
consumers together. Only in this way will the latter be better informed about the 
situation of producers and workers in the third-world and will be willing to 
cooperate. Shorter value chains will, additionally, show a much more direct 
connection between both, allowing consumers to appreciate the impact of their 
actions more clearly and incentivizing them to each time more important levels of 
commitment. FLO constantly seeks to highlight the importance of direct linkages 
between producers and consumers, showing how the latter contribute to the 
wellbeing of the former, and often portraying these relations as unmediated: 
“fortunately, they [producers] are not alone in this endeavour, as millions of 
consumers and supporters are helping out” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International, 2007b:12).  
In this way, the subaltern-consumer nexus presented by the FTCC could be 
understood as a dialectical union in which both poles of the commodity chain, in 
spite of their radical differences (in terms of their attributes, but also the function 
given in the system), come together into a relationship which is characterized by 
the development of close bonds and empathy. This is possible due to what the 
FTCC presents as a reduction of the distance between the subaltern classes and 
consumers, as the emphasis on information flows and the reduction of 
intermediaries in the value chain evidence.  
However, this emphasis on proximity fails to account for what is actually a 
fundamentally mediated relationship between both extremes of the value chain. If 
any Fair Trade product gets to be consumed, it is because it has been bought to a 
producer, exported, imported, distributed and sold to a consumer. This is, the 
relationship between producers and workers from the South and consumers from 
the North is in the vast majority of cases mediated by the presence of commercial 
capital. Even if Fair Trade seeks to shorten value chains and avoid intermediation 
as much as possible, a direct transaction between producers and consumers is very 
difficult to achieve; Fair Trade products always need to be commercialized by 
intermediaries. Even if FLO distinguishes between an “integrated supply chain” – 
composed only by organizations that have Fair Trade at the core of their mission – 
and a “product certification route” – bringing together for-profit actors that have 
obtained the Fairtrade certification – the historical evolution of FLO described 
earlier has promoted the demise of the former in favor of the later. The 
consequence being that nowadays supply chains are increasingly and almost 
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exclusively based on the certification of actors, making of the commercialization 
of Fair Trade products the monopoly of professional trade firms, thus, commercial 
capital.
The presence of capital fractions (commercial capital and in the case of some 
products – where HL certifications are an option – both commercial and 
productive capital) and the central role they occupy in the system introduces 
certain tensions within the FTCC. The fact that capital is able to make decisions 
and even profit from the system is something only seldom openly acknowledged 
by Fair Trade actors. The preferred option, instead, is to ignore its presence. 
Capital, therefore, assumes the role of a taboo for the subaltern-consumer nexus, 
because even if it is a constitutive part of this relationship, it should not be 
mentioned. This is the clear conclusion emerging from a symptomatic reading of 
all the different passages in which FLO seeks to emphasize the importance of 
consumers without acknowledging the intermediation of capital – “to survive 
producers need markets, consumers to purchase their products” (Fairtrade 
Labelling Organizations International, 2005:18) – or those other ones in which it 
highlights who the winners of this system are – “FLO and its 20 members work to 
ensure a win-win situation serving both producers and consumers” (Ibid:3). A 
further example of this taboo of capital can be found in the most recent strategic 
framework that FLO has developed for the years 2013-15. Under the general aim 
of “unlocking power”, FLO identifies the four main constituencies whose power 
needs to be unlocked: smallholders, workers, citizens and companies, and ‘the 
people’. For each group, a brief description is offered. It is when one looks at the 
“unlocking the power of citizens and companies” headline, that the text becomes 
curious: “we will strengthen the grassroots social movement further, so we can 
increase producers’ sales and ensure even greater impact” (Fairtrade International, 
2014:5). While a first and logical question would be to ask why a company would 
need to have its power unlocked by Fairtrade, I think it is more interesting to note 
the fact that in the description of the goal that concerns them, companies are not 
mentioned. There is a clear tension here, because even if “companies” are part of 
the title, they are simply ignored in the reminder of the section. The same happens 
in the 2012-13 Annual Report (Fairtrade International, 2013c), where in spite of 
offering a longer and more detailed text, no actions are presented for unlocking the 
power of companies.  
The role of capital generates noise within the FTCC, noise that is not in tune with 
its general melody. Being that the case, the FTCC seeks to ignore it, to repress it, 
to make it inaudible. One of the main ways in which this is done is, precisely, 
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through the deployment of the subaltern-consumer nexus representation which, by 
definition, emphasizes the centrality of the relationship between subaltern classes 
and consumers – portraying them as strategic allies – and overshadows the 
intermediaries that make this linkage possible. However, these attempts are only 
partially successful because, at the end of the day, capital plays a central role in 
the system, and its presence needs to be acknowledged in one way or the other.  
The taboo of capital should be understood as more than a simple curiosity within 
the FTCC. It is an expression of the tensions that emerge in a system that has been 
built on the basis of accepting the contradictions inherent to capitalist social 
relations. The taboo of capital shows how part of the FTCC rests on the repression 
and denial of commercial capital. And this is not a minor point, because 
commercial capital plays a central role in any trade system. In this way, we learn 
not only that the relationship between producers and consumers is far from being 
unmediated, but also that this mediation goes beyond a mere functional role: since 
commercialization is done by private, for profit, companies, they also need to be 
benefited by the system and have a say in its functioning.  
As the subaltern-consumer nexus occupies such a central position in the FTCC, it 
has become one of the most relevant elements to communicate in the Fair Trade 
wine sector. The winery Tres Vientos, for example, has sought to find the best 
way in which this direct connection between consumers and subaltern groups 
could be transmitted with the commodity form itself. Their strategy was to include 
bottle neck collars containing messages that interpellated the customer directly, 
not only incentivizing them to commit to the system (“choose products with the 
Fairtrade mark”) but, most importantly, highlighting their capacity to make a 
change in the life of those that needed it the most by choosing this product: “with 
every purchase, you contribute to more balanced trade relationships and promote 
greater autonomy for producers.” Lastly, one of the sides of the collars presents a 
QR code that, followed by the inscription “meet the people who make up Tres 
Vientos FAIRTRADE”, is linked to a website that presents the story of Uvasol, 
the grape producer organization that Tres Vientos buys the certified production 
from. In this way, the consumer is not only made conscious of her/his power to 
make a change in this world, but is also invited to meet those whose life he/she is 
contributing to change.  
However, the subaltern-consumer nexus, as I have argued, is far from being an 
unmediated connection. In between the two poles of the relationship capital 
fractions – especially commercial – play an important role, not only as 
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commodity-dealers, but also in the construction of the subaltern-consumer 
representation. Nick, representative of the wine importer Larex AB in the United 
Kingdom explains the importance of getting producers to convey the message to 
consumers: 
We’ve got the producers trying to get that story over: websites is one way to do it, 
all this sort of things. But we need everybody. And we can only do our bit, we are 
quite small. Any chance you get for the producers to… it’s a great chance, because 
they can bring it to life, because they can start talking about “this is our school, it’s 
fantastic, we love it, it changes the whole village”. I think the more we can talk 
about that, the better. Any story is good really to get over. I rely on good 
communication with the winery. Alejandra [from La Chileciteña] has to feed 
information (…) we use everything (Interview UFT3). 
In this way Nick explains the relevance of the subaltern-consumer nexus for the 
overall FTCC and its possibilities of success and, at the same time, he shows the 
importance that commercial capital acquires in portraying such a nexus. They feed 
from information coming for the winery and are in charge of the engineering 
necessary to get the producer’s messages presented to the consumer. The 
subaltern-consumer nexus has become so important for the Fair Trade sphere that 
it is even one element of negotiation with distributors and retailers, as together 
with the purchase of wine cases, buyers also get the right to “own” certain stories 
that they seek to communicate to their consumers: 
What we do with a lot of importers, who don’t have as much volume, but they want 
it to be personalized, the project, to their customers, what we do is we take the 
Premium plan and we would get specific information from Alejandra, she would 
give us this information, what we do, we take it to a customer and say “we would 
give you the information on that project, you could tailor make it to your customer”, 
but in theory they are not taking anything because the projects were done back in 
Argentina, we are just taking it and we give the same project maybe to someone in 
Finland or Norway and the UK and they can personalize it. I’m trying to give you an 
example. We do one actually with a South African producer in Finland and they did 
sunhats. A small project, few hundred, couple of thousand dollars, but they were 
able to personalize that on their website and tell their consumers “your money will 
be used for this, it’s going to that, it has provided a sunhat for a grower or worker”. 
Then you get your picture with the grower and all that. And it works really well. 
And we’ve done that with La Chileciteña (Interview UFT3).  
What this “behind the scenes” process shows is the fact that in Fair Trade the 
unmediated, direct, subaltern-consumer nexus is impossible. Commercial capital, 
as a commodity-dealer, makes possible the connection because Fair Trade, as a 
system based on mainstream international trade that permanently seeks to expand, 
cannot do without it. Therefore, from a functional point of view – because the 
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relationship is built through a commodity and the commodity cannot be 
transmitted without the intervention of multiple merchants: i.e. exporter, importer, 
distributor, retailer – the subaltern-consumer nexus, as portrayed by the FTCC, 
cannot take place.
Additionally, as it has been shown, commercial capital is relevant too because of 
the role it has in constructing the representation of the subaltern-consumer nexus 
and communicating it to consumers. This element of the FTCC is appropriated as 
a marketing strategy which seeks to interpellate individuals into Fair Trade 
consumers and bring them into the system through their purchases. A new 
commodity chain is built in parallel to the one that deals with wine. In this case, it 
is about information: producers and workers are asked to record a video in which 
they tell their story or pose for some pictures next to a representative outcome of 
Fair Trade’s transformative power. Then, this information is edited by the winery 
and sent to their importer in the UK. The importer now has to work on the material 
they have received, both by making it useful for its own purposes and as a further 
element of negotiation with distributors and retailers. Different stories, bit and 
pieces of information, are divided among the importer’s buyers for their further 
elaboration into “tailored” representations of the subaltern-consumer nexus. At the 
end of this process, the message that the final consumer of the Fair Trade wine 
bottle receives, the image of the producer or work that is finally conveyed, have 
passed through so many hands, gone through so many filters, that it is difficult, to 
say the least, to consider the subaltern-consumer nexus as an unmediated, direct, 
relationship.  
In conclusion, this section has reconstructed the FTCC by analyzing the three most 
important pillars on which it is erected: (1) the displacement of the centrality of 
class-struggle and capitalist contradictions by the proposal of the North/South 
dichotomy as an alternative cleavage; (2) the legitimation of the domination of 
capital over the subaltern through the postulation of the compatibility of their 
interests; and (3) the overshadowing of capital’s centrality in the system by the 
portrayal of the consumer-subaltern nexus. 
3. The FTCC and hegemony 
While the previous subsection engaged with the main elements that give content to 
the FTCC and the particular ways in which they have been embedded in my case 
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study, the purpose of this subsection is to analyze the FTCC by putting it in 
relation to the concept of hegemony. This will be done in two different ways. 
First, by acknowledging the unequal levels of power that different class fractions 
are given in this system, I will analyze how the resulting relations of domination 
are translated into a specific articulation of interests within the FTCC. In this way, 
I will be able to determine the historical bloc of forces that the FTCC seeks to 
attract and the relative importance that each group occupies within. Second, I will 
move from an “internal” view of the FTCC’s constitutive elements and their 
relation to class fractions to an “external” perspective from which to analyze its 
political strategy. In this way, I will explain the specificities that the “Fair Trade 
politics” assume in order to struggle for the hegemonic expansion of the FTCC in 
society at large.  
3.1 The hegemonic articulation of interests within the FTCC 
As it has been shown, the FTCC possesses the elements necessary in order to 
accommodate the interests and views of a variety of social actors under a common 
project. A very comprehensive transnational historical bloc has been articulated 
around the FTCC, including small producers and their organizations, workers, 
private firms, exporters, importers, distributors, retailers, consumers, NGOs, and 
other supportive organizations from civil society. This is possible because the 
FTCC is presented as a political project that is able to improve the situation of all 
actors involved, transcending their factional interests by the proposal of a system 
that has been created with the goal of empowering the subaltern classes with the 
cooperation of capital. At the same time, the FTCC is composed of a 
democratizing narrative that makes consumers aware of the fact that they can very 
easily—by making the right purchases—contribute to transforming the injustices 
of international trade. At the end of the day, the FTCC ends up being a very 
appealing world-view in which subaltern classes, capital, NGOs, and ordinary 
people can join forces to transform the world: “for producers, the industry, and 
consumers, Fairtrade is an attractive way to make the world a better place” 
(Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2005:3).  
However, as we have seen, the FTCC is far from offering such a democratic 
balance between competing interests; instead, it makes some concessions to the 
subaltern classes but never at the expense of capital. In this way, the FTCC can 
correctly be described as a “bid for hegemony” (van der Pijl, 2012:7) following 
Gramsci’s remarks: 
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Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests 
and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a 
certain compromise equilibrium should be formed—in other words, that the leading 
group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But there is also no 
doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for 
though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be 
based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus 
of economic activity (Gramsci, 1992:161).  
A comprehensive concept of control—as a world-view with the potential to 
become hegemonic—is built on the basis of the articulation of the interests of 
dominant and dominated groups. However, as Gramsci clearly explains, even if 
the dominant class fractions will incur in certain sacrifices in order to content the 
dominated ones, this will never be at the expense of its “essential” interests. This 
is due to the fact that the construction of a concept of control, in the last instance, 
cannot threaten the position of the group that exercises “the decisive function” in 
the economic system. In the case of the FTCC, I argue, this means that while 
certain interests of the subaltern classes are actually taken into account, this is only 
done as far as it does not threaten capital’s central position. In this way, the 
FTCC’s “ethical-political” face highlights the alliance that a variety of actors have 
created in order to cooperate toward the empowerment of the subaltern class, 
while its “economic” face reveals that transformations take place only at a 
peripheral level, leaving capital’s central position untouched.  
While the dominance of capital over the subaltern shall be clear at this point, in 
this subsection I would like to argue that, within the capitalist class, it is the 
commercial capital fraction that exercises the “decisive function” in Fair Trade’s 
“decisive nucleus of economic activity.” This means that commercial capital is, in 
the last instance, a hegemonic class fraction, occupying in this way a central 
position in the definition of the features adopted by the FTCC. In what follows, I 
will demonstrate the centrality occupied by the commercial capital class fraction 
and describe how such a hegemonic position is reflected in the structuration of the 
FTCC and the system it promotes.  
In the first place, commercial capital is able to exercise power over productive 
capital due to the system’s particular architecture and the place it is given within. 
Fair Trade, being a market-based approach to social change, cannot solve the 
tensions derived from the need of realization. That is, if Fair Trade is supposed to 
effectively work and offer results, it depends on the actual validation of 
commodities in the market. In this sense, as with capitalism in general, some 
equilibrium needs to be found between consumption and production if crises want 
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to be avoided. However, there are two main features of Fair Trade that make it 
even more challenging to govern the contradiction between production and 
realization: first, the transnational nature of the system, which places producers 
and consumers in different countries and, therefore, makes more difficult the 
development of a strategy capable of dealing with this difficulty; second, and most 
important, the absence of any sort of higher authority with the political power 
needed in order to regulate the level of production, the availability of credit, 
subsidies, and any other sort of instrument that, for example, a state could make 
use of. As a consequence, the task of assuring the realization of production is left 
to private actors with access to the consumer markets (basically, some fractions of 
productive capital, but mainly commercial capital). Therefore, commercial 
capital’s overall power in the system (and vis-à-vis productive capital) emerges as 
a consequence of its central role as a realizer of Fair Trade commodities, its 
position linking producer and consumer societies, and its strategic access to the 
latter.  
Additionally, if the fair trade system is to be successful and increase its outreach, 
it depends on the continuous expansion of the sale of its products. And at a point 
that Fair Trade is far from hegemonic, that is, at a point in which Fair Trade 
products are not the main focus of supermarkets’ demand, retailers still have a 
very important bargaining power and much to gain from their position as 
gatekeepers of massive consumption markets. Furthermore, supermarkets’ 
position has been reinforced with Fair Trade’s decisive adoption of a 
mainstreaming strategy. Since then, the main channel for sales has been big 
retailers and supermarkets, and the case of wine is not an exception as Larex’s 
representative describes: “pretty much, the supermarkets here dominate the 
business, and they are the strongest players in Fair Trade, and The Cooperativist, 
specifically in Fair Trade, would be the biggest retailer of all” (Interview UFT3). 
In the second place, this power that the commercial capital fraction acquires due to 
its central position within the economic realm is reflected in the 
institutionalization of Fair Trade relations promoted by the FTCC. This can be 
appreciated, for example, in the requirements for certifying, since the system itself 
poses important burdens on productive capital, who are the ones that need to meet 
the most demanding criteria in order to certify and go through the most detailed 
and long audits, while commercial capital (be it traders or licensees) face much 
looser standards. While the former need to adjust the way in which they produce, 
in which people work, their relation to the environment, etc., Traders are only 
demanded to pay the minimum price, the Fairtrade Premium, and they should be 
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open to the possibility of pre-financing. However, as we have seen, Traders 
themselves are part of the committees that settle minimum prices, allowing them 
to keep the burden under control. Licensees (which comprises any actor that buys 
finished Fair Trade products from Traders in order to re-sell them, ranging from 
importers to distributors and retailers), lastly, do not really face major challenges 
at the time of certifying, except for paying a license fee for using the Fairtrade 
logo. In this way, Fairtrade International’s standards impose higher burdens on 
those actors engaged in production (HL and SPO), which tends to soften the more 
one travels through the chain toward the retail store. This, I argue, is a reflection of 
commercial capital’s power over productive capital in the Fair Trade system. 
While the historical bloc behind the FTCC is composed by a capitalist hardcore—
dominated by commercial capital—it also includes the subaltern classes. And 
given the prominent place that the FTCC grants to the subaltern, it is important to 
highlight that if its rhetorical exaltation did not have some sort of material 
correlate, it would be very difficult to actually integrate the subaltern into this 
historical bloc. As the Gramscian notion of hegemony explains, some concrete 
concessions have to be made. While in the previous chapter we have seen certain 
benefits that the subaltern can grasp from this system (a minimum price, the 
Premium, representation through the Joint Body, etc.), in this chapter I would like 
to highlight one aspect that is particularly relevant to the subaltern in terms of 
agency within the Fair Trade sphere: the role of producer networks. 
As explained in Chapter 3, the producer networks try to serve as fora for producers 
to—voluntarily —engage with their fellows and promote their interests as a 
whole. Three of these networks are in place currently, bringing together producers 
from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. These structures could be interpreted as 
platforms from which small producer organizations could better coordinate actions 
as a collective, providing the basis for the development of a common interest and 
unified action. In this sense, producer networks could offer the potential for 
different nationally-based subaltern groups to discuss the possibility of 
constituting a common transnational agency within the Fair Trade system. 
However, it is not clear whether this is the case, as these networks appear more as 
loose structures with limited power and infrastructure, than active forums of 
engagement. Nevertheless, even if the latter were the case, it is undeniable that 
producer networks have acquired centrality in the Fair Trade system in the last 
years. First, they were included as members of Fairtrade International in the same 
conditions as National Initiatives. Later on, they saw their importance increased, 
becoming co-owners of Fairtrade International together with the National 
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Initiatives, entitling both parts to equal voting rights in the General Assembly and 
the Board.  
Small producers, having such a relevant position in the imaginary constructed by 
the FTCC, are integrated into the formal governance structure of the Fair Trade 
system occupying, at least formally, a very relevant position. This fact evidences, 
in consonance with the concept of hegemony, that if the FTCC is to be backed by 
the subaltern groups, it needs to accept certain concessions. In this case, small 
producers are not only positioned centrally within the FTCC’s narrative, but also 
in the formal governance of the Fair Trade bureaucratic structure. They are 
beneficiaries not only of the system, but also their owners: “that’s also why we are 
so proud that Fairtrade International is the world’s only ethical certification 
scheme jointly-owned by the producers.” (Fairtrade International, 2013c:4). 
What this fact also shows is a hierarchy within the subaltern classes, since it is 
mainly small producer organizations that get to be represented in the formal 
structures and governance, and not workers. While currently all three producer 
networks have to include representatives of Joint Bodies along small producers, 
this was not always the case. Of particular relevance for my analysis is the case of 
CLAC, the Latin American network, which has historically opposed the 
certification of HL organizations and resisted, until very recently, the inclusion of 
Joint Body representatives among its members. As a matter of fact, even if all 
three producer networks currently include worker’s representatives, they appear to 
be underrepresented in relation to small producers. Furthermore, the hierarchy 
between small producers and workers can also be evidenced in the different status 
they possess: while small producers can join Fair Trade through their own 
organizations, workers can only do it through the company they work for, 
depending always in this way on the management. This has very concrete effects 
in various aspects. The previous chapter showed, for example, that managers, 
because the winery does not benefit from it, have little incentives to increase 
Fairtrade Premium incomes. SPOs, instead, have the capacity to develop their own 
strategy in relation to Premiums. In this way, because of the weaker position they 
are given in the Fair Trade mode of regulation and its governance, workers can be 
seen as subordinated to small producers within the subaltern pole. 
The hierarchical relationship between productive and commercial capital can be 
seen in the form of dependence in the Argentinean Fair Trade wine sector. The 
main difficulty that Fair Trade certified actors experience in the Argentinean wine 
industry is the impossibility that this mode of regulation has in order to influence 
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demand. Committing to Fair Trade, fulfilling all of its regulations, certifying all 
your production or producers, all that, can be totally useless if there is no one 
willing to buy your products. That is the situation of the small producer 
organization Uvasol. Uvasol has brought together a group of small and medium 
grape producers and contratistas, all of them certified. Initially, this association 
was created with the goal of providing grapes to Bodega Fabretti. With time, they 
were able to expand and sell to some other certified wineries, though more 
intermittently. However, according to Uvasol’s president, in their best years this 
group of producers could sell only 20%-to 25% of their production as Fair Trade, 
and this proportion was reduced to less than 10% in 2013. This drop obeyed the 
fact that, for the first time since 2006/7, Bodega Fabretti did not buy them any 
grapes because of its growing stock and lack of sales. This situation pushed 
Bodega Fabretti to reconsider their 100% Fair Trade policy: that year it began to 
sell non-certified wine and diverted some of its production to the internal market 
(where the Fair Trade label is not used). As a consequence, this also strengthened 
Uvasol’s dependence on non-Fair Trade channels of commercialization. 
When explaining this situation, the owner of Bodega Fabretti, Gabriela, identified 
the main problem as the little regulation that FLO imposes over commercial 
capital. According to her view, productive capital faces many responsibilities in 
order to enter and remain within the Fair Trade system, while commercial capital 
fractions do not engage with any sort of commitments, making it very challenging 
to give foreseeability to the realization of Fair Trade production: 
Actually, no one pays me a premium and my wine competes with any other. I do 
have to pay a Premium to the producer. I compete in price when buying the grape 
and I pay the Premium. And when I sell, no one pays me a Premium. And I am in 
between, very vulnerable. Because I have to tell the producers when I’m going to 
buy from them, how much I’m going to buy, how I’m going to buy. I have to take 
care of them. My importer… tomorrow tells me “I buy,” the day after “I don’t buy” 
(…) They do not have a commitment with me… of explaining how we’ll progress, 
how it is going to work. This issue of commitment doesn’t exist (Interview AFT14). 
The example of Gabriela represents the dependence that productive capital has on 
commercial capital in the Fair Trade wine sector. Because even if a Fair Trade 
wine producer performs outstandingly according to the Fair Trade criteria, no 
benefits can be yielded from the system if they do not manage to sell their 
production. And even if Fair Trade promotes the development of long-term 
relationships between buyers and sellers, this does not happen (as it was shown in 
the previous chapter) because commercial capital—being the dominant class 
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fraction—is subjected to much less restrictions. Gabriela explains how the little 
control on commercial capital has been prejudicial for her: 
Or now, that I have to think about next year’s production, if they will tell me from 
Sweden in a year’s time “oh, you produced all these quantities thinking that we 
would continue buying this wine? But you know, we’re not going to buy it.” Wal-
Mart did that to me. They stopped buying from one day to the other and I was stuck 
with all the stock there. They made me produce cabernet, I made cabernet, I had 
FLO changing the definition [of a cabernet sauvignon small producer], I did 
everything, “here’s the cabernet.” They bought two containers, “we don’t want more 
cabernet” (Interview AFT14).  
The freedom of commercial capital to engage with Fair Trade producers or not as 
they wish makes the development of long-term relationships impossible. Pablo, 
manager at Medrano, has also highlighted the unequal situation of productive and 
commercial capital in the Fair Trade system and the difficulties that it poses to the 
former: “what should be done… I mean, the certification or the norm should 
encourage more the sales of wine. FLO should demand more from certified 
traders, so that demand could grow… something like that. A lot is demanded from 
the producer, but well, if there’s no market, it’s difficult.” (Interview AFT12). The 
challenges posed by the changing demand are not only seen in the existence or 
inexistence of demand, but also on its characteristics: as the managers from 
Ecowine and Finca Alentejo have explained, sometimes buyers have attempted to 
buy either very high volumes that could not be covered in the short term, or very 
small ones, which did not make the transaction worthwhile.  
In this way, the intrinsic transnational nature of this market-based system does not 
provide ways to accommodate the relationship between demand and production. 
Since the Fair Trade bureaucracy has very limited resources in order to incentivize 
the demand of Fair Trade wine in the UK, the task of realizing these commodities 
in the market is almost exclusively monopolized by commercial capital, granting 
them centrality in the system. A centrality that, as it shall be clear by now, results 
in more freedom and less restrictions than productive capital.  
In conclusion, the analysis presented has shown that the FTCC has the capacity to 
attract a variety of actors: NGOs and their networks, grassroots organizations, 
commercial and industrial capitalist fractions, small producers, workers, and 
contratistas. However, given the different amounts of power that each group has in 
the conventional and Fair Trade economies, their interests are unevenly considered 
and included in the FTCC. The examination of the centrality of different 
functional positions in the Fair Trade mode of regulation, the power to 
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determine—or undermine—rules, and the level of burdens imposed by the system 
has made evident that the FTCC has been articulated under the hegemony of the 
commercial capital class fraction.  
3.2 Fair Trade politics: a war of position 
Even if the Fair Trade system and its corresponding FTCC have continuously 
expanded and grown in the last decades, when put in the context of the overall 
international trade, it is undeniable that they still represent a marginal 
phenomenon. That is why it is important to emphasize that the FTCC should not 
be understood as hegemonic, but as a “bid for hegemony,” that is, a concept of 
control that has the potential to become hegemonic, but still needs to fight its way 
throughout civil society in order to gain massive support, to become a new 
common sense. While in the previous subsection I have explained that Fair 
Trade’s economic logic demands the continuous expansion of the production and 
sales of certified products, we find this imperative’s correspondence at the 
“ethical-political” level in the form of a political project that seeks to gain 
legitimacy and become hegemonic. If the FTCC, both at the economic and 
ideological level, is based upon an expansive logic, the question that should follow 
is: which strategy does FT follow in order to expand its presence and acceptance 
throughout society? Or put differently: what does the FT politics consist of? The 
Gramscian concept of war of position offers a first step in the direction of 
answering such a question. 
As it has been explained, Fair Trade has built a system that attempts to do without 
the state. While Fair Trade considers the state relevant as a parameter for the 
definition of certain minimums in its standards and sometimes demands its 
involvement as a consumer or supporter (see chapter 6), its functioning does not 
target the state but, on the contrary, seeks to build an alternative form of 
regulation. In this way, it becomes clear that the politics through which the FTCC 
seeks to be promoted cannot be understood as a war of maneuver, because they do 
not go against or attempt to obtain state power, but, instead, can be much better 
identified with a war of position. As the concept of the war of position explains, 
the struggle for hegemony takes places within civil society and is fought by a 
variety of public and private actors in different (not necessary public) arenas. The 
goal here is not to achieve state power, but to promote and spread a particular 
world-view which would grant legitimacy to certain political praxis. 
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While a similar pattern of Fair Trade politics as a war of position is to be found 
globally, their level of development, the different strategies pursued, the relative 
positions achieved, and the degrees of success vary greatly from society to society. 
That is why, in the remainder of this section, I will justify my interpretation of Fair 
Trade as a war of positions by resorting to the more concrete specifications it 
assumes in relation to the different actors and settings that constitute my case 
study. As it was briefly outlined in Section 2, the United Kingdom is one of the 
eldest and biggest Fair Trade markets in the world. The economic relevance that 
Fair Trade has acquired in this country finds its correlate in the important 
development of a supporter base (constituted by individual sympathizers but also 
by a multitude of grassroots organizations) that plays an active role in the 
promotion of the FTCC. The case of Argentina is very different, first, because Fair 
Trade’s presence there is relatively new and the number of certified organizations 
is still modest, and second, and most important, because due to Fair Trade’s 
geography, Argentina is a place only of Fair Trade production. This last point 
means that all Fair Trade wine produced in Argentina is transported directly from 
the winery to the port, making it an inexistent product for the local society. This 
feature, common to the vast majority of producer countries, shows the limited (or 
inexistent) penetration of Fair Trade in Southern societies and explains the 
irrelevance of war of position in this context. As a consequence of these facts, the 
war of position is fought in the North, and that is why this subsection draws more 
heavily on the data I have collected in the UK. In what follows, I describe the 
form that the Fair Trade politics assume by, first, identifying the most relevant 
“trenches” where the war of position is fought and, second, explaining the 
pedagogic nature of this struggle for hegemony.  
The Fairtrade Town scheme is one of the best examples of how Fair Trade politics 
can be understood as a strategy that follows the logic of a war of position. The 
“Fairtrade Town Action Guide,” developed by the UK-based Fairtrade 
Foundation, defines five goals which involve a great variety of actors and civil 
society institutions: “gaining council support” entails a statement of support and a 
commitment to use Fair Trade products whenever possible by the local city 
council; “getting Fairtrade products into shops and cafés” means that at least two 
Fair Trade products have to be offered in a certain number (depending on the 
city’s size) of retail and catering outlets; “making Fairtrade a part of the 
community” will be achieved by involving a diverse group of civil society 
organizations—such as workplaces, places of worship, schools, universities, clubs, 
societies, voluntary organizations, et cetera—and gaining their support and 
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commitment to use Fair Trade products whenever they have the chance; “engaging 
and informing the general public” is done by organizing events and activities in 
order to raise awareness and getting some media coverage; last, the objective 
“working together to keep things moving” states that a local steering group shall 
be created in order to coordinate the activities related to the Fairtrade Town 
campaign and further develop social commitment once the goals have been 
achieved.
In this way, through the definition of goals, the relevant trenches where the fight 
for hegemony is to be fought are identified. But that’s not the only place, since the 
material available for the grassroots organizations (steering committees, for 
example) also gives strategic advice on how to get the project started, how to 
proceed and succeed. In this way, the Fairtrade Foundation—the UK’s most 
important representative of Fair Trade’s bureaucracy—provides a “legal 
framework” (definition of goals, criteria to evaluate their fulfillment, confirmation 
of the Fair Trade Town status) and orientation (material, ideas, support, etc.) to 
grassroots movements in order to contribute to the expansion of the FTCC across 
civil society. According to the Fairtrade Foundation, there are over 2,000 Fair 
Trade towns all over the world, out of which more than 600 can be found in the 
UK, showing not only the market relevance that this country has in the Fair Trade 
world, but also the important development that Fair Trade politics have acquired 
in comparison to other countries.  
While the Fairtrade Town initiative appears as probably one of the most ambitious 
and comprehensive strategies developed in order to progress in the war of 
position, similar but more modest schemes also exist. These more specialized 
initiatives are focused on specific trenches, and could be seen as stepping-stones 
on the way to achieving the Fairtrade Town status. Hence, the Fair Trade 
recognition can be granted individually to universities, schools, and faith groups if 
they express their commitment in the form of serving Fair Trade products 
whenever possible, raising awareness within their social basis, and setting up their 
own steering committees. The division of labor among Fair Trade actors works in 
the same way as in the case of the Fairtrade Towns strategy, with the Fair Trade 
bureaucratic institutions providing an official framework for these initiatives and 
delegating the actual implementation of the strategy to their supporters. At the 
same time, these strategies do not only foster the expansion of the FTCC 
throughout a wide variety of civil society institutions, but also contribute to the 
development of the Fair Trade grassroots sphere, since the creation of stable 
committees or steering groups is always involved among the objectives.  
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On top of these more concrete schemes, the Fairtrade Foundation organizes every 
year the Fairtrade Fortnight, which is basically a period of two weeks when a 
variety of Fair Trade–related events take place. Such a big concentration of 
activities, and the variety of organizations and institutions that get involved, 
usually produce an important impact, grabbing also media attention, which 
magnifies its effects. The Fairtrade Fortnight is the “high season” of Fair Trade 
campaigning and awareness raising, as all relevant actors become engaged, 
including not only the Fair Trade bureaucracy and grassroots organizations, but 
also traders and retailers. While on the one hand, the Fairtrade Fortnight works in 
the same way as a marketing campaign and businesses and Fair Trade actors use it 
alike in order to promote sales, on the other hand, it functions as an opportunity in 
order to present to a national audience what the FTCC is all about.  
While Fair Trade actors are particularly active in the promotion and defense of the 
FTCC, capital—especially commercial—seems to be well aware of the importance 
of the Fair Trade politics. It is precisely due to this that Christian, manager for one 
of the main Fair Trade wine importers in the UK, sees wine as a product which 
faces more difficulties when it comes to the struggle in certain civil society 
trenches:  
I think the reason it is difficult [to position Fair Trade wine], and you may think it’s 
unrelated, but the reason I think it’s difficult is because you can’t market Fair Trade wine 
to children. And for me that’s where Fair Trade starts: in schools, in villages, in the 
community projects; right down to the grassroots. When children are young, they are 
understanding the qualities of Fair Trade (…) But wine, because of the nature, it’s 
alcohol at the end of the day. And you can’t have the same level of interaction with 
children. And I think that is why. Certain mystery or block against it. (Interview UFT1). 
This wine importer also becomes involved in the Fair Trade promotion, since they 
organized their own event during 2014’s Fairtrade Fortnight, which, as the 
interviewee suggests, allows them to contribute to the diffusion of the FTCC and 
make sales at the same time (ethico-political + economic): “that’s going to be a 
nice consumer event, raise awareness of Fair Trade and, you know, maybe get a 
couple of sales as well, that would be great.” (Interview UFT1).  
The promotion of the FTCC and the struggle for its hegemony assumes most of 
the time the form of a pedagogic relationship, in which the promoters try to 
explain, to teach, the problems in international trade identified by the FTCC and 
the particular ways in which this system contributes to solve them. That is why, 
and following Gramsci, it can be said that the FT politics are based on the 
construction of pedagogic relationships: 
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The pedagogic relationship cannot be limited to the strictly "scholastic" 
relationships (…) This relationship exists throughout society as a whole and for 
every individual relative to other individuals, between intellectual and non-
intellectual sectors, between rulers and the ruled, between elites and their followers, 
between leaders and led, between vanguards and the body of the army. Every 
relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily a pedagogic relationship (…) (Gramsci, 
2014:1331).
The pedagogic dimension of the Fair Trade politics is quite clear when we go back 
to the subaltern-consumer nexus described as part of the FTCC. One of the key 
elements presented there was that the alleged proximity between the subaltern and 
consumer was to be facilitated by providing information to the latter about the 
former’s situation. In this way, consumers (in the form of individuals but also, as 
we have seen in this section, public and private institutions) have the possibility to 
learn and understand about the difficulties faced by “southern workers and 
producers.” Furthermore, the pedagogic relationship at stake also teaches 
consumers about the virtues of the Fair Trade system and its transformative 
impact, encouraging taking action and joining this initiative. The pedagogic 
dimension of the Fair Trade politics can be best appreciated by reviewing not only 
the amount of promotional and informative material that Fair Trade actors, 
certified organizations, and licensees produce, but also the variety of ways in 
which this “education” is attempted.  
The Cooperativist is one of the UK’s biggest supermarket chains and a leading 
player in Fair Trade retail sales in general and wine in particular, since it became 
the first retailer in the country to offer that product. Brad, its Fairtrade strategy 
manager, shows very clearly how the struggle for the imposition of a concept of 
control comprises both dimensions, one that engages with education and another 
one that is based on activism: “It’s an ongoing process of education on one side 
and campaigning with our membership and product development and trying to 
drive the market on the other hand. And it all basically comes to the question… 
it’s about the matching between the ethos of Fair Trade and what The 
Cooperativist stands for, in a nutshell.” (Interview UFT5). Particularly interesting 
from the last quotation is the fact that, seen from the point of view of the 
supermarket, the FTCC (or “ethos,” as Brad calls it) is not a representation to be 
put forward in itself, purely, but this has to be done in such a way that it secures a 
match, a fitting, with the company’s own representation. Because, while the 
company is in one way functional to the Fair Trade movement, promoting and 
spreading its concept of control, the latter is in another way functional to the 
company, by contributing to its legitimized accumulation.  
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Interestingly enough, pedagogic relationships are not only established between 
certified actors (be they producers or commercial capital) and consumers, but also 
takes place among the former. A good example of this emerged during the part of 
my fieldwork which took place in the UK. When interviewing the UK 
representative of Larex AB—La Chileciteña’s importer—he emphasized the 
importance of conveying the “Fair Trade message” not only to consumers, but also 
to the buyers themselves: 
I’m taking the buyer there in a few weeks’ time, I’m taking him to Argentina (…) 
And when you show them the projects… we’ve taken them to see the projects, then 
they go “wow, ok, get it, get it.” That’s one of the reasons for taking the new buyer. 
We are paying for it, because they usually go for a trip, he has three hours with us, 
goes to somewhere else and sees four wineries a day or whatever there is. Now we 
just take him, we are paying for him, and I’m gonna show him, it will be two days 
at the winery, and he will see all the projects, he will see everything (Interview 
UFT3). 
The SPO La Chileciteña, together with its commercial branch in Europe, relies on 
some sort of “touring the buyer” strategy, in which they invite their buyers from 
time to time in order to show them the impact that Fair Trade producing is making 
in their community. In this way, they do not only provide information, but get 
their buyers to experience what the FTCC is all about. This strategy serves as a 
way of conveying the message to the buyer and it is also appropriated by the 
buyer, not only as an “awakening” to the reality of Fair Trade, but also as an input 
that the retailer can use in order to build its own pedagogic relationships with 
consumers. This is clearly transmitted by The Cooperativist’s wine buyer 
statement: 
[It was] my first trip to Argentina, to see the projects out there and what we do is 
incredible, I’m absolutely thrilled about it (…) I think getting the Fair Trade 
message over to the consumer is always hard as a product, because, there used to be 
a documentary about… sometimes there’s a natural suspicion about Fair Trade, 
whether it’s really helping people on the ground. Which, you know, it’s fair enough, 
but actually what I’ve seen with my eyes deserves attention, for the visible, material 
difference it makes. So, in wine, I’m going to be looking at, over the next months, 
to display that more directly in the bottle. (Interview UFT6) 
This partnership between La Chileciteña, Larex AB, and The Cooperativist has 
also gone the journey in the opposite direction, by developing a “touring the 
producer” strategy. In this case, as it happened in 2014 during the Fairtrade 
Fortnight, two representatives from La Chileciteña were taken to the UK in order 
to present their experience in a variety of Fair Trade events. Some of their 
presentations took place within civil society “trenches” (with talks at universities, 
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for example), while others were related to Fair Trade wine tasting events. I had the 
chance to participate in one of them, held in London, and observed how the typical 
wine tasting was infused with elements typical of the FTCC. The event was not 
only based on the activity of savoring different (Fair Trade) wine samples—led by 
an expert in the field—but also involved a presentation by the representative from 
La Chileciteña who not only told the story of her grandfather and his experience 
becoming a member of this cooperative, but also offered a PowerPoint 
presentation with images from Chilecito—the village where the winery is 
located—and the different projects that had been funded thanks to Fair Trade and 
The Cooperativist.
Both sorts of tours can be understood as pedagogic activities, where corporate 
buyers, Fair Trade supporters, or potential consumers are taught what the FTCC is 
and how it works. These two examples are interesting also because they show how 
the struggle for hegemony is not only fought by the Fair Trade bureaucracy or 
grassroots organizations, but also by other actors. In the first of the two examples, 
La Chileciteña, a certified producer organization that reunites subaltern classes, 
together with its co-owned merchant house, organized a program of activities for 
The Cooperativist’s buyer. In the second example, the initiative is taken by The 
Cooperativist instead, who invited two members from La Chileciteña and made 
them take part in a variety of events they had arranged—sometimes in cooperation 
with steering committees or other sorts of grassroots organization—in some of the 
key institutions for the war of position.  
As the last example shows, the cooperation between corporations and Fair Trade 
actors is not uncommon, especially because the former many times lack the power 
of mobilization that the latter possesses. Brad explains how this need has made 
them build “strategic relationships” with the Fair Trade organization Traidcraft, in 
order to use their supporter base: “the original motivation with Traidcraft actually 
wasn’t about the products and, first and foremost, it was more about the 
campaigning side and trying to build awareness of Fair Trade, so it just came from 
there.” (Interview UFT5). While at the level of production, the Fair Trade 
bureaucracy likes to portray itself as domesticating capital through the imposition 
of their standards, in the war of position, instead, the relationship seems to be 
inverted, with the NGO sphere acting many times in a way that is instrumental to 
capital.  
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4. The FTCC: a reaction against or a consequence of neoliberalism? 
The analysis presented in this chapter so far has been mainly concerned with a 
discussion of the FTCC in relation to the Fair Trade sphere. This section attempts 
to put it into a broader social context by discussing how the FTCC relates to past 
and current hegemonic concepts of control: corporate-liberalism and 
neoliberalism. In this way, it will be possible to analyze how the FTCC stands in 
relation to these alternative world-views and the ways in which it is articulated to 
them.
As it was described in Chapter 1, the Amsterdam Project identified two main 
comprehensive concepts of control that have achieved hegemonic status globally 
since the post-war: corporate-liberalism and neoliberalism. As van Apeldoorn 
(2002:51) describes, the corporate-liberal concept of control:  
synthesizes the two ideal-typical orientations of money and (domestic) productive 
capital respectively, the former premised on the principle of economic liberalism 
and the latter on the principle of social protection. This synthesis, however, entailed 
not only an articulation of the interests of these two idea-typical capital fractions, but 
also a class compromise between capital and labor as the newly emerging regime of 
industrial accumulation brought with it a further incorporation of the working class.  
The corporate-liberal concept of control can be therefore characterized by three 
main elements: first, it results as a synthesis of a concept of control put forward by 
the money-capital class fraction and another one promoted by the productive 
capital class fraction. As a consequence, corporate-liberalism proposes a balance 
between “(international) economic liberalization and (domestic) state 
intervention” (Holman, 1996:27). Second, this concept of control promotes not 
only the conciliation between the two most relevant competing class fractions, but 
also between the capitalist class as a whole and labor. Third, the corporate-liberal 
concept of control was able to mobilize a broad social base, being backed up by a 
historical bloc “containing both a coalition of bank capital with the new Fordist 
industries (with the latter being the dominant fraction), and an alliance of Fordist 
capital with organised labour” (van Apeldoorn, 2002:52). This concept of control, 
which was pivotal in the construction and legitimation of the welfare state, 
remained hegemonic until the economic crisis of the 1970s questioned its main 
pillars.  
One of the outcomes of the critical 1970s was the emergence of the neoliberal 
concept of control, which by the 1990s had already become globally hegemonic. 
The neoliberal concept of control expresses “the general objective of “unmaking” 
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the post-war class compromise and a fundamental restructuring of social relations 
in favour of private enterprise and propertied interests” (van Apeldoorn, 2004:195-
60). The main objective of transforming the balance of forces between capital and 
labor is what made the neoliberal concept of control a “political project to restore 
capitalist class hegemony by, in its own rhetoric, freeing the market from the 
shackles of the state (disembedding the market)” (van Apeldoorn, 2002:55). As a 
consequence, already by the end of the 1980s, and especially during the 1980s, the 
dominant tendency all around the globe was marked by the retreat of the state 
regulation that sought to tame a pure market logic and, as a consequence, an 
increased power of the capitalist class over subaltern groups.  
It is not casual that initiatives of “private regulation” begin to flourish within the 
context of the state’s weakening. Areas of social life that were formerly subject to 
the state’s intervention in the definition of the rules of the game start to be more 
and more under the control of players themselves. Additionally, it is also within 
this period that NGOs begin to emerge as actors that attempt to exercise regulatory 
functions over transnationalizing processes, either substituting the state in those 
terrains where it has retreated from or tackling issues where it had not been present 
before (cf. Hirsch, 2003). This trend, as Hirsch (Ibid) has well explained, is not 
simply the result of activism from below, but is also promoted by the most 
relevant international organizations of the moment (IMF, World Bank, etc.) and 
states themselves, as it can be evidenced in the extraordinary increase of resources 
that are directed toward NGOs. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the 
Fair Trade movement is institutionalized in its certification-based variant during, 
and experiences a permanent growth from, the 1990s. 
In this subsection I will argue that the FTCC and its specific institutionalization 
can be seen as both a reaction against and a consequence of the hegemonic 
imposition of a neoliberal concept of control. The FTCC should be understood as 
a reaction against a neoliberal concept of control because much of its content can 
be understood as vindication of the corporate-liberal concept of control in 
opposition to neoliberal developments such as the flexibilization of production and 
labor relations, the retreat of the state in terms of social services provision, and the 
enhancement of socioeconomic rights or, more generally, the disembedding of the 
economy from the social and political realm. However, the FTCC is also to be 
understood as a consequence of neoliberalism because it assumes the typical form 
of a neoliberal political project—as its private-governance approach is shaped by a 
multi-stakeholder architecture that comprises only non-state actors—and relies on 
a logic of market-driven social change. Therefore, I argue, the FTCC is crossed by 
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a contradictory relation to the neoliberal concept of control because it, on the one 
hand, seeks to overcome some of its most characteristic features by reintroducing 
central elements of corporate-liberalism but, on the other, attempts to do so by 
relying on a neoliberal strategy. The remainder of this section will analyze the 
tension that emerges from this contradiction and will discuss its implications.
The FTCC, as a reaction to neoliberalism, could be understood as an attempt to 
return to the main pillars that characterized the corporate-liberal concept of 
control. The similarities of the FTCC’s content to that of corporate liberalism can 
be appreciated by reviewing the latter’s three defining characteristics: a 
combination of international economic liberalization and domestic state 
intervention, the conciliation of antagonistic class interests and the construction of 
a hegemonic historical bloc with a wide social base.  
As the analysis offered in this chapter has shown, even if Fair Trade seeks to 
regulate some aspects of international trade, it ultimately depends on constantly 
growing trade flows in order to assure the system’s subsistence. In this way, even 
if Fair Trade imposes some extra conditions (vis-à-vis conventional trade) to those 
merchants engaged in international trade, it has to keep the amount and degree of 
its requirements relatively limited. Ultimately, Fair Trade needs to favor the 
international circulation of Fair Trade products, without which the system—which 
is built on the basis of a North-South dichotomy—could not work. Additionally, 
the lower level of burdens imposed on commercial capital when compared to 
productive capital—and subaltern fractions, as in the case of SPOs—evidences not 
only the importance of international economic liberalization, but also an analogic 
idea of “domestic state intervention.” While the standards regulating commodity 
flows across borders are less rigid, the most detailed and demanding requirements 
are included in the two standards related to production: HL situations (productive 
capital) and SPOs (subaltern fraction). As Chapter 6 has shown, many of the 
points included in these standards resemble some of the aspects that characterized, 
for example, the corporate-liberal wage relation, or at least attempt to tackle those 
of its features that have been threatened the most by neoliberal flexibilization. In 
this way, interpreting the role of the Fair Trade bureaucracy in a way analogous to 
the state—both as the structure that provides the framework for the system and as 
the political authority that oversees and regulates it—it can be said that the 
importance given to the regulation of the conditions of production could be 
interpreted as a way of domestic intervention in order to guarantee a certain 
balance between capital and the subaltern classes.
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The second main element, the compromise between capital and labor, understood 
in my case study as a compromise between capital and subaltern classes, has been 
shown in great detail in this chapter. The Fair Trade bureaucracy, in a fashion 
similar to that of the welfare state, seeks to arbitrate the relationship between 
capital and the subaltern. This arbitration is guided by the attempt to reconcile the 
interests of these two groups, in an analogous way that the welfare state sought to 
do with capital and labor. In this way, it incorporates without questioning 
constitutive capitalist contradictions, attempting, at its best, only to attenuate their 
effects. The specific content of the FTCC and the concrete ways in which it is put 
into practice are, therefore, the result of the negotiation between, and the mutual 
acceptance by, capital and subaltern classes within the framework provided by the 
Fair Trade bureaucracy. This negotiation, nevertheless, is characterized by 
different quotas of power that each actor acquires due to their more or less 
strategic position within the Fair Trade system. 
When it comes to the particular historical blocs that support each concept of 
control, a common feature is that both are based on the integration of capital and 
subaltern class fractions. However, while corporate-liberalism is characterized by 
the synthetic result of the concepts of control put forward by productive and 
money capital (under the hegemony of the productive capital fraction), the case of 
the FTCC shows an alternative articulation between the capitalist class fractions, 
with a commercial capital fraction acquiring a hegemonic position and the 
productive capital one following its lead. And if we look at the subaltern section of 
this historical bloc and its internal power relations—something that is not done in 
the analysis offered by the Amsterdam scholars—we can also argue that the FTCC 
favors an articulation of subaltern classes in which small producers have a higher 
hierarchical position than the other subaltern classes. This can be seen, especially, 
in the fact that they are more directly represented in the transnational producer 
networks, which are members of the main organs of the Fair Trade bureaucratic 
structure and also own it together with the National Initiatives. 
When interpreted as a reaction to neoliberalism, the FTCC’s content can be 
understood as an attempt to re-create a welfare state-like regulation at the 
transnational level, and that is why FTCC can be considered to resemble the 
corporate-liberal concept of control. However, the FTCC is crossed by a 
contradictory relation to neoliberalism, as it constitutes not only a reaction but also 
an outcome of it. The FTCC’s nesting in a wider neoliberal framework becomes 
most evident when we consider its form (i.e., the sort of politics through which 
changes are promoted) as Fair Trade constitutes a system of private regulation that 
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seeks to do without state intervention. In this way, Fair Trade legitimizes the 
power of market relations to bring about change and builds a framework that relies 
on self-regulation by the actors involved. In total coherence with the neoliberal 
spirit, the Fair Trade system supports a form of control and coordination that 
excludes the state and, at the same time, is based on market logic.  
The FTCC not only attempts to do without the state, but also seeks to channel the 
transformative will of its supporters through market. Criticism to unjust 
international trade relations, marginalization, and exploitation is not to be directed 
against the economic system, but expressed through that very same economic 
system; problems are not to be solved by public actors, but by private ones. As we 
have seen, the struggle to disseminate the FTCC is to happen in the “private” 
realm of civil society, and even if it comprises activism, grassroots movements, 
campaigning, and other typically “political” activities, all of them have the 
ultimate goal of motivating more sales of Fair Trade products. The exaltation of 
the subaltern-consumer nexus is clear evidence of the role that any virtuous citizen 
is given: at the end of the day, Fair Trade can be understood as a market 
democracy, where consumer-citizens express their normative views through 
purchases. In this manner, the particular way in which the FTCC is to be 
implemented perfectly reproduces neoliberal elements such as the retreat of the 
state, the disembeddedness of the economy—or actually, the embedding of the 
political in the economy—the self-regulation by private agents, the expansion of 
market rationality, etc.  
If I have argued that, in terms of content, the FTCC resembles so closely the 
corporate-liberal concept of control, especially due to their shared aim of 
conciliating conflicting interests in order to guarantee a broad social base as their 
historical bloc, how is one to explain the FTCC’s strong neoliberal form? I 
consider there are two reasons to explain this. In the first place, one should look at 
the role of the hegemonic class fraction. While in the case of the corporate-liberal 
concept of control, it was the productive-capital fraction that exercised 
hegemony—privileging, in the last instance, a logic of domestic intervention or 
social protection—in the case of the FTCC, hegemony is exercised by commercial 
capital. I believe that this fact explains quite clearly why the FTCC, so closely 
resembling the corporate-liberal concept of control in many aspects, ends up 
introducing a plainly neoliberal political logic. Commercial capital, being one of 
the forms that capital assumes in the moment of circulation and, therefore, 
detached from the process of production, is not concerned about the conditions of 
production; instead, its main interest is to accelerate and increase the process of 
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realization in the market, which becomes easier in a cosmopolitan regime of free 
trade with little external intervention and no barriers. In this way, the commercial 
capital fraction resembles in important ways the other relevant capital fraction 
engaged in circulation: money-capital, which is the class fraction that has been 
behind the hegemonic expansion of neoliberalism.  
In the second place, the neoliberal elements of the FTCC are to be explained not 
only by the similar functional positions of money and commercial capital, but also 
by the sectorial dimension of Fair Trade. As it has been explained, the FTCC 
entails a project that is restricted, by definition, to circumscribed economic and 
social spheres (mainly, agricultural production and trade) and, unlike 
neoliberalism or corporate liberalism, it does not provide a global project for the 
economy as a whole. In this way, the FTCC has not been constituted as a 
contender for hegemony vis-à-vis neoliberalism, but has instead been embedded in 
it as a way to facilitate its success. In this way, in its attempt to increase the level 
of social protection in international agro-food markets, Fair Trade has adopted 
political tools and strategies compatible with the dominant neoliberal concept of 
control.  
All in all, in terms of its content, the FTCC can be described as an attempt to 
reconcile the interests of the subaltern and capital, resembling in this way the 
corporate-liberal concept of control. However, if we complement the analysis of 
the FTCC’s content with one of its form, it becomes clear that the FTCC weakens 
corporate-liberalism. This element clearly shows why the FTCC is to be 
understood not only as a reaction to but also as a consequence of neoliberalism, 
introducing elements that do not only contradict, but also undermine, its potential 
as a reaction to the neoliberal concept of control. This tension is fundamental not 
so much because it shows an important contradiction within the FTCC, but 
especially because it proves to be self-defeating. As the analysis of this and the 
previous chapter have shown, most of the “progressive” objectives derived from 
the corporate-liberal concept of control—those that seek to protect the subaltern 
classes from, and reposition them in relation to, capital—end up being dissolved 
or weakened by the neoliberal approach that Fair Trade has chosen in order to 
implement them.  
As a consequence, I consider that this combination of corporate-liberal content 
that ends up being diluted by a neoliberal form makes visible the fact that the 
FTCC could be best understood as an example of roll-out neoliberalism. Peck and 
Tickell (2002) distinguish two phases of neoliberalism. The first one, roll-back 
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neoliberalism, represents its negative face, as it was characterized by deregulation 
and dismantlement. Roll-back neoliberalism, dominant until the 1990s, entailed 
the active destruction and discredit of the social-collectivist institutions that 
characterized the welfare state (Ibid:384). Such an image of neoliberalism is 
similar to the one that has been presented so far in this chapter. However, Peck 
and Tickell’s main argument is that this characterization of neoliberalism shall not 
be essentialized, as this destructive and reactionary moment of anti-regulation was 
later on superseded by a new stage of roll-out neoliberalism. This second moment 
emerged as a reaction to the institutional and political limits posed by “the 
perverse economic consequences and pronounced social externalities of narrowly 
market-centric forms of neoliberalism” (Ibid:388). In this way, roll-out 
neoliberalism represents a positive moment, in which the initial process of 
destruction and dismantlement is progressively complemented by a constructive 
moment that involves the deployment of new modes of governance and regulatory 
relations. This process, however, shall not be understood as a return to previous 
institutional arrangements, but rather as the construction of new, properly 
neoliberal forms of “metaregulation”.  
The concept of roll-out neoliberalism, I argue, synthetizes the FTCC’s 
combination of a content that longs for some of the social protection principles 
characteristic of corporate liberalism and a form that epitomizes a neoliberal 
understanding of political praxis. Additionally, it contributes to the explanation of 
Fair Trade’s self-defeating tendency, as it exposes the system’s overall acceptance 
of a neoliberal understanding of regulation, which ultimately undermines its 
reformist potential. Lastly, it highlights the conservative political outcome of Fair 
Trade: because the FTCC manages to channel the concerns of those dissatisfied 
with the social inequalities produced by the current economic system through, 
precisely, the very same means that the system proposes, it turns out to contribute 
toward neoliberalism’s “reconstitution” rather than its “implosion” (Ibid).  
5. Conclusion
Chapter 6 identified the modest transformative potential of the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation and, in the case of the Argentinean wine industry, the way in which it 
contributes to furthering sectorial inequalities. The present chapter, in a 
complementary way, sought to identify the main causes behind those outcomes by 
examining the ideological elements and political processes that have shaped the 
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Fair Trade system as we know it. This was done in a number of steps, each of 
which comprised (a combination of) different levels of analysis. First, the most 
relevant class fractions and their main characteristics were identified. This was 
done both at the level of my concrete case and, more generally, the level of the 
Fair Trade system as a whole. Second, I offered a reconstruction of the FTCC by 
analyzing its three most relevant elements and their implications for different class 
fractions. While the FTCC of control was understood here as a general feature of 
the Fair Trade system, its more abstract examination was complemented by the 
concrete analysis of the ways in which it is embedded in my case and appropriated 
by the relevant actors. Third, by using the concept of hegemony, I sought to 
explain the type of interest articulation that the FTCC makes possible and the 
political strategy adopted by Fair Trade in order to disseminate its world-view 
throughout society at large. Again, this analysis proceeded at two levels of 
generality, identifying features that are common to the overall system and 
discussing the concrete ways in which they take place in relation to my case. 
Fourth, the relationship of the FTCC with previously and currently hegemonic 
concepts of control was discussed. This last section proceeded at the highest level 
of abstraction, as it sought to compare the general features of the “sectorial” FTCC 
with two other “macro” concepts of control. 
All in all, the analysis presented in this chapter has shown that Fair Trade’s 
modest transformative ambitions, and their further dilution through 
implementation, are a consequence of the system’s acceptance of the main 
capitalist contradictions. The FTCC attempts to deny their inherently conflictive 
and destabilizing nature by displacing the subaltern-capitalist cleavage with a 
geographical one, postulating the compatibility of contradictory interests and 
presenting the relationship between subaltern classes and northern consumers as 
unmediated and unproblematic. However, FLO’s market-driven approach, which 
depends on voluntary certification and a system of private governance, enhances 
the power of capitalist fractions at the expense of the subalterns’ position. As a 
consequence, its attempts to improve the situation of marginalized small producers 
and workers are undermined by the acceptance of the legitimacy of capitalist 
interests.  
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Conclusion
The overall logic of this dissertation was presented in Chapter 2 as a dialectical 
movement that begins with an abstract general concept of Fair Trade and 
progresses towards its further concretization in the particular case of Fair Trade 
wine produced in Argentina and consumed in the UK. In this way, the initial 
notion of Fair Trade was critically confronted with the concrete forms it represents 
along different levels of generality. Thus the various moments of the research 
process have contributed to the transformation of the concept of Fair Trade – not 
in the sense of fully replacing one concept with another, but emerging from the 
specific (though partial) conclusions developed while operating at different levels 
of generality. The goal of this concluding chapter is therefore to finish with the 
dialectical movement and systematically present the knowledge – Generality III – 
that has resulted from it. 
In contrast to the research process, which logically proceeded from the general to 
the particular, the partial conclusions presented here will progress from the most 
concrete (case-specific) to the most general (common to the entire Fair Trade 
universe) in order to make explicit the way in which the increasing levels of 
concretization involved in this dissertation have transformed the general concept 
of Fair Trade. Therefore, the conclusion about the Fair Trade system as a whole is 
the result of a series of arguments that has been built on the specific effects of: (1) 
the coupling of the Argentina Fair Trade wine mode of regulation and the sectorial 
regime of accumulation, (2) the comparison of the conventional and Fair Trade 
modes of regulation, (3) the evaluation of the Fair Trade mode of regulation as in 
the standards and (4) the analysis of the ideological underpinnings and political 
implications derived from the FTCC.  
The remainder of this section is divided into five parts: the first reconstructs the 
main argument that has emerged from the process of inquiry. Moving from the 
most concrete to the most general conclusions of my empirical analysis, it offers a 
definitive answer to the question of Fair Trade’s transformative potential. The 
second section will build on the previous argumentation in order to discuss more 
generally the implications of the Fair Trade initiative for today’s field of 
transformative political praxis. The third and fourth sections will offer some 
reflections on the theoretical and methodological frameworks that have guided my 
research process. Lastly, the fifth section presents possible paths for further 
research.  
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1. Fair Trade: A final assessment 
Far from promoting transformation, the concrete effects of the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation in the Argentinean wine sector have proven to be clearly reproductive. 
The local regime of accumulation is currently characterized by a hierarchical split, 
in which a dominating and expanding quality-led regime of accumulation has 
eclipsed the hegemony previously enjoyed by a decaying quantity-led regime of 
accumulation. The most marginalized actors are located within the latter: small 
grape and wine producers that, since they are still attached to the table wine value 
chain, are the prey of the very concentrated power held by the three major 
wineries that dominate the market. Against this background, Fair Trade helps 
maintain this hierarchical split, as it only offers opportunities to actors that are part 
of the more successful and dominant quality-led regime of accumulation. This is a 
consequence of Fair Trade’s international orientation and representation of 
products, because they, when embedded in the Argentinean wine sector, de facto 
exclude the production and commercialization of table wine (together with the 
small grape and wine producers that are part of its value chain). Consequently, the 
(limited) benefits offered by the Fair Trade mode of regulation are delivered to 
actors that occupy more strategic positions in the sector, and are denied to those 
whose future sustainability is at stake. 
The Fair Trade mode of regulation in the Argentinean wine sector does not imply 
major transformations compared to the conventional one. While most important 
features remain unchanged, only a few could be considered to have the potential to 
contribute to necessary modifications in the sector, most importantly the 
regulation of hiring and working hours, the introduction of an administered 
minimum price and the promise of long-term trading relationships. However, as 
the empirical analysis has shown, the implementation of the Fair Trade standards 
in the Argentinean wine sector seems to systematically undermine their actual 
application and the transformative power that would come with them. Given that 
Fair Trade bureaucrats consciously decided on these gaps of implementation, I 
described them as the outcome of the Fair Trade system’s self-defeating behavior, 
which involves granting exceptions to its own regulations and subjecting its 
standards to adaptation and a lack of enforcement. Therefore this mode of 
regulation as conducted in practice provides no opportunities for significant 
transformations in the Argentinean wine industry.  
Moving to a higher level of abstraction, one can discuss the implications of these 
findings for the assessment of the Fair Trade mode of regulation “in general.” This 
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can be partly done by analyzing the Fairtrade standards, which are common to 
producers and workers all over the world. The analysis of the Fair Trade mode of 
regulation “in the standards” showed that, far from transforming the productive 
and commercial structures that cause inequality, it attempts – at best – to improve 
the situation of producers and workers by repositioning them within those same 
structures. One of the main limitations of the Fairtrade standards is their formalist 
approach, as they recursively resort to national or sectorial legislation to define 
minimum requirements. This has two main drawbacks. First, it fosters uneven 
levels of protection globally, as the requirements will depend on the legal 
frameworks of each state or sector. Second, by relying on official parameters, the 
Fair Trade mode of regulation is ill equipped to solve problems caused by the 
official legislation itself. The main consequence of these drawbacks is that the 
effectiveness of this mode of regulation at providing social protection will depend 
on the context in which it is applied, as the discussion of the minimum wage vis-à-
vis the living wage exemplifies. 
While the Fair Trade mode of regulation is far from revolutionary, when compared 
to the status quo it presents some progressive innovations that could improve the 
position of marginalized producers and workers (as already identified: a reaction 
to some aspects of labor flexibilization, a minimum price, long-term contracts, a 
Fairtrade Premium, etc.). The analysis of the Argentinean wine sector showed that 
the implementation of the standards swept away most innovative developments, 
but are there reasons to believe this will be always the case? Argentina possesses 
certain specificities that are responsible for some of the shortcomings in 
implementation, which cannot be universalized. The clearest example is the 
minimum price. In a context of high annual inflation, FLO has not managed to 
keep its minimum price updated, thus making it totally irrelevant. As a 
consequence, Fairtrade’s minimum price does not play a role in the Argentinean 
wine industry, but could potentially do so in other contexts if properly calculated. 
However, most of the shortcomings related to implementation were a consequence 
of Fair Trade’s self-defeating behavior; this, I argue, does not seem to be unique to 
the Argentinean case but is rooted in Fair Trade’s ideological underpinnings and 
more general form of politics.  
The main reasons for Fair Trade’s limited reformist standards – and the tendency 
towards their further dilution in the process of implementation – are found in the 
FTCC. Its core element, the fairness principle (according to which Fair Trade is 
committed to the conciliation of capitalist and subaltern interests) constitutes the 
backbone of a system that attempts to satisfy the contradictory demands of 
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different social classes. Additionally, the choice of voluntary standards and 
certification as its main instruments of intervention in essence replaces state power 
with a multi stakeholder-based form of governance. Both elements imply that in 
the process of empowering the subaltern classes, capitalists’ cooperation cannot be 
forced or go unrewarded. As a consequence, the introduction of clashing interests 
acts as a de facto limitation of Fair Trade’s transformative potential “in the 
standards”, and favors a self-defeating attitude in favor of capital in their 
implementation.  
All in all, Fair Trade’s limited transformative potential can be seen at the highest 
level of generality as emerging from an uncritical acceptance of the main capitalist 
contradictions. However, unlike other economic forms, this one has been 
developed in the name of “just” and “alternative” relations of production and 
trade. In this way, Fair Trade seeks to legitimize itself among those concerned 
with global inequalities as an ethical alternative to a de-humanized economy. It 
invites them to join forces as consumers and contribute to global transformation. 
Since such a transformation is far from occurring, the Fair Trade system is instead 
legitimizing the current order of things: it attracts and channels discontent with 
neoliberalism in a form – and through means – that are compatible with it. 
2. First as tragedy, then as farce 
Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of 
 great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. 
 He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. 
(Marx, 1972:10)
The first pages of the introduction to this dissertation justified the relevance of 
examining Fair Trade due to its potential contribution to a broader debate on the 
emerging forms of global political praxis. The case of Nicaragua was presented as 
a paradigmatic example of the way in which global solidarity and commitment 
have been transformed in recent decades. In this concluding section, I return to 
that example in order to trigger a more general discussion of the implications of a 
Fair Trade model of politics. 
At a first glance, when looking at the case of Nicaragua in the 2010s one could be 
tempted to have a feeling of déjà vu. As in the 1980s, we find the Sandinistas in 
power again. As in the 1980s, we see that coffee cooperatives in Nicaragua are 
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internationally endowed with a symbolism that incarnates the values of 
egalitarianism and emancipation. As in the 1980s, the production and 
commercialization of coffee seems to be the most popular way in which socially 
concerned individuals around the world express their solidarity with the 
Nicaraguan people. Are we, therefore, witnessing the repetition of a historical 
period? Is history happening a second time? A closer examination of the ways in 
which these a priori similar historical facts have been actualized shows that if one 
were to interpret history as occurring twice, it should be done following Marx’s 
famous axiom: “the first time as tragedy, the second as farce”. 
A discussion of the 21st century version of the Sandinistas is, of course, well 
beyond the scope of this work. I will therefore only focus on the transformed way 
in which the coffee value chain continues to be a means of expressing 
international solidarity and support. In the 1980s thousands of people travelled to 
Nicaragua, in the context of a long-lasting and violent civil war, in order to work 
in coffee cooperatives and state-owned plantations. The formation of the so-called 
international coffee brigades was a political act: through the direct involvement in 
the production of coffee, activists were expressing their support for the 
Sandinista’s cause directly on the field, in the battle ground. The work of the 
coffee brigades in Nicaragua was combined with an attempt to develop alternative 
means of commercialization through which other sympathizers of the Sandinista 
revolution could contribute with their purchases. Participation in the coffee 
brigades demanded important levels of commitment and sacrifice: travelling to a 
distant country immersed in violence, taking part in physical labor during long 
working days, living in modest conditions, etc.  
However, very few of these elements be found in today’s paradigmatic coffee-
solidarity incarnation: Fair Trade. As the analysis presented throughout this work 
has made clear, Fair Trade has its origins in cases of solidarity trade like that in 
Nicaragua; nevertheless, the system’s current features present stark differences. 
While Fair Trade still appeals to an internationalist logic similar to that of the 
coffee brigades, it proposes channeling solidarity in a very different way. While in 
the 1980s involvement in the coffee brigades would require important levels of 
sacrifice, nowadays, instead of harvesting the coffee, you can simply enjoy it in 
the coffee shop around the corner. While in the 1980s solidarity with Nicaragua 
represented a political statement in favor of socialist-oriented reforms, today’s 
vaguer commitment to empowering small producers evidences much less radical 
connotations. And closely connected to this is the fact that, while involvement in 
coffee production in the 1980s was intended to be an anti-capitalist action, today’s 
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purchase of Fair Trade coffee not only relies on – but also contributes to – the 
system’s preservation. In this way, if Fair Trade politics are to be compared to the 
international coffee brigades in any way, it should be in the form of a farce. It is a 
farce because even if Fair Trade might resemble the latter in many ways, and 
present its message along very similar lines, the intended economic and political 
effects are very different. As a consequence, Fair Trade offers a political project in 
which, under the guise of an ethical alternative to the unfair north/south divide, it 
simply works as a safety valve that channels opposition to the system through the 
very same means that the system has developed. As Marx (1992:247) asked and 
answered: “Why does history take this course? So that mankind may part happily 
with its past.” 
In what way, then, does Fair Trade make it possible to happily part with the past,
to leave behind more radical (often anti-systemic) forms of political engagement? 
It is precisely due to its farcical relationship to previous forms of internationalism, 
in which it vindicates the cause of transnational solidarity and engagement but 
attempts to operationalize it in a deeply transformed way, that Fair Trade can be 
seen as an invitation to overcome older, obsolete forms of political action that 
used to be informed by outdated ideals of radical transformation, and channel 
transformative synergies through new, updated means that do not challenge the 
system. Hence, this new form of political engagement raises the flags of previous 
struggles but reverses their consequences, as the Fair Trade mode of regulation 
and its structural forms do not pose any relevant challenge to conventional modes 
of regulation and regimes of accumulation. On the contrary, through its integration 
of opposition to the system, it helped pave the way for accumulation and 
maintaining the status quo. One could affirm that, in developing a system that 
relies on the very same structures and mechanisms that are at the root of social 
inequalities, Fair Trade simply contributes to solidifying their dominance because, 
as stated in one of the quotes that inaugurated my conceptual framework, the 
movement of history “is all the more governed by the logic of accumulation, the 
more the class struggle occurs in modalities that are compatible with the extension 
of commodity exchange” (Aglietta, 2000:67). At the end of the day, Fair Trade 
redirects the conflictive potential that originated in class antagonism towards a 
market-based and commodity-centered model of politics, thus diminishing any 
possible major disruptive effects.  
All in all, the Fair Trade initiative does not seem to provide a viable alternative for 
transforming the global inequalities derived from transnationalized commodity 
circuits, because its only aim is to keep marginalized producers and workers in the 
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game by making some improvements in their living conditions. This, of course, is 
better than nothing. However, its failure to tackle the very structure of social 
relations that produces (and reproduces) its marginalization has perverse 
consequences. The first is the futility of this struggle: if the causes of poverty and 
inequality are not solved, the only thing that Fair Trade can aspire to is alleviating 
the hardship – to lessen the suffering. The second consequence is the self-
defeating behaviors that this analysis has brought to the fore. Because even if Fair 
Trade activists attempt to produce some transformations or improvements, their 
acceptance of the most basic capitalist institutions and relations – that lie at the 
origin of the problems that are to be solved – end up eroding, subverting and 
undermining any attempts at progressive change. The third (and most perverse) 
consequence is the fact that Fair Trade ends up legitimizing the order of things, 
and therefore contributing to its preservation. However, this is not done in a 
straightforward way, because Fair Trade does not simply say “the system we have 
is good.” Instead, it denounces the system, declares it “unfair” and proposes a 
different path to follow. The problem is that this alternative path is no more than a 
new, friendlier head of the same monster. In this way, Fair Trade constitutes a 
false alternative that, since it is portrayed as an ethical option, presents the same 
old social relations under a new legitimizing light.  
3. Theoretical reflections 
Theoretically, this dissertation can be understood as an attempt to outline a 
renovated regulationist perspective that takes the original Parisian formulation as 
its point of departure and seeks to overcome its main weaknesses by 
complementing it with the work of the Amsterdam Project. Its most immediate 
goal was to provide a conceptual framework for the empirical research presented 
here. However, its ultimate aspiration is to make a theoretical contribution to the 
wider field of critical political economy.  
The proposed regulationist framework has not simply combined the two original 
perspectives; it has also critically appropriated them in various ways. While the 
French Regulation Approach provided the main pillars on which my conceptual 
framework was built, its main weaknesses were nevertheless highlighted: a 
relative neglect of agency, the reduced conceptualization of extra-economic 
dimensions and its fixation with the nation-state as the main scale of analysis. In 
order to overcome these problems, key concepts developed by the Amsterdam 
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Project were introduced, such as class fractions and class formation, 
comprehensive concepts of control, the transnational and hegemony. Furthermore, 
the sectorial dimension of my study demanded a reflection about adapting these 
macroeconomic theories to this new scale. In relation to the French Regulation 
Approach, this led to the discussion of the conditions of possibility and the 
characteristics of properly sectorial modes of regulations, regimes of accumulation 
and institutional forms, plus the development of a sixth structural form: the 
representation of the product. In relation to the Amsterdam Project, efforts to 
adapt its macroeconomic formulations involved reflecting on the implications of 
using the notion of a comprehensive concept of control at the sectorial level and 
the different forms in which it might relate to broader, hegemonic concepts of 
control. While it provided a fruitful way to deal with the main weaknesses of the 
French Regulation Approach, the Amsterdam Project was also critically 
appropriated, as it became necessary to overcome some of its limitations. This was 
done in two main ways. First, the concept of subalternity was introduced in an 
attempt to remediate the relative neglect and lack of theorization that subordinated 
class fractions have received in the original Dutch formulation. Second, a 
discussion of NGOs within a historical materialist framework was provided in 
order to face the challenge of accounting for actors with no obvious links to the 
structure of class relations. 
Applying the resulting conceptual framework to an empirical examination of Fair 
Trade made it possible to put forward an original and unprecedented perspective 
of analysis that sought to overcome some of the limitations of the current 
literature. In this way, it was possible to examine the ways in which Fair Trade 
attempts to structure socioeconomic relations, to compare them to the ones that 
dominate the conventional economy and to determine its concrete effects. 
However, the analysis was not limited to this more structuralist and economic 
dimension of Fair Trade, as the process of inquiry was further developed in order 
to explain the political processes and ideological elements that are responsible for 
the concrete socioeconomic outcomes identified. Consequently, this regulationist 
framework sought to overcome both the fragmentary and utilitarian tendencies 
that dominate the literature in a way that made it possible to account for Fair 
Trade’s multidimensional nature.  
From a broader point of view, this conceptual framework should also be 
understood as an attempt to move forward the development of the critical social 
sciences and, more specifically, political economy. When describing the present 
state of the critical social sciences, Žižek (2006:55) concluded that “the ‘pure 
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politics’ of Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière and Étienne Balibar (…) shares with 
its great opponent, Anglo-Saxon Cultural Studies and their focus on struggles for 
recognition, the degradation of the sphere of economy.” Denunciations against 
economic reductionism by cultural studies and post-structuralism have led to the 
prioritization of the study of culture, discourses and signs in isolation from 
material determinations, which has seriously reduced the scope and potentiality of 
social criticism (Rojek and Turner 2000; Sayer 2009). This “culturalist offensive” 
has had analogous effects in the field of political economy, where its vindication 
of the cultural dimension of economic life has been conducted at the expense of 
“reducing the economic systems to the lifeworld in which they are embedded” 
(Sayer 2001:687). As a consequence, attempts to develop political economy have 
been marked by ‘culturalism’, i.e., the reduction of all social (economic) facts to 
culture. While the advancement of critical political economy does indeed require 
serious engagement with the symbolic dimension of social life, this should not be 
done at the cost of denying the relative autonomy of economic social relations and 
the effects they produce in terms of constraints and opportunities. Within this 
background, the proposed regulationist framework should be welcomed as a 
double reaction: in the first place, as a reaction to the deterministic and 
economistic tendencies present in neoclassic economics and some orthodox forms 
of Marxism; in the second place, as a reaction to the culturalist variants of political 
economy that end up subsuming the specificities of the economy in the reign of 
language and discourse. The critical appropriation of the French Regulation 
Approach and the Amsterdam Project put forward here, I argue, makes it possible 
to examine economic phenomena, paraphrasing Gramsci, in its “integral sense”: as 
the complex totality of specifically economic, but also political, social, ideological 
and cultural processes.  
Theoretically, this dissertation sought to provide a fruitful conceptual framework 
for analyzing Fair Trade and developing its potential applicability to other 
empirical realms. Therefore, the theoretical perspective presented here can be seen 
as a possible path for the advancement of the original regulationist formulations 
and, hence, a contribution to the field of critical political economy.  
However, some of the developments presented here, while useful enough for my 
empirical analysis, would still require further elaboration in order to become 
relevant theoretical contributions. This can be said in relation to both the 
representation of the product structural form and the concept of subaltern classes.
In relation to the first, it must be admitted that the Regulation Approach still lacks 
the conceptual elements necessary for its further refinement. Therefore, my use of 
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this concept has been mainly empirically driven, lacking a deeper theoretical 
elaboration. By contrast, my attempt to conceptualize subaltern classes was 
characterized by a more important theoretical discussion. Nevertheless, in order to 
more fully develop this concept within the framework of a transnational historical 
materialist perspective (as the Amsterdam Project usually describes itself), more 
empirical research and analytical work will be needed to explore the subalterns’ 
internal cleavages, processes of class formation and, especially, their ability to act 
transnationally.  
4. Methodological reflections 
Methodologically, I developed a dialectical justification for the research design 
that guided my process of inquiry. By using a dialectical perspective, I attempted 
to explicitly reflect on the various levels of concreteness/generality at which the 
research process has operated, and to discuss the implications of this fact for the 
different phases of the project.  
In methodological terms, this dialectical approach offers a specific framework for 
understanding the limitations and potential of analyzing concrete cases. Going 
beyond dichotomic positions – singularizing and generalizing ones – I have argued 
that empirically examining a case provides both an entry point to some general 
aspects shared by other cases and concrete aspects that are unique to the case 
under examination. As a consequence, it becomes the researcher’s responsibility 
to determine which general and concrete aspects her/his case leads to, and to 
develop her/his analysis with this layered understanding in mind.  
Consequently, my research design was characterized by a sequence of moments 
that – even if all were necessary for the assessment of Fair Trade (in the case of 
wine produced in Argentina and consumed in the UK) – involved varying levels of 
generality. Thus different types of data (and different methods of data collection 
and analysis) became relevant for the various moments in my dialectical research 
process. This led to a plural strategy of data collection that relied mainly on in-
depth interviews with relevant actors and the collection and analysis of a variety of 
documents produced by Fair Trade organizations. Participant observation was also 
conducted when possible, though to a much lesser extent. These qualitative 
primary sources were complemented with quantitative ones, which consisted of 
statistical databases. Secondary sources were also important and came from the 
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academic literature. All these different types of data were used, analyzed and 
combined in different ways according to the different moments they contributed to 
in the overall research process, as was explained in Chapter 2.  
All in all, a dialectical understanding of carrying out a case study was particularly 
useful in my empirical analysis, as it made it necessary to identify the different 
levels of concreteness and abstraction at which I was working at each stage and, 
consequently, reflect on the level of generalizability or uniqueness of my 
conclusions. This made it possible to elaborate a more complex and accurate 
argument, which was capable of distinguishing how the different dimensions 
assessed were specific to the case under examination or common to the whole Fair 
Trade universe.  
Though the wide variety of data sources used was enough to accomplish the goals 
that guided my inquiry, this dissertation would have benefited from the possibility 
of obtaining data from “within” the most relevant Fair Trade organizations, 
especially Fairtrade International. Internal data could only be gathered for this 
analysis via secondary sources, but primary source data would have been 
important to reconstruct the internal processes that guide the governance of the 
Fair Trade sphere, and to explain how the relationships between different actors 
take place and are negotiated. Observation of board and general assembly 
meetings, and the work in the commissions that decide on standards and minimum 
price modifications, would have been particularly relevant. Unfortunately, due to 
lack of access, this could not be done.  
5. Future research 
The main conclusions presented in this dissertation – and the research process 
through which they have been achieved – signal possible paths for further research 
in order to enrich the state of the art both thematically (in the Fair Trade literature) 
and theoretically (in the field of critical political economy). In this last subsection, 
I present three possibilities: (1) deepening the conceptualization of (transnational) 
subaltern classes through a closer examination of Fairtrade Producer Networks; 
(2) a comparative analysis of the role of productive capital throughout the system 
in the form of a critical study of Hired Labor certifications and (3) a theoretical 
engagement of the regulationist perspective used here with Convention Theory in 
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order to better account for the concrete socioeconomic effects of Fair Trade’s 
“quality moment.”
1. This dissertation has provided a first attempt to develop the Amsterdam 
Project’s conceptualization of social class (fractions) in order to account for 
subaltern classes, their internal cleavages and their possibilities of class formation. 
The Amsterdam Project has argued that because subaltern groups are usually 
impeded from exercising their agency transnationally (as capitalist fractions much 
more easily do), they have received little attention within a framework that 
attempts to better understand the increasingly transnational nature of global 
capitalism. 
Future research on Fair Trade could thus be useful in the further conceptual 
refinement of “subaltern classes” within such a theoretical strand. This could be 
done by studying the three Fairtrade Producer Networks that bring together 
representatives of various Small Producer Organizations and Joint Bodies in 
Africa and the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean, respectively. These organizations, as it has been described, have 
improved their institutional representation and position within Fairtrade 
International in recent years, as they have not only become co-owners of the 
organization but also, more recently, have been made responsible for the provision 
of direct services to producers. In spite of these recent changes, producer networks 
have received little attention in the academic literature. In this dissertation I have 
argued that changes in FLO’s architecture have had little impact on the subalterns’ 
power within the organization; however, it would be relevant to examine the 
concrete dynamics that take place among subaltern groups within producer 
networks. Consequently, their examination could be enriching not only as a form 
of generating knowledge about a thus far unexplored phenomenon, but also as a 
driver of theory development. In this way, one could ask whether producer 
networks can offer grounds for the process of forming a transnational subaltern 
class, how different subaltern classes relate to each other, and the diversity of 
interests and hierarchical relations established between them. Given the fact that, 
as argued by the Amsterdam scholars, subaltern groups have few chances of acting 
transnationally, future research could examine producer networks as possible 
arenas for the transnationalization of subaltern groups and, in this way, contribute 
to the further refinement of the conceptualization of the subaltern classes.  
2. This dissertation used a class-based conceptual framework to question the 
north-south cleavage put forward by the Fair Trade geography. As a consequence, 
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it was able to identify (and highlight the contradictions associated with) the 
important presence of fractions of productive capital in the “south” – these are 
often major sectorial players and/or are connected to transnational circuits. This 
fact, unsurprising for many Fair Trade scholars, is much more obscure for 
ordinary consumers and the general public, who have no means of distinguishing 
whether the Fair Trade product they are buying comes from the property of a 
marginalized small producer from the south (as the FTCC narrates) or the 
plantation owned by transnational capital from the north.  
In the case of the Argentinean wine industry, it was possible to see that major 
fractions of transnational capital had much easier access to international markets 
and, in this way, were in a better position to profit from Fair Trade. When the 
examination became more general, the attention was turned to the process of 
negotiating minimum prices, where the presence of big plantations – with 
relatively lower costs of productions due to economies of scale – pushed minimum 
prices below the costs of sustainable production for small producers. In this way, 
the evidence presented here points to the fact that Fair Trade is not only benefiting 
conventional capitalist fractions but also that, in so doing, it undermines the 
possibility of improving the situation of subaltern classes.  
These findings, in addition to the fact that the creation of the Hire Labor 
certification has always been strongly contested by many actors and observers 
(CLAC, the Producer Network for Latin America being one of the most relevant 
examples), indicate the need for a global and systematic study of the presence of 
capitalist fractions certified as Fair Trade producers, the relative power and 
importance they have in the system vis-á-vis Small Producer Organizations and 
the effects that their participation in the system has on the position of Small 
Producer Organizations.  
3. Fair Trade is currently undergoing what Goodman et al. (2014) have defined as 
its quality moment, i.e., a historical phase in which the goal of mainstreaming has 
pushed the system to embrace the quality criteria that dominate conventional food 
networks (e.g., better taste, higher quality and packaging capable of conveying 
these attributes) at the expense of alternative representations – linked, for example, 
to solidarity with marginalized producers or an ethical commitment to their 
communities. In light of my empirical analysis, this quality moment came to 
reinforce the already-dominant tendency in favor of high quality in the 
international wine market; its main effect is the de facto exclusion of players 
connected to the value chain of table wine in Argentina. While the analytical 
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framework put forward in this dissertation was able to identify such a 
phenomenon, an in-depth exploration of the role of quality in the representation of 
Fair Trade products exceeds the scope of this project and the possibilities offered 
by its conceptual apparatus. Future research, hence, should examine in a 
comparative way the role played by “conventional” quality criteria in the 
representation of Fair Trade products and determine whether the Fair Trade 
quality moment also leads to the exclusion of the most marginal players, as was 
the case in the Argentinean wine industry.  
The previous literature on Fair Trade, as showed in Chapter 3, has already 
analyzed the way in which Fair Trade transforms/reproduces quality conventions 
in relation to certified products. This literature has convincingly described the 
symbolic and institutional impacts of the struggle for quality representations. 
However, it has been weaker in identifying the concrete socioeconomic effects 
that changing representations of Fair Trade products have had, and the structural 
constraints (posed by the Fair Trade system and conventional economic sectors) 
that have framed the emergence of such representations. In this way, it would 
seem appropriate to expect future explorations of the role of quality in the 
representation of Fair Trade products to transcend a narrow deployment of 
Convention Theory and commit to its articulation within a regulationist 
framework.   
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Annex: List of interviews 
Code Place Date Position Organization Description
AC1 Buenos
Aires
20082013 President InstituteforEquitable
Trade
LocalNGOthathasbeeninvolvedin
differentnoncertifiedinitiativesrelatedto
FairTrade,socialeconomy,etc.
AC2 Buenos
Aires
21082013 Boardmember AmartyaFoundation NGOworkingonsustainabilityissues.Ithas
aprogramtosupportresponsible
consumption
AFT1 Buenos
Aires
21082013 LiaisonOfficer FairtradeInternational FirstrepresentativeofFLOinArgentina
AFT2 Buenos
Aires
22082013 FormerFair
Tradeadvisor
forLa
Chileciteña
 WrotehismasterthesisonFairTradeinLa
Chileciteñaandlaterworkedforthemasa
FairTradeimplementer.
AC3 Buenos
Aires
22082013 Responsiblefor
FairTrade
project
FundaciónFortalecer Foundationthatbelongstothe
ArgentineanAgrarianFederation.Has
workedquitecloselywithFLOsincethey
gotaprojectfundedbytheInterAmerican
BankofDevelopmenttopromoteFair
Tradepractices.
AFT3 Mendoza 06092013 Manager PasoAltoWinery(HL) FairTradeofficeratPasoAlto
AFT4 Mendoza 07092013 Worker PasoAltoWinery(HL) Workerandpresidentofthejointbodyat
PasoAlto.
AFT5 Mendoza 10092013 Manager LaMarianaWinery(HL) FairTradeofficeratLaMariana.
AFT6 Mendoza 10092013 LiaisonOfficer FairtradeInternational HasrecentlybegunatFLO.
AC4 Mendoza 12092013 Directorofthe
MendozaSan
JuanRegional
Center
INTA(NationalInstitutefor
AgriculturalTechnology)
INTAisastateagencydedicatedto
researchandtechnologicaldevelopmentin
theareaofagriculture.
AFT7 Mendoza 13092013 Manager TresVientosWinery
(Trader)
MarketCoordinator:EuropeCanada
Africa.InchargeofFairTrade.
AFT8 Mendoza 13092013 Agronomist Uvasol(SPO)andFabretti
(Trader)
ImplementerandadvisorofUvasoland
FairTradeOfficeratFabretti.
AC5 Mendoza 16092013 Researcher INTA(NationalInstitutefor
AgriculturalTechnology)
Specializedinthesituationofsmallgrape
producersinMendoza
AC6 Mendoza 19092013 Marketingand
Communication
sManager
WinesofArgentina WinesofArgentinaisthesectorial
organizationthatpromotestheimageof
theArgentineanwineindustry
internationally
AFT9 Mendoza 24092013 Contratista Uvasol(SPO) 
AFT10 Mendoza 25092013 Contratista Uvasol(SPO) 
AFT11 Mendoza 26092013 Grapeproducer Uvasol(SPO) President
AC7 Mendoza 25092013 Manager COVIAR(Argentinean
VinicultureCorporation)
COVIARisthesectorialorganizationthat
administerstheWineFund.
AFT12 Mendoza 25092013 Manager MedranoWinery(HL) ExportManager
AFT13 Mendoza 26092013 Manager PalmerWinery(Trader) QualityManager.InchargeofFairTrade
AC8 Mendoza 27092013 Researcher INTA(NationalInstitutefor
AgriculturalTechnology)
InterestedinFairTradewithinthe"Value
addedprogram"
AFT14 Mendoza 30092013 Coownerand
general
manager
Fabretti(Trader) 
AFT15 Chilecito 15102013 Vicepresident/
grapeproducer
LaChileciteña(SPO) 
AFT16 Chilecito 15102013 Grapeproducer LaChileciteña(SPO) SmallProducer
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AFT17 Chilecito 15102013 Grapeproducer LaChileciteña(SPO) MediumProducer
AFT18 Chilecito 15102013 Worker LaChileciteña(SPO) FormermemberoftheJointBody
AFT19 Chilecito 15102013 Manager LaChileciteña(SPO) InstitutionalRelationsFairTradeofficer
AFT20 Buenos
Aires
04112013 Ownerand
manager
Ecowine(HL) FairTradeofficer
AC9 Buenos
Aires
05112013 Researcher INTA(NationalInstitutefor
AgriculturalTechnology)
InchargeofanagreementbetweenINTA
andFundaciónFortaleceronFairTrade
AC10 Buenos
Aires
05112013 President Interrupción NGOthatpromotesFairTrade(Working
withthecertificationIMO)
AFT21 Mendoza 18112013 Manager MedranoWinery(HL) FairTradeofficer
AFT22 Mendoza 20112013 Worker Ecowine(HL) Workerandmemberofthejointbody.
AFT23 Mendoza 20112013 Worker Ecowine(HL) Workerandmemberofthejointbody.
AFT24 Mendoza 20112013 Worker Ecowine(HL) Workerandmemberofthejointbody.
AC11 Mendoza 20112013 Manager Zuccardi CSRManageratthewineryZuccardi(IMO
certified)
AC12 Mendoza 21112013 President BodegasdeArgentina PresidentoftheNationalChamberof
Wineries
AFT25 Mendoza 21112013 Ownerand
manager
FincaAlentejo(HL) FairTradeofficer
AFT26 Mendoza 21112013 Worker FincaAlentejo(HL) Workerandmemberofthejointbody.
AFT27 Mendoza 22112013 Manager MendozaWines(Trader) Enologist.InchargeofFairTrade
AC13 Mendoza 27112013 Manager FosterWinery(non
certified)
QualityManager
AC14 Mendoza 27112013 Manager FosterWinery(non
certified)
Sales
AC15 Mendoza 27112013 General
secretary
FECOVITA(noncertified) Thisfederationofcooperativesisoneof
thebiggestwineriesinthecountry.
AC16 Mendoza 28112013 President ACOVI(Associationof
ArgentineanWine
Cooperatives)

AFT28 Mendoza 29112013 Manager LaMarianaWinery(HL) Memberofthejointbody.
AFT29 Mendoza 29112013 Worker LaMarianaWinery(HL)
AFT30 Córdoba 30112013 Auditor FLOCert FLOCertistheorganizationthatcontrols
theprocessofcertification
UFT1 London 20012014 Manager Herrmanns Wineimporter
UFT2 Banbury 20022014 Manager OriginalWine Wineimporter
UFT3 Reading 19022014 Manager Larex/LaChileciteña Wineimporter
UC1 London 20012014 Owner Ruta40 Argentinaspecializedwineshop
UFT4 Reading 26022014 BoardMember FairTradeSteering
Committee

UFT5 Manchester 02032014 Fairtrade
Strategy
Manager
TheCooperativist OneofUK'sbiggestsupermarketsand
leadingFairTraderetailer
UFT6 Manchester 02032014 Winebuyer TheCooperativist 
UFT7 London 08032014 Consumer InterviewmadeduringFair
Tradewinetasting

UFT8 London 08032014 Consumer InterviewmadeduringFair
Tradewinetasting
UFT9 London 08032014 Consumer InterviewmadeduringFair
Tradewinetasting
UFT10 London 08032014 Consumer InterviewmadeduringFair
Tradewinetasting

UFT11 London 08032014 Consumer InterviewmadeduringFair
Tradewinetasting

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UFT12 London 08032014 Consumer InterviewmadeduringFair
Tradewinetasting

UFT13 London 19102013 Productofficer
forwine
FairtradeFoundation TheFairtradeFoundationistheUK's
NationalInitiativerepresentedinFLO.
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